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ABSTRACT
Ngai Weng Chan
A contextual analysis of flood hazard management in Peninsular Malaysia
This research seeks to explain the creation and perpetuation of flood hazards in Peninsular
Malaysia in terms of a 'hazard response-in-context' model. Socio-political (socio-cultural and
political economy) and institutional contexts are found to be central to understanding hazards
as essentially socially-created phenomena superimposed onto a physical process system
through which hazards are transmitted.
Malaysia is an ex-colonial, newly-industrialising country. The pace of social, economic and
political change is fast, as is the pace of technological change. Other things being equal, these
are the contexts in which flood hazards are magnified. Contexts are changing, and changing
physical systems have given rise to increased flood risk, exposure and vulnerability. Other
contexts, largely structural, such as persistent poverty, low residential and occupational
mobility, landlessness, and ethnic culture have also contributed to increased vulnerability to
flood hazards.
The situation, behaviour and response of individual floodplain occupants in Peninsular
Malaysia are found to be heavily influenced by macro socio-political contexts. These are also
termed contextual forces and they are fundamentally 'structural'. Macro contexts also
'condition' institutions (meso context) and influence their approach to hazard management
including their effectiveness. Institutions (including organisations) were found to be largely
inadequate in their management and reduction of flood hazards, and can be improved to
create positive influences on flood hazard reduction as well as help individuals (micro
context) cope more effectively. Both socio-political and institutional contexts were found to
be important as they amplify hazards or fail to adequately address and reduce them. The
pioneering of what is termed 'segment analysis' to analyse links between contexts at various
levels is an important contribution in this research.
The research concludes that the hazard response-in-context model is appropriately applied to
Peninsular Malaysia as it handles both structural and institutional contexts and individual
management of flood hazards effectively.
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NOTES ON MALAYSIAN SPELLINGS, CURRENCY, ETHNICITY AND POVERTY
1. The spellings of place-names in the thesis is in accordance with current Malaysian
government policy to use the Malaysian rather than the colonial place-names. For
example, the English name for Penang is now officially Pulau Pinang.
2. The currency $ referred to throughout this thesis is the Malaysian Ringgit. In April
1995, $1 Malaysian Ringgit approximates £0.23 Sterling (i.e. £1 = $4.38).
3. In Peninsular Malaysia, Malays (comprising 55.3 per cent of the total population) are
considered the indigenous people. Together with the `orang ash' (aborigines) such as
the Sakai, Negrito, Jalcun, Senoi and other indigenous minority groups, they are
collectively known as `bumiputeras' or 'sons of the soil'. The orang ash i is a minority
group (0.6 per cent of total population) largely inhabiting the jungles of the hilly
interior and are not included in this research. In contrast, Chinese (33.9 per cent of
total population) and Indians (10.2 per cent of total population) were previously
immigrant communities and are classified as 'non-bumiputeras'. However, since
aborigines are not researched, the terms 'Malays' and 'non-Malays' (mainly Chinese
and Indians) are used throughout this thesis for socio-economic and other comparisons
instead of the commonly used tumiputeras' and 'non-bumiputeras'.
4. In Peninsular Malaysia, the 'poverty line' is defined as the monthly household income
level which generates a minimum level of food and other necessities. At 1989 prices,
it is estimated to be a household income of $350 per month, and the 'hard-core'
poverty line is defined as a monthly income of $175 (Utusan Malaysia 20.6.89).
These are the two figures used in framing the questionnaires at the beginning of this
research in 1991 and subsequently in the field survey in 1992/93. They, therefore,
form the basis on which income analyses are made throughout this thesis. However,
whenever necessary, reference is made on price fluctuations over the duration of the
research. Adjusted according to the consumer price index, the corresponding figures
at 1993 prices are approximately $394 (poverty level) and $194 (hard-core poverty
level) per month respectively.
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1	 AIMS
1.1	 Introduction
This research seeks to explain the creation and perpetuation of flood hazards in Peninsular
Malaysia in terms of a 'hazard response-in-contexts' model. Response at the individual
(household) level is analysed in the context of socio-political' (national/international) and
institutional' (organisational) forces3.
After more than half a century of hazards research, social scientists (especially geographers)
have evolved a considerable understanding of natural hazards from the viewpoint of human
ecological adaptation. Early deterministic views of natural hazards (White 1935) were
replaced by behavioural-oriented 'hazard response' models developed by North American
hazard researchers and dominated the field in the 1960s and 1970s (Burton et al 1978).
Towards the end of the 1970s, radical critiques of these dominant models, and new findings
and interpretations especially from the Third World, led to the emergence of the 'structuralist'
view of hazards which emphasised socio-political reasons for the creation and perpetuation
of hazards in poorly developed countries (Hewitt 1983a). Hazards may be viewed as
essentially socially-created phenomena superimposed on to a physical process system through
which hazards are transmitted (Blaikie et al 1994; Varley 1994). Recent critical philosophical
and theoretical development in hazards research has built on the structuralist interpretation
and has projected thinking towards a broader contextual view of hazards (Penning-Rowsell
et al 1986; Mitchell et al 1989; Palm 1990; Penning-Rowsell Forthcoming). This view makes
socio-political, institutional and other contexts central to understanding of hazards.
The current intellectual challenge in hazards research is to conceptualise the links between
I In this research, the 'socio-political context' includes the socio-cultural and political
economy contexts. These terms are elaborated in subsequent chapters.
' The 'institutional context' refers to legislation, organisational structures, attitudes and
sub-cultures, and policies and instruments relating to flood hazards. These are examined in
detail in subsequent chapters.
3 These are contextual forces closely linked to the contexts from which they originate.
The term 'forces', when mentioned in relation to the socio-political and institutional contexts,
is used throughout this thesis to refer to contextual forces.
1
the various models and this research attempts this through the development of a particular
'hazard response-in-contexts model'. This is an extension of the contextual model of Mitchell,
Devine and Jagger (1989) and incorporates both the behavioural and structural paradigms.
While previous hazards researchers have concentrated on parts of this 'model', this research
emphasizes the role of 'contexts' as central to understanding the flood hazard in Peninsular
Malaysia. Thus, the situation, behaviour and response of individual floodplain occupants in
Peninsular Malaysia is conceptualised as being heavily influenced by and in some cases even
driven by socio-cultural, political economy and institutional contexts. For instance, individual
flood hazard responses are often influenced and heavily constrained by institutional contexts
which either amplify hazards or fail adequately to address and reduce them. This view leads
to a critical analysis of institutions and the influences which they create, both positive and
negative. In turn institutions, as well as individuals and communities of individuals, are
subject to socio-political contexts which 'condition' them, 'condition' vulnerability to hazards,
and influence their approach to hazard management including its effectiveness. These socio-
political contexts are also termed 'structural' forces and they also lead to 'failures' to
adequately address hazards.
Malaysia is an ex-colonial, newly-industrialising country, with a high economic growth rate
and rising standards of living in recent years (Figure 1.1)5 . The pace of social, economic and
political change is rapid, as is the pace of technological change. Other things being equal,
these are the conditions in which we can expect flood and other hazards to be magnified
simply because rapid economic change can have dramatic effects on natural and social
processes (e.g. the hydrological cycle, floodplain development etc.). However, they are also
conditions which produce opportunities for flood hazard reduction. As well as economic
development, Malaysia is pursuing goals of sustainable development and social progress
embracing ethnic equity (largely in terms of income) and poverty reduction. Flood hazard
reduction has an important role to play in achieving these goals and may also benefit from
4 In this research, 'structural' forces refer to societal forces operating at the local,
national or international level. They include socio-cultural and political economy forces. The
structural paradigm/perspective is largely based on the influence of these forces. In contrast,
the terms 'structural' approach/measures/methods/schemes are concerned with flood defence
and refer to the technological/engineering approaches.
5 Malaysia comprises Peninsular Malaysia (previously Malaya before achieving
independence from the British on 31st August 1957) and East Malaysia (comprising the two
states of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo). This research concerns only the
former.
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Figure 1.1: Peninsular Malaysia: Political Divisions of States and Districts (Inset - The
State of Pulau Pinang).
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their achievement, and a critical assessment of flood hazard reduction policies and
achievements is therefore required. Two potential strategies of reducing flood hazards are
'flood warning and evacuation systems' and 'income equity', and these are examined in some
depth. These two strategies are important issues in the country's development and are viewed
as 'segments' of Malaysian society. They provide an ideal focus for examining the links
between macro socio-political contexts, institutions and individuals. Their investigation can
inform us not only about their current effectiveness in relation to flood hazard reduction, but
also about the influence/constraints which macro contextual forces, institutions and individuals
have on one another.
1.2	 Broad research questions
This research aims to examine the following broad questions:
1	 How important is the flood hazard and its effects in Peninsular Malaysia?
2	 What are the important contexts responsible for the creation and perpetuation of flood
hazard, and vulnerability to flood hazard in Peninsular Malaysia?
3 How and to what extent do the contexts of `socio-cultural' and 'political economy'
forces affect the creation and perpetuation of flood hazards, and condition the flood
hazard responses of individuals, communities (groups) and institutions?
4 As part of the context, how adequate are current strategies and policies of the
Malaysian government in managing the flood hazard, and to what extent do
institutions and organisations affect flood hazard response and how effective are they?
5	 How do individuals perceive and respond to the flood hazard, and what are the
important factors that affect such perception and response?
6 To what extent do (a) formal flood warning and evacuation systems and (b) official
policies on income equity address the flood hazard problem in Peninsular Malaysia,
and how can their analysis inform us of the importance of context upon individual
flood hazard responses?
1.3	 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 identifies the aims and the focus of the
research. Chapter 2 is an introductory chapter presenting an overview of the importance of
the flood hazard and its effects in Peninsular Malaysia, the trends and factors contributing to
increasing flood risk, exposure and vulnerability, and a detailed discussion of the research
methods. Chapter 3 presents a critical review of existing hazards research literature, with
4
special emphasis on flood hazard research. It briefly traces the development of hazards
research with contributions from geography as well as from other fields. Various
perspectives, paradigms and models of hazards research are examined and a flood hazard
'response-in-contexts' model is conceptualised for Peninsular Malaysia. Key contexts and
their facets affecting the flood hazard in the peninsula are also identified. Chapter 4 is an
empirical chapter. It analyses in detail the ways in which the two key contexts of socio-
cultural and political economy affect the creation and perpetuation of flood hazards. Chapter
5 examines in detail the influence of the key institutional context and its facets on the flood
hazard. A 'criteria approach' is employed to evaluate the effectiveness of flood hazard
institutions and organisations in managing flood hazards. Results of a questionnaire survey
of government officers and private practitioners dealing with the flood hazard are used in this
evaluation.
Chapter 6 investigates the reasons for persistent occupation of floodplains, especially those
influenced/constrained within contextual forces. It examines individual choice of settlement
and the constraints faced by floodplain occupants in choosing to move/migrate when faced
with flood hazards. Chapter 7 analyses flood hazard perception and response at the individual
level. Results of a household questionnaire survey are discussed. The chapter analyses the
significant factors influencing flood hazard perception and adoption of reduction strategies
of floodplain occupants. Chapter 8 focuses on what is termed as 'segment analysis'. Two key
segments representing key issues in Malaysian society relating to flood hazards are selected.
They are the flood warning and evacuation segment and the income equity segment. Both
segments are employed to examine the links between contextual forces and individuals, and
to demonstrate how contextual forces at various levels can affect overall flood hazard
response. Finally, Chapter 9 discusses the main findings and conclusions from this research.
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2 BACKGROUND AND METHODS
This chapter presents the background to this research. It comprises an overview of the flood
hazard in Peninsular Malaysia focusing on aspects of the natural and human use systems that
have contributed to increased flood risk and human exposure and vulnerability. It further
examines the extent of flood losses, critically reviews contributions to flood hazard literature,
and presents a discussion of the research methods.
2.1	 Background to flood hazard in Peninsular Malaysia
2.1.1 Introduction
In Peninsular Malaysia, the flood hazard is caused by a combination of natural and human
factors. Malaysians are historically a riverine people as early settlements grew on the banks
of the major rivers in the peninsula. Coupled with natural factors such as heavy monsoon
rainfall, intense convection rain storms, poor drainage and other local factors, floods have
become a common feature in the lives of a significant number of Malaysians.
Floods are the most common natural hazard6 faced by the inhabitants of Peninsular Malaysia.
The peninsula is located in a tectonically stable region between the Sunda and Sahul Shelves.
It does not experience intense earthquakes, volcanoes or other forms of earth movements,
although landslides are fairly common on a local scale. Furthermore, the peninsula is not in
the path of hurricanes or cyclones which can cause disaster. On the national scale, the flood
hazard accounts for almost the entire reported annual cost for disaster preparedness,
mitigation, relief and rehabilitation.
Compared with the floods in England and Wales which are typically mild and mainly
associated with damage to property rather than to loss of life (Neal 1989), or the floods in
Bangladesh which can be catastrophic in nature and result in the loss of thousands of lives
and major damage (Aysan 1993 p6), floods in Peninsular Malaysia lie somewhere between
these two cases. Floods occur annually in the peninsula causing damage to properties and loss
of life. It is useful to distinguish between 'normal' from 'major' flood events. 'Normal
6 The term 'natural hazard' has given rise to much debate. In the context of this thesis,
it refers to an event based in nature such as an earthquake, a flood, a drought, a volcanic
eruption etc. For a detailed definition see Appendix G.
6
floods' are seasonal floods which occur annually during the Northeast Monsoon Season
between November to March. During these floods the waters do not normally exceed the stilt
height of traditional Malay houses. Thus, people living in stilt houses' in the rural areas in
the East Coast8
 are well adapted to normal floods. It is the major floods, which are 'unusual'
or 'extreme' events that render them helpless. 'Major floods' also have their origins from
seasonal monsoon rains but statistically occur once every few years (although the historical
records show that they can occur in consecutive years, for example in 1970 and 1971 in
Pekan). These floods are extensive9 , severe and unpredictable and result in significant loss
of life, damage to crops, livestock, property, and public infrastructure (Winstedt 1927). In
a major flood, people's copine mechanisms are totally ineffective and they rely on
government relief for recovery. During major floods, a flood depth of 3 metres is not
uncommon and hundreds of thousands are often evacuated (see Table 2.2). Other
classifications such as 'flash flood', 'tidal flood', 'river flood' and 'monsoon flood' may be
grouped as normal or major floods depending on the severity (see Appendix G).
7 In many parts of rural Peninsular Malaysia floodplain inhabitants live in stilt houses,
a form of traditional flood proofing. See Figure 2.8 and Chapter 7 for an in-depth
examination of the role of stilt houses in individual flood hazard management.
8 Peninsular Malaysia may be divided into two distinct regions, viz. East Coast and West
Coast which are separated by a central mountain range (see Appendix F, Figure F.1).
Comparatively, the East Coast is largely undeveloped resulting from a century of colonial
neglect, deficient in natural resources and highly flood-prone due to its exposure to the annual
seasonal Northeast Monsoon winds. In contrast, the West Coast is highly developed, resource
rich, and contains the bulk of the peninsula's economic activities, population, cities and
infrastructures. It is seldom affected by monsoon floods except during 'extreme' events.
However, because of its rapid development and highly urbanised nature, it is affected by flash
floods.
9 It is not uncommon for a major flood to affect an entire state. For example, the 1971
major flood was described as 'nation-wide' affecting almost every state in the peninsula (see
Appendix I).
10
'Coping'm  may be defined as 'the manner in which people act within existing resources
and range of expectations of a situation to achieve various ends' (Blaikie et al 1994 p62). In
the case of floodplain occupants, it involves managing resources and choosing defence
mechanisms (flood reduction strategies) to survive and recover from flood hazards/disasters.
7
2.1.2 Natural conditions and the flood hazard
The monsoon winds have a profound influence on many aspects of life in the East Coast of
Peninsular Malaysia (Monteiro 1962). While the winds bring forth the much needed rains for
agriculture, particularly wet rice cultivation, they are also largely responsible for the seasonal
occurrence of floods. Floods can be viewed as an extreme event which is both a blessing as
well as a curse or as Parker (1991a) puts it:
'An interesting characteristic of extreme natural events is that they may be
productive resources and hazards at the same time'.
Flooding in the peninsula is both considered a hazard (loss of life and property) and a
resource (deposition of fertile alluvium on floodplains).
Peninsular Malaysia experiences a hot, wet humid equatorial climate regime in which the
most distinguishing feature is its heavy year round rainfall ranging from 1,500 mm to more
than 3,500 mm annually (Figure 2.1). More significantly, however, is the occurrence of
sustained heavy rain spells (sometimes for several weeks) during the monsoon season from
which a total rainfall of 610 mm within 24 hours is not uncommon (Malaysian National
Committee 1976 p561). Being located in the southernmost tip of the Asian Mainland, the
Malaysian peninsula is directly in the path of the seasonal monsoon winds. In particular, the
East Coast states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang and Johor (see Figure 1.1) are exposed
to cold surges of northeasterly winds between November to March (Cheang 1987; Chan
1989). During these months the monsoon winds which originate from the Asian interior bring
heavy rains to the entire East Coast as they are moisture-laden after crossing the South China
Sea and the Gulf of Siam (Figure 2.2). The seasonal floods in the East Coast are therefore
a natural consequence of these heavy rains occurring over a short period of time.
Furthermore, when the prevailing easterly winds cross the central mountain ranges of the
peninsula, they occasionally cause a 'spill-over' effect bringing heavy rains and subsequent
flooding to the West Coast as well. Sooryanarayana (1988) attributes the geographic location
of the East Coast states as the main reason for the occurrence of floods as they face the South
China Sea and are therefore exposed to onshore cold surges and monsoon disturbances which
bring heavy rainfall to the coastal belt and foothill regions. During these Northeast Monsoon
months, a monthly rainfall total of 500 mm is not uncommon (Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.2: Location of Peninsular Malaysia in relation to Monsoon Winds in Southeast
Asia
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In general, while localised flooding" is mostly due to convectional rain storms, most of the
extensive and severe floods in Peninsular Malaysia are associated with the onset of the
monsoon seasons. Seasonal floods caused by heavy rains during the Northeast Monsoon
period are termed 'monsoon floods'. Consequently, it is not surprising that in terms of flood
frequency and magnitude, the four East Coast states are the most susceptible to flooding,
each experiencing various magnitudes of flood occurrence almost every year (Table 2.1)".
Figure 2.4 illustrates the concentration of the flood events during the Northeast Monsoon
months from November to March.
While the Northeast Monsoon is largely responsible for the extensive floods in the East Coast
of the peninsula", the occurrence of the same phenomenon in the west coast is more
localised and associated with the Southwest Monsoon Season (May to September) and two
relatively short transitional periods known as the Inter-monsoon Seasons (April and October).
During the Southwest Monsoon Season, south westerly winds coupled with small intense and
short-lived squalls called `sumatras' bring rains to the west coast plains, particularly the west
coast of Pulau Pinang and the coastal areas of Kedah and Perlis (Chan 1990a). However, the
Indonesian island of Sumatra acts as a barrier and these winds do not normally cause large
scale floods (Malaysian National Committee 1976 p561) although floods occurring during this
period may also be termed 'monsoon floods'. The latter two inter-monsoon seasons are prone
to torrential rainstorms. During these two transitional periods when the monsoon winds
change directions, light winds and predominantly calm atmospheric conditions coupled with
hot and abundant sunshine give rise to intense convection currents which culminate in heavy
thunderstorms in the late afternoons (Chan 1990b). These thunderstorms have been shown
" Localised floods are usually flash floods in which the hydrograph shows a rapid
attainment of the peak flow (flood peak) over a short period. This could be due to a number
of reasons such as accelerated runoff as a result of land use changes, constricted river
channels caused by siltation and intense rainfall events such as convectional thunderstorms.
Such floods are usually of relatively short duration.
12 Table 2.1 is an arbitrary classification of flood types by the DID. According to DID
staff involved with compiling the annual flood reports (from which the table is constructed),
no fixed criteria are applied. Thus, the DID has no systematic definition of 'minor',
'moderate', 'major' and 'flash' floods and this ultimately limits the usefulness of this table.
13 During extreme events, the Northeast Monsoon may generate 'spill-over' effects across
the central mountain ranges on to the West Coast. A good example is the 1971 flood which
inundated the Federal Capital and other parts of the West Coast (see Appendix I).
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minor flood
moderate flood
nujor flood
flash flood
Key:
Table 2.1: Flood frequencies of different magnitudes in various states in Peninsular
Malaysia (Source: Drainage and Irrigation Department (DID) Malaysia. Definitions of
flood magnitudes are based on DID's estimate of the extent and severity of each flood)
tate
Year
Kedah Perlis Pulau
Pinang
Perak Bfgor Pahang T o ganu it,tan Negri
Bomb.
Melaka Johor Fed.
Tarr.
1925 - - * *** - - - - - - -
1926 ***
-
*** *** *** *** ***
- -
-
-
1931 - - *** - - - *** • - - -
1936 - • • - - - - - - _
1947 • • - •** - - • - - - - -
1948 - - - • • - - - - - - -
1949 a - - - - • • - - - _
1950 - - • - - - - _ - - -
1951 - - • • • - • - • - * -
1952 a
-
• • • - - - - • • -
1953 - - • • - - - - - - -
1954 a - • • - • *** • *** *** a** -
1955 - - - • • - - - _ • - -
1956 - - - • • - • - • - • -
1957 - - - • *** - ** _ _ - • -
1958 - - - • • • - • _ - - -
1959
-
- • • • • • • • - * _
1960 • a • • • • • • • • • _
1961 • • - • • • • • • • * _
1962 • • • • • • • • • - • -
1963 • - • • • • - • • - • -
1964 • • • *lb • • - - • - • _
1965 • • • ** • • *** *** • • • _
1966 • • • ** • • • • • * •
1967 ** • • *** • *** *** 1.1.• • • ***
1968 - - - - • • • • • • - -
1969 - -
.	 _
•
-
• • • _ - *** -
1970 • - - • • *** ** • - _ - -
1971 ** - *** • *** ••• •* •• *** - *a,* -
1972 • • • ** • *16 •. *** - *** - -
1973 • • - ii. • *** *** •** F - F
1974 • - F • r - lb* 1b41. • - -
1975 • - • • • • • *** • - • -
1976 • - •• - F - • *a _ - • _
1977 • - • - F • - • - - • _
1978 • - • - F • ••• • _ _ *** F
1979 - - - - - *** *** *** _ _ ** _
1980 - - - - - - - • - - • -
1981 - - - - - - - ** - - • -
1982 - - - - - • ** .41, - - • -
1983 - • - - - ** *** *** - - • _
1984 • - F • • • - .41 • ** • F
1985 l - • - • - - - • • • F
1986 F • r • • • *4*. •,". - - *a* F
1987 - - - • • ** •• ** - - *** -
1988 *** *** - - *** •••• *** .4, • a* F
1989 .	 _ • *** • - - *** *** ** • le* F
1990 ** • ** • - - • dial - - • -
1991 - - F - F • • • - - ** F
1992 a • i - - • - ** _ F *a* F
M13 * _ r - _ * * *** *** * * *** I'
13
•a-
Figure 2.4: Temporal distribution of floods in various states in Peninsular Malaysia
(After Sooryanarayana 1988)
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to be responsible for 'flash floods' in Kuala Lumpur (Water Resources Committee 1971),
Pulau Pinang (JICA 1990), Melaka (Leigh and Low 1983), Kedah (The Star 12.11.90) and
Perak (The Star 15.4.91).
Other than the usual monsoon and flash floods, lowly located coastal areas in the peninsula
are also susceptible to 'tidal floods'. These occur twice a month during neap tides and are
fairly predictable and mild. Consequently, they are not as serious as the former two types of
floods. However, tidal surges coinciding with heavy rainfall during the monsoon season can
exacerbate both flash and monsoon floods but the flood type is usually categorised as the
latter two categories and not tidal. In their accounts of flood causes in the peninsula, the
Malaysian National Committee (1976), Leigh and Low (1978) and Sooryanarayana (1988)
neither made any mention of tidal flood nor tidal surge. On the whole, the effect of tidal
surges do not appear to be significant in Peninsular Malaysia. However, sea level rise is a
global phenomenon and is a potentially important factor in assessing possible trends in flood
risk. Recent research on the Kelantan river basin, using the Goddard Institute for Space
Studies '2 x CO2 ' scenario, suggests that change associated with a mean temperature rise of
about 3-4 degrees celsius could generate an increase of about 9.0 per cent in river flood peaks
(Parry et al 1992). This research, which is based upon the analyses for the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climatic Change (IPCC) (1990), also indicates that the effects on sea level rise and
tidal flooding in Peninsular Malaysia could be significant. Considering the fact that 50.0 per
cent of the country's population live along the coastal zone, with several key cities and
industries, tidal flooding caused by sea level rise could become significant (Ch'ng 1993).
However, future temperature and sea level rise will depend upon international action in
reducing the input of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and this remains uncertain (Chan
and Parker Forthcoming).
Finally, the topography of the peninsula accentuates flood problems. The presence of broad
alluvial plains both to the east and west of the central mountain range results in most river
profiles with a typically flattened appearance. Furthermore, Quaternary changes in sea-level
and progressive sedimentation by the overloaded rivers have raised their base-levels
(Malaysian National Committee 1976 p562). This results in rapid runoff in the catchment
region and although flood flows are short-lived in the upper reaches, they increase in duration
considerably towards the coastal plains (Leigh and Low 1978 p49). Furthermore, the alluvial
plains on both the East and West Coasts of the peninsula comprise large expanse of tidal,
mangrove and freshwater swamps which are gradually being filled by heavy clay carried
15
down by the rivers. The low-lying swampy topography has resulted in drainage impedance
and this leads to frequent flooding. Thus, low-lying topography is as much a contributory
factor to frequent flooding in the coastal riverine areas as is heavy rainfall.
Flood-prone areas in Peninsular Malaysia have been mapped by the Drainage and Irrigation
Department (DID) on the basis of the extent of past floods. Figure 2.5' shows the
approximate distribution of flood-prone areas in the peninsula. Most of the extensive flood-
prone areas are located along the East Coast.
2.1.3 Flood losses
As a result of seasonal floods occurring almost annually in one part of the peninsula or
another, flood losses in terms of loss of life and damages to properties are substantial. The
annual costs incurred by the Malaysian government in flood disaster preparedness, rescue and
relief operations, and post-flood rehabilitation of victims and public utilities are substantial
(Chan 1993 p195). While loss of life due to flooding in the peninsula is not as severe as in
Bangladesh or some other countries, it is nevertheless significant (Table 2.2). Flood damages
are based on crudely estimated damage to crops and livestock, public structures and
properties, and interrupted activities and rescue and relief. The damage figures shown are
substantial and would be much higher if damage to private properties is included. Smith
(1985) has shown that potential flood damage in large urban centres such as Kuala Lumpur
can be high. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) estimated that the average
annual flood damage potential in the whole peninsula is about $72 million at 1982 prices
(approximately $92.2 million at 1993 prices) (JICA 1982 pP-14).
During past floods, few estimates have been made of damage to private properties, businesses
and industries. Survey results from the current research on actual flood losses of individuals,
private properties, businesses and industries reveal that they can be substantial (Appendix K).
Such losses comprise both direct and indirect losses as well as tangible and intangible
losses. The average losses per flooded household for the most recent and worse floods
experienced are $1,393 and $1,837 respectively (both at 1993 prices). These may not appear
to be high figures but bearing in mind that 46.9 per cent of households in the survey had
14 It is not known whether the mapping of flood-prone areas has been accurate and
therefore the identified flood-prone areas should be regarded as estimated and approximate
ones.
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Table 2.2 : Official flood loss estimates for selected floods in Peninsular Malaysia
Flood Event
(Year)	 (Place)
Damage
($ million
at 1993 prices)
Deaths Persons
Evacuated
1967 Kelantan R. Basin 199.3 38 320,000
1967 Perak R. Basin 154.5 0 280,000
1967 Terengganu R. Basin 40.2 17 78,000
1971 Pahang R. Basin 93.1 24 153,000
1971 Kuala Lumpur 84.7 24 NA
1979 Peninsular Malaysia NA 7 23,898
1982 Peninsular Malaysia NA 8 9,893
1983 Peninsular Malaysia NA 14 60,807
1984 Batu Pahat R. Basin 20.3 0 8,400
1986 Peninsular Malaysia NA 0 40,698
1988 Peninsular Malaysia NA 37 100,755
1988 Kelantan R. Basin 33.0 19 36,800
1991 Peninsular Malaysia NA 11 NA
1992 Peninsular Malaysia NA 12 NA
1993 Peninsular Malaysia NA* 22 17,000
NA = Not Available
* In the state of Kelantan, a total of 200 schools were closed during the 1993 flood resulting
in 113,000 students missing school for a total of between 6 to 11 days.
(Source: DID Malaysia and Malaysian National Security Council)
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monthly incomes below $500, these losses are significant. In the business damage survey, all
businesses suffered some form of losses. 58.9 per cent of businesses suffered losses more
than $1,000 during their most recent flood. Of more significance is the fact that 9.3 per cent
suffered losses greater than $10,000. Industrial flood damages are also considerable as
production shifts had to be stopped or run at less than full capacity, and there was damage
to goods and machinery. The current study on industrial damages reveals that damages vary
between $10,000 to $500,000 per factory, depending on the type and size of industry. A
detailed discussion of flood losses of households, businesses and industries based on survey
results of this research may be found in Appendix K.
2.2	 Human use of floodplains
The lure and attractiveness of the floodplain as a place of occupancy is well documented
(White et al 1958; Parker 1976; Smith 1992 pp230-1; Alexander 1993 p131). In Peninsular
Malaysia, it has been estimated that approximately 2.5 million people" live in floodplains
and are vulnerable to flood of varying probabilities (JICA 1982 pP-14). Floodplains are also
regions where a significant proportion of the peninsula's population and much of the
economic activity are concentrated (Leigh and Low 1978 p49). Table 2.3 indicates the extent
to which populations have settled on urban centres in the floodplain regions in the peninsula.
The three largest urban centres in the peninsula are located on floodplains and are susceptible
to frequent flooding. In addition, five of the top ten urban centres and more than half of all
urban centres are located on flood-prone areas. Urbanisation may well accelerate in the near
future as Malaysia pushes further towards goals of rapid development and income equity. The
Malaysian economy has grown by over 8.0 per cent per year from 1988 to 1993 and
indications and projections point to it at least maintaining that momentum over the medium
term (The Economist July 1994 p61). With such a rapid growth rate existing urban areas will
expand and many rural areas will be transformal. Also, the government's policy for greater
income opportunity and equity amongst the various ethnic groups may well force the
predominantly rural Malays to abandon their traditional padi" (paddy) farms and to move
15 Based on the country's annual average rate of population increase of 2.5 per cent
between 1982 and 1993 (Government of Malaysia 1991a p28), the total floodplain population
would be 3.3 million in 1993. This figure is expected to be higher if rural-urban and
international migration (mostly Thais and Indonesians) are taken into account.
Padi is the main food crop cultivated in Peninsular Malaysia. From it comes rice,
which forms the staple diet of Malaysians from all ethnic groups.
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Table 2.3: Rate of increase in the population of major urban centres located on the
banks of major rivers in Peninsular Malaysia between 1957 and 1990
Centre River 1957 1990 % Increase
Population Population
Kuala Lumpur(1)* Kelang 316,200 919,600 190.8
Ipoh(2) Kinta 125,800 293,849 133.6
Georgetown(3) Pinang 234,900 248,241 5.7
Johor Bahru(4) Johor 75,100 246,395 226.6
Kelang(6) Kelang 75,600 192,080 154.1
K. Terengganu(7) Terengganu 29,400 180,296 513.3
Kota Bharu(8) Kelantan 38,100 167,872 340.6
Kuantan(11) Kuantan 23,100 131,547 469.5
Melaka(12) Melaka 69,900 87,494 25.2
Alor Setar(15) Kedah 52,900 69,435 31.3
Muar(16) Muar 39,100 65,151 66.6
Batu Pahat(17) Batu Pahat 40,000 64,727 61.8
Keluang(20) Mengkibol 31,200 50,315 61.3
Teluk Intan(21) Perak 37,000 49,148 32.8
Sungai Petani(22) Merbok 22,900 45,343 98.0
Dungun(29) Dungun 12,500 28,903 131.2
Kulim(31) Kulim 17,600 26,817 52.4
Kemaman/Cukai(43) Kemaman NU 15,952 NA
Kuala Kangsar(45) Perak 15,300 14,539 -5.0
Mersing(48) Mersing NU 13,888 NA
Pasir Mas(50) Kelantan NU 13,402 NA
Tangkak(52) Tangkak NU 13,251 NA
Kota Tinggi(53) Johor NU 13,056 NA
Ampang(54) Kelang NU 12,987 NA
Kuala Krai(57) Kelantan NU 12,607 NA
NU = Non urban NA = Not Applicable
* Figures in brackets indicate the ranked position of urban centre in terms of total population.
(Source: Karim 1990 p78-9)
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into jobs in urban centres. According to Mahathir Bin Mohamad (1970 pp107-14), the current
prime minister, the Malays must be urbanised and encouraged to migrate to urban centres
(mostly dominated by Chinese), to stand any chance of catching up with the other ethnic
groups.
All of these impending developments will undoubtedly lead to further swelling of urban
population, thereby exacerbating the pressures for floodplain encroachment in urban centres
located on or adjacent to floodplains. The rate of urbanisation in the peninsula has increased
more than four fold from 10.7 per cent in 1911 to 44.7 per cent in 1990, and the number of
urban centres has also increased more than eight fold (Table 2.4). For example, the federal
capital of Kuala Lumpur is expected to merge with the nearby urban centres of Petaling Jaya,
Shah Alam and Kelang into a continuous conurbation stretching the entire length of the
Kelang River valley by the year 2020 (Figure 2.6). It is expected that the total urbanised area
in the Kelang valley would be about 44.0 per cent in the year 2005 but the middle section of
the valley around this conurbation would be 80.0 per cent urbanised (JICA 1989 pD-17).
There are many reasons why floodplains have been preferred locations for early settlements.
The peninsula comprises numerous rivers and a central mountain range flanked by flat
marshy swamp-land near the coastline. The early settlers must have found the floodplains
between the mountain range and the marshy swamps suitable for agriculture and easily
accessible by river. As a result, early Malay settlements grew rapidly on the banks of rivers,
particularly at their confluences and estuaries (Plates 2.1 and 2.2). It is not surprising,
therefore, to find that most of the major cities and towns in Peninsular Malaysia are located
near to or just beside the major rivers (Figure 2.7).
Despite susceptibility to frequent flooding, floodplain occupation has progressively increased.
This is because the social, economic and other benefits of inhabiting and using floodplains
are often perceived to outweigh the negative effects of flooding (Alexander 1993 p131).
Floodplain encroachment has become more and more difficult to control. Floodplains are
continually enriched with deposits of fertile alluvium and soil moisture for agriculture, most
notably for padi. Such alluvium is impermeable and ideally suited for wet padi cultivation.
Furthermore, as floodplains are never too far from rivers the availability of irrigation is an
added bonus for agriculture. Irrigation has enabled padi to be cultivated twice a year (Chan
1991a). In the early days of settlement when roads were few and far between, communicating
through the thick equatorial forest between settlements was difficult. Consequently,
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Table 2.4: Increasing rate of urbanisation in Peninsular Malaysia, 1911 to 1990
Year Total
Population
Percentage
Urban
Number of
Urban Centres
1911 2,339,000 10.7 8
1921 2,907,000 14.0 14
1931 3,788,000 15.1 16
1947 4,908,000 15.9 20
1957 6,279,000 26.6 36
1970 8,810,000 28.7 49
1980 11,473,000 37.5 68
1985 12,968,000 41.1 NA
1990 14,605,000 44.7 NA
NA = Not Available
(Source: From Ooi 1979 and International Law book Services 1991)
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Figure 2.6: Future expansion of urbanised areas in the Kelang River Basin (After JICA
1989)
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Plate 2.1: Location of Pekan Town (foreground) on the southern bank of the Pahang
River and that of Pulau Pekan Baru (background) in the shallow waters of the same
river
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Plate 2.2: Top: The federal capital of Kuala Lumpur was founded at the confluence of
the Gombak and Kelang Rivers. This area is now the Central Business District of the
city. Bottom: A lower section of the Kelang River showing embankment of the channel
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settlements flourished beside the major rivers because of the ease of riverine communication
and transport. Today, although river communication has declined considerably due to the vast
improvement in roads and railways, many rural settlements still depend on it. Rivers also
serve as the main source of domestic water supply. The headwaters of many rivers in the
peninsula are used as catchment areas and many are dammed as reservoirs. Some examples
are the Kelang gates Dam on the Kelang River and the Kenyir Dam on the Terengganu River.
Rivers also provide a basic form of rich protein from fisheries and edible freshwater plants.
As padi farming usually involves only two months of intensive work during the year, farmers
are left with plenty of time to get involved in supplementary income generating activities.
Fishing is one such activity.
Towards the mid-19th Century tin mining became an important economic activity in the
peninsula. It was also an activity which exacerbated the flood hazard as forested land was
cleared for mines, the disposal of tailings caused siltation of rivers, and abandoned mines
increased rates of erosion (Leigh and Low 1978). Miners discovered that many floodplains
of the peninsula, notably the Kinta and Kelang Valleys contained rich deposits of alluvial
tin' washed down from the foothills. This created a 'tin rush' which sparked an influx of
immigrants, notably Chinese into the peninsula. Not only did the immigrants build settlements
on the floodplains but also around the mines. In fact, some of the major urban centres in the
peninsula today originated as mining towns. They include the two largest cities Kuala Lumpur
and Ipoh, and Seremban, Taiping, Ampang, Kampar and others. Some properties adjacent
to riverine areas may also command high property values because of their locational values.
Such is the case of properties in and around the confluence of the Kelang and Gombak Rivers
in the heart of Kuala Lumpur. Finally, in much of the peninsula a combination of population
pressures (due to population increase and rural-urban migration) and rapid development in
urban centres has forced many people to inhabit the more hazardous zones not previously
occupied on the floodplain.
To the indigenous Malays whose ancestors have lived on the floodplains for centuries, floods
have become an integral part of their history and culture. This is especially so in the case of
rural Malay peasant farmers and fishermen who regard seasonal flooding as something to be
expected and as part and parcel of their life. Living on floodplains is second nature to them
17 It was the discovery of rich alluvial tin deposits in the early 19th century that triggered
off 'in-migration' of the Chinese from China and later of the British intervention in the Malay
peninsula which led to almost three-quarters of a century of British colonial rule.
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and cohabiting with the flood risk for long periods has made them well adapted to the flood
hazard. A good example of the traditional 'natural style' adaptation to floods that has evolved
through the centuries amongst Malay society is the 'stilt house' (Figure 2.8). Living in stilt
houses enables most families to cope reasonably well with 'normal floods', i.e. those with
flood depths below the height of the stilts. It is this, amongst other reasons, which largely
accounts for their reluctance to leave the flood-prone area and relocate elsewhere, despite
encouragement by the government (Chua 1972).
The above discussion demonstrates that a combination of natural flood-producing mechanisms
and human-use of floodplains has resulted in increased risk and exposure to floods in
Peninsular Malaysia. While 'risk' may be defmed as the probability and other physical
characteristics of hazards, it is essentially a product of hazard and vulnerability as 'there is
no risk if there are hazards but vulnerability is nil, or if there is a vulnerable population but
no hazard event' (Blaikie et al 1994 p21). Heavy monsoonal and convectional rainfall, flat
topography on both coasts, heavy siltation of rivers, and human activities have all contributed
to high flood risk. Risk is increasing because flood characteristics are changing due to rapid
urbanisation of catchments (Yaziz and Sulaiman 1985; Friends of Penang Hill 1991;
Hamirdin 1992). Deforestation and other environmentally damaging human land uses have
also significantly altered hydrological parameters. Research has revealed that significant water
yield increases occur after deforestation (Abdul Rahim 1988, 1990; Abdul Rahim and
Harding 1992), and that commercial logging resulted in significant increases in storm flow
volume and initial discharge (DID 1986). Other human activities such as tin mining have also
contributed to flooding. Climatic change inducing sea level rise may also be an important
flood inducing mechanism which can increase future flood risk (Parry et al 1992). Flood
reports for the period 1925 to 1992 (see Table 2.1) also suggest that flooding has become
progressively more frequent, with flash floods mainly affecting the federal capital and Pulau
Pinang. Flooding magnitudes have also appeared to have increased since the 1970s (a period
of rapid economic development) in the East Coast states. The physical contexts of floods
have, therefore, changed. Together with greater exposure and vulnerability of human
populations (see below), it has contributed to increased flood risk.
'Exposure' is a measure of the population at risk. As the peninsula's major cities grew they
spilled onto floodplains progressively increasing flood exposure (Chan and Parker
Forthcoming) and flood damage potentials (Figure 2.9). Some prominent examples are the
rapid development of the Kuala Lumpur-Petaling Jaya-Shah Alam-Kelang conurbation and
28
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rapid industrialising Georgetown. Expansion in existing urban areas (the majority of which
are already on floodplains) due to population expansion and rural-urban migration have also
forced people to inhabit the more hazardous parts of existing floodplains. A 'classic' result
of urban encroachment of floodplains is the growth of a large squatter population in the major
urban centres (Wan Abdul Halim 1982).
If 'vulnerability' is defined as 'the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their
capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural disaster'
(Blaikie et al 1994 p9), then Peninsular Malaysia is a prime example where increased
vulnerability is found. The outstanding feature of the peninsula is its wide disparity in
regional development (mainly between the East Coast and West Coast states) and its
extremely variegated ethnic mix which also exhibit significant differences in incomes. Those
who find it hardest to recover from a flood disaster and reconstruct their lives are the most
vulnerable, and these are generally the poor. And because those who occupy floodplains are
the poor (comprising peasant farmers and fishermen in rural areas and squatters in urban
areas), they are the most vulnerable (see Chapter 6). Thus, the poverty syndrome is directly
related to vulnerability (Davis 1978 pll, 1981 p14). Increased vulnerability to flood hazards
in Peninsular Malaysia, therefore, is caused fundamentally by poverty and is persistently
reinforced by increased flood risk and exposure. Vulnerability, however, should not be
simply equated with poverty. There are other causes such as class, caste, gender, ethnicity,
disability, and age or seniority, and vulnerability is produced by a combination of these
factors and the economic resilience (i.e. access to resources and poverty) of people (Blaikie
et al 1994 p9; Cannon 1993; Cannon 1994 p27). Nevertheless, many would agree that, in
practice, it is the poor who suffer the most in a disaster (Cuny 1983; Davis 1984a; Varley
1994), and flood disasters may be found at the interface between flood hazards and vulnerable
conditions (Davis 1984b p6). A detailed examination of how the natural and the human use
systems have contributed to increasing flood risk and human exposure and vulnerability in
four selected study areas in the peninsula may be found in Appendix E.
2.3	 Methods
This research adopts the triangulation strategy by engaging a combination of complementary
research methods which includes the 'cultural insider' observer approach (i.e. by the author),
historical analysis, institutional analysis using the 'criteria approach', quantitative and
qualitative surveys and case studies. The 'cultural insider' approach involves asking research
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questions as an 'observer-participant'. It is employed in the analysis of government,
institution and individual response to the flood hazard. Historical analysis is used to study
how broader socio-political contextual forces have created and perpetuated the flood hazard.
Institutional analysis is based mainly on the criteria approach but some observer participation
was also used in evaluating flood hazard institutions and organisations (both quantitative
questionnaires and qualitative interviews are administered to government officers). The case
study method is employed to study individual/household perception and response. In this
method, both quantitative and qualitative surveys are used within each of four selected case
studies. The merits and demerits of each method are outlined in Table 2.5 and examined
below.
The employment of more than one research method to approach a research question, or
'triangulation', is becoming increasingly common (Fordham 1992 p88). Triangulation is now
a preferred research strategy and is recommended in the literature because of its advantage
of possessing the merits of all methods adopted while simultaneously reducing the demerits
inherent in them (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992 p197; Denzin 1970; Marshall and
Rossman 1989). In this way, triangulation contributes to the overall effectiveness of the
study. The various research methods adopted are complementary rather than contradictory
because different areas/objectives in the study are better tackled by some research methods
than others.
2.3.1 Perspective and interpretation as a 'cultural insider'
It has been said that 'all social science research begins and ends with observation' (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias 1992 p199). The observational method, whether an insider or not,
is often used in social science research such as social anthropology (Spradley 1980),
sociology (McCall and Simmons 1969; Jorgensen 1989) and psychology (Ekman 1957; Weick
1985). Ethnographic fieldwork requires the researcher to live and work in the conununities
being studied. The researcher has to participate in activities, ask questions, eat strange foods,
learn new languages and watch ceremonies. In geography, although direct observational
methods are indispensable to physical geographers, human geographers have not used them
extensively. This is true of the sub-branch of natural hazard studies in geography which has
been criticised as overly dependent on the quantitative questionnaire survey (Torry 1979a
p369). However, some hazard researchers have employed observational methods as a
supplementary to basic questionnaire survey. For example, Ramachandran and Thakur (1974)
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Table 2.5: Principal research methods and their main merits and demerits
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used a research strategy combining careful field observation with intensive interviewing to
study flood response in India. Heijnen and Kates (1974) also drew on observations when the
former spent several years of intensive work and study in Northeast Tanzania.
In this research, familiarity and deep understanding of Malaysian culture in terms of its
history, politics, government set-up, and its multi-racial society is a methodological strength
brought by the author. In the interpretation of events and response to the flood hazard, the
author does so, not just as a member of Malaysian society, but also a government officer
drawing upon seventeen years of experience in government service. This experience serves
well as a vehicle of access to many government reports, interviews with senior government
officials and other avenues. Attachment at the federal DID, various state DIDs and the
Malaysian Meteorological Service (MMS) also helped in many ways in the collection of data
and the evaluation of each organisation. The author was attached to the federal DID in Kuala
Lumpur for two months and in the Kelantan, Pulau Pinang and Pahang state DIDs for shorter
periods ranging from two weeks to a month each. He was also attached to the MMS for a
month. The aim of these attachments was to observe and study each organisation. As the
author was treated as a member of staff (albeit on a temporary basis) he can observe the
functioning of each organisation. Of more significance are the casual discussions with staff
of middle and lower management during coffee and lunch breaks. These discussions usually
bring out revealing responses from the staff as they are more open to talk about their
grievances and opinions of their organisation and other related organisations. There is simply
no fear of being victimised by their superiors. Under the constraints of an official interview,
responses from them are bound to be rather subdued and thus do not represent the real
scenario. First hand experience and observation was also gained when the author spent three
months living in a Kampung Tendong, a remote village near the Kelantan river from
November 1992 to January 1993 during which time flooding occurred twice. Other than these
advantages there are other merits in using the observation and interpretation of a cultural
insider.
One important merit is that the cultural insider's conception of reality is not directly
accessible to aliens, outsiders, or non-members, all of whom necessarily experience it initially
as a stranger (Schultz 1967). It is not possible to acquire a small section of the cultural world
of the insider until one has learned the language and understood the culture. This is the
greatest merit of the insider approach. Without insider knowledge, the researcher has to go
to great lengths before beginning to study the insider's world. Davis (1981 p21) recognised
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the dangers of cultural detachment which face research workers from western developed
countries working in the Third World. These researchers often fail to grasp the realities of
local cultures and are too ready to project western values, often resulting in a vast gulf in
terms of academic elitism, language barriers, geographical remoteness and income levels of
consultants vis-a-vis local families. Cultural collisions between upper class disaster workers
and lower class disaster victims have also been noted by Oliver (1981). To overcome this
problem, outsiders have to study the local culture before embarking on the research proper.
For instance, Hayano (1982) had to learn to play poker and later become a professional poker
player as part of his participant observational investigation of poker players. Another
researcher, Douglas became a nude beacher in order to study the nudists but later reversed
his role when he participated as a member of the home owners's association opposed to the
nude beach (Douglas et al 1977). In the case of the current research, there is no such
problem. As an informed member of the culture under study the author uses this advantage
to effect in the analysis of many aspects of the flood hazard in the contexts of the historical,
socio-cultural, political economy and institutional forces. Living amongst the flood victims
certainly helped to deepen his understanding of how individuals in the peninsula perceive and
response to the flood hazard. This 'observer-participant' role is made more relevant in the
context of this research as it draws upon 20 years of academic experience with numerous
publications on hazards research and a Masters thesis on the drought hazard in Peninsular
Malaysia (Chan 1981a).
Another important merit of the method is its directness, which makes it possible to assess
behaviour as it occurs. During a flood event, people's behaviour actually occurs in real life,
that is in their natural settings. The method is also ideal for certain groups of people who are
unable to give responses to interviews satisfactorily, either through physical handicaps, lack
of verbal skills, shyness or failure to understand the questions asked. This is the case in many
of the kampung (village) areas where many of the respondents are the aged who have
hearing, verbal and other physical communication disabilities. In Kelantan, the local dialect
is profoundly different from the Bahasa Malaysia (Malaysian national language) spoken in
other parts of the peninsula. This becomes a major constraint during interviewing".
Familiarity with the local area is also an added advantage for the cultural insider. This
" In Kelantan, the author took nearly a month to get familiar and conversant in the
Kelantanese dialect although he already has a good command of Bahasa Malaysia. Naturally,
the interviewers employed in the Kelantan study area were Kelantanese.
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familiarity makes it easy to gain accessibility to the most remote `kampungs' (villages) which
are not accessible by modern transport. For instance, the biggest problem when interviewing
remote kampung folks is not refusal but the difficulty in which their houses could be reached.
For example, the areas in and around Kampung Tendong (Kelantan) can only be reached by
bicycle and motor-cycles or on foot. Another case is Kampung Pulau Pekan Barn (Pekan)
which is only accessible by boat. Without knowledge of the local area it would be difficult
to gain access into this kampung.
The insider method is, however, not without demerits. One which is commonly stated is that
such a form of research is not suitable for studying large populations, which is better
addressed by quantitative surveys (Jorgensen 1989 p13). The method is also not suitable for
evaluating causal relationships between variables, especially if multiple variables are studied
and testing the hypotheses require some form of statistical functions. Furthermore, if abstract
variables such as perceptions or attitudes are studied, observation is almost impossible. In
such cases it is necessary to include one or more other research methods such as a
quantitative survey or an experiment to supplement the qualitative observations of the insider.
Perhaps one of the more common demerits of the insider that can blur the phenomenon
studied is 'cultural blindness'. Often, the insider can be 'blinded' by prejudiced opinions,
rigid ways of doing things, over-zealous feelings for the organisation in which he/she is a part
of and others. Certain aspects of the insider's culture could be taken for granted, as he/she
may not quite appreciate their significance because of being too close to the subject.
Consequently, his/her views may not be as objective as that viewed from outside, as for
example that of an outsider's. One example is the issue of equity in which the Malaysian
government is practising a policy of 'positive discrimination' in order to bring the standard
of living of Malays and other `bumiputras' (see notes on pxx) up to the level of the other
ethnic groups, notably the Chinese and Indians. As this issue is taken for granted and
discussion or debate prohibited (except amongst the component parties of the National Front
within closed doors), the insider may not appreciate its significance when evaluating flood
hazard responses. When the insider is from the group discriminated against, then the effect
of cultural blindness can be more pronounced. Furthermore, the insider can be from any one
of the ethnic groups and must avoid any prejudice towards the other groups if the study is
to be free from cultural bias.
Another demerit of the insider method is the constraints on the insider when attempting to
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evaluate the organisation in which he/she is a part of. While constructive criticism can be
good for the organisation, it can also be misconstrued as damaging and the insider can be
penalised for it. Within this constraint of fear of reprisals the insider is unlikely to be as open
as would an outsider in his/her critique of the organisation. Observing and assessing an
organisation without the organisation's knowledge may pose ethical problems. It is a question
of professional ethics to let the organisation know about the insider's intentions and
'observing without telling' can be treated as a serious offence of which the insider can be
penalised.
Finally, constraints in ethnic sensitivities also prevent the insider from openly criticising
government policies related to ethnicity as this may stir up animosity amongst the various
ethnic groups. The May 1969 racial riots were the result of the explosion of such
sensitivities. To prevent such a tragedy from ever repeating itself, the government amended
the Internal Security Act (1960) in 1969 to ban open discussion and debate on sensitive ethnic
issues.
2.3.2 Historical analysis
Almost all geographical research uses historical analysis in one way or another. This is not
just because history affects the present but also because historical data such as census records,
existing land use maps, published reports, government files, and the existing literature are
all used to some extent in research. There are basically three approaches to historical
analysis: historism, historicism and historicalism (Harvey 1990 p215). While historism
approaches history as essentially factual and ignores the role of the interpretative researcher,
historicism and historicalism see history as an interpretative process'. Critical historical
analysis is, therefore, not just a matter of reconstructing history by digging through archives
or libraries to locate the facts and events of history, but is an active interpretative process
whereby existing archival material and other historical evidence' are assessed and evaluated
in relation to the present. This second approach is adopted in this research.
19 'Historicism' sees the past as being reconstructed from the standpoint of the present.
`Historicalism' argues that past and present mediate one another (Harvey 1990 p215).
20 Both primary historical records/archives as well as their secondary versions (ie reports
derived from original primary records) are used in this research.
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Torry (1979a p369) has advocated that historical reconstructions exhibit some first rate
discussion illuminating the social adjustments to hazards that various societies have made in
the past. Much of the work on historical analysis in hazards research takes after the Marxist
approach. In his analysis on 'Capital' Marx (1887, 1894), has adopted what is essentially a
'structural historicism' approach. Coincidentally, the emergence of the structural paradigm
in hazards research saw researchers employing this approach. For instance, Watts (1983) used
a historical analysis to research the case study of drought hazard in northern Nigeria. His
analysis revealed the importance of the historical perspective in understanding Hausa peasant
society as significant cultural and artistic forms of the hazard are reflected in praise epithets,
folk tales, fables and historical anecdote. Furthermore, the history of Nigeria is closely tied
to colonial influence which not only exploited and impoverished the economy but more
significantly also changed modes of production and in the process increased vulnerability to
drought. Admittedly, colonial integration eroded pre-capitalist elements in the economy and
changed the adaptive capability of Hausa communities to such an extent that they became less
and less capable of responding to and coping with drought. This study has shown that the
drought hazard along the West African desert (at least in northern Nigeria), can only be
understood from the historical perspective and is an important pointer to understanding flood
hazard in Peninsular Malaysia.
There are many merits of historical analysis. It is an important investigative method in hazard
models of the structural paradigm and those relating to hazards-in-context, especially in
developing countries with a culture closely tied to a particularly hazard and an economy
previously under colonial exploitation. In terms of hazards-in-context, although much is
known about the endogenous aspects of hazard systems (factors linking hazard components
such physical processes, human exposure, perception, adjustments and losses), there is a
dearth of research on contexts of hazard that are created by the interaction of exogenous
factors and hazard components. Exogenous factors such as indigenous cultures, pre-colonial
production systems, colonial exploitation and other historical perspectives are best approached
via historical analysis. Easy access to archival records, census data, government reports and
other published materials is another merit. Besides, such a method allows the researcher to
work in libraries and archives which are open to the public.
One demerit is that the accuracy of the analysis depends on the accuracy of the historical
records. There is no sure way of telling when a certain record is true and when it is not.
History is written by different people with different background, ideology and even loyalties.
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Thus, an English writer is unlikely to severely condemn British exploitation of Malaya's
economy as a Malaysian writer would, even though impartiality on the part of academics is
advocated. This bias of western historians against the anti-colonial feelings of their local
counterparts can distort analysis to a considerable degree. The culture of confidentiality in
many government departments may also become a disadvantage as official records are
classified and made unavailable to the researcher. Examining archives and historical records
is an arduous task demanding the greatest patience. The process is tedious and slow. For
instance, the Malaysian Archives allows a researcher to order only four documents at any one
time. A certain amount of time is also wasted as there is a time lapse before the documents
are located and brought to the researcher. Although quantitative data are obtained and used
in historical analysis, there is no denying that the method is inherently qualitative. In this
respect, it cannot derive objective statements or inferences on predictive characteristics in the
way quantitative methods can.
2.3.3 Institutional analysis
The role of flood hazard institutions is vital in flood hazard management. In the United
Kingdom, researchers have developed institutional analysis to study their effectiveness
(Penning-Rowsell et al 1986). Although several methods or approaches can be used in the
assessment of the adequacy of flood hazard institutions, the criteria approach is common.
This method of evaluating the adequacy of institutions (flood hazard or otherwise) based on
multiple criteria was originally used in assessing water institutions in the 1960s and 1970s
(Fox and Craine 1962; Craine 1969). Other general water management studies which have
used the same approach include Mitchell (1971), Barr (1973), Olcun (1977), Porter (1978),
Parker and Penning-Rowsell (1980), Sewell et al (1985) and Parker and Sewell (1988). In
assessing the adequacy of flood hazard institutions. Penning-Rowsell et al (1986) and Parker
and Penning-Rowsell (1991) have also used the approach.
The criteria approach is based upon a number of predetermined criteria which are perceived
by the investigator as the best representation of the 'fitness' or `purpose' of institutions. The
criteria chosen are based on a priori expectations of institutions. There are no hard-and-fast
rules about the number of criteria, although generally, the greater the number of criteria the
more thorough and rigorous is the evaluation. For instance, in evaluating water institutions
in England and Wales, Parker and Sewell (1988) used nine criteria or what they termed
'evaluative themes'. In another study, Penning Rowsell et al (1986) used ten evaluative
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criteria in their evaluation of British flood hazard institutions. And, in evaluating water
resource management institutions in twenty countries, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (1989) has used a total of thirteen criteria.
The criteria approach is inherently judgemental rather than data-led. It relies upon
accumulating knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of institutional arrangements as
revealed through case studies (Parker and Penning-Rowsell 1991). It is also a basically
qualitative research method in which the outcome hinges as much on the skills of the
investigator as it does upon an understanding and perception of the institutions. In this thesis,
much of the information used in evaluating flood hazard institutions in Peninsular Malaysia
is gathered through in-depth interviews with officers at various levels/departments within the
federal and state government hierarchies. Flood hazard organisations are also studied in
detail. Information such as mission statements, future visions, institutional objectives,
policies, organizational set-up, plans, jurisdiction, staffing (numbers and qualifications), and
other data are used in the evaluation (see Chapter 5).
2.3.4 The case study approach
The large extent of floodplains in Peninsular Malaysia and the absence of data on the total
floodplain population necessitates the use of case studies. The 'case study approach' is used
in the selection of sample areas within which both quantitative and qualitative methods are
employed. This includes the use of structured questionnaires administered by interviewers;
long, unstructured interviews (all carried out by the author); self-completion postal
questionnaires; and group discussions. Telephone interviews are also used when direct
interviews were not possible. This section discusses the merits and demerits of the case study
method. The development of the survey questionnaires and sampling strategies is discussed
in detail in Appendix F and the full questionnaires presented in Appendix A, B, C and D.
The case study approach has been criticised for insufficient precision (that is, quantification),
objectivity, and rigour (Yin 1989 p10). Another criticism is the limited degree to which
findings based on case studies can be generalized. Yet in recent years, more and more social
science researches have used this technique of inquiry as a result of refinement and
improvement in the method. For example, in a perusal of forty illustrative researches using
the case study approach, Yin (1989) has discovered amongst the authors a distinguished group
of scholars (including a few who have served as heads of their respective professions). This
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serves to underline the growing importance and application of this approach in social science
research. Case studies provides in-depth insight not available otherwise and are selected, not
for their typicality (as quantitative sampling dictates) but for their explanatory power
(Mitchell 1983).
Although case studies have in the past been mostly used as a preliminary phase of a more
detailed survey (for instance, as an exploratory study or reconnaissance survey), it is now
increasingly being used as the main method of inquiry in deeper research. There are now
exploratory, descriptive or explanatory case studies (Yin 1981a, 1981b). One popular
definition of a case study is given by Schramm (1971):
`...the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case
study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they
were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result.'
This definition cites `decisions' (as in floodplain manager's decision to adopt certain flood
mitigation adjustments) as the focus of the case study but it could well have been 'institutions'
(as in institutional responses to flood hazard mitigation ), `events' (as in a flood event),
'processes' (as in flood flows in rivers), etc.
Yin (1989) offers a more detailed and `technical' definition which states that a case study is
an empirical inquiry that:
(a) investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when
(b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly defined; and in which
(c) multiple sources of evidence are used.
This definition can be used to differentiate between a survey and a case study. While a survey
can be used to study a phenomenon and its context, its ability to investigate the context is
rather limited.
A case study is not synonymous with qualitative research although the very nature of a case
study makes it seem more qualitative than quantitative (Schwartz and Jacobs 1979; Van
Maanen et al 1982). Case studies can be quantitative if quantitative evidence is used. By the
same token, surveys can also be qualitative when certain questions (such as those seeking
categorical rather than numerical response) are applied in the questionnaire. On the whole,
despite their limitations case studies continue to be used extensively in social science
research, including the traditional disciplines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology,
political science, history, economics and geography. In hazards research, researchers working
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within the behavioural paradigm have employed this method (Kates 1962, 1963). Based on
case studies, hazards investigators from different parts of the world researched different
hazards in an international collaborative effort (White 1974). Multi-disciplinary disaster
studies have also used this approach widely (Davis 1975, 1981 pp151-74). More significantly,
however, case studies form the basis on which advocates of the structural paradigm carry out
their researches (Hewitt 1983a; Watts 1983; Susman, O'Keefe and Wisner 1983). Recently,
researchers working within the 'hazards in contexts' view have also used the method
(Mitchell et al 1989; Palm 1990; and Cutter 1993). In the United Kingdom, the Flood
Hazard Research Centre has used case studies extensively (Parker et al 1987; Neal and Parker
1988; Fordham 1992). In fact, many researchers have argued that the applicability of case
studies is no longer in question. Case studies do have a distinctive place in evaluation
research (Patton 1980; Cronbach et al 1980; Guba and Lincoln 1981; Yin 1989; Fordham
1992).
2.3.5 The social survey/quantitative interview
The survey questionnaire is the single most important research tool used by geographers
working within the dominant paradigm of the North American School (see Chapter 3). So
preoccupied were these early hazards researchers with the structured survey questionnaire that
a single cross-cultural and cross-hazard questionnaire was used in the study of all types of
natural hazards ranging from floods to avalanche and in cultures as diverse as the
industrialised American and the Usambara farmers of remote Tanzania (White 1974).
Predictably, the use of this single questionnaire has been extensively criticised in the hazards
literature (Wade11 1977) but none so vividly as that by Torry (1979a). Yet, despite these
criticisms and the emergence of new research methods the survey questionnaire remains an
important research tool in hazards study.
The survey questionnaire entails personal interviewing and the flexibility by which
questioning may be done is one of the merits of this method. Although a structured
questionnaire is used in most instances, it still allows an experienced interviewer great
flexibility in the wording, structure and clarity of questions. Furthermore, potentially the
interviewer is in a position to control an interview. He/she can re-phrase questions, clarify
questions, coax the respondents (but not to the extent of eliciting a biased response) and even
probe for additional information and details that are relevant. For instance, many unique flood
experiences of respondents in this research were recorded during the structured questionnaire
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interview (Appendix H). Also, the interviewer can ensure that the interview is conducted in
private and that others in the household such as the spouse or other family members do not
influence the respondent in any way.
Survey questionnaires are used extensively in hazards research in geography for two reasons.
First, they enable direct contact with people and human processes being investigated. Second,
and more significantly, is their 'quantitative' nature. A central theme common to all
quantitative researches is the employment of a sound scientific methodology which proceeds
along a route with well defined stages: problem, hypothesis, research design, measurement,
data collection, data analysis and generalization (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992).
While this line of inquiry is unchallenged in natural science research, much has been disputed
about its applicability in social science researches, particularly those involving the
measurement of social phenomena. According to the `Verstehen' 21 tradition, the natural and
social sciences are distinctive bodies of knowledge resulting from their divergence and the
nature of their subject matter. Thus, it follows that natural and social scientists must
inevitably employ different methodologies of research, quantitative research being the domain
of the former and qualitative research being the domain of the latter. In contrast to this
tradition, however, is the view of the 'logical empirists' who believe that despite their
distinctive humanistic nature, the social sciences can still achieve objective knowledge in the
study of the social world. To the empirists, both the natural and social sciences can be
researched by the same quantitative methodology.
Because of its quantitative nature, researching a sample of a statistically derived size allows
the researcher to infer findings on to a larger population. This saves time and resources and
makes it possible for large populations to be studied. In many cases it is also impossible or
unnecessary to study an entire population when a sample would suffice. In some cases the
population size may be unknown or infinite and quantitative sampling is probably the best
solution.
Another merit is the high response rate which may be obtained through direct interviewing
as compared to mailed questionnaires or telephone interviews. This, however, depends on
how the interviewer presents himself/herself, sample characteristics, the purpose of the survey
and other factors.
21 Verstehen is German for 'empathy'.
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While it is obvious what quantitative research has to offer hazards research, it is not without
demerits. One is its preoccupation with the laws of causality. Yet, researches based on the
survey method may at best bring about simple levels of association and correlation and
'correlation does not imply cause' (Bryman 1988). Another limitation is the focus of
quantitative research on the individual unit of analysis and its subsequent aggregation of all
the individuals studied. Society should not be viewed as an 'aggregation of disparate
individuals' (Blumer 1948). Furthermore, it has been argued that quantitative research does
not allow for in-depth analysis of social phenomena which is also inherently difficult if not
impossible to quantify. Social behaviour and culture have taken centuries to evolve and it is
not possible completely to understand such phenomena by merely administering a
questionnaire survey (although not all social science quantification is by questionnaire).
Advocates of qualitative research have also claimed that people are more alike than they are
different. As such, there is no need to conduct large-scale surveys and statistical analysis.
This point may have been wrongly claimed in the case of many population surveys (such as
census enumeration) but there is certainly some truth in the study of small closely-knitted
communities. The erroneous results of many market researches and some opinion polls such
as the 1936 literary poll in the United States 22 and the opinion polls conducted during the
British General Elections of 1987 and 1992 (Butler and Kavanagh 1988 p127) are proof that
survey research is not infallible.
2.3.6 The unstructured interview
The unstructured interview is essentially a qualitative research method used primarily in
reconnaissance or pilot surveys. It involves interviewing a respondent without a rigid
questionnaire structure but with certain aims or key questions in mind. Increasingly, this
method is now being used to complement the quantitative survey questionnaire which is
unable to record details and in-depth accounts of the events being studied. In this research
unstructured interviews are employed in the insider method, historical analysis, institutional
analysis and as a supplement in the questionnaire survey.
' In 1936, the Literary Digest Poll which interviewed 2.4 million people predicted a victory
for Landon by 57.0 percent to 43.0 percent. Yet, the actual results of the presidential election
gave Roosevelt a huge landslide victory of 62.0 percent to 38.0 percent (Freedman et al 1978
p302-7). It was later discovered that the error was in the construction of the sampling frame. The
questionnaires mailed were all based on telephone directories and most of the poor did not have
telephones.
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There are many advantages in the unstructured interview that have made it an important
research tool. Perhaps the most important is its ability to probe deeply into the subject.
Detailed accounts and reconstruction of events are all possible with this method. In hazards
research, respondents can be urged to narrate and account their hazard experience to the
greatest detail. As questions are not structured, respondents sometimes produce answers that
prove unexpectedly invaluable. The material obtained from a non-directive interview (e.g.
an in-depth interview) also enables the researcher to diagnose the motivations that are
operative and this further allows for possible interpretations. Thus /new aspects of the research
can surface and this further adds to new research questions which make the research even
more comprehensive.
Often respondents will not tell the truth in a doorstep interview, much less in a mailed
questionnaire survey'. A structured survey questionnaire may give an impression of
'officialdom'. Respondents may feel under pressure and may provide answers that will not
incriminate themselves. Spontaneity may be lost. On the other hand, an articulate interviewer
may be able to avoid the impression of an interview. If a relaxed atmosphere is created
respondents can be encouraged to talk and respond freely. It is believed that non-directive
interview methods are more likely to reveal the truth, since people are unwittingly revealing
themselves.
Some researchers have claimed that since people are more alike than they are different, there
is no need to have a large sample as in a questionnaire survey (Schlacicman 1989). Therefore,
the number of unstructured interviews can be small reducing the cost of interviews.
However, the unstructured interview also has its disadvantages. Results depend on the
expertise and objectivity of the interviewers. Interviewers may inject bias. There is also the
possibility interpreter bias of the data. The method may be considered too qualitative and
subjective and unscientific. Related to this is the criticism that because the method is non-
quantitative, it cannot be truly predictive, limiting its usefulness. Sample sizes may be too
small to make reliable statements about the total population. Sampling can be criticised for
' Whether or not the respondent tells the truth in an interview may depend on the topic of
inquiry. If the topic is about personal income (therefore with tax implications) or something
personal which may implicate the respondent, then it is not likely that the whole truth will be
revealed. On the other hand, if the topic is about general perception or views without any
implications, then the interviewer may expect a reasonably truthful answer.
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being haphazard and uncontrolled in the selection process, possibly generating bias and
statistical error. Finally, it is argued that it is not possible to classify sub-sections of the
sample to get segmentation analysis, because the sample may be much too small.
As a qualitative method, the unstructured interview has gained popularity coinciding with a
major shift in emphasis to qualitative research. In the past, the quantitative survey and the
unstructured qualitative interview have been seen as alternatives. However, recent advances
in qualitative research have improved its standing in the research community (see Robson and
Foster 1989; Yin 1989) and increasingly researchers now use a judicious combination of both
methods in their researches (Fordham 1992).
2.4	 Segment analysis
A central aim of this research is to examine and understand the links between the socio-
cultural, political economy and the institutional context and how these contexts affect
individuals in terms of flood hazard response. A method of analysis is therefore devised so
that the links between various contexts can be analysed. This method is called 'segment
analysis'. Many segments may be identified within the sphere of influence of contextual
forces on the individual (Figure 2.10). For instance, the researcher can take the 'flood
warnings and evacuation' segment and trace the links between the macro level contexts of
socio-cultural and political economy, meso level institutional context and the micro level
individual. In this way, flood warning and evacuation effectiveness can be analysed using
evidence from all three levels. More significantly, shortcomings can be identified at each
level.
Segment analysis is an attempt at innovatory approach to the study of hazards. Its strength
is that it allows phenomena to be examined across contexts. Hitherto, contexts have been
analysed in isolation although hazards are perceived to occur within a variety of contexts
(Mitchell et al 1989; Penning-Rowsell Forthcoming). Focus on one segment at a time enables
in-depth analysis. A segment may be further broken down into sub-segments for more
detailed analysis. For instance, flood warning and evacuation can be divided into sub-
segments of flood forecasting, institutional procedures of warning between flood hazard
organisations, warning dissemination to the public and final evacuation.
In this research two segments are selected for analysis. These are the 'flood warnings and
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Figure 2.10: Examples of segments within the influence of contextual forces on individual
response to the flood hazard in Peninsular Malaysia
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evacuation' and the 'income equity' segments. The former is selected because of its
significance and potential in flood hazard reduction in Peninsular Malaysia. The latter is
selected because it is a central issue in Malaysian society. Segment analysis is qualitative in
nature and dependent upon the expertise of the researcher. Although historical and other
published data are used, much depends on interpretation.
2.5	 Conceptual model
Conceptualisation is an important research methodology. One of the early tasks was to
develop a flood hazard response-in-context model for Peninsular Malaysia. This model is
based upon a variant of the behavioural hazard response model of the 'dominant North
American School' (see Chapter 3), but one nested within the current contextual view of
hazards. Based on this model, the extent to which contexts pervade and influence the flood
hazard in the peninsula is analysed. Also, the model is used to analyse individual perception
and response to the flood hazard and how contexts affect them. This model is discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 3.
2.6	 Case studies and surveys in the current research
Four case study areas are selected. The selection of the case study areas is based on criteria
which include geographical location, flood magnitude and frequency, flood type, urban or
rural environment, presence or absence of formal flood warning systems, and ethnicity
(Appendix F discusses the sampling rationale in detail). Selected case study areas showing
sampling sites, numbers of respondents interviewed, and approximate flood-prone areas are
illustrated in Figure 2.11 (Pulau Pinang), Figure 2.12 (Kuala Lumpur), Figure 2.13
(Kelantan) and Figure 2.14 (Pekan).
Within these four case study areas, households are sampled for the main survey. This survey
is based on a quantitative method of stratified random sampling using cadastral maps and
street maps to select properties (Figure 2.15, Figure 2.16 and Figure 2.17). In remote
kampungs where such maps are not available, sketch maps of house layout within the
kampungs are used (Figure 2.18).
To supplement the quantitative survey, detailed flood experiences of individual households
in each study area were recorded using the unstructured interview method. This serves to
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Figure 2.15: Street map of the Kam pung Baru and Kampung Datu Keramat sample sites
in Kuala Lumpur showing the location of households interviewed (Based on Director of
National Mapping, Malaysia 1982)
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Figure 2.16: Street map of the Georgetown sample site in Pulau Pinang showing the
approximate location of households interviewed (Based on Director of National Mapping,
Malaysia 1982)
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Figure 2.17: Approximate location of households interviewed in the Pekan town sample
site based on topographical and street maps of the mukim of Pekan
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Figure 2.18: Sketch map of approximate location of sampled households in relation to
the distribution of houses in the Kampung Tendong sample area in Pasir Mas, Kelantan
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give a more detailed insight into the flood hazard which is not captured by the quantitative
survey. Of the total 618 households surveyed, 172 were from Pulau Pinang, 192 from
Kelantan, 114 from Kuala Lumpur and 140 from Pekan. Of the total, 336 households were
residential, 145 were farming, 96 were commercial and 41 were fishing.
In order to put into perspective the extent to which the flood hazard affects floodplain
occupants, a supplementary quantitative survey on flood damages to business establishments
was also carried out in each of the four study areas. This was a brief record of actual flood
damage to property, goods, business and other related flood losses. Hitherto, as far as the
author is aware, no such survey has been done in the peninsula. In this research, a total of
273 business establishments were surveyed, with 52 in Pulau Pinang, 76 in Kelantan, 55 in
Kuala Lumpur and 90 in Pekan.
A supplementary questionnaire survey of government officers, academics, consultants and
workers of voluntary organisations was also carried out. This survey also employs the
quantitative questionnaire design but some detailed flood experiences of the respondents based
on the qualitative research methodology was also used. Interviews in the four study areas
were conducted by the author. Respondents from other states outside of the study areas were
posted mailed questionnaires to complete (a self addressed and stamped envelope was attached
for the return). The author also carried out qualitative interviews with individual respondents
and had group discussions with employees of some organisations. Telephone interviews were
carried out only when respondents were not available for direct interview. A total of twenty-
one respondents was interviewed and twenty-eight mailed questionnaires were returned,
making a total of forty-nine respondents.
Finally, the criteria approach based on selected evaluative criteria is used in the evaluation
of the adequacies of flood hazard institutions. The evaluation of flood warning and evacuation
systems is based partly upon 'observer-participation'. While in England, the author spent two
months (February and March 1992) on attachment at the National Rivers Authority's flood
forecasting and warning section in Waltham Cross in order to study advanced forecasting
system and warning procedures. During the fieldwork in Peninsular Malaysia, the author also
spent two months on attachment at the DID and the MMS (September and October 1992),
and visited several other flood hazard organisations to study and evaluate the forecasting
systems, warning dissemination systems, evacuation procedures and the preparedness, relief
and rehabilitation programmes. Detailed interviews (both quantitative and qualitative)
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regarding all aspects of the flood hazard were also held with top level government officers
in the various flood hazard organisations.
This chapter has examined the background to the flood hazard in Peninsular Malaysia,
demonstrated the ways in which flood risk, exposure and vulnerability are increasing, and
discussed the methods employed in this research. The next chapter critically examines the
development of hazards research, hazards theory and concepts, and develops a model of flood
hazard response for Peninsular Malaysia.
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3	 CONTEXTUAL HAZARDS THEORY IN CONTEXT
This chapter critically examines the dominant hazards paradigms'. It focuses on how
geographical concepts have been applied in the study and development of hazards research's.
It also highlights some of the more prominent work on hazards from other fields, particularly
in the English speaking world. A 'hazard response-in-context' model is conceptualised for
Peninsular Malaysia. This model forms a basis of this thesis and is tested for its applicability
in the Malaysian context in following chapters.
3.1	 Theoretical evolution of modern hazards research
Much of the early work on hazards research, predominantly on natural hazards, was by
geographers. The theoretical foundations of hazards research, and the roots of the dominant
paradigm of hazards research, lie within the sub-branch of behavioural geography. Because
of this, much of the early literature and current understanding of hazards'', and indeed of
flood hazards in particular, have their origins in geography. Geographers' interest in man-
' In this thesis the terms 'perspectives', `paradigms' and 'models' are viewed to occupy
a place on a hierarchical structure ranging from 'the most general' to `the most specific'. In
this hierarchy, a perspective would occupy one end marking the most general and a model
would occupy the other end marking the most specific. A paradigm occupies an intermediate
position. In terms of hazards research, a good example of a perspective would be 'the
geographic approach to natural hazards study'. Because of this, perspectives on hazards
research may be viewed as `approaches' or as `schools of thought' (Alexander 1993 p12). On
the other hand, the two commonly noted paradigms in hazards research are 'the behavioural
paradigm' and 'the structural paradigm' (Smith 1992 p40-45). Finally, a good example of a
model in hazards research would be Kates's (1971) `general system model of hazard
response'.
2.5 The term 'hazards research' (also commonly known as natural hazards research) is
adopted throughout this thesis to refer to 'the totality of factors which generate, sustain,
exacerbate, or mitigate those characteristics of natural and man-made environments that
threaten human safety, emotional security, and material well-being' (Mitchell 1984).
'While the study of the flood hazard has been carried out all over the world, it is not within
the scope of this dissertation nor is it the intention of the author to do an exhaustive literature
review of global flood hazard studies. This section presents a critical review of the more salient
developments of flood hazard research in particular and natural hazards research in general in the
Anglophone literature.
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environment' relationships has stimulated research on the relationship between humans and
hazards. This has led to development of the behavioural paradigm (also known as the natural
hazards paradigm, see below) which has its roots in human-ecological adaptation rather than
orthodox environmental determinism (Semple 1911). While determinism portrays humans as
helpless in the face of environmental hazards, human ecology focuses on the variety of
adjustments open to humans.
This fundamentally ecological viewpoint was initially advocated by Harlan Barrows (Barrows
1923) who influenced much of the later work of Gilbert White. The theme of human
ecological adaptation to natural hazards is subsequently exemplified in the works of White
(1945), Kates (1971) and Burton et al (1978, 1993). During the great depression of the
1930s, soil erosion and floods were significant hazards. The United States government largely
sought to control floods through engineering means. During this period, almost the entire
literature and work on flood hazard research in the United States was contributed by
engineers and hydrologists who viewed technological response (such as dam and levee
construction) as the principal answer to flood damage reduction. It was at this time that
Gilbert White pioneered early geographic flood studies in his research on 'Human Adjustment
to Floods' (White 1945)28 . This initiated geographic influence in flood hazard studies, and
indeed in the broader field of natural hazards studies. He demonstrated that United States
federal increases in expenditure on structural flood prevention did not have the desired effect
of reducing flood losses. Instead, flood losses continued to rise as a result of floodplain
encroachment which was encouraged by increased structural protection of floodplains. As a
solution, White proposed that it was more important to investigate the whole range of human
response to floods and identify the available alternatives for flood loss reduction.
At about the same time, the study of natural hazards was conducted in disciplines and
professions that worked to a considerable degree in isolation from each other and from the
public (Burton 1986 pix). But the 1960s saw a move towards a broader inter-disciplinary
approach to the study of natural hazards. This was seen in the development of natural hazards
' The 'man-environment' theme is one of the established core geographic traditions. In
the context of this theme, the masculine terms 'man' and 'his' are accepted terminologies in
geography and should not be misinterpreted as sexist language. In the context of general
usage, however, non-sexist terminologies are adopted throughout this thesis.
28 According to Kates and Burton (1986 p10), 'Human Adjustment to Floods' may well have
been the most influential dissertation in US geography.
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research in geography (Kates 1962; Burton and Kates 1964; White 1964) and disaster
research in sociology (Dynes et al 1964; Barton 1969; Drabek 1969) and anthropology (Lessa
1964; Tonkinson 1968; Anderson 1968; Torry 19791329).
In the 1960s and 1970s, White collaborated with two of his research students Ian Burton and
Robert Kates at the University of Chicago and developed what became the dominant
behavioural paradigm in hazards research. This paradigm is based on human ecological
adaptation within a theory of rational decision making. Subsequently, similar work was
extended to the University of Colorado, the University of Toronto, Clark University, and
(recently) Brown University. Much of the North Americans' work was centred around the
individual's response to the flood hazard. This hazard response model was then extended to
research different hazards in different parts of the world in an international collaborative
programme (White 1974). The culmination of a decade of natural hazards research was then
published in their much criticised volume of 'The Environment as Hazard' (Burton et al
1978). The White-Burton-Kates School of natural hazards (also known as the Chicago School
or the North American School) had significant effects and influence on geographic research.
According to Gold (1980 p211), a notable by-product of the school was the stimulus it gave
to behavioural geography. Furthermore, the school is highly influential at the national and
international level, is heavily and consistently funded, and has published extensively. As
such, it represents conventional geography's outstanding success story in the academic-
government arena (Emel and Peet 1989 p62).
Thus, from the early formative years of hazards research in the 1940s until the 1970s, the
dominant behavioural paradigm strongly influenced the research direction and focus. As a
result, other researchers tended to be rather orthodox and worked mostly within the confines
of the dominant paradigm. They tended not to challenge its theoretical base, preferring to
make incremental changes within the paradigm (Fordham 1992 p14). And because the
dominant paradigm of the 'North American School' stressed the individual unit of analysis
as its basis of explanation, group and community response, institutions, and socio-political
and economic processes, were under-researched. Furthermore, the emphasis on the individual
unit of analysis also favoured quantitative measurement techniques. Although this is not
necessarily a weakness, it curbed the usage of qualitative techniques within case studies,
29 Torry (1979b) presented an overview of the development of anthropological studies in
hazardous environments, notably that of natural hazards/disasters from the 1950s to the end
of the 1970s.
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ethnography, content analysis, observation and participant observation.
Other than the geographic literature, researchers from other disciplines working outside the
North American paradigm have also contributed, notably in disaster research and emergency
planning for disaster. Beginning in the late 1970s, the adequacy of the traditional behavioural
paradigm was questioned, both from within and outside geography (Waddell 1977; Torry
1979a). Radical critiques exposed the limitations of the dominant paradigm and generated new
interpretations of hazards. By the mid-1970s, dissidents of the dominant paradigm argued that
human perception and response to hazards were subject to cultural, social, economic and
political forces (Torry 1979b). More significantly, researchers based in Third World countries
discovered that broader structural forces (local and national) were more powerful and
pervasive in deciding the outcome of hazards and disasters (Waddell 1983; Hewitt 1983b).
This radical view which went beyond the conventional geophysical cause of hazards became
known as the structural paradigm. More recently, the recognition that structural forces at the
international level can strongly affect local vulnerability has resulted in an expanded version
of the structural paradigm, known as the 'political economy paradigm' or the 'political
ecology perspective of hazards' (Watts 1983; Cuny 1983; Marston 1983; Davis 1987;
Winchester 1992; Blaikie et al 1994"; Varley 1994). This essentially 'structuralist' view
links social relations to the environment, and is rooted in Marxist political economy.
Another view by the sociologist Mary Douglas is mainly concerned with how culture affected
cognition and behaviour with reference to response to hazards (Douglas 1986). While
working within the dominant paradigm, British researchers also discovered the importance
of institutional forces in floodplain management. In the United Kingdom, local planning
authorities and hazard institutions hold the key to hazard mitigation as individual action is
rather limited and constrained. This stimulated the development of institutional analysis in
hazards management (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986) in which institutions are viewed within a
" Although basically a social/structuralist perspective of hazards emphasising
vulnerability and lack of access to resources, Blaikie et al (1994) avoid using: (1) a purely
deterministic approach rooted in political-economy; (2) notions of equating vulnerability with
poverty or some other specific conditions; and (3) definitions of vulnerability that focus
exclusively on the ability of a system to cope with risk or loss. They advance the political
economy perspective by explaining vulnerability as a progression from 'root causes' to
'dynamic pressures' and 'unsafe conditions', which, when coincide with hazards, lead to
disasters.
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political economy context and are important factors in explaining failure or success of flood
hazard management policies. In a similar manner, sociologists, anthropologists, engineers,
epidemiologists, and those working in development studies and disaster medicine and others
made contributions to the literature of hazards research and formed their own interpretations
and perspectives on hazards (see Section 3.3).
Beginning in the 1980s, critical philosophical and theoretical development of hazards research
projected thinking towards a contextual view of hazards (Oliver 1981; Penning-Rowsell et al
1986; Mitchell et al 1989). This view emphasises the importance of varying contexts on the
occurrence of hazards. Focusing on the contexts of societal and political forces in relation to
hazards is an advancement of the conventional human-ecological view (behavioural paradigm)
and the structuralist view (structural paradigm). In the contextual view, social, institutional,
political, cultural and economic contexts are central to understanding of hazards as essentially
phenomena created by society and superimposed onto a physical process system through
which they are transmitted. Contexts are multi-layered. They may be looked at from different
'scales' (micro - individuals or households; meso - institutions and organisations; and macro -
the state), 'space' (individual property; village; district; state; and country) and 'time'
(before, during and after hazard occurrence). Some of the recent examples using this new line
of approach are the works of Mitchell et al (1989) on wind storm hazard in southern
England, Palm (1990), Palm and Hodgson (1992) on earthquake risk in California and
Penning-Rowsell (Forthcoming) on non-structural flood alleviation in Argentina. The current
work of the Disasters and Vulnerability of Megacities Study Group of the International
Geographical Union is also modelled after the contextual view (Parker 1994).
3.2	 The evolution of the geographic perspective
Although the geographical perspective on hazards is exemplified by the early pioneering work
of White (1945) and the subsequent development of the North American school, its roots
originate from the human-ecological tradition within geography and may go back to
Darwinian thinking (Barrows 1923). Humans and their environment are seen to interact to
produce either resources or hazards. As such, the geographical perspective may be viewed
from both the physical as well as the human angle. While the former is based on the premise
that geophysical extremes are the main cause of hazards, the latter focuses on human-
ecological adaptation, thus recognising the important role played by humans in the human use
system (Kates 1971; Burton et al 1978, 1993). Geographers tended to emphasise the spatial
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and temporal distribution of hazards and their impacts. Thus, much of the early work focused
on mapping the location of extreme geophysical events and human occupancy in the hazard
zones. Case studies are widely used to identify similar patterns of risk, perception and
response to hazards. Social science methods of survey are widely used. A cross cultural
questionnaire has been applied to research hazards in a wide range of physical and social
environments (White 1974).
3.2.1 The behavioural paradigm and its development
The traditional 'behavioural paradigm' originating from the North American School of
hazardologists is one of two main paradigms in hazards research (Smith 1992). It is
developed from models and concepts of the geographical perspective and is considered by
many as the 'dominant' paradigm in hazards research.
Early hazard response models, mostly developed by geographers before the 1950s were based
on the assumption that choice of floodplain occupants was essentially one of economic
optimization. This later became known as the 'Model of the Completely Optimizing Man'
(White 1973 p199). It assumed that individuals living in places of hazard would:
(a) have relatively complete knowledge of the particular hazard and its occurrence; and
(b) seek to make those adjustments which would represent an optimal resolution of the
costs and benefits from each of the adjustments open to them.
However, the model is an ideal that is never achieved in real life. Firstly, it would be
impossible, if not naive, to expect floodplain occupants to have complete knowledge of the
floods and their occurrences although public education strategies aim to improve knowledge.
Furthermore, each flood is distinctly different from the next due to spatial and temporal
variations. Secondly, it assumes that humans only think along economic lines and that choice
of adjustment is solely based on economic consideration of cost and benefit. This may not
necessarily be true. For instance, illiterate padi farmers of the far eastern Third World
countries may not have occupied floodplains because of their 'attractiveness' and 'economic
lucrativeness'. Such farmers could have been forced into these 'marginal' areas simply by
social and political factors such as poverty, landlessness and political policies. Furthermore,
choice of adjustment may not necessarily be traced to economic considerations. For instance,
building houses on stilts in rural Malaysia is as much a necessary structural response to the
flood hazard as it is a distinct Malay culture (see Chapter 7).
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The inadequacies of the completely optimizing man prompted researchers to look for an
alternative. Thus, a second model called the 'Subjective Utility Model' was developed. This
model was essentially modified from the model of the completely optimizing man. It assumed
that man:
(1) would still seek to optimize economically as far as possible;
(2) would perceive and assess the flood hazard as well as make decisions in the choice
of response based on incomplete knowledge of the hazard.
This second model was thought to be better equipped to handle people's actions and response.
For instance, it was more 'real' in real life situations in the floodplains where occupants
rarely have complete knowledge of the flood hazard. Nevertheless, it still maintains the
notion that humans are always looking for economic optimization and is therefore still
subjected to the same limitations as those of the first model.
The above models were tested in the field by White (1973 p200) who found that neither
seemed to explain much of the behaviour of floodplain occupants. For instance, although
floodplain occupants were fully aware of the danger of a recurrence of the hazard, they
readily moved back into their houses once the flood had subsided. Floodplain occupants were
also unaware of the valuation in property although they were aware of the difference in
hazard potential on a spatial basis. Limitations of the models led geographers to search for
new models of hazard response. Simon's (1956) 'Model of Bounded Rationality' was
adopted.
Bounded rationality suggests that imperfect knowledge of humans of the world around them
results in 'satisfactory' choices rather than the ideal optimum. This model was generally used
for a variety of management decisions involving firms and organisations. In this respect, the
'behavioural theory of the firm' (Cyert and March 1963) was a logical extension of the theory
of bounded rationality in business organisations. The geographer Robert Kates also tested the
model in his study of the behaviour and perceptions of floodplain occupants in Lafollette
(Kates 1962). The results of this study indicated that humans are largely rational in decision-
making and that they make choices from a range of available alternatives based on individual
knowledge.
Based on the model of bounded rationality and human ecological adaptation along the lines
of the dominant paradigm, Kates (1971) developed a comprehensive model of decision-
making known as the 'General Systems Model of Human Adjustment to Natural Hazard'
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(Figure 3.1). This model is considered the dominant conceptual model in hazards research
(Fordham 1992 p37). It is described in some detail because of its fundamental importance in
hazards research and also because it is being extended into a model of flood hazard
perception and mitigating adjustment at the individual/household level (see Section 3.5).
In Kates's (1971) model, hazard perception is a function of expectation of future occurrence
and personal vulnerability which was claimed to be independent of socio-economic indicators.
In terms of the hazard, the most important characteristics were hypothesized to be frequency,
magnitude, duration and temporal spacing. In terms of personal experience, it was recency,
frequency and intensity of an event. Finally, in terms of personality, it was fate control,
differential views of nature and tolerance of dissonance-creating information. Choice of
adjustment is influenced by four critical features of the hazard, viz, frequency, magnitude,
suddenness of onset and ecological setting. Awareness of adjustments is hypothesized to be
a function of access to communications network and differences in awareness due to factors
controlling access to information.
On the whole, the model can, at best, only represents a subset of all possible factors affecting
perception and adjustment. As such, critics should consider whether it includes the most
important factors rather than all relevant factors (Whyte 1986 p252). It has also been argued
that the Kates model approximates to a closed system where problems are analysed only with
reference to its internal structure and not its external environment (Fordham 1992 p41).
Advancement in research and theory has since shown that 'external forces' are intricately
linked with individual choice (Hewitt 1983a). In terms of the flood hazard factors such as
land use, environmental preservation, individual power to choose, institutional influence,
political ideology, colonial history, economic and socio-cultural background etc. all affect the
final choice of individuals.
Despite many justifiable criticisms (see Section 3.2.2), the model simplified the complexity
of the problem area and was a bold initial step which served to at least create a focus for a
critical response (Fordham 1992 p39). It has been found to reveal more explanations of
human behaviour (both individual and group) in a flood event than previous models. Its
simplicity was attractive and widely acceptable to researchers working in the field. Kates's
model has been widely used to investigate not only the flood hazard but also to study other
natural hazards (White 1974; Sarre 1976; Kirkby 1973; Burton et al 1978, 1993). Despite
its limitations, the basic elements of the model have been generally accepted as useful. In the
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United Kingdom, the model was imported almost unchanged into British geographical
research in the 1970s (Penning-Rowsell 1972; Harding and Parker 1972, 1974; Parker 1976;
Parker and Harding 1979). Even in the 1990s, the model is still being adapted in hazards
research (Fordham 1992).
Burton, Kates and White extended Kates's (1971) model into their so-called 'Choice Tree of
Adjustment model' (Burton et al 1978). The human use system interacts with the natural use
system to produce hazards, which humans recognise, consider how they might deal with
them, and choose options that seem to them available (Burton et al 1993 pp31-65). Human
response to hazards are considered ecologically based and classified into 'biological
adaptation' and 'cultural adaptation'. Emphasis is then placed on how individuals and
agencies response to the large range of choices available when faced with a hazard. The
theoretical range of choice of response encompasses all the ways (immediate, temporary and
long term) in which society may act to reduce the effects or increase the benefits of a
hazard. Because this model is a direct extension of Kates's model developed within the
confines of the North American School, much of the criticisms are essentially the same.
3.2.2 Critiques of the dominant paradigm
While the dominant paradigm has been widely used and still provides a useful theoretical
framework in hazards research, especially that at the individual level of analysis, it has been
severely challenged and criticised (Waddell 1977; Torry 1979a; Hewitt 1983a; Penning-
Rowse11 et al 1986).
One criticism is its inherent over-emphasis on the role of the individual in hazards
management, either as a decision-maker or as a victim. Individual choice and action may
seem effective in the free-enterprise system of the United States but the impoverished and
deprived in Third World countries are helpless in the face of disasters. Because of this focus
on individuals, community level response are modelled in the crudest forms by Kates (1971)
who simply sum the aggregate response of all individuals within the community. Even in the
case where individual responses are deemed important, society cannot be viewed just as an
aggregation of individuals. Often, there is a high degree of dependence on community
response to flood hazards (Harding and Parker 1976). Also in some countries such as the
United Kingdom, flood hazard management appears better explained via a 'model of
community hazard response' (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986). This limitation is, however,
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corrected to some extent in later work by Burton et al (1978) but individual response still
remains one of the prominent features of the dominant paradigm, although the authors (in a
second edition) recognised the importance of differential vulnerability to hazard between and
within communities, conditioned by social group, economic class or livelihood system (Burton
et al 1993 pp250-2). A further critique is the fact that an individual's response may be
constrained if not severely curtailed by institutional forces. Thus, in many western societies,
response to hazards is better analysed and understood through institutions and government.
For example, researchers in Britain have found that institutional and political forces often
override whatever little choice floodplain individuals may have (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986).
Another criticism centres on the almost entirely western oriented approach used by early
hazardologists working within the behavioural paradigm. Much of the work on which models
and theories is based is from the United States and Canada, and other western developed
countries. Thus it was argued that the behavioural paradigm is a narrow view based on
western interpretation of hazards and disasters. It is also deeply rooted in materialism and
capitalism and described by its critics as an optimistic, deterministic evaluation which reflects
undue faith in technology (Smith 1992 p42). Waddell argues that the dominant paradigm was
a product of, and relevant to, a particular type of society:
`..a western, urban-industrial, capitalist state characterised by a resolutely
anti-environmentalist ideology, a population that both is massively mobile and
has lost most of its sensitivity to the natural world, and a central government
whose responsibility for managing environmental problems is ill-defined'
(Waddell 1977 p73).
The use of a common cross-cultural questionnaire across all hazards (White 1974) has been
another weakness of the behavioural paradigm. Lewis (1976) has pointed out that research
methods developed within the North American continent cannot be applied to other parts of
the world, especially those of less-developed' or 'under-developed' countries. Similarly, the
same set of questionnaire cannot be used interchangeably in two widely differing societies
with different cultures, values and literacy. Also, what is applied to one hazard cannot be
applied en bloc to another as hazards differ substantially in their origins, time, space and
other attributes .
Geographers working within the dominant paradigm have also been accused of paying scant
attention to the cultural aspects pertaining to hazard response although they are aware of its
importance (Walker 1979 p113). In their employment of the standard survey instrument,
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researchers working within the paradigm have also been accused of holding culture and social
organisation constant. This is untenable as the influence of culture on risk perception of
hazards is well documented in the sociological literature (Douglas and Wildavslcy 1983;
Douglas 1986). Elsewhere, Davis (1978 pp15-19) has underlined the importance of
understanding the local culture when planning response (e.g. the provision of shelter/housing)
to disasters.
According to Hewitt (1983b p6), the dominant paradigm is characterised by research in three
main foci: (a) emphasis on field monitoring and scientific explanation of geophysical
processes aimed at modelling and prediction; (b) commitment to physical and managerial
control aimed at controlling nature through technological solutions; and (c) emphasis on
disaster plans and emergency measures, especially relying on military-styled operations
during and after a disaster. Because of the above foci, the paradigm has been criticised as
being too 'technocratic' (Hewitt (1983b p8). Others have found that hazard-loss reduction
strategies cannot rely on technological solutions alone but must involve some adjustments
within human societies (Jones 1993 p165).
To others, especially anthropologists and sociologists, the dominant paradigm shows scant
regards for important sociological factors in community hazard response, particularly with
reference to cultural, social institutions and organisations that have been shown to strongly
influence behaviour (Torry 1979a; Douglas 1982). In fact, Torry (1979a) has claimed that
geographers have tended to concentrate on the physical properties of land and weather that
make societies hazard-prone, but neglected the benefit of 'a coherent social systems frame
of analysis'.
The paradigm has also been criticised for its association with human ecology. For instance,
it has been argued that hazards research is different from human ecology. While the former
seeks to understand individual human adjustment to environmental extremes, the latter seeks
explanations for collective human adjustment (social units) to the environmentally routine
(Mileti 1980 p328). Torry (1979a) noted the 'absence' of an ecological perspective in hazards
research, even though the dominant paradigm is based on human ecological adaptation. Smith
and Tobin (1979) have also noted that environmental attitudes, values and imperatives are
lacking in the dominant paradigm.
The paradigm presents a traditional, highly compartmentalised view of hazard which focuses
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on hazard agents, thereby emphasising the differences rather than exploring the similarities
of hazards (Jones 1993 p163). In addition, there is still a tendency to perpetuate certain
misconceptions about hazards by over-emphasising conspicuous, high energy events which
have large-scale impacts, death tolls, the unpredictability of 'natural' events, and the value
of the technocentric approach (Jones 1991).
Finally, structuralists contend that the dominant paradigm is inappropriate, especially with
reference to the Third World where individual response is severely constrained within the
cultural, economic, political and social milieu (Waddell 1977; Torry 1979a). Thus,
structuralists contend that vulnerability to hazards in human populations is more determined
by socio-political and economic forces than by individual response.
3.2.3 Strengths of the behavioural paradigm
Despite many criticisms levelled against it, the behavioural paradigm has stood its ground,
most notably during its peak in the 1970s. Even as new developments and findings surfaced
in the 1980s, the traditional paradigm was never displaced. Instead, major critiques are
merited with the credit of enriching it with fresh ideas, demonstrating that hazard research
is an open-ended scientific enquiry in which its critics are as much a part of the evolving
research as its early innovators (Burton et al 1993 p243). The paradigm is, therefore, not
static but dynamic and capable of absorbing new knowledge and growing with time. This is
only natural as an ever changing world necessitates new knowledge, models and paradigms.
To prove its worth, the traditional paradigm is still being employed in a combination with
other paradigms in many current researches (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986; Fordham 1992).
Within the confines of geography, research into natural hazards has evolved steadily over
time within a unified paradigm, viz, the behavioural paradigm. The ability of the behavioural
paradigm to bind together natural hazards research of cross-cultural dimensions is in itself
a strength. Because of this, natural hazards research benefited from the considerable
advantages of a coherence and integration that contrasts markedly with other areas of
behavioural geography (Gold 1980 p202).
The behavioural paradigm is policy-oriented and therefore has wide applicability on
government agendas. When it was discovered that in spite of the United States government's
increased spending on flood prevention, flood damage had actually risen sharply, researchers
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working within the paradigm soon gained the attention of the government. This was reflected
in the substantial funding that has been made available for natural hazards research.
Subsequently, this applicability extended into the international arena whereby the International
Geographical Union (IGU) were involved in a collaborative effort working within the
dominant paradigm.
Although its focus on the individual is criticised as a limitation, it is this feature that has
perpetuated the popularity of the behavioural paradigm in hazards research. The simplicity
of analysing individual response to hazards enables the researcher to tackle many complex
research problems which are otherwise difficult to approach. Individual response should be
treated as a first step in an ascending hierarchy towards the understanding of hazards. It
should not be perceived as the final and ultimate end product of a research. Thus, knowledge
gained from individual response can then be researched within a more comprehensive and
wider spectrum by including influences from institutional, socio-political and economic
forces. In fact, the situational attributes affecting individual response can be modelled in the
contexts of historical, socio-political, economic, institutional and other forces. This is what
is being attempted in the current research.
The dominant paradigm reveals more explanations of human behaviour in hazard events than
previous research. Its assertion that human response to hazards is boundedly rational
(although this concept was originally borrowed from sociology) is well documented (Burton
et al 1978, 1993). Thus, if the behaviour of floodplain occupants is formed on the basis of
inadequate knowledge, then flood reduction policies should include educating them. This is
indeed how the National Rivers Authority (NRA) in Britain operates (Fordham 1992 p31).
Because of this, the dominant paradigm has wide practical applications to the reduction of
hazards. This has been proven in terms of substantial research grants such as in the
collaborative international research programme in the 1970s sponsored by the IGU (White
1974; Burton et al 1978). Thus, it commands the recognition of the international community.
Currently, the United Nation's International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR)
is run along the lines of the traditional paradigm focusing on physical risks and the role of
natural science and engineering in the hazards policy arena (Mitchell 1990; Varley 1994).
In western developed countries where capitalism and freedom of choice prevails, individual
response can be significant. Notwithstanding the influence of wider forces affecting the
individual, he/she is nevertheless largely free to choose. In such a situation, the behavioural
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paradigm which emphasises individual choice, whether in the selection of settlement location
or the adoption of adjustment can be appropriate.
Although the use of a quantitative questionnaire design has been severely criticised (Lewis
1976; Waddell 1977), the basic research design of the dominant paradigm is actually based
on an examination of occupance of hazard-prone areas, hazard perception and the adjustment
choice process, the range of possible adjustments to hazard events and the effects on response
of varying public policy (White 1974). That such a research design is a strength is testified
in the enduring effect it has on much hazards research, as even up to the present day many
researchers still employ it albeit with additional research tools such as qualitative methods
(Fordham 1992 p32). The quantitative questionnaire has remained popular largely because
its core structure has proved to be sufficiently reliable. In fact, refinement and improvement
of other research methods (especially in qualitative research) has strengthened the research
design as quantitative and qualitative methods are used to complement one another. Related
to this is the extensive use of the case study approach exemplified in the collaborative
research programme (White 1974). Hazard researchers working within the dominant hazards
paradigm have largely employed the case study approach and have contributed substantially
to the refinement and popularisation of the technique. This then, is a strength of the dominant
paradigm.
The simplicity but coherent approach adopted by the dominant paradigm is attractive and
widely acceptable to researchers working in the field. Kates's model has been widely used
by many researchers all over the world to study not only the flood hazard but also to study
other natural hazards as well (White 1974). Despite its limitations, the behavioural model is
useful as it is still being adapted to hazards research (Fordham 1992; Burton et al 1993).
Related to the above point is that the paradigm has a cross-cultural dimension. Cross-hazard
and cross-cultural comparisons may have their limitations but it provides an insight to the
extent of hazards and disasters, and their effects on human populations in the world.
3.3	 Complementary perspectives and paradigms
After five decades of hazards research, many disciplines have made contributions to the field.
And despite the dominance of the behavioural paradigm, the field of hazards study has not
integrated into a common discipline but has disintegrated because of increasing specialisation.
As a result, many complementary perspectives or 'schools of thought' can now be identified
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(Alexander 1993).
Of all the other perspectives in hazards research the social and political perspective comes
closest to challenge the dominant behavioural paradigm. It contends that social and political
systems lead to the creation and reinforcement of hazards. It was initially developed by
sociologists and some human geographers (Hewitt 1983a). This perspective centres on the
vulnerability of floodplain communities. Social and political systems in Third World countries
generated by decades of colonial exploitation have increased vulnerability. Consequently,
these countries are poorly equipped to handle or cope with floods. High incidence of poverty
and deplorable living conditions (accompanied by grossly inadequate housing facilities) have
forced 'squatting' on the potentially hazardous floodplains (which contain swampy low-lying
land which would otherwise be left alone). Such poverty stricken communities would be most
vulnerable in the event of a flood occurring as they neither have the experience nor the
resources to cope. For example, the lack of suitable farm land due to overcrowding and
population pressures in Bangladesh has forced landless farmers to progressively occupy
'marginal' areas for agriculture. Winchester (1992) has shown that decades of poverty and
colonialism has increased the vulnerability of some communities in South India to natural
disasters. The process of `marginalization'' of the rural peasantry has no doubt added to
the increase in flood hazard potential as more and more farmers have occupied flood-prone
areas. According to Susman et al (1983 p279), the international division of labour and market
forces within the poor underdeveloped countries have caused the poorest of the poor to live
in the most dangerous places. The process of marginalization in relation to the flood hazard
is shown in Figure 3.2. Poverty, vulnerability and militarization may also coincide with the
occurrence of 'natural' disasters leading to a vicious 'poverty-repression-militarization cycle'
which brings about mortality, famine, refugee migrations and the destruction of homes and
livelihood (COPAT 1981; Turton 1991). More recently, Varley (1994) and her co-authors
have demonstrated how socio-political forces such as the inadequate planning for, and
response to disasters, are the real cause of human suffering from disasters. Similarly, Blaikie
et al (1994) stress the significance of the human factor in disasters. The authors demonstrate
that the social, political, and economic environment is as much a cause of disasters as the
3' The term `Marginalization' has been used to refer to poor countries where the rural
peasantry, due to neglect, repression and deprivation has progressively been forced into marginal
or peripheral lands which are normally considered too hazardous to be farmed. This has the effect
of making such poor peasant societies extremely vulnerable and the hazard more severe (Blaikie
1985)
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natural environment. Because of this, effective disaster mitigation is rooted in human society
and humans have to understand vulnerability in terms of their own society in order to take
effective action.
Over the years, the social and political perspective has evolved to become known as the
'structural paradigm'. It is based on the assertion that underdevelopment and economic
dependency of Third World countries have increased their vulnerability to hazards and
disasters. Structuralists view the occurrence of disasters as a product of the global economy,
colonial exploitation, capitalism and marginalization of the poor rather than as a product of
extreme events in nature. Underdevelopment in Third World countries breed impoverishment
which is perpetuated by technological dependency and vulnerability to hazards. As a result,
disaster reduction is seen to lie in the redistribution of wealth rather than on the use of
science and technology. This can lead to a Marxist view of disasters.
According to Smith (1992), the structural paradigm challenges the behavioural paradigm at
several key points. Firstly, it asserts that natural hazards are not uniquely dependent on
geophysical extremes. Increased vulnerability may be the result of poverty, colonialism,
marginalization, militarization and landlessness. As a result, increased vulnerability is related
more to human exploitation rather than the forces imposed by nature.
Secondly, it asserts that some Third World countries are by nature hazard-prone and that
disasters in such countries are not unusual phenomena. Third World countries are more
susceptible and vulnerable to disasters largely because they lack the resources to respond
effectively.
Thirdly, it asserts that since the roots of Third World disasters lie in the everyday social
order, effective hazard management would depend on structural changes in society rather than
technological solutions. Because of this, a clear understanding of the local social order is of
more importance in hazard management than imported technology. Furthermore, effective
hazard management is best achieved from within, by changing the existing economic, social
and political conditions rather than by importing external help. Finally, technical aid and
disaster relief are seen as short-term temporary measures which may do more harm in
increasing dependency rather than reducing vulnerability of such countries in the long term.
Fourthly, it asserts that disaster victims are not to blame for their own misfortunes.
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Structuralists do not view disaster victims as lacking in hazard perception, unaware of what
they are doing, or engage in irrational, hazard-inducing behaviour. They are of the opinion
that disaster victims lack time and access to resources to respond and combat disaster
effectively.
The structural paradigm is not without criticism. One commonly mentioned limitation is that
it is mostly applicable to Third World countries. Because of this, its usefulness as a research
tool for hazard management in the developed countries is limited. However, it has been
argued that the structural paradigm may be applied to developed countries because of
regional/and local variations in wealth. For instance, the majority of the 6,500 people who
were evacuated when a sea wall collapsed in Towyn, North Wales in 1990 were elderly
pensioners who could not afford property insurance (Welsh Affairs Committee 1990). Here,
the effects of floods were magnified by the limited resources of recovery which elderly
people could call upon. Furthermore, the paradigm may be applied to developed countries
on the premise that all individuals are to some extent constrained and influenced by the
institutions, economic and social circumstances in which they find themselves (Smith 1992).
And that these institutions are influenced by macro scale economic and political processes
which operate at international level. Another weakness is that it does not offer a framework
for practical hazard mitigation. All it does is to offer a theoretical perspective with limited
world application. Finally it must be pointed out that the structural paradigm is also open to
all the same sociological criticisms arising from scant regard being given to social
organisations, values, culture and other societal forces in hazard management as does the
behavioural paradigm.
The natural science perspective is essentially the natural scientist's explanation to the
occurrence of hazards. It is sometimes referred to as the 'technical approach' (Alexander
1993 p14). It focuses on how natural processes in the 'Earth-Atmosphere System' create
hazards and takes into account the importance of society in altering the physical processes.
Hazards are principally attributed to the natural causes. As such, it is of paramount
importance to monitor and understand the natural processes. It is also important for the
natural scientist to measure and monitor these processes in order to classify them. The natural
processes can also be modified by humans and this makes it more complicated and difficult
to study. Natural scientists often believe that natural processes can be controlled by
technological solutions. This perspective is strongly advocated by natural and physical
scientists who employ seismology, volcanology, geomorphology, hydrology and engineering
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approaches to hazard management. Some good examples of the natural scientist's approach
to hazards are Harding (1972), Ward (1978), El-Sabh and Murty (1988), and the United
Kingdom (UK) flood studies report (Institution of Civil Engineers 1967).
The natural science perspective is essentially a 'tech-fix' approach, although in recent years
it has incorporated ecological, biological, environmental and `sustainability'32
 considerations
(a good example is the NRA in Britain as exemplified in the work of Gardiner [19911).
Because of its emphasis on technology as a means of alleviating hazards, it has often been
criticised as being too narrow an approach. No field of science can predict the occurrence of
hazard events with any level of certainty. Furthermore, artificial structures with high
protection levels may still be 'over-topped' by an extreme event. For instance, a 100-year
flood protection embankment may still be over-topped by the 101-year event. Furthermore,
this 'technocentric' approach tends to assume that human ingenuity is sufficient to overcome
hazards, either by modifying them or making the environment 'safe'. This is certainly a
misconception as the number of hazards and their impact on people and property have
continued to increase and the environment becoming increasingly hazardous (Aysan 1993 p2).
Studies by others have also shown that disasters occur because of other factors such as the
misapplication of technology, institutional ineffectiveness, warning ineffectiveness, and hazard
generating socio-political systems (Turner 1978; Penning-Rowsell et al 1986; and Winchester
1992).
The organisational perspective was originally an approach used by organisational analysts
in explaining hazards. It focuses upon the ways in which organisations such as government
agencies, private companies and voluntary bodies deal with hazards. Many scientists such as
economists, economic geographers, system analysts, planners, sociologists and those who are
concerned with 'collective behaviour' or rather 'collective decision-making' have been
responsible for this perspective (Turner 1978; Handmer and Parker 1991; Parker 1992). The
role played by such agencies and bodies cannot be underestimated because any action taken
by any such body may have widespread effects on the occupants of hazard zones. The basis
for organisational explanations to hazards is that organisations may contribute in one way or
another to the creation or worsening of hazards.
n `Sustainability' is both a controversial and ill-defined concept. In terms of 'sustainable
development', the following definition by the Brundtland Commission (1987) has been
adopted: 'development that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs'.
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Turner (1978) studied a number of hazards arising out of organisational inefficiencies and
listed reasons for the creation and aggravation of hazards. Reasons may include inherent
organisation inefficiencies within the organisation and outside the organisation (interaction
with other organisations); the existence of organisational 'sub-cultures' which leads to
'collective blindness' to the hazard; using the 'decoy' (for instance, an agricultural
organisation will highlight the benefits of clearing virgin forest for agriculture in terms of
productivity and employment but will disregard or pay less attention to the potential of floods
created by such an activity); the tendency for 'organisational exclusivity' (some organisations
tend to disregard the advice and warnings of other quarters, especially from scientists and
environmental preservation pressure groups); information dissemination difficulties (large
companies or governmental bureaucracies tend to complicate the process of passing on
information. As such, the information received at lower ranks could well be distorted and
therefore not the real information); difficulties dealing with floodplain occupants who are
'strangers' to a company's or agency's instructions; failure to comply with regulations; failure
to minimize emergent danger (or failure to admit imminent danger by raising an alarm); and
failure to organise safety procedures (for evacuation or relocation) in the event of flood
occurrence. Elsewhere, Handmer and Parker (1991) have documented the tendency for
organisations to `groupthink', thus narrowing options. They further noted that there is a high
level of secrecy amongst the bureaucracy of government organisations in Britain, all of which
hinder emergency planning.
The organisational perspective's usefulness tends to be limited to the scale of the organisation
in tackling problems associated with hazards. In many parts of the world, especially western
industrialised countries, the role played by organisations in generating and mitigating hazards
is very important (Parker 1992 pp10-16). For instance, in the United Kingdom, the role of
the NRA in flood hazard management is vital. Similarly, in Peninsular Malaysia, the role of
the DID is crucial in flood hazard mitigation (see Chapter 5).
The anthropological perspective is centred on 'humans' and 'the community' as the
fundamental unit of disaster analysis. The anthropologist views disaster studies as distinctively
and solely within the realms of cultural anthropology. According to Torry (1979a), the
anthropologist is concerned about Alt influences disasters have on social processes in a three
" Torry (1979a) has defined the term 'community' as politico-territorial units ranging from
towns to entire nations and including localised ethnic enclaves such as tribal populations.
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dimensional viewpoint, viz, holistic, developmental and comparative. In the first viewpoint,
it is the community that is the ultimate object of study. In the second, it is mechanisms that
govern social change and evolution. In the final viewpoint, it is the cross-cultural
investigation of principles that underpins social integration and change. Anthropologists have
focused on the role of disasters in guiding the socio-economic evolution of populations, in
dispersing them and in causing the destruction of civilisations (Alexander 1993 p13, Torry
1979b). Anthropologists have also studied the `marginalization syndrome' (Oliver-Smith
1979) as well as looking at threshold points beyond which communities can no longer
withstand hazards. In many ways, the anthropological perspective may overlap with the social
and political perspective.
The sociological perspective in hazards research can be seen in much of the work of Dynes,
Quarantelli, Mileti, Sorensen, Drabek, Douglas and others. It focuses on the socio-cultural
aspects of disasters. Some examples are hazard vulnerability and impacts in terms of patterns
of human behaviour, the effects of disasters upon community functions and organisation
(Quarantelli 1978; Dynes 1970), the stress factor in disaster research (Glass 1970), disasters
in relation to bereavement (Church 1974) and the 'disaster syndrome' (Wallace 1956). It also
focuses on human behaviour during times of disaster (Mileti 1984), their perception of risk
(Mileti 1989), disaster warning systems and general hazard and disaster studies (Mileti et al
1975;), emergency planning (Sorensen et al 1984) and public warnings of disasters (Sorensen
and Mileti 1986; Mileti and Sorensen 1988; Sorensen and Mileti 1989), disaster warning
responses (Drabek and Stephenson 1971), social impacts of disasters (Drabek and Boggs
1968), and the sociological aspects of extreme environments (Mileti et al 1975). Douglas
emphasised the influence of culture on risk perception (Douglas 1986). Her contention is that
perception of risks is encoded in social institutions and that culture and social organisation
determines decision-making. Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) are of the opinion that the
selection of particular single issues as environmental hazards is culturally determined. In what
they call a 'cultural theory of risk perception', they contend that people's concept of hazards
should not be taken at face value but that it reflects certain forms of social organisation,
morals, economic, political or other value-laden factors.
The sociological perspective is a diverse one in that all aspects of society in relation to
hazards are studied. However, its apparent relevance in disaster research is weakened by the
fact that individual, institutional, economic and political responses are considered far less
important in the creation and perpetuation of hazards. Furthermore, the perspective does not
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acknowledge the importance of structural or engineering solutions to protect society from
environmental hazards. Its sociocentric view of hazards and disasters (focusing on cultural
or social organisations) inevitably inhibits its very scope and applicability .
Other than the perspectives mentioned above, there have been recent additions in the field of
hazards research. One is the development studies perspective which evolves around
problems created by the aftermath of hazards. These include the provision of aid, relief and
shelter, hazard victim relocation, refugee management, health care and the avoidance of
starvation. Because the most critically affected by hazards are poverty-stricken developing
countries, much of this perspective is centred on the Third World countries. Some examples
of the development studies perspective on hazards research are Davis (1978, 1981), Chen et
al (1980) and Knott (1987). Finally, a new field in disaster medicine has created what is
known as the disaster medicine and epidemiology perspective. This perspective focuses on
the management of mass casualties, the treatment of severe physica1 trauma and the
epidemiological surveillance of communicable diseases resulting from a disaster (Beinin
1985).
3.4	 Recent developments in the geographic perspective
3.4.1 Hazards-in-context
The hazards-in-context model enables researchers to examine hazards and disasters differently
from traditional views developed by previous generations of hazard researchers (e.g. Burton
et al 1978; Hewitt 1983a). Contexts may be temporal (historical), spatial, political, economic,
socio-cultural, environmental, institutional, organisational, etc.. According to Mitchell,
Devine and Jagger's (1989) 'A Contextual Model of Natural Hazard', a natural hazard system
consists of two parts: a subsystem of hazard components and a subsystem of hazard contexts
(Figure 3.3). The former contains four interacting components which modify one another
through seven endogenous links (a human-ecological approach). On the other hand, the later
contains exogenous factors that interact with and modify hazard components but are largely
independent of them (a structuralist approach). Exogenous factors are highly variable and
because of this, contexts are likely to change. This poses a challenge for researchers
attempting to identify and analyse contexts in their search for commonalities amongst hazards
and disasters.
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Figure 3.3: A basic Contextual Model of Natural Hazard (After Mitchell, Devine and
Jagger 1989)
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3.4.2 Strengths and limitations
Hazards-in-context is a relatively new perspective in hazards research and it offers
researchers a new and dynamic approach in viewing hazards. Its focus on hazards as being
more influenced by contextual socio-political forces rather than strictly human-ecological ones
is appropriate in the current state-of-the art in hazards research. In this new approach,
hazards are analysed in terms of the contexts affecting human populations. Vulnerability and
impacts are therefore placed in perspective. Each context affecting a hazard can be studied
individually as well as in combination. In the case of the latter, comparisons between contexts
enables the researcher to identify the most influential context within specific time and space
frames. This will then enable policy makers to target strategies and policies of hazard
reduction against the identified context. Hazards are by nature highly changeable in time and
space. So too are contexts. This is not a problem as the analysis of hazards-in-context is
highly versatile and takes into account such changes. Modelling changes in contexts over time
and space enables the researcher to monitor the effects of such changes on hazards. Unlike
the behavioural paradigm which is only appropriate in western capitalist societies, or the
structuralist paradigm which is largely applied in the Third World (although it can be used
to study poor sections of western societies), the hazards-in-context approach may be applied
to both developed and undeveloped countries. Finally, no standard research method is
specified in this approach. Researchers can employ both quantitative and qualitative methods,
and historical analysis and other secondary data sources can be used.
A limitation with the hazards-in-context approach is that there is a dearth of research on
contexts of hazards as it is a relatively recent development (Mitchell et al 1989 p406). More
specifically, much hazards research in the past and that currently under way seeks to measure
hazard components such as physical processes, risk and vulnerability of human populations,
adjustments to hazards and the net losses from hazards. Less is known about the exogenous
factors or contexts between which hazard components interact to produce the final outcome.
Thus, there is a scarcity of literature on contexts. Because of the multitude of contexts
influencing any hazard, the analysis of all contexts is inherently complex and poses problems.
Analysing each context separately may be a solution but contexts may be intricately related
and affect one another. To further complicate the picture is the fact that contexts are dynamic
and change through time and space. Thus, until the researcher can identify the key contexts
influencing a specific hazard, it is unlikely that any meaningful analysis can proceed.
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3.5	 Developing a flood hazard response-in-context model for Peninsular Malaysia
3.5.1 Flood hazard research in Peninsular Malaysia
In Peninsular Malaysia, much of flood hazard research reflects a technocentric approach
which strongly emphasises the use of structural/engineering methods, and to a lesser degree
on non-structural methods in solving flood problems. As a result, the bulk of the literature
on flood studies in Peninsular Malaysia is concentrated within the field of engineering and
hydrology. Some notable examples are Charlton (1964), Volker (1971), Water Resources
Committee (1971), Banks (1973), Bidwell (1979), DID (1973a, 1974, 1976), JICA (1980,
1982, 1989, 1990), and Syed Mohammad et al 1988). This approach is central to the 'Society
over Nature' school of thought, or technocentricism. Although technology plays an important
role in flood hazard management, it is a fallacy that it can provide the means of total
protection against all floods. Conversely, it has been observed that technology can increase
vulnerability (Jones 1991 pp37-8).
Flood hazard research in the social sciences, mostly involving geographers, has so far
proceeded along the line of the dominant North American paradigm. One of the earliest
research is Winstedt's (1927) report on the 'great flood' of 1926. Chua (1972), Leigh and
Low (1972), Abdul Samad and Tohardi (1973), Sham (1973), Abdul Samad (1974), Leigh
and Low (1983), Jamaluddin and Ismail (1983), Jamaluddin (1985) have variously studied
human response to the flood hazard. Leigh and Low (1978), Lim (1988) and Chan (1993)
have researched government and public policies on flood management while Low (1983) and
Sooryanarayana (1988) have investigated the physical aspects of flooding. Some parts of the
peninsula are affected by droughts (a minor hazard) and this phenomenon has been researched
by Chan (1981a, 1981b, 1985, 1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1991b). A summary of the principal
findings of past research is given in Appendix J.
3.5.2 The conceptual flood hazard response-in-context model
The application of the flood hazard response-in-context model for Peninsular Malaysia is an
attempt to advance hazards theory. Malaysia is one of the 'Tiger economies' of Asia,
experiencing profound and rapid physical, political and socio-economic changes. Such
changes are likely to affect both the nature of flood hazards as well as human responses to
them. The hazard response-in-context model is dynamic and takes into account such changes,
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and enables the researcher to explore the influence of macro socio-cultural, political economy
and other societal contexts, and meso institutional contexts on micro level responses of the
individual. More significantly, it seeks to identify the links between contextual forces of
different levels/scales and seeks to analyse how they interact and influence one another.
The conceptual flood hazard response-in-context model for Peninsular Malaysia is a hybrid
model reflecting both the behavioural and the structural paradigms, in addition to the current
perspective of hazards-in-context (Figure 3.4). Individual response can be effectively studied
via the behavioural paradigm, which also takes into account geophysical forces generating the
seasonal floods. The structural paradigm explores the influence of local, national and
international structures on local vulnerability to flood hazards. Local and national structures
are manifested by poverty, low residential and occupational mobility, low educational
attainment, customs and traditions, equity and communal/ethnic issues, federal-state politics
and development policies relating to flood hazards. On the other hand, international structures
are manifested by colonialism, neo-colonialism, dependency, and globalisation of the world
market system. All these structural contextual forces can lead to the creation and perpetuation
of flood hazards (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
There are a number of contexts in which flood hazards and flood hazard response are located.
Contexts are exogenous factors which often deeply pervade flood hazard creation,
perpetuation and response. Thus, they often determine the course of development of the flood
hazard, vulnerability to the hazard, and the form, extent and successfulness of hazard
response. The challenge in this research is to conceptualise the links between contexts at the
socio-political level through the institutional level down to the individual level where hazard
impacts are felt. Thus, a 'flood hazard response-in-context model' is conceptualised (Figure
3.5).
In this model, individual and institutional management of flood hazards are conceptualised
as being heavily influenced by macro socio-political contexts. These macro contexts comprise
socio-cultural and political economy forces which 'condition' individuals and institutions and
influence their approach to hazard management including its effectiveness. They also
'condition' and often 'determine' human vulnerability to hazards. These socio-political
contexts are also termed 'structural' forces and they in themselves may lead to 'failures' to
adequately address hazards. In turn, the behaviour and response of individuals are also
influenced by meso institutional contexts which sometimes amplify hazards or fail to
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Figure 3.5: A 'Flood hazard response-in-context' model for Peninsular Malaysia
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adequately address and reduce them.
Within the broader influence of socio-political and institutional contexts, individual/household
perception and response to the flood hazard is based on an initial conceptual 'Model of flood
hazard perception and response at the individual/household level' (Figure 3.6) which is an
extension of Kates's (1971) model. In this initial model, interaction between the human use
system and the physical process system creates an objective level of flood hazard. The level
of the hazard depends on (i) human use such as the type of land use, building characteristics
and the amount of damageable material wealth; and (ii) the geophysical characteristics of the
locality (mostly relating to flood characteristics). The two systems are dynamic and
modifications to either (by way of feedback mechanisms) may alter the level of the hazard.
Individual perception of the flood hazard is hypothesized to influence the degree and form
of adjustment. This perception is complex and is dependent on the individual's situation
which is determined culturally, politically, economically and socially (amongst other factors).
In terms of culture, variables such as ethnicity, religion and beliefs, and values in life are
hypothesized to affect perception. In terms of politics, the individual's perception is envisaged
to be influenced by attitudes towards government, publicity of flood mitigation schemes,
attachment to political parties and government policies. Economic well being largely
determines an individual's resilience towards the flood hazard. Finally, social characteristics
(including flood experience) and attitudes/beliefs towards the environment, education, gender
and others can also have an effect on perception. There are, however, other situational
characteristics that may have an effect on perception as well.
If, however, the flood hazard is not perceived (irrespective of whatever the actual level of
the hazard), then response is unlikely. If the flood hazard perception threshold is reached,
then the search for adjustment begins. Thereafter, the adjustment is evaluated for final
decision-making as to whether it will be adopted. The same factors that influence perception
are also hypothesised to affect the evaluation of adjustments.
Finally, broad socio-political and institutional contextual forces are hypothesised to influence
the evaluation process as well. The process does not end after an adjustment has been adopted
because any adjustment adopted will eventually have feedback effects on both the human use
system as well as the natural event system.
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Figure 3.6: Model of flood hazard perception and mitigating adjustment at the
individual/household level (After Kates, 1971)
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3.6	 Key contexts affecting flood hazard response in Peninsular Malaysia
This section identifies the 'key contexts' considered to be most important for analysis of flood
hazards and flood hazard response in Peninsular Malaysia (Table 3.1). It examines in a
general way how each key context and their 'facets' can influence both the creation and
perpetuation of the flood hazard as well as the perception and response of individuals and
organisations to floods in Peninsular Malaysia. It sets the scene against which these contexts
will be analysed empirically in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
Extending Kates's (1962) key observation, when analysing floodplain 'managers', that
individuals are 'prisoners of their experience', in a similar way they are also prisoners of
their contexts. Thus, contexts are important in any analysis of flood hazards and response to
them, and the argument extends from individuals to include organisations which are
influenced by, and reflect, the political economy context. Focusing on contexts should,
therefore, add weight and penetration to analysis. The principal problem in exploring contexts
and demonstrating their significance is methodological, and is examined in more detail in
Chapter 2. The historical method and the use of examples (case studies) are two ways in
which contexts may be approached.
3.6.1 Socio-cultural context
Many facets of the socio-cultural context are responsible for the creation and perpetuation of
flood hazards in Peninsular Malaysia. In the early years of settlement, a combination of
socio-economic factors have led to the settlers to occupy floodplains. Malays are basically
a riverine race and have, therefore, always preferred floodplains as their homes.
Consequently, flooding has gradually become an integral part of their culture. Flooding is
seen as an acceptable hazard in their lives. Interestingly, generations of experience with the
flood hazard has made the people resilient to it. They have developed traditional modes of
adjustments and can cope fairly well with normal floods'. It is the major flood that renders
them helpless with the majority unable to recover sufficiently for the next planting season.
The `kampung way of life', the stilt house and traditional warning and evacuation mechanisms
are cultural adaptations that have evolved from living with floods (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8).
Malay culture is profoundly different (in many ways it is in direct contrast) to Chinese or
See Section 2.1 for definition of normal and major floods.
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Table 3.1: Key contexts and facets which affect the flood hazard in Peninsular Malaysia
Key context	 Facets of context
Socio-cultural	 Historical settlement
Colonialism
Ethnic culture (ethnicity, values, beliefs, attitudes, religion,
customs, tradition, the `kampung way of life', land ownership
and inheritance, outlook in life, etc.)
Political economy
	 Neo-colonialism
Economic development policies
Flood hazard policies
Federal-state politics
Post-colonial communalism
Equity and poverty eradication
Institutional	 Laws
Organisational structures
Attitudes, values and culture
Policies and instruments
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Indian cultures. The majority of Malays live a quiet and sedentary life in rural kampungs
contented with religious pursuits while immigrant Chinese and Indians engage feverishly in
business and other material pursuits in the cities' s . Consequently, the ways in which each
ethnic group perceive and respond to flood hazards can differ. Ethnicity is an important facet
affecting flood hazard response.
The facet of colonialism has profound influence on flood hazard response in Peninsular
Malaysia. British colonial rule for more than three-quarters of a century in the peninsula is
reflected in many spheres, including the economic (as in exploitation of the Malayan
economy, uneven regional development favouring resource-rich states, neo-colonialism and
imperialism), political (as in political systems modelled after colonials), institutional (as in
hazard institutions set up by colonial powers or modelled after colonials) and social (as in the
practice of communalism and the immiseration of peasant farmers). In the hazards literature,
researchers such as Susman et al (1983) have demonstrated that many catastrophes in the
Third World are due to structural imbalances and maladaptations to the new economic system
introduced via colonialism which displaced more resilient indigenous systems of production.
Consumerism and the western market system break down the traditional way of life via the
injection of such western cultures into them (Said 1991). Marxist interpretations of
colonialism have stressed its negative dimensions (Marx and Engels 1976; Brett 1973;
Cardoso and Faletto 1979). In Peninsular Malaysia, Hua (1983) has highlighted the
mechanisms of perpetuating oppression that maintain the conditions responsible for Malaysia's
economic subordination to metropolitan capital despite having achieved independence for
more than three decades. This negative effect of core-periphery relations has determined the
way in which many aspects of the Malaysian economy has developed.
3.6.2 Political economy context
In this research, the political economy context covers those facets associated with political,
social and economic systems which can amplify or attenuate flood hazards. For example,
'Neo-colonialism' is a facet through which developed western economies exploit the
economies of developing countries. It usually leads to dependency problems which reinforces
'core-periphery' relations (Brett 1973; Fong 1989). Consequently, the developing country's
35 The first Chinese and Indian immigrants came to the peninsula with only one aim, i.e.
to make their fortune. Hence, their almost total involvement with commerce and business.
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economy is weakened through this exploitative process and has less resources to deal with
hazards, thereby becoming more vulnerable. A country's development policies (including
flood management strategies and policies, government aid and relief, formal/official warning
and evacuation systems) are translated from political ideology. Ill-conceived policies can
amplify hazards and also contribute to increased flood risk, population exposure and
vulnerability. The Malaysian government's emphasis on using technological solutions may
prove ineffective and can lead to increased vulnerability. Equity and poverty eradication are
key political ideologies preached by successive Malaysian governments since independence.
The extent to which these two facets are resolved can have significant effects on flood hazard
reduction. For example, if rural income levels are raised vis-a-vis urban incomes, and
poverty levels are significantly reduced, then vulnerability would be reduced proportionately.
Better off rural peasants (mostly floodplain dwellers) will be able to recover faster from flood
impacts. Communalism is a common ideology practised amongst the majority of political
parties in Peninsular Malaysia (Mahathir Bin Mohamad 1970). The colonialists have used it
effectively to segregate the various ethnic groups, culminating in immigrant Chinese and
Indians becoming rich citizens and indigenous Malays (mostly floodplain dwellers) remaining
poor. Communalism has now taken on a new dimension in that there are sections of all
communities being left behind in economic progress. While previously there are mainly poor
Malays in remote kampungs, there are now poor Chinese in new villages' and poor Indians
in rubber estates. Related to communalism is the process of differentiation (in terms of
income and opportunity) and marginalization (in terms of social allocation whereby peasants
are being forced to occupy marginal land) which lead to the immiseration of rural peasants
(Nonini 1992). Impoverished peasants are therefore most vulnerable to flood hazards. Finally,
the urban version of rural peasants are the landless and homeless 'squatters' the majority
whom are rural peasants who have migrated into the cities to look for a better living,.
Inevitably, high land prices and rents in cities have driven the migrants to inhabit hazardous
zones, most notable of which are flood-prone riverine areas. Combined with poor education
and low occupational mobility, urban squatters are forced to persist in these areas and become
very vulnerable to flood hazards.
36 The Chinese 'new village' was created during the 'Emergency' (1948-60), a period
when Malaya faced the threat of communist terrorists operating under the Communist Party
of Malaya (CPM). It is a nucleated type of rural settlement surrounded by barbed wires
employed by the British, ostensibly, to stop rural Chinese from giving supplies to the
communists (who operated from the Malayan jungle). Thousands of these new villages were
created during the emergency. However, it is a dual-purpose strategy employed to segregate
the different ethnic groups as well as to suppress the MCP (see Hua 1983 pp94-9).
93
3.6.3 Institutional context
In Peninsular Malaysia, flood hazard management is almost an exclusive responsibility of the
government. As in many other countries, floodplain management is an activity occurring
within an institutional context. Although general development policies are formulated by the
federal government (at the political economy level), the formulation of flood hazard policies,
their implementation and enforcement, action during floods, and day-to-day operations are
vested in flood hazard institutions. Management of the flood hazard is done either directly
or indirectly by flood hazard institutions set up by the government and government owned
flood hazard organisations such as the DID, MMS, Police Department, Welfare Department
and others. The government, therefore, interacts with the public through institutions.
Institutions form the link between socio-political contexts and the individual. Within such a
scenario, flood hazard reduction then largely depends on how effective flood hazard
institutions are. Flood hazard institutions can either reduce flood hazards through effective
management or amplify them through mismanagement or failures.
There are four facets of the institutional context which can determine the outcome of flood
hazards. Legislation is a key factor in effective flood hazard management. Laws, regulations,
administrative jurisdiction, enforcement powers, duties and responsibilities, and
interventionary powers are important tools for the government to control and enforce flood
reduction programmes. Flood hazard management will be effective if all the above 'tools' are
adequately legislated and vice versa. Organisational structures demarcates the
responsibilities, functions and powers of an organisation. Thus, organisational objectives
largely determine the way in which flood hazard management will be undertaken. Within this
framework also lies administrative structures, administrative discretion, duplication of
responsibilities, fragmentation and administrative flexibility, all of which influence the
effectiveness of the organisation and therefore the extent to which the flood hazard can be
reduced. Attitudes and sub-culture are developed over the life time of an organisation.
Organisations can develop specific values, attitudes, customs and sub-cultures amongst its
corporate structure which in turn influence decision-making. Policies and instruments are
other 'tools' employed by institutions in the management of flood hazards. To a large extent,
policies determine the degree to which the flood hazard can be alleviated. Ill-defined policies
can lead to the amplification of flood hazards. A policy embracing 'sustainable development'
will help reduce flood hazards but such a policy is often viewed by developing countries as
a hindrance to rapid economic development. In a developing country such as Malaysia, a
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balance must be sought between the need for rapid economic development and the
achievement of sustainability in the long run. 'Equity' and 'poverty eradication' are policies
pursued by the federal government. They should also be policies embraced by institutions (not
necessarily concerned with flood hazard) as success in both will undoubtedly bring about
more balanced regional development and more equitable income distribution amongst the
people. Rural inhabitants with better incomes can then recover faster from hazard impacts and
respond more effectively with better means of adjustments. However, if institutions do not
embrace and implement such policies, it can only increase vulnerability resulting in more
severe impacts.
This chapter has critically examined the dominant hazards paradigms, identified key flood
hazard contexts and developed a 'hazard response-in-context' model. The next chapter focuses
on the socio-cultural and political economy contexts, two key contexts that have contributed
significantly to the creation and perpetuation of flood hazards in Peninsular Malaysia.
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4	 THE SOCIO-CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY CONTEXTS OF
FLOOD HAZARD RESPONSE IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
In Chapter 3, key contexts and their facets affecting the flood hazard were identified. This
chapter focuses on the socio-cultural context and political economy context and their facets.
This is an empirical chapter in which a combination of historical analysis, qualitative and
quantitative analysis, and the insider approach is employed to analyse the creation and
perpetuation of the flood hazard within the influence of the above two key contexts. The
institutional context is analysed in Chapter 5.
4.1	 Socio-cultural context
4.1.1 Historical patterns of settlement
The early settlers chose to live on floodplains near the major rivers for a number of reasons
such as water supply, agriculture, communications and transport, fishing and tin mining.
Historical records indicate that the first major Malay settlements were in the floodplains of
Kedah and other northern or north-eastern states (Mahathir Bin Mohamad 1970 p21).
Abundance of land and geographical considerations have made the Malays 'people of the
lowlands'. Land was plentiful in the more accessible river valleys and floodplains for
everyone. The hills and jungle in the interior were never necessary for cultivation or
permanent settlement. Furthermore, rice is the stable food of the Malays and padi farming
is their main occupation. As the padi plant needs water-logged soils and flat land, floodplains
are the ideal locations for extensive cultivation. Hence the early Malay settlers became
primarily plainsmen, padi farmers and fishermen who lived on the banks of rivers. The rivers
became their principal means of communication, source of fish and other aquatic food supply,
and ironically also their sewerage system. Gradually, small settlements grew into towns and
those that are located near the confluences (which commanded both inland and sea
communications) soon became the capitals of local chiefs or rulers.
According to Kennedy (1967 p123), the geography of the peninsula was the principal factor
that determined the pattern of settlement in Malaya. The typical Malay kingdom was based
on settlements along a major river valley. Usually, the capital lay near the river estuary so
that the ruler could control the movements of people and goods in and out of the state,
organise defence against enemy attacks, and levy tolls and taxes on imports and exports. The
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river served as the main, and often sole means of communication, while the jungle, swamps
and mountains which form the hinterland acted as natural barriers. Some examples of such
settlements are the royal town of Kuala Kangsar on the banks of the Perak River (where the
residence of the Perak Sultan is located), Pekan on the Pahang River (where the residence
of the Pahang Sultan is located), Kuala Terengganu on the Terengganu River, Alor Setar on
the Muda River, and Kota Bharu on the Kelantan River. As a result, the majority of present
day cities and towns in the peninsula are located adjacent to or near rivers, giving rise to a
large flood-prone population and a high damage potential (see Figure 2.7).
The growth of large settlements were mostly on fertile river valleys and delta regions where
flat land and rich alluvial soils were found. Some of the early padi settlements which have
survived until the present day include the Kedah Plain (on the Kedah and Muda Rivers), the
Kelantan Delta (on the Kelantan River), the Seberang Prai Region (on the Muda River Delta),
the Krian Region (on the Kerian River), and the Terengganu Plain (on the Terengganu
River). In the present day, these areas are no longer solely made up of padi fields but are all
densely populated with compact built-up areas. For instance, Kota Bharu and Kuala
Terengganu are capital towns located on the Kelantan Delta and Terengganu Plain
respectively. Because of their location, these are vulnerable areas as they are subject to
seasonal flooding as well as flash flooding. Those located on river estuaries and deltas are
also subject to tidal floods. As padi farmers are one of the poorest income groups in the
country (Chan 1991a p35), they are also one of the most vulnerable communities to flood
hazards. It has been estimated that 57.7 per cent of farmers were living below the 'poverty
line' (see definition on pxx) in 1991 (International Law Book Services 1991 p234). In the
current study, the 95 farmers surveyed yielded an average monthly household income of
$346, well below the 1993 poverty line of $394 per month. The farming community,
therefore, has one of the highest incidence of poverty in the country. This implies that the
majority of farmers will find it financially difficult to cope with flood hazards, and to recover
and rehabilitate. Hence their high vulnerability to flood hazards.
Fishing was an indigenous occupation amongst the Malays, long before the British came to
Malaya. According to Winstedt (1951), fishing was a significant form of indigenous economic
activity. A significant proportion of indigenous Malays are specialised fishermen who live in
fishing villages dotted along all major river estuaries and river banks. The long coastline of
the peninsula is also ideal for fishing activities. These are all areas which are highly
vulnerable to the flood hazard not just by virtue of their proximity to rivers and seas, but also
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their low-lying topography and the threat of the monsoons (particularly those settlements on
the East Coast). When the weather is good and there is demand for fish, padi farmers are
sometimes enlisted as part-time fishermen. In fact, a significant number of padi farmers
engage in part-time fishing and other economic activities during the season immediately after
transplanting and harvest. This is the period when they have the most free time. In 1951,
Winstedt (1951 p122) estimated that there were about 50,000 Malay fishermen (mostly on
the East Coast) and another 10,000 Chinese fishermen (mostly on the West Coast). In 1992,
Keng (1992) estimated that there were 115,000 fishermen of which Malays comprised nearly
90.0 per cent and Chinese 9.0 per cent. The fishing community is also one of the poorest
groups in Malaysian society. In 1991, it was estimated that 27.7 per cent of fishing
households were below the poverty line (International Law Book Services 1991 p234). In the
current study, fishermen had the lowest average household incomes ($325 per month) of all
income groups surveyed. Thus, 57.2 per cent of fishing families have monthly incomes below
$350, and are, therefore, poor. Although the fishing community is well attuned to normal
flooding and nature in a way that others are not (76.2 per cent of fishermen interviewed are
aware of flood hazards), they remain one of the most vulnerable to major floods because of
their low income. Fishing settlements have not developed and prospered in the way mining
settlements have. They remain a permanent feature of the rural Malaysian landscape. For
example, present day fishing settlements are found in the coastal parts of Kota Bharu, Kuala
Terengganu, Kemaman, Pekan, Kelang, Teluk Intan and others. Because of the high poverty
rate within the farming and fishing communities vis-a-vis other communities, income equity
is a central issue in Malaysian society that needs to be addressed (see Chapter 8, Section 8.3).
Finally, mining towns have also evolved significantly in the peninsula. Although tin has been
mined for local use and export (mainly to China) since the Melaka Sultanate in the 16th
Century, it was not until the industrialisation of the west in early 19th Century, particularly
with the rise of the tin canning industry, that the tin rush began in the peninsula. The early
Chinese miners settled close to the major rivers wherever large deposits of alluvial tin were
found. Thus, the federal capital of Kuala Lumpur was founded at the confluence of the
Kelang and Gombak Rivers because of tin (Gullick 1983; Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council
1959) (see Plate 2.2). Other big settlements to have a tin origin were Ipoh (on the Kinta
River), Kampar (on the Kampar River), Taiping (on the Krian River), Sungai Lembing (on
the Lembing River), and Sungai Siput (on the Perak River). The mining settlements were also
located near rivers because Chinese gravel and hydraulic pump methods necessitated the use
of water from the rivers. Because the settlements were near to rivers, they were easily subject
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to periodic seasonal flooding. Also, mining exposed the land surface to erosion. This leads
to more rapid and higher rates of runoff, a shorter time lag between rainfall and flood flow,
and greater flood peaks. According to Leigh and Low (1972, 1978), mining activities are one
of the major factors leading to increased flooding in the major tin producing areas of the
country. The breaking of bunds which prevented the water from mining ponds to flow into
adjacent low land where settlements are located is another threat of flooding (see Appendix
I, 1963 flood). There were several cases of such localised flooding in Ipoh in the late 1970s
(DID undated a).
4.1.2 Colonialism
A brief historical background is necessary as a prelude to the analysis of the influence of
colonialism on the flood hazard in Peninsular Malaysia. Although western colonial influence
began with the Portuguese capture of the port of Melaka (then Malacca) in 1511, it was the
British who most deeply influenced much of the peninsula's history. The British first
colonised and set up trading posts at the ports of Pulau Pinang (then Penang) in 1786,
Singapore' in 1819 and Melaka in 1824. When the British signed the Treaty of Pangkor
with a Malay ruler in 1874, it marked the beginning of British colonial rule in the region
which was to last more than three-quarters of a century.
Although direct influence of colonialism on the flood ha72rd in Peninsular Malaysia can be
seen in flood policies during the colonial and post-colonial periods, its 'indirect' influence is
more profound in terms of colonial exploitation of the economy, development policies,
communal ethnic policies, agriculture policies, rapid economic development, and the
introduction of cash cropping. Each of these points are analysed in detail in the following
sections.
(a)	 Colonial flood policies and their influence on current flood management approach
Early flood management policies and strategies were developed by the colonialists and the
current approach is modelled after them. The DID, the agency now responsible for flood
management in Malaysia, was initially set up in 1932 by the British. As a result, much of its
37 Singapore was part of Malaysia until 1965 when it elected to be an independent
republic.
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organisational structure and the way it functions, especially its emphasis on agricultural
interests (mainly drainage and irrigation) via the engineering approach, is modelled after the
British. Thus, it is no coincidence that the prime responsibility of flood alleviation and land
drainage in Britain rests with the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Consequently,
British flood alleviation and land drainage policies emphasise agriculture interests based
largely on the skill of the engineer (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986 p172). Before the formation
of the DID, river conservancy was the responsibility of the Public Works Department
(PWD), another agency set-up by the British which focuses on engineering solutions. During
the 1920s, a number of flood mitigation schemes were undertaken by the PWD, notably in
Kuala Lumpur and Ipoh situated on the Kiang and Kinta Rivers respectively. In these two
schemes, only engineering solutions were used as the two rivers were canalised, embanked
and shallow sections dredged periodically (DID 1973b pix). This essentially British culture
of employing engineering solutions, a 'tech-fix' approach, continued right through
independence until today. This is proven by the continued employment of British firms in
many of the country's hydrological and flood management schemes. A recent notorious
example is the construction of the Pergau Dam (a multi-purpose dam incorporating flood
control features) in which British firms were guaranteed contracts worth millions of ringgit
(Davidson and Rufford 1994).
Although post-colonial governments in Malaysia have reportedly adopted a more
comprehensive multi-disciplinary approach in flood management (Water Resources Committee
1971), flood problems continue to be predominantly approached by structural or engineering
solutions (JICA 1982). Since 1971, flood management became the official responsibility of
the DID. It adheres strictly to engineering solutions of 'flood control' and is largely
dominated by engineers (see Chapter 5). This is very much a British culture as flood
management in Britain has mainly been the responsibility of the predecessors of the National
Rivers Authority (NRA), organisations largely dominated by engineers. The NRA is an
organisation dominated by engineers and its approach to flood management has been based
on structural/engineering methods. In recent years, however, the NRA has moved on and
adopted a multi-disciplinary approach to flood management, but their Malaysian counterparts
such as the DID have failed to follow suit and are still predominantly employing the
engineering approach. Because of this, structural measures of flood control is the norm and
non-structural measures are under-developed. The comprehensive analysis in Chapter 5
demonstrates this point effectively.
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The hallmark of British bureaucracy is its 'culture of secrecy' which impedes the free flow
of information to the public (Parker and Handmer 1992 p258-65). According to the authors,
such a culture is one factor that sets the conditions which encourage the perpetuation of
hazards and the occurrence of accidents, emergencies and disasters. Such a culture is also
practised in the Malaysian administrative bureaucracy for national security reasons, but as
shown in Britain, it can lead to ineffective hazard management. The bureaucratic
infrastructure of the Malaysian administrative system was originally created by the British.
It was the British who set up district offices and land offices so that they (the governing body)
could extend their rule to the most remote parts of the peninsula (International Law Book
Services 1991 p92). Although many changes have been made since independence, the
bureaucratic nature of doing things from one administrative level to another (e.g. from the
federal level down to the mukim [the lowest official administrative unit] level) or between
government agencies still prevails until today. In terms of the flood hazard this can be seen
from the inability of different government departments to cooperate and work effectively to
manage the flood hazard. For instance, the DID often has difficulty convincing other agencies
not to develop certain floodplain regions.
(b)	 Colonial exploitation of the Malayan economy
Various theories on the reasons for western imperialism in countries in the far east have been
expounded. In the case of Malaya, the most prominent is that of economic gains based on the
Marxist perspective (often the sole reason given) (Hobson 1961; Sinclair 1967; Badriyah Haji
Salleh 1990). Others like Fieldhouse (1966) are of the opinion that British intervention
resulted from the initiative and private interests of individuals (mostly British officials). Yet,
others, notably the British themselves, have claimed that the main reason for British
intervention in the affairs of the Malay states during the late 19th Century (subsequently
leading to colonisation and rule over Malaya) was to bring law and order to the region so that
trade could be carried out without disruptions caused by Malay feudal disputes and Chinese
secret societies scuffles (Kennedy 1967 pp 156-7). Whatever the reason, it is undeniable that
without economic gains (the British had already considerable interests in the three Straits
Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore prior to intervention), they would not have
set foot in the Malay peninsula.
However, this section is not about the reasons which brought about intervention. Rather, it
is about how the colonial government differentially exploited the peninsula's resources,
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drained its revenues (both through over-subscription to Imperial defence and other
contributions as well as through profits channelled out of the country via British and other
European enterprises). They failed to develop the rural economy which led to large sections
of the population, as well as large parts of the peninsula, remaining poor and thereby
becoming vulnerable to the flood hazard. They also laid the basis for today's rapid
urbanization in the West Coast states which in itself is a force generating increased flood risk
and exposure (This is examined in Section 4.1.2 f).
Li (1982) criticises the British for overly exploiting 'one of the richest colonies of the 'British
Empire' 38 . The effect of British colonial rule on Malaya's economy can be seen in two
areas. First, although tin and rubber made the economy prosper, this prosperity was seldom
enjoyed by the masses. Much of it went to large British and European companies. The
majority of the masses, especially the indigenous Malays, remained poor. Second, because
the colonial government's interest and focus was almost entirely on tin and rubber (and other
cash crops), it paid scant attention to rural development and almost totally neglected padi
farming39 . This resulted in vast regions of the country being undeveloped and large sections
of the population being impoverished.
Tin and rubber are the two stalwarts on which the economic history of Malaya has evolved.
Although the rise of the latter as the single most important export during the first quarter of
the 20th century can be described as nothing short of sensational (Li 1982 p62), tin has had
a much longer history. From 1898 to 1905, Malaya was the world's largest tin producer,
supplying more than half of the world's output. Tin was the single most important factor
leading to British intervention and subsequent formation of the four 'Federated Malay
38 At the turn of the century, the colony which came closest to British Malaya in terms
of revenue was Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) which for 1899 had a revenue of £1.7 million as
compared to £2 million for British Malaya. However, while the former had a population of
more than 3.3 million, the latter had a population of only 1.2 million. Thus, in per capita
population terms, the British government in Malaya was probably three times richer than its
counterpart in Ceylon (Li 1982 p13).
39 Although it is unrealistic to expect British capitalists to invest money in the padi
farming industry which at best could yield only meagre profits, it is a moral responsibility
of the colonial government to do so. That it did not goes a long way to prove that the latter
also had its mind firmly set on exploitation of rich resources and not on the welfare of the
people.
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States' 4° in 1895. The British neglected the `Unfederated Malay States' which were not rich
in tin deposits contributing to their under-development, impoverishment and vulnerability to
the flood hazard (see Section 4.1.2 c). Before the British came the Chinese were the main
producers of tin in the peninsula but the British with larger investment capitals and superior
mining techniques soon replaced and 'marginalized' the Chinese miners. For instance,
Chinese share of the tin production fell from 78.0 per cent in 1910 to 32.0 per cent in 1937
while British share rose from 22.0 per cent in 1910 to 68.0 per cent in 1937 (Li 1982 p66).
By 1960, three years after independence, the European (mostly British) share of production
was still 60.0 per cent, and the returns from the tin industry played a major role in keeping
the sterling area afloat (Karim 1990 p134).
However, it was not just the free enterprise system that defeated the Chinese miners. It must
be mentioned that the British capitalists were supported and favoured in many ways (as in the
issuance of mining licences and concessions for example) by their own government. Official
policies and favouritism were the factors that killed off Chinese competition as a series of
enactments established official control over the industry. According to the enactments, the
most important criteria for the granting of a mining licence was the amount of capital a firm
could raise and because of their larger capitals, British firms were naturally favoured. The
corruption of the Mines Department was also notorious, even before the sensational trials of
a number of high-ranking officers in 1940 (Thompson 1943 p71; Li 1982 p67). As if such
factors were not enough to eliminate Chinese competition, a series of international tin
agreements or schemes to control tin production (thereby stabilising tin prices) during the
1930s finally removed even the most resilient of the remaining Chinese mines. The effect of
the agreements favoured large producers (British) as when the tin quota was low, they could
easily pool their resources and fulfil it without the help of the small Mmes. As such, small
mines had to close or stay idle during times of low quotas. It was during times of high quotas
when the large mines could not fulfil them that the small mines had a chance to produce, thus
making them 'marginal producers'. Gradually, a combination of the use of tin dredges
(British and other European) and the closure of small mines (Chinese) led to the
unemployment and impoverishment of thousands of Chinese miners. For example, before the
4° The Federated Malay States comprising Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan (all on the
West Coast) and Pahang (on the East Coast) were formed in 1896 with the Resident-General's
headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and a resident in each of the four states. In the case of
Pahang, only its western part, largely comprising undulating topography suitable for rubber
cultivation, was developed by the British.
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quota system on production was introduced in 1931, the average total labour force was about
100,000 men but by 1937 it had dwindled down to only 49,000 (Thompson 1943 p75).
Finally, the British also controlled and monopolised the tin smelting business in Malaya and
the world. The control of Malaya's tin industry is evident of Britain's almost total domination
and exploitation of its economy.
In terms of rubber production, Europeans were able to wrest large areas in concessions from
a predominantly British Civil Service who, directly or indirectly, were in control of the whole
country. According to Badriyah (1990 p260), the colonial government clearly favoured British
and other European investors in the rubber industry. This is evident not only in the liberal
allocation of land and the charging of low rentals for new estates but also in the government's
direct involvement in bringing in foreign labourers (most notably Indians) to work in them.
By 1953, Europeans owned 83.0 per cent of rubber estates covering some 0.65 million
hectares (Puthucheary 1960 p27). In contrast, the Chinese owned smaller estates amounting
to 14.0 per cent of the total hectarage and the Malays were mostly smallholders (plots of less
than 40 hectares). Other than the direct control in the rubber industry exerted by their
dominant hectarage, the colonial government also employed rubber restriction schemes to
limit production levels of smallholders, thereby reducing their competition.
In commerce where most of Malaya's economic activity were in the production of exports
and the distribution of imports, British control was almost total. Practically all the import-
export houses in colonial Malaya were British or at least European and they were protected
by the colonial government without any need for legislation (Mahathir Bin Mohamad 1970
p48). European companies did not merely control the major share of both tin and rubber
production but also in their exports as well. For instance, the Dunlop Organisation, apart
from owning extensive rubber estates in the country, was also one of the world's most
important supplier and manufacturer of rubber products. Because of this, European companies
also controlled much of the trade in Malaya. About 60.0 per cent of exports in 1953 were
done by the producers and manufacturers themselves (Puthucheary 1960 p62). The import
of highly specialised machinery and other products needed by European companies was also
dealt by themselves. And the bulk of the imported goods was handled by large European
companies. Imported goods from these large companies were then distributed to smaller
intermediary companies (mostly European and Chinese) which then re-distributed them to the
Chinese middleman who usually owns a `kedai' (retail shop) in the town or village. The kedai
is not an indigenous feature of pre-colonial Malay culture but was introduced by Chinese
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immigrants during the colonial period. Its intrusion into the kampung represents the first
introduction of capitalism into the subsistence economy of the indigenous Malays. More
significantly, however, it played an important role in breaking down the self-sufficiency of
the traditional economy rendering it more vulnerable to the flood hazard. Throughout this
distribution process, the Malays are not involved at all and therefore gain no benefit from the
trade. They not only remained as peasant farmers and fishermen but because of the rapid
change from a subsistence economy to a capitalistic one, they grew more dependent on the
kedai for goods (the traditional ones which they previously produced and new goods from
other states or imported goods). As a result, their resilience and coping mechanisms with
regards to the flood hazard were weakened if not lost completely. And they became more
vulnerable to floods, especially the severe floods.
In other areas of the economy, the British also controlled the whole of the banking business
as well as the shipping sector. In the former, British banks were patronised by British mining
and rubber companies and other concerns. Initially, the banks were set up to deal largely with
the financing of the import-export business, especially that connected to tin and rubber but
later branched out to include other businesses. In the latter, almost all ships plying the
international routes had British or European firms as their agents in Malaya. With this grip
on shipping, the exclusion of local firms from the import and export business was complete.
Finally, British firms also had a firm grip on the lucrative government contracts for
construction and supplies as they were naturally favoured by the British run government.
Major construction works such as roads, bridges, public buildings, and dams had ready
contractors in British firms. Not surprisingly, major colonial government contracts for
construction and supplies were often a closely guarded monopoly of British firms. According
to Mahathir Bin Mohamad (1970 p49),
`..So institutionalized was the doling out of contracts to the British firms, that
the brass plaques on foundation stones which were put on all Government
buildings often carried the name of the British firm or the contractor himself,
a practice which is unthinkable today.'
Finally, British colonial exploitation of Malaya's economy must be seen in light of the large
amount of funds contributed by Malaya to the home government in Britain for military and
other imperial expenses. Apart from expenditure on railway, roads and other public works,
a large amount of the annual revenue of the peninsula was consumed by military expenses.
This was rather odd as prior to the 2nd World War, British Malaya was not involved in any
war. According to Li (1982 p28), this was largely due to Malaya's own wealth as the home
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government in Britain was not slow in casting a covetous eye on Malaya's rich resources. To
help fund its imperial defence, Britain wanted Malaya to contribute the highest possible
amount for local and imperial expense. For instance, from 1890 to 1895, the Straits
Settlements were ordered by the Colonial Office to pay £100,000 annually for military
expenses. This was then fixed at 20.0 per cent of the Colony's revenue in 1899 which totalled
$1.9 million' (Emerson 1964 p309). In 1931, the local government managed to persuade
the home government to fix the annual contribution at $4 million. Apart from the above
'regular' contributions to imperial defence, Malaya was also generous in military
contributions known as 'special circumstances'. For example, in 1899, it contributed $65,000
to the Boer War (Parliamentary Debates, 19th July 1923, V166, p2618). Its contribution
towards the Imperial War Exchequer during World War I was at least £15 million (Annual
Report of the Straits Settlements for 1916). Malaya also contributed towards the construction
of a battleship named 'Malaya' (part of the Imperial fleet) at a cost of £2.25 million. Another
£2 million was given for the construction of the greatest naval base in the far east
(Parliamentary Debates, 13 May 1914, V62, p1088). It is estimated that from the end of
World War I to 1938, Malaya contributed no less than £22.25 million to imperial defence
(Parliamentary Debates, 24 June 1942, pp1992-3).
It would not be difficult to imagine how the Malayan economy, and indeed flood hazard
management might have benefited if all the resources exploited by the colonialists were not
channelled out of the country but into the development of these two areas. The above point
is reflected by Leigh and Low (1978 p53), who stressed that the cireveaiea of cwaSeN fioods
in the 1940s was beyond the capability of the Malayan government because of inadequate
financial resources. Whilst vulnerability to the flood hazard during the colonial period may
in large part be attributed to all the above reasons brought about by colonial rule, the
inheritance of a much exploited economy in 1957 meant that such vulnerability would
continue, at least until all the problems created by the colonialists could be overcome. This
may take a long time as the economy of post-colonial Malaya (at least during the first few
decades after independence) was still very much dominated by British and European interests,
with Chinese interest increasingly taking a stronger foothold. Thus, the Malayan economy
may not be in a position to spend on flood hazard reduction strategies as much as it would
need to. Consequently, flood hazard vulnerability perpetuated, especially in the traditionally
41 This amount was only second to personal emoluments totalling $2.9 million paid out
to the elaborate bureaucracy. Here again, as the top flight government officers were British,
a significant percentage of this amount were channelled back to Britain.
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impoverished areas.
(c)	 Colonial policies of uneven regional development
Although British colonial rule is largely responsible for developing much of Malaya, it also
gave rise to wide disparities in regional development. The colonialists were only interested
in states that were either rich in tin or rubber. Thus, the Federated Malay States were rapidly
developed to facilitate the increased exploitation of both commodities while the other states
were neglected and lagged further and further behind. Consequently, this has led to wide
disparities in regional economic development within the peninsula. Paying a visit to Malaya
before World War II, Li (1982 p24) remarked that:
`..one could not but be impressed with the fine government buildings, good
roads, comfortable travel by rail, schools and medical services in the
Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements. The situation was not as
good in the Unfederated Malay States.'
Wide regional development disparities, therefore, developed between the Federated and
Unfederated Malay States. For instance, during the early decades of the 20th century, the
state of Perak (one of four Federated Malay States under British rule) was much more
developed than Kelantan which was virtually untouched by modern economic development
and thereby retaining its Malayan backwardness. And the Straits Settlements were even more
developed than the four Federated Malay States due to their early colonisation. In 1936 total
revenue for the four Federated Malays States was $68 million (averages about $17 million
each) as compared to only $3.2 million' for Kelantan. This is precisely where the problem
lies. Because the British were only interested in exploiting tin and rubber they concentrated
on developing the Federated Malay States. Of the four Federated Malay States, Perak and
Selangor were the richest in terms of revenue, and were therefore developed more rapidly
than the other two states of Negri Sembilan and Pahang which lagged a long way behind
(Kennedy 1967 p197). In fact, Pahang (an East Coast state) was the least attractive to the
British. It neither had any large reserves of tin nor was it suitable for rubber. Thus Pahang
was the least developed and had the poorest communications and other infrastructures. And
since it was in the East Coast and therefore exposed to the Northeast Monsoon winds, its
population living on floodplains was very vulnerable to the seasonal floods. Other than the
42 This figure is for 1937 (from Annual Reports of the Federated Malay States and
Kelantan).
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Federated Malay States, the three Straits Settlements were the most developed as they were
all ports which handled the flow of almost all goods in and out of the country. The least
developed were the Unfederated Malay States, notably Kelantan and Terengganu on the East
Coast and Kedah and Perlis in the northeast'. Of these, Kelantan and Terengganu are the
least developed and therefore the most vulnerable to floods as both are exposed to the
Northeast Monsoon winds.
Undeniably, colonial contextual forces are at least partly responsible for disparities in incomes
and development between regions (up to independence). In other words, such forces are
responsible for the creation of 'cores' and 'peripheries' in relation to each other. According
to King and Parnwell (1990 p1), core areas are economically well developed, where the
inhabitants are generally richer, and have greater access over the peninsula's material
resources. They are also usually highly industrialised and urbanised, and have good
infrastructure and essential services. On the other hand, peripheral areas are those which do
not have the above mentioned attributes of core areas. In Peninsular Malaysia, cores and
peripheries can be identified in terms of states (as in Kuala Lumpur being the core and
Kelantan being the periphery) or regions (as in the West Coast being the core and the East
Coast being the periphery).
Because of the existence of core and peripheral areas, there are also disparities in the coping
capacities of regions, states, and people during floods. Consequently, perpetuation of
peripheral areas is one of the reasons why certain regions are more vulnerable to the flood
hazard than others. For instance, although East Coast states are generally well adjusted to
'normal' floods, poor states such as Kelantan and Terengganu cannot cope with major floods
and take a much longer period to rehabilitate and recover. Because of this disparity, the
current federal government is obliged to help the poorer states during flood emergencies.
Every year, a significant amount of money is spent on flood hazard preparedness, relief and
rehabilitation (Majlis Keselamatan Negara 1992).
As a result of more than three-quarters of a century of colonial rule, rigidly set policies have
' Perlis replaced a Siamese advisor with a British advisor after the Anglo-Siamese Treaty
in 1909. Johor, because of its close proximity to Singapore, had British influence since the
latter was founded in 1819 but a formal British advisor was only taken in 1914. Terengganu
was given British protection in 1910 and accepted a British advisor in 1919. Finally, Kedah
had British advice and assistance since 1910 but only formally accepted a British advisor in
1923.
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reinforced and deepened economic disparities between states and regions. Certain states and
regions have been so neglected that it may take many decades for them to catch up with the
developed states and regions. Such disparities are still very prevalent in the country today.
In fact, the disparities are so large that post-colonial governments have not been able to
effectively reduce them. In many areas, the disparities are increasing. Credit, however, must
be given to post-colonial governments for realising such disparities and introducing
development policies to redress the situation, although the efforts have been largely
ineffective as richer states have forged even further ahead of those lagging behind (Faaland
et al 1990). Thus, it would not be entirely wrong to suggest that flood hazard vulnerability
in the poorer states and regions of post-independent Malaya was largely contributed by
colonial development policy.
(d)	 Colonial communal policies of ethnic segregation
British policy in Malaya was based on the colonial ideology of harmony and consensus
combined with a policy of 'Racial divide and rule' in which the various ethnic groups are
segregated (Abraham 1976). Hirschman (1985) offers the interpretation that 'racial divisions'
in the peninsula are largely a product of British colonial practices. Although the British
encouraged large scale immigration of Chinese and Indians, the immigrants were not thrown
into contact with Malays, but were segregated geographically, economically and socially from
the local population. Thus, Malays continued to live in rural areas (mostly on floodplains as
they were farmers), the Chinese in mining towns and other urban centres (as they were
mostly miners and businessmen) and the Indians in rubber estates and towns (as they were
mostly rubber tappers, traders and government labourers who worked on roads and railways).
It was largely a result of this policy that led to the inuniseration of the Malays (mostly
peasants during colonial rule) on one hand and their marginalization and proletarianization
on the other (Nonini 1992). And because of this policy, the Malays have largely remained
trapped in their farms on the floodplain even until today. Although Malay peasants are quite
well adjusted to 'normal' flooding as the majority live in stilt houses and have developed
many coping strategies (see Chapter 7), they are the poorest and most vulnerable group to
severe flooding in the peninsula and are likely to remain so.
British colonialists perceived Malay peasants as most suitable for padi cultivation, fishing and
other rural economic activities and should therefore remain subsistence producers. This
official view became an obstruction for peasant economic mobility as it discouraged peasants
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from moving into other jobs (in the towns) and plant cash crops. The colonialists simply
wanted them to remain in rural areas in order to sustain the food supply for the Chinese (who
worked in mines, cities and towns) and the Indians (who worked in the rubber estates). The
Malays were never encouraged to go into business, mining or other economic activities. A
small proportion of the educated Malays were encouraged to go into government service but
the majority remained in the traditional agrarian sector. Furthermore, Malay entry into the
rubber industry as smallholders was severely curbed and controlled by the British who did
not want competition to their estates. Although many Malays eventually planted rubber in
smallholdings and became a threat to British interest, their efforts were soon stifled by
various government schemes such as the Stevenson Scheme in 1922 and the International
Rubber Regulation programme in 1934 (Nonini 1992 pp85-102). These rubber restriction
schemes were organised by agreements between large capitalist producers and colonial states,
of which the British were the foremost advocate. In Malaya, the British were able to
implement both schemes to great effect, restricting smallholder production and thereby
eliminating competition from them. This has the effect of suppressing rural Malay standards
of living but more significantly it prevented the Malays from moving out of their flood-prone
farms into the better drained foothills where the rubber plant thrived. Thus, continued
impoverishment and geographical immobility perpetuated and exacerbated the flood hazard
amongst the Malay peasantry.
On the other hand, the Chinese were encouraged by the British to go into mining, business
and other commercial activities. In fact, large scale immigration of the Chinese from China
was encouraged if not induced by British colonial policy. In his book 'The Malay Dilemma'
in which he described the reasons leading to Malay poverty in comparison to other ethnic
groups in Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir, the current prime minister of the country, accuses the
colonial government of a loose immigration policy which resulted in the influx of a
'hardened, adventurous and resourceful' immigrant Chinese population which subsequently
dominated the Malaysian economy (Mahathir Bin Mohamad 1970). The other main ethnic
group, the Indians, was also encouraged by the colonial government to migrate to Malaya in
large numbers, mostly to work in rubber plantations owned by the British. Many Indians,
however, were also involved with trading, money lending, wholesaling and other commercial
activities. Economically, the Indians are also better off than the Malays although they still lag
behind the Chinese. Current figures show that the ratio of mean monthly income between
Malays and Chinese is 58.8 per cent while that between Indians and Chinese is 75.9 per cent.
The ratio of mean income between Malays and Indians is therefore 77.5 per cent
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(Government of Malaysia 1991a p11).
Tunlcu Abdul Rahman (Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 July 1988, p17), Malaysia's first
prime minister, sums up the Malays' plight just after independence:
'The Malays required help in raising their standard of living, so in the first
five year development plan we agreed on extensive development because the
people of the kampungs had been completely neglected by the British 	
(e)	 Colonial agriculture policies favouring the plantation sector
Malay peasants were impoverished not just by colonial policies of ethnic segregation which
reduced their occupational mobility. Related to the above point is the fact that the colonial
government's preoccupation with plantation agriculture had severe negative effects on peasant
agriculture. Despite the introduction of land alienation, credit service and the provision of
agricultural and marketing facilities by the colonial government, they were found to be
inadequate as peasant interests continued to be neglected. Thus, Lim (1977 p225) remarked
that:
'It would not be an exaggeration to say that the colonial government's
activities favouring the plantation sector were often tantamount to an anti-
peasant policy and stunted peasant development during a period when
conditions were conducive to growth'.
The government's inability to provide effective measures to bring peasants into the main
stream of economic development is largely responsible for the latter's perpetuation within a
subsistence level of existence. Because of government neglect, Malay peasants have largely
remained poor. Thus, at the end of the 1930s, many Malayan peasants were hard-pressed by
indebtedness, low productivity, unfavourable marketing arrangements and insecurity of
tenure. And most of these problems, claimed Lim (1977 p225), could have been averted had
there been a government more genuinely committed to the social and economic progress of
its people. It was largely because of such inuniseration that rural Malay peasants are
perpetually the most vulnerable to major and extensive floods which obliterate much of rural
floodplains, most notably in the East Coast. Such was the case in 1926 when the country
suffered from widespread floods at the height of which the Pahang and Perak Rivers rose
from 23 to 34 metres above their normal levels resulting in the surrounding land resembling
a vast inland sea (Lim 1977 p159). Other than its toll on human life and suffering and
property damage, large areas of kampung and padi land (including crops) were destroyed
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(Winstedt 1927). In Kuala Kangsar (Perak) alone, more than 4,000 hectares of padi were
destroyed (see Appendix I).
(f) Colonial influence on rapid economic development
The exploitation of tin and rubber by the colonialists also significantly modified the
hydrological cycle and contributed to the exacerbation of flood hazards, especially flash
floods on urban floodplains on the West Coast. The opening of tin mines not only involves
the clearing of forested land but the exposure of the land surface, as mines are left exposed
for long periods of time. Even when the mines have stopped operations, the land was not
replanted with vegetation. Natural regeneration on mining land takes a long time as the soils
are poor due to excessive leaching. Mining activities have been pointed out as a contributory
factor to increased flooding in the peninsula (Leigh and Low 1972, 1978 p49-52). Similarly,
replacing forested land with rubber trees also result in increased surface runoff, siltation of
rivers, and decreased lag time between rainfall and peak flow (Daniel and Kulasingam 1974;
Zulkifli and Abdul Rahim 1991). The building of railways and roads to facilitate
transportation and the growth of towns and other settlements all add increased incidence of
floods. Finally, rapid development of urban areas in the major towns have led to floodplain
encroachment and the growth of a large flood-prone population. In this way, the more
developed West Coast states are subject to flood problems, especially those relating to flash
floods (Jamaluddin 1985).
(g) Changing production systems and loss of traditional coping mechanisms
In hazards research, a central critical point about colonialism is the introduction of foreign
(exogenous) methods which are ill adapted to local conditions in the colony. The failure of
early American settlers to overcome drought hazard on the Great Plains was largely due to
the transference of farming methods best suited to the humid conditions of the east coast of
the continent. Few farmers who formed the wave of movement westwards recognised or
understood the climatic adversities of the Great Plains which was subject to periodic and often
chronic arid conditions (Warrick 1983 p68). In the African continent, there are many
instances where colonialism has increased hazard vulnerability through the introduction of
alien farming methods, resulting in the disappearance of traditional coping mechanisms and
adjustments (Watts 1983). More significantly, however, is the change in the production
system brought about by colonialists. Thus, the transition from producing use-values for local
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consumption (including a variety of food crops), to growing cash crops reduced the ability
of the population to cope with environmental stress. Consequently, nutrition suffered and the
population became more vulnerable (O'Keefe and Wisner 1975; Richards 1975; Susman et
al 1983).
In Peninsular Malaysia, the introduction of cash crops such as rubber, coffee, tea, cocoa, oil
palm and others transformed the production system from one of subsistence food cultivation
to that of market-oriented cash cropping. Although subsistence agriculture remained important
in the East Coast, the lucrative returns from these cash crops, most notably rubber, induced
the majority of peasants to cultivate them in smallholdings. And although many farmers did
retain part of their land for padi cultivation, there were many who completely abandoned it
and went into full time rubber cultivation. The extent of peasant involvement in the rubber
industry is reflected in the fact that one third of the total area in 1930 was under smallholder
cultivation and smallholders contributed two fifths of the peninsula's production (Karim 1990
p117). This change in the production system is more pronounced in western Peninsular
Malaysia where colonial influence is greatest and the physical environment more suitable for
rubber. As a result of moving into a cash oriented production system, farmers were integrated
into the world market, making them vulnerable to external market forces beyond their control
or understanding. If they were previously already vulnerable to the flood hazard, they were
now more vulnerable than ever as their traditional padi crop which served as a buffer for
recovery was now not there any more. For instance, the aftermath of World War I brought
on a major recession on the colonial economy in the early 1920s. This sent the price of
rubber down sharply and although its effects were initially felt across the board by all
producers from the large estates to the smallholder, the introduction of the Stevenson Scheme
(1921 -1928) by the colonial government protected the large European estates from price
fluctuations but added further misery and hardship to peasant smallholders as their production
was curtailed (Nonini 1992 pp85-88). Thus, the effects of the 1926 widespread flood were
badly felt by peasant rubber smallholders and padi farmers alike. In the case of the latter, at
least part of their rice surplus from the previous year could help them recover sufficiently for
the next season's planting. In the case of the former, replacing padi with rubber meant that
there is the loss of indigenous coping farming methods such as the use of flood resistant padi
varieties. Furthermore, although rubber trees were not destroyed in the flood, tapping the
trees had to be stopped for a period of a few weeks to more than a month, thus reducing
income to almost nil and they had no rice surplus to fall back on. When other factors such
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as the restriction of production by the Stevenson Scheme, exploitation by Chinese middlemen
and fluctuating market prices are taken into consideration, all will add up to increased hazard
vulnerability amongst farmers. Similarly, peasant coconut cultivators (cocoa and coffee are
usually inter-planted between coconut trees as they need the shading from the taller coconut
palms) were subject to a worse fate as smallholdings were too small to provide a reasonable
standard of living and flooding damages the trees resulting in low yields (Lim 1977 p198).
(h)	 Summary
'Core-periphery' relations between Britain and Malaya can be explained by the classical
Marxist position which argues that the impact of the relationship is profoundly ambivalent;
that it tends on the one hand to create exploitation and subjugation while on the other it
produces new forces in colonial societies through the elimination of their own backwardness
(Brett 1973). Certainly, in the case of Peninsular Malaysia, the Marxist view seems most
appropriate. It is an undeniable fact that without British colonial influence, the natives would
still be trapped in their traditional mode of production, the Chinese and Indians would not
have migrated to the peninsula in such numbers and overall development would have been
much slower. Conversely, it is also true that core-periphery relations between Britain and the
peninsula have largely been in favour of the former.
That the colonialists developed many parts of the peninsula (notably the West Coast states
rich in tin and rubber) and contributed in no small measure to Malaysia's modern
development is a fact that cannot be refuted. It would be wrong to condemn colonial rule as
solely having negative effects on the country. Much of modern Peninsular Malaysia,
particularly with regards to communications (roads and railways), the ports, the economy
(plantation agriculture, mining, etc.), the development of towns, health and education, and
a sound public service amongst others are a reflection of British colonial heritage. But that
is not the point. That it has exploited the country's rich resources, significantly drained its
revenues, created wide disparities in regional development and incomes amongst the ethnic
groups, fostered communalism resulting in the immiseration of Malay peasants, suppressed
rubber smallholders and Chinese miners, influenced flood hazard policies, exacerbated flood
hazards by inducing rapid development in the West Coast, changed indigenous modes of
production and destroyed traditional flood hazard coping mechanisms are pertinent issues that
have significantly contributed to the creation and perpetuation of flood hazards as well as
increased vulnerability amongst certain sections of the country's population.
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4.2	 Political economy context
The condition of human society is a function of political economy. The way in which society
is structured in relation to access to resources and wealth, is a central explanation of hazard
and disaster (Wisner et al 1976; Hewitt 1983a; Blaikie et al 1994). Parker and Handmer
(1992) found that hazard management and emergency planning are fundamentally affected by
a matrix of 'pervasive influences', of which political economy is a predominant influence.
Political and economic ideologies are translated into policies which pervade government
agencies and institutions. It is such policies (whether for economic development or hazard
management) that can either reduce hazards and disasters, or amplify and exacerbate them.
Much socially-created hazards and disasters have been shown to be generated and reinforced
by political economy forces (Hood and Jackson 1992). Blaikie (1985), from a neo-Marxist
perspective, demonstrated that soil erosion in Third World countries are contributed by
political economy contexts, notably class relations and imperialism.
4.2.1 Neo-colonialism
Neo-colonialism, or imperialism" as it soon came to be known, is the modern form of
colonialism. With the achievement of independence by their ex-colonies, colonial pov.ers
sought to control the economies of their ex-dependencies through trade, 'multinational
companies' (MNCs) owned by nationals of the colonial powers, arms deals, provision of aid,
and other means. Although such imperialistic domination is not immediately associated with
the flood hazard, a deeper analysis would soon reveal that a dependent economy (often
impoverished) will have little resources to manage the flood hazard. Neo-colonialism can also
have a more direct effect on the flood hazard when developed countries transfer technology
(flood forecasting, warning, basin management) or grant aid (relief, food, money) to their
dependencies. In Malaysia, the British have mainly provided such expertise but since the
1980s, the Japanese have taken over this imperialistic role by transferring their expertise in
flood hazard management via the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA 1982, 1990).
There is a vast literature on neo-colonialism and imperialism condemning the exploits of
44 There are many definitions for the term 'imperialism'. In this research, imperialism
is taken to mean the direct or indirect domination and exploitation of Peninsular Malaysia,
in the political, economic or social spheres by other countries, notably those of the Western
developed world but in recent decades also by developed countries in the East, notably Japan.
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western imperialists (see Hobson 1961; Nadel and Curtis 1964; Gudeman 1978; Hua 1983;
Cheah and Abu Talib Ahmad 1990; Nonini 1992). However, it is not within the aim nor
scope of this research to conduct a comprehensive review of them. Rather, this section has
the modest aim of highlighting the existence of such a literature, and more significantly it
seeks to ascertain the extent to which neo-colonialism is affecting post-colonial Malaysia, in
relation to the creation and perpetuation of flood hazards.
Undoubtedly, the present day Malaysian economy is still as dependent on foreign capital and
trade for its products as in the past. Although the country achieved political independence in
1957, it did not acquire the same status economically. Economic links with western
imperialists and the global economy, or neo-colonialism, is strong and is responsible for
Malaysia's subordination to metropolitan capital (Hua 1983). Immediately after independence,
Malaysia was the world's largest producer of tin and the second largest producer of natural
rubber but both products were dangerously exposed to the vagaries of widely fluctuating
world commodity prices. For instance, the price of rubber fell sharply during the period
between 1963 and 1972 causing widespread hardship amongst rubber smallholders. The
International Tin Agreement signed initially in 1931 restricted tin production in 1958 to 43.0
per cent of the peninsula's potential. This resulted in the closure of 255 mines and 12,807
miners lost their jobs (0oi 1979 p390). Over-exploitation during the colonial period led to
depletion of surface tin deposits in many of the traditionally tin-rich areas. Subsequently, such
areas could only be mined profitably by mechanised tin dredges, for which only western
firms had the capital resources to use. Thus, exploitation by Europeansin the tin industry
continued well after independence (Europeans produced 60.0 per cent of the peninsula's tin
in 1960). Between 1980 and 1986 a total of 655 mines were forced to close and tens of
thousands lost their jobs (Karim 1990 p134).
The over-dependence of tin and rubber made the post-independence Malaysian economy
extremely vulnerable to global forces beyond its control, which is why successive
governments since independence have aimed at diversifying the economy. For instance, the
drastic fall in commodity prices in the early 1970s severely curtailed the growth of the
Malaysian economy. The gradual decline of both products has also severely affected the
Malaysian economy. As a result, the 1971 flood was more severely felt, not just because of
its magnitude (a 1 in 100 year event) but also because there was an economic depression.
Both public and private resources could not deal with the flood as well as they would have
if economic conditions had been better. Consequently, the recovery capacity was lower.
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Those who suffered the most were the unemployed miners, retrenched rubber tappers and
rubber smallholders. This was one of the reasons why the 1971 flood (declared a national
disaster) was more severely felt in the West Coast than in the East Coast, the former being
heavily dependent on tin and rubber while the latter on traditional padi farming and fishing.
Post-colonial Malaya has enjoyed economic success, despite its subjection to neo-colonial
forces and the world market. The mid-1970s onwards were boom years, with an average
Gross National Product (GNP) growth rate of approximately 7.0 per cent per annum. The
moving away from its traditionally based primary sector into manufacturing was the main
impetus, although diversification programmes into other commodities such as oil palm,
timber, pepper and cocoa further strengthened the economy. The discovery of major oil fields
in Sarawak, Sabah and Terengganu then became the driving force which further advanced the
country's surge towards recognition as a Newly Industrialised Country in the 1980s. Although
a minor hiccup was experienced in the mid-1980s due to world-wide recession, the country
recovered sufficiently within a couple of years and has since surged even faster ahead in
economic development. Between 1988 and 1994, the country's economy grew at an average
rate of 8.0 per cent per annum (The Economist 1994 July p61). This then, provides the
perfect scenario for the advocate of imperialism to champion its positive effects. However,
such a mechanistic straight forward Marxist conclusion is not completely correct as there are
negative neo-colonial effects on the economy.
In a televised speech across the nation on the 31st of August 1985 (Independence Day), the
prime minister Dr. Mahathir warned against the threat of neo-colonialism. He stressed that
independence would be meaningless if the country was still threatened by neo-colonialism
(The Star 1.9.85). The prime minister's warning is not without basis as many fields in the
country are still under the control of rich foreign countries. For example, the country's
economy is largely dominated by foreign based 'multinational companies' (MNCs) (mostly
in manufacturing and oil/natural gas mining and processing), and its primary (oil palm,
rubber, tin, oil) as well as secondary products (processed and manufactured goods) are mostly
sold to the developed world. A significant proportion of its needs are also imported from the
developed world. And foreign shipping and insurance companies dominate the two sectors.
The national debt is also increasing. The country's dependence on western banks resulted in
a total debt of approximately $50 billion in 1984. In the same year, foreign companies and
banks raked in profits totalling $4,806 million, and foreign shipping and insurance companies
took in profits amounting to $2,279 million. In another analysis, Hua (1983 p186) noted that
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the outflow of investible income continued unabated. In 1974 and 1975, the outflow was $600
million and $550 million respectively. The figures did not include repatriation of income in
the form of royalties, patent fees and other services of which the figures for the two years
were $1,341 million and $1,061 million respectively. In 1980, repatriation of profits rose to
$1.8 billion. In 1981, the net cash outflow in freight and insurance was $2 billion. In 1990,
foreigners owned a quarter of the total $109.8 billion in share capital in Malaysia. Given this
volume of ownership and the economic boom in the last five years, the foreign companies
are expected to reap significant profits. Consequently, the amount of repatriated funds flowing
out of the country is expected to rise in tandem with rising profits. All these have certainly
substantially decreased the country's resources which are needed for development, and this
has disastrous effects on flood hazard commitments, noting that it already has a low salience
on government agendas.
In an analysis of the ownership of share capital of limited companies in Malaysia, Jomo
(1990) noticed that although the share of foreigners is decreasing, it still remains substantial.
For example, foreign ownership totalled $2,909 milli n (62.1 per cent) of the total share
capital in 1969. In 1988 this figure was $24,082 million (24.6 per cent) and in 1990
foreigners owned $27.6 billion (25.1 per cent) (Government of Malaysia 1991a p14). In a
comprehensive analysis on the politics of imperialism in Malaysia, Hua (1983) demonstrated
the extent to which imperialistic domination has facilitated the Malaysian economy's
continued subordination to metropolitan capital. He identified imperialistic control in the
forms of the international finance markets, sub-contracting, technological dependence, aid
granting, managerial and other 'invisible' ties, which siphon off surplus value. A good recent
example of the 'conditional' nature of aid and its neo-colonial implications is the Pergau
Dam45 affair. The exposure of this controversy implicated the British government's promise
of aid (in building the dam) in return for Malaysia's agreement to buy arms from Britain
(Davison and Rufford 1994). Such neo-colonial forces have considerably weakened the
Malaysian economy. In the context of hazards and disasters, it has made the country more
vulnerable.
Another example of neo-colonialism is the overwhelming dependence of the Malaysian
45 This is a multi-purpose dam built on the Pergau River in the State of Kelantan. The
British donated £234 million in aid to the project, but it was later accused of being linked to
the Malaysian government's decision to buy £1.3 billion-worth of arms from British
companies (The Sunday Times, UK 27.12.94).
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economy on the global economy and the 'protectionist strategy' of developed countries (Fong
(1989). This is a structural weakness as the economy is dependent on the industrialised
countries for investments and technologies, markets for its commodities and manufactured
goods, and has to fight protectionist strategies such as the European Union (EU) and others.
Global economic pressures have been demonstrated to affect vulnerability to disasters in
developing countries (Blaikie et al 1994 pp39-41). Malaysia is therefore extremely vulnerable
to global economic conditions, as demonstrated again by the world recession in 1985. As a
result of decline in commodity prices and the reduced demand for its manufactured goods,
the Malaysian economy experienced a negative growth rate of 1.0 per cent in Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) - the first in its modern economic history. As a result, unemployment rose
to about 10.0 per cent (it is currently about 6.0 per cent). Fortunately, only minor floods
occurred across the country in the two recession years of 1985 and 1986. Nevertheless, the
later flood was severe in Terengganu as damages totalling $3.26 million were estimated (see
Appendix I).
Exports make up a significant proportion of the Malaysia's GDP. For instance, the country's
exports made up 48.3 per cent of GDP in 1985. The corresponding figure in 1990 was 78.6
per cent and it is projected to be about 73.4 per cent in 1995 (Government of Malaysia 1991a
p18). Thus, reduction on export earnings, whether in terms of export volume or price
fluctuation, will have disastrous effects on the economy. The collapse of the tin industry
serves to illustrate this point. As one of the major producers of tin in the world (Malaysia
produced 28.0 per cent of the world's supply in 1985), it suffered when global prices fell
sharply during the global recession in the mid-1980s. It has been estimated that 80.0 per cent
of tin mines went out of operation in 1985 (Far Eastern Economic Review 7 November 1985
p115). In the case of rubber, falling prices and competition from synthetic rubber produced
by developed countries have forced many smallholders out of production. The total hectarage
shrunk from approximately 2.0 million hectares in 1985 to about 1.8 million hectares in
19934' (Government of Malaysia 1991a p92). The production figures also dropped from
1.47 million tonnes in 1985 to about 1.3 million tonnes in 1993. Recession and uncertainty
in the world market has also affected other commodities in Malaysia. In 1985, falling oil
prices meant that Malaysia had to drill 50.0 per cent more in order to maintain its oil revenue
(Pant 1987 p103). It is becoming increasingly apparent that developed countries are using the
46 This shrinkage is in part due to the conversion of rubber to oil palm and also due to
the abandoning of smallholdings with an uneconomic hectarage of old rubber trees.
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world recession to their advantage. The case of oil palm in Malaysia perhaps exemplifies the
extent to which developed countries (via neo-colonialism) have the economies of developing
countries at their mercy. The prices of oil palm went down from US$740 a tonne in 1985 to
US$235 a tonne in 1986. The cause of the price crash in oil palm was the strategy of
developed countries to subsidise the production and export of soya bean in the United States
and rape-seed oil in the European Union (Pant 1987 p104). Although the prices of both soya
bean and rape-seed are both higher than oil palm in 1985, the manipulations of
protectionalism and imperialism have denied oil palm from Malaysia and other developing
countries markets in the EU and the USA. The above discussion has two effects on the flood
hazard in the peninsula. First, lower revenues from tin, rubber and other exports reduces the
government's ability to spend on flood management. And second, rubber smallholders, tin
miners and those employed within the two industries become marginalized and thereby more
vulnerable to flood hazards.
Another area where neo-colonialism is draining the Malaysian economy of vital resources is
the flow of profits out of the country via foreign investments, notably that of multi-national
companies (MNCs) (see Japanese MNCs below). According to Mehmet Sami Denker (1994),
MNCs evade tax in Malaysia by an accounting process called 'transfer pricing' whereby
prices of manufactured goods (usually partly finished) are deliberately depressed. These goods
are then sent to a branch of the company located in a tax haven to be finished and exported
at a huge profit there. MNCs started to invest in the peninsula in the 1970s and began
building their factories in 'Free Trade Zones' (FTZs), many of which are located in
floodplains. For example, FTZs in Petaling Jaya and Shah Alam (Selangor) are located in the
Kelang River floodplain, part of the Bayan Lepas FTZ are periodically flooded (Pulau
Pinang)", and Pasir Gudang (Johor) is sited adjacent to the Johor River. These FTZs have
not only increased the flood damage potential of their own infrastructure and properties but
have inadvertently resulted in the growth of small townships around them which serve their
work force. For example, the township of Bayan Baru prospered and grew because of the
Bayan Lepas FTZ.
In the mining of petroleum and natural gas, Petronas the national oil corporation of Malaysia,
owns the entire oil and gas resources in the country. But, as a new corner to the field, it
' In Pulau Pinang alone, scores of multinational companies such as Intel, Advanced
Micro Devices, Motorola, Hitachi, Philips, Thompson and Sony dominate the state's FTZs
in Bayan Lepas and Seberang Prai.
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depends heavily on the technical expertise of foreign giants such as Shell, Esso, British
Petroleum, British Gas, Gulf, and others. At the end of 1988, there were 32 foreign oil
companies in operation in the country (Karim 1990 p139). In agriculture, foreign based
companies such as Guthrie, Harrison & Crossfleld, Sime Darby and others are responsible
for converting hundreds of thousands of hectares of virgin forest into rubber and oil palm
plantations. This has increased runoff by at least 10.0 per cent and contributed to the
exacerbation of flood hazards (Leigh and Low 1978 p50). The power of MNCs (in foreign
capital and ownership), has given rise to the universally accepted truth that developing nations
are locked into a subordinate relationship with advanced capitalist power (The Economist
15.3.94 p73). The strong presence of the MNCs and continued inflow of foreign investment
from developed countries gave rise to many negative effects. By virtue of their size,
international expertise and economies of scale, MNCs effectively killed off small and medium
local enterprises. This not only led to the absence of domestic entrepreneurship but also the
over-reliance on foreign capital. Local enterprises were largely confined to medium and small
scale low technology areas such as retailing, wholesaling and traditional agriculture; further
accentuating the 'foreign dominance-domestic dependence' structural weakness of the
economy (Fong 1989 p291). According to Hua (1983 p188), MNCs also exploited cheap
labour in developing countries. In Malaysia, women were the ones generally most exploited
as they form the bulk of the work force in the FTZs. In terms of the flood hazard, women
are the most vulnerable as they have to look after the children during evacuation and tend to
them during the entire relocation period.
On the whole, from Peninsular Malaysia's viewpoint (a developing country), neo-colonialism
exploits its economy in the same way as colonialism has in the past. Control of the economy
by MNCs and other foreign based agents denies the home country access to vital resources.
At the same time, it also denies the local population of access to wealth which could have
raised standards of living and increased the ability of households to cope with and recover
from flood hazards. Thus, both country and people are made more vulnerable to flood
hazards by neo-colonial forces. Elsewhere, studies have shown that lack of access to
resources or wealth have led to diminished ability to deal with various hazards (Blaikie et al
1994) and that vulnerability can be increased for particular groups who are being incorporated
into a world system of capitalistic production relationships (O'Keefe et al 1977; Hewitt
1983a).
Malaysia's 'Look east' policy have often been suggested as anti-western and hence anti-
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imperialistic. However, this cannot be further from the truth as in the last decade, the
Japanese have taken over the major imperialistic role which the British have held in the past
(Jomo 1994a p5). Amongst the older generation of Malaysians to have survived the Second
World War, the majority would have much to say about Japanese imperialism. In present day
Malaysia, Japanese imperialism is manifested in several ways. Major building contracts in
the 1980s were won by Japanese firms, even though some bids were higher than domestic
bids (Jomo 1994a p'7). The yen appreciation in the 1980s reduced Japanese price
competitiveness in the world market, resulting in the internationalization of Japanese capital.
This was felt strongly in Malaysia as Japanese investments have also dominated the Malaysian
economy in the last decade. While this appears good for the Malaysian economy in the short
term, their impact on the long term is undesirable as there has been little technology transfer
and enhancement, and they appear to stifle domestic investments (Anuwar Ali 1994 p124).
For example, MNCs dominate much of the FTZs, many of which, as mentioned earlier, are
located in floodplains. Japanese MNCs such as Mitsubishi, Sony, Nissan, National, Toyota
etc. are not too different from their predecessors of the likes of Barlow Estates, Harrison and
Crossfields, Dunlop, Guthrie Corporation, etc. Their brand of imperialism is no different
from that of the British (Gann 1984). The most prominent exploitation of the Malaysian
economy is that of Mitsubishi Motor Corporation which monopolised the production of
Malaysia's national car, the Proton Saga (Jomo 1994c). This prestige project has been costly
to the Malaysian government but Mitsubishi was the principal beneficiary despite installing
an obsolete plant in Malaysia producing a second-class vehicle which was a deliberately
downgraded Mitsubishi Fiore (Bartu 1992 pp76-7). Bilateral trade with Japan has also largely
favoured the Japanese. In 1991, Malaysia suffered a trade deficit of -$11,347.8 million with
Japan (Bank Negara 1991).
Since the 1980s, Japanese flood consultants (mainly through JICA) have also been employed
to work together with the DID on all aspects of flood management in the country. The
Japanese experts JICA has since published many reports on various flood mitigation strategies
for different river basins in the country (JICA 1980, 1982, 1989, 1990). But an analysis of
these reports revealed that Japanese strategies of flood management are predominantly
structurally based. Although some sections of JICA reports involve non-structural measures,
they are not stressed sufficiently, presumably there is not much money to be made in non-
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structural projects such as squatter relocation and improvement of warning systems". On
the other hand, structural engineering projects can total billions of ringgits. For instance, in
the proposed flood mitigation schemes for the states of Perlis, Kedah, Pulau Pinang and
Perak structural measures such as river improvement, dam construction, floodways, and
polders dominate the proposals. Non-structural measures were only proposed as minor or
secondary `back-up' measures as they covered only two pages of the 44 page report on the
National Water Resources Study of Malaysia (JICA 1982 pp213-4). Finally, Japanese
influence has contributed to exacerbating environmental problems relating to flood hazards
in their major role in Malaysia's deforestation (Jomo 1994b).
4.2.2 Economic development policies
'Rapid economic development' is a policy pursued by successive governments since
independence. Through its '2020 Vision', Malaysia aims to become a developed country by
the year 2020 and so far, indications are that it is right on course (Government of Malaysia
1991b; The Economist 16.7.94 p61). According to the current prime minster Dr. Mahathir
Bin Mohamad, '...In our unrelenting drive for growth... .our goal of making Malaysia a
developed country by the year 2020 will become a reality' (Government of Malaysia 1991a
pvi). In its pursuit of the 2020 objective, a combination of shrewd planning and the discovery
of off-shore oil and gas deposits has made Malaysia's economy one of the fastest growing in
the world (Thillainathan 1992). During the 5th Malaysia Plan period (1986-1990), the country
achieved an average annual GDP growth rate of 6.7 per cent of which the 1990 growth rate
was about 10.0 per cent (Government of Malaysia 1991a p7). In the 6th Malaysia Plan period
(1991-1995), the Malaysian economy is expected to grow even faster at an average rate of
7.5 per cent per annum in real terms. To maintain such a high growth rate, the rate of
deforestation, agriculture, and industrialisation (most of which takes place on densely
populated floodplains) is expected to keep pace. Other things being equal, the flood hazard
is expected to be amplified both in terms of the hazard as well as the damage potential. Chan
and Parker (Forthcoming) have demonstrated that rapid urbanization and development have
48 Personal communication with government officers who feel that foreign consulting
agencies always emphasise structural flood mitigation schemes because of the large capital
investment involved and the fact that there is a lot of money to be made. By comparison,
there is no great financial benefits of relocating squatters and foreign based agencies do not
want to get involved with the politics of their host country. Similarly, land use control,
forecasting and warning systems and other non-structural measures are not as profitable as
a flood control dam or the channelling of a major river.
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significantly contributed to increasing flood risk, exposure, damage potential and vulnerability
(amongst certain sections of Malaysian society).
To stay within the 2020 objective, the main thrust of the current 6th Malaysia Plan (1991-
1995) is to sustain the growth momentum achieved over the last three years of the 5th
Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) in which the GDP grew at an annual rate of more than 8.0 per
cent. This means that efforts at industrialisation, agricultural development and expansion (in
terms of opening more land schemes), improvements in infra-structure (transport and
communications), tourism, and other areas of development will continue at a rapid rate
(Government of Malaysia 1991a). The rapid expansion of all these sectors is expected to
change the hydrological regime leading to the exacerbation of the flood hazard, especially in
the areas chosen for each development. Not only will the traditionally urbanised areas be
subject to more environmental stress but also, rural areas which are being targeted for
development are expected to experience an increase in the flood hazard.
During the 5th Malaysia Plan period, industrialisation has provided the main stimulus to the
growth of the Malaysian economy. The export-oriented manufacturing sector has been the
main focus of industrial development. The manufacturing sector has expanded rapidly during
the 5th plan period, making it the leading growth sector in the economy as well as the largest
sector in terms of employment creation. The average growth rate of all manufacturing
industries during the 5th plan was about 13.9 per cent. In terms of investment in the
manufacturing sector, a total of $18,000 million was invested in 1990. At the beginning of
the 6th plan, this figure had increased to $58,575 million, involving 3,210 projects
(Government of Malaysia 1991a p132). In the 6th Malaysia Plan, the momentum gained in
this sector will be sustained, if not increased. A total of $3,187 million is allocated for
industrial development and a growth rate of 11.5 per cent is targeted. By the end of the 6th
plan, it is estimated that a total of $80,000 million would have been invested. The expansion
of the manufacturing sector means that more land will be opened for the spatial location of
factories, the building of infrastructure, housing for workers, and other support in the service
sector for the industry. More industrial estates (FTZs) will be created and existing ones
expanded. This will involve both urban and rural locations. The expansion of rural industries
will also be emphasised as this is a vehicle to redress social and regional disparities in
incomes. It is expected that rural growth centres will develop from locations with rural
industries while urban locations will continue to expand.
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However, modernising the rural sector may have eroded traditional social structures based
on family, kinship and fellowship in the kampung. These structures were broken down when
'profit-making' became the ultimate motive of many rubber smallholders. Many kampung
folks became selfish and 'money-minded'. The traditional `gotong-royong' (mutual help) spirit
became weak. In previous subsistence farming communities, there was a great deal of this
spirit amongst the kampung folks. This is crucial during times of flood. One can always count
on either relatives or friends for help. The spread of capitalism amongst rubber smallholders
has gradually eroded such communal ties. This has made families more vulnerable in times
of flood.
The export oriented nature of the economy also had a negative effect on traditional padi
farming. As a result, padi farming became secondary in importance. And although self-
sufficiency in rice was stressed by the government, padi cultivation never attained the same
importance as that of rubber or oil palm. Thus, padi always lost out to rubber and oil palm
whenever there was competition in land use. This inevitably led to the occupation of marginal
flood-prone land by padi farmers as most of the less hazardous land were planted with rubber
and oil palm. More significantly, however, is the fact that the use of these flood-prone land
has marginalized padi farmers and made them vulnerable to the flood hazard.
Under the 5th Malaysia Plan, a total of 353,296 hectares of new agriculture land was
developed by the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) and other agencies. Under
the 6th Malaysia Plan, this total has been reduced to 162,708 hectares (Government of
Malaysia 1991a p100). Despite this reduction, large tracts of virgin forest will have to be
cleared for the new agriculture land. This is expected to significantly affect the hydrological
regime in the areas selected for the development.
Tourism has become an important source of revenue for Malaysia. Gross receipts from the
industry grew by 24.5 per cent from $1,500 million in 1985 to $4,500 million in 1990
(Government of Malaysia 1991a p234). In the 6th plan, the industry will be expanded and
a national tourism plan adopted. This will involve the approved building of new hotels and
tourism related projects amounting to $2,602 million. Improvements in basic infrastructure
facilities in new tourism locations as well as existing ones are also planned. The national
parks of the country, notably Taman Negara which is located in the heart of the Malaysian
jungle in Pahang, is expected to be developed with new facilities. Another example is the
Bukit Bendera area in Pulau Pinang. It is the only remaining forested area on the island but
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the Pulau Pinang state government has recently approved a grand plan to develop the area
into a tourist resort complete with hotels, cable cars, casino, and other structures. This caused
a public outcry as prior developments on its hill slopes have already caused environmental
degradation and alleged to have exacerbated flood problems (Friends of Penang Hill 1991).
Other examples of tourist destinations to be developed are Pulau Besar Island Resort
(Melaka), Desani Integrated Tourism Complex (Johor) and Tasik Kenyir (Terengganu). The
Kuala Lumpur International Airport and Langkawi Airport are to be expanded. Total
allocation for improvements of airports under the 6th plan is $997.5 million. The total
allocation to expand the tourism industry,however, is about $533.9 million. Under this
amount, an allocation of $157.4 million is given under the 6th plan for the building and
improvement of roads and other infrastructure to have better access to tourist resorts
(Government of Malaysia 1991a p24'7). All these developments are expected to further
amplify flood hazards and increase damage potentials.
In terms of roads, the government plans to expand, upgrade and improve them under the 6th
plan. The recent completion of the North-South Highway stretching from Bukit Kayu Hitam
at the Thai border to Johor Baru at the Singapore border involved the opening up of tens of
thousands of hectares of forest land. Another example is the East-West Highway which links
the West Coast to the East Coast. Between 1985 to 1990, a total of 20,030 kilometres of new
roads were built. Over the 6th plan period, a total of $8,952.8 million is allocated to land
transport improvements, the bulk of which is in the building of roads.
A significant portion of Peninsular Malaysia's economy is also dependent on logging. In the
1960s, extensive exploitation of its forests either through logging, agriculture and other land
use have reduced the total forest cover to less than 68.0 per cent of its total land area of the
peninsula (0oi 1979 p369). Since then, agriculture, logging, rural development and other
human uses have proceeded rapidly and the current total area under forest is expected to have
decreased substantially. In forestry, a total of 29 million cubic metres of sawn logs will be
produced in 1995. This represents a decline from 1990 but the amount is still substantially
large to cause concern over issues related to flood hazard. Also, the production of sawn
timber will be maintained at an annual level of 9.1 million cubic metres over the 6th plan
period (Government of Malaysia 1991a p93-95).
The importance of forest cover as a natural form of flood prevention is widely claimed (Shiva
et al 1991; Kenyalang 1992, Sahabat Alam Malaysia 1992; Utusan Konsumer 1992; Malayan
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Nature Society 1992). The dense evergreen equatorial forest of the peninsula protects the top
soil from splash erosion and overland flow through its thick, multi-layered structure,
undergrowth and litter layer. Natural forest also absorbs part of the rain water during and
after a rain event, leaving only a portion of the rain water into the streams. Finally,
interception of the rainfall by the forest canopy, tree trunks, branches, undergrowth and leave
litter increases the lag time by which the rain water reaches the streams. All the above factors
have significant implications on flood occurrences. For instance, forest conversion and
logging of commercial trees have been shown to have disastrous consequences on soils and
the hydrological regimes (Daniel and Kulasingam 1974; Kamaruzaman 1990; Friends of
Penang Hill 1991; Hamirdin 1992). The DID (1986 and 1989) has also shown that clear-
cutting of dipterocarp forest resulted in a water yield increase of 822 nyn (410.0 per cent),
793 mm and 476 mm in the first, second and third years respectively. Similarly, Abdul
Rahim (1990) found that logging in the peninsula has substantially increased water yield
between 55.0 per cent to 70.0 per cent (unsupervised logging) and between 28.0 per cent to
44.0 per cent (supervised logging with conservation measures). Abdul Rahim and Harding
(1992) observed that magnitude and rate of water yield depended on the amount of forest
cleared, the type of logging and the rainfall regime.
Despite water yield increases through logging, the relationship of deforestation to flooding
remains inconclusive. For example, although Zulkifli and Abdul Rahim (1991) found that
there is a water yield increase of between 3 mm to 5 mm for every percentage of forest cover
cleared, the runoff was usually insufficient to produce noticeable flooding downstream.
Nevertheless, uncontrolled and inappropriate techniques of logging have resulted in
accelerated soil erosion, landslides and river siltation, resulting in reduced carrying capacity
of rivers. Ultimately, this can contribute to increased flooding (Leigh and Low 1978 p50).
For example, increased flooding in parts of Pulau Pinang has been attributed to the clearing
of forest on the slopes of Bukit Gambier, Bukit Jambu and Paya Terubong hills (Friends of
Penang Hill 1991 p96-110).
In recent years, Malaysian development policies are reportedly to take aboard the concept of
`sustainability' (see definition in Section 3.3, Footnote 32) (Government of Malaysia 1991a
p5). However, in the light of current rapid growth and the relentless pursuit of the 2020
objective, it is likely that economic and political considerations would be given priority in
many development schemes.
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4.2.3 Flood hazard policies
In Peninsular Malaysia, notwithstanding the fact that individuals are responsible for their own
lives and properties, the responsibility of flood management rests largely with government
departments and agencies. Before 1971, flood problems were tackled on an ad-hoc basis.
Although a large number of government agencies were involved with flood operations from
forecasting to rehabilitation, no specific government agency was solely responsible for overall
flood management. Each agency operated within its own jurisdiction. In theory, state
governments (through state agencies) received funds from the federal government and are
responsible for tackling flood problems in their own states respectively. Because of political,
economic, physiographic and other differences, some states may have different policies and
strategies in managing floods other than those prescribed by the federal government. As a
result, there has been no clearly formulated and comprehensive national policy on flood
management (Leigh and Low 1978 p52). Such a state of affairs led to the amplification of
flood hazards of which the 1967 and 1971 nation-wide floods were outstanding examples.
Since the 1971 flood, flood management became a formalised responsibility of the
government and the DID was given this function. But, as examined in earlier in Section 4.1.2
(a), the DID was more interested in agricultural development than flood management. Not
surprisingly, river conservancy and flood mitigation was assigned relatively low priority by
the DID (Leigh and Low 1978 p53). Its domination by engineers resulted in its adoption of
a lop-sided `structural/engineering approach' to flood problems. More recently, although
many of its schemes incorporate non-structural measures, such measures are usually of
secondary importance and often under-funded. For example, funding allocations for non-
structural measures are almost negligible when compared with those of structural measures
(Figure 4.1). Structural measures continue to feature highly on Malaysian flood management
strategies. While the federal government has recognised that high cost structural measures of
flood control are either economically unjustifiable or unfeasible, the bulk of the annual
allocated flood expenditure still goes to structural schemes.
In the current 6th Malaysia Plan which embodies the National Development Plan (NDP), a
central aim is to make science and technology an integral component of socio-economic
planning and development, which entails building competence in strategic and knowledge-
based technologies, and promoting a science and technology culture in the process of building
a modern industrial economy (Government of Malaysia 1991a p4-5). In terms of flood hazard
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mitigation, it is envisaged that the highest affordable technology will be employed in all
aspects of flood hazard management such as forecasting, warning, disaster preparedness,
disaster relief and recovery. In forecasting and warning, high-tech methods such as satellite
imagery, radar measurement of rainfall, telemetric rainfall and river level gauging, automatic
sirens and sophisticated telecommunication links will form the basis of future flood hazard
management. While the emphasis on high-tech solutions should enhance the accuracy of flood
forecasts and increase warning times, they must be complemented by other improvements,
notably social and educational programmes aimed at those living in flood-prone areas.
Because the NDP over-emphasises structural measures of flood mitigation it promotes an
unbalanced flood hazard management strategy. This narrow 'tech-fix approach' brings with
it all the associated problems when applied to a public who is not suitably tuned to it. For
instance, improvement in forecasting and warning is nullified when there is no corresponding
improvement in warning dissemination and evacuation (Neal 1989). While it cannot be denied
that non-structural measures such as flood forecasting, warning and evacuation procedures
have been improved since 1971, there is still much room for improvement (see Chapter 5).
Furthermore, there are many non-structural measures such as flood insurance, legislation,
development planning, flood risk analysis, land use change, resettlement, flood proofing,
public education and others that are still very under-developed. In order to reduce flood
hazards substantially, the Malaysian government needs to change its present emphasis on the
deeply rooted structural approach to a more comprehensive one. While recognising the
importance of non-structural measures in flood hazard management, there has not been
enough effort to translate that recognition into action. The early innovators of this
technocentric approach have now recognised the importance of societal forces in hazards
creation (Burton et al 1993).
In tandem with rapid development in the country, cities have grown, spilled on to the more
hazardous parts of floodplains and progressively increased flood exposure (Chan and Parker
Forthcoming). Some examples are the Kelang valley conurbation comprising Kuala Lumpur-
Petaling Jaya-Shah Alam-Kelang on the Kelang River floodplain, Georgetown on the Pinang
River floodplain and Kota Bharu on the Kelantan River floodplain. As disasters, poverty and
urbanisation are closely related (Davis 1978 pp10-5), urban floodplain encroachment caused
by rapid urbanisation and poverty (landlessness) is expected to generate a greater vulnerable
population. Pursuing the 2020 objective has given rise to an even more rapid development
of many already over-populated areas, particularly in most of the major urban centres in the
country. Accelerated developments of this type may, on the one hand, be good for the
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economy but could be disastrous when the already delicately balanced hydrological system
is stretched further. A good example is the rapid expansion of the federal capital in the 1960s
which led to the disastrous flood in 1971. Similar examples can be found elsewhere. In
Britain, the Datchet floodplain development study is a good example (Neal and Parker 1988).
To overcome this dilemma, flood management policies must be closely framed with
development policies in forestry, agriculture, urbanisation and other forms of human land
use. Principles of sustainability and conservation of the environment, particularly with
reference to developments affecting the river environment, must be adhered to strictly. Due
to rapid developments in recent years, policies which seek to reduce the conflicts between
flood hazard reduction and rapid economic development are needed.
4.2.4 Federal-state politics
In Peninsular Malaysia, there are two levels of government: the federal government and the
state government". Although the former sets the policies and passes legislation, the latter
has enough power in many areas that allow it to act independently. As a result, disputes often
arise over issues of land, river, forest, and other resources within a state. Such disputes are
often complicated and intensified when the federal government and the state government are
not from the same political party.
The varying degrees of the flood hazard in different states in the peninsula are contributed
partly by conflicts of interests between the two levels of government and partly by the
complicated system of division of jurisdiction with respect to land, river and their
management. For example, the division of jurisdiction over land between the federal and the
state governments can result in the latter deviating from established federal policies. Land
within the boundaries of a state legally belongs to that state. Thus, the development of land
(including rivers and land adjacent to them, the rich tropical forest on the land and other
natural resources) is a matter of the state government and not that of the federal government.
Although the federal government has set laws and regulations for the use of land (to control
erosion, flooding, pollution etc.), it is the state government who makes the final decision on
the use of its land. As a result, conflicting land development strategies and policies between
the two levels of government are not uncommon. For instance, federal policy may dictate a
fixed rate of deforestation but since the states control their own forests and need revenue
49 State governments are further broken down into district offices and mukim offices.
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from them, the rate of deforestation may be much higher than that prescribed. This point is
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 when federal organisations come into conflict with
state governments.
In terms of development funding, each state government depends on the federal government
for funds to run the state. Funds (for flood management and others) are allocated by the
federal government to each state under each 5-year Malaysia plan. Generally, the amount
allocated depends on the revenue of the state from its resources such as land, forests,
minerals, etc. Once the federal government has come to a decision, the total amount allocated
is then broken down on a yearly basis. Each year a certain proportion of the total allocated
is given to the state until the end of the fifth year. Other than the allocated funds, state
governments can also borrow loans from the federal government to run some of its projects.
The amount of such loans depends on the population of the state and the purpose of the loan.
Generally, this is how the funding system works but there are exceptions to the rule.
Although floods have always been a significant hazard affecting many parts of Peninsular
Malaysia, its salience on the political agenda is probably low. The irony of the flood hazard
is that it has become so common in the everyday life of Malaysians, especially amongst the
inhabitants in the East Coast and those occupying low-lying riverine areas on the West Coast,
that it has not been addressed with the priority in the same breath as other social, economic
and political issues. In fact, Malaysians are probably more concerned about the percentage
of their taxable income in the next budget than the threat of flooding in the next monsoon.
Before the 1971 flood which crippled the federal capital of Kuala Lumpur and affected almost
the entire peninsula, flood mitigation was not a significant issue for the government (Chan
1993 p198). It was only after the 1971 flood that a comprehensive flood management policy
was drawn up. Even so, budgetary allocations for flood management are very low compared
to other allocations. In the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990), the total expenditure for flood
mitigation and river conservancy was $164.1 million. This was only 0.46 per cent of the total
development expenditure of $35,300 million over the period. In the Sixth Malaysia Plan
(1991-1995), $367.9 million has been allocated for urban drainage which include most of the
major flood mitigation schemes in the country. This amount represents only 0.67 per cent of
the total development allocation of $55,000 million (Government of Malaysia 1991a p62).
The low priority given to flood management on political agendas results in many of the flood
related problems not being addressed adequately. Consequently, it is one of the reasons why
the flood hazard has continued to occur in many parts of the peninsula.
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Qualitative interviewing of top government officers in flood hazard organisations and other
government departments in the current research has revealed some interesting results. In
Peninsular Malaysia, politics play an important part in funding allocations. Almost all
development projects funded by the federal government are politically determined. For
instance, the building of the Pulau Pinang Bridge (connecting the island to mainland
Peninsular Malaysia) has been on the drawing board since the beginning of the 1980s but it
was many years later before it was finally approved and built in 1987. Pulau Pinang has
always been a problem state for the federal government because of the strong support of the
opposition Diplomatic Action Party (DAP) by its people. The bridge was a strategy employed
by the federal government to woo voters during each election. It was finally approved when
growing discontent amongst Penangites appeared to swing the vote towards the DAP. This
case illustrates how politics and the control of it can determine funding and the approval of
important projects. It is certainly the prerogative of the ruling party to use every strategy
(within the law) to enhance its political position. Certainly, there is nothing illegal about the
Pulau Pinang bridge issue. There are many other similar incidents employed by the federal
and state governments but suffice to say, one is enough to demonstrate the point.
Since politics determine funding, it is only logical that (other things being equal) the federal
government will allocate more funds to states which support it and less to those that do not
(unless it is of the opinion that funds may improve its support). Kelantan is often described
as the poorest state in the country (The Star 24.8.94) and by coincidence also the most
vulnerable to the flood hazard because of its exposure to the Northeast Monsoon Winds, its
flat terrain and the densely populated floodplains where the majority of its people inhabit
(New Straits Times 25.12.84). Under the 6th Malaysia Plan, $80.2 million were allocated
to the state for flood management (DID undated b). This sum is substantial considering the
fact that many other states got much less. However, during the subsequent general election
in 1990", the ruling National Front lost the state to the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), an
opposition Islamic party. Since then, funds allocated under the 6th Malaysia Plan has been
flowing much slower into Kelantan. This is a fact that is confirmed by official figures and
the government officers interviewed. No reason is given for this slow down. The passing of
" In Peninsular Malaysia, seats are contested for both the Parliamentary and State
constituencies. In Kelantan, there were a total of 13 Parliamentary Seats and 36 State Seats.
In the 1990 general election, the UMNO led National Front (which forms the federal
government) did not win a single Parliamentary or State Seat. The majority was won by PAS,
which then formed the Kelantan state government (Information Malaysia Yearbook 1994
p437-41).
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a state law to introduce the Islamic `sharia' penal system by the PAS state government in
November 1993 (The Economist 27.11.93 p83) aggravated relations with the federal
government as it challenges federal policy (the rest of the country's legal system is based on
British law) 51 . With PAS seemingly getting a stronger and stronger grip on the state
government, it is not expected that flood management funds will be increased in the next
Malaysia plan, unless the federal government uses it as a strategy to win back the voters. At
the present moment, it is likely that flood management schemes in Kelantan will continue at
a slow pace. Thus, other things being equal, flood hazards are likely to continue
undiminished as flood management funds are curtailed and schemes delayed from completion.
4.2.5 Post-colonial communalism
Communalism is a sensitive word seldom uttered in Malaysian circles. Yet, it is practised
subtly for practical reasons by political parties, institutions and other groups in Malaysian
society. Historical, colonial and cultural reasons have given rise to the pronounced pluralistic
Malaysian society where deep rooted demarcations permeate the population structures and
locations, political organisations, economic activities and religious beliefs (Section 4.1). That
such demarcations still exist today is largely reinforced by political forces. In a multi-ethnic
country where competition and sensitivities are unusually high amongst the various ethnic
groups, communalism is practised by respective political parties which represent them. Thus,
while pluralists are inclined to attribute ethnic diversities to ethnic origins and cultural
background, a more acceptable reason is the result of deliberate segregation by first, the
colonial rulers and then, since independence, by successive post-colonial governments.
Communalism worked well for the British whose 'Divide and Rule' policy prevented ethnic
unity against them. Post-independence communalism, however, has taken on new dimensions.
It would appear surprising that communalism would exist in a multi-ethnic country striving
for ethnic equity. Yet, according to the current prime minister Dr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad
(1970 p174), although all political parties in Malaysia advocate non-communalism, they are
in fact all communal in their set up. He argues that economically, the Malays who have
lagged considerably behind the other ethnic groups, have to depend on 'racialism'
(communalism) to sustain themselves. Communalism and racial politics when used
51 The federal government is worried that Kelantan would turn into an islamic state. This
would not only exacerbate ethnic problems but also frighten foreign investors. The Economist
(27.11.93 p83) reported that Chinese organisations throughout the country are upset over the
passing of the law.
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constructively as tools to achieve ethnic equity (in sharing the wealth of the country) are
therefore justified. The emergence of a new Malay middle class testifies to the practicality
of communalism (The Economist 6.11.93 p89).
The most notorious of communal parties are the opposition political parties such as the DAP
(Chinese), PAS (Malay) and S46 (Malay). These parties champion the cause of each ethnic
group they represent. Often, opposition parties take advantage of common issues relating to
the flood hazard and distort them into communal ones. For instance, squatters living in a
flood-prone area along the Pinang River in Pulau Pinang refused to be relocated to make way
for flood mitigation works carried out by the state government (formed by the ruling Barisan
Nasional Party) in 1991. The opposition parties then seized the opportunity and made the
issue into a communal one as the majority of the squatters supported them. This led to long
delays in the implementation of the flood mitigation works resulting in the perpetuation of the
flood hazard in the area.
Discrimination in access to resources is a dynamic pressure leading to increased vulnerability
of specific ethnic groups to disasters (Blaikie et al 1994). In Peninsular Malaysia, ethnic
segregation generated by communalism has also led to such discrimination. Communalism,
during and after the colonial period, has left the Malays way behind the Chinese and Indians
in terms of economic well being. Until today, poor Malay peasant farmers still occupy flood-
prone padi land throughout much of the East Coast and along riverine areas on the West
Coast. These are areas most susceptible to the flood hazard. The poorer section of the
Chinese and Indian communities are not spared either. As many cannot afford the luxury of
legitimate housing, they squat on river banks where the threat of flooding has deterred
development. It is by no means an unusual discovery to find that the poor are worse hit and
most vulnerable to the flood hazard. Rather, the world's poor are hit hardest by natural
disasters and are most vulnerable because of having to live in the most dangerous, hazard-
prone areas (Wisner et al 1976; Davis 1978; Burton et al 1993). Poor Malay farmers have
found it difficult to relocate or move into towns (mostly dominated by Chinese). Similarly,
poor Chinese from new villages and Indians from rural rubber estates have been faced with
the same problem. Even when the poor migrate into townships, they inevitably end up living
in the most hazardous zones such as river banks and other flood-prone areas. The most vivid
examples are squatter settlements found along flood-prone stretches of rivers such as along
the Pinang River (Pulau Pinang), the Kelang River (Kuala Lumpur), the Kelantan River
(Kelantan), the Kinta River (Perak) and others (see Chapter 6). In a way, such communities
135
have become marginalized and impoverished through communalism, a force generated by the
political economy context.
Since the 1970s, more positive efforts have been made by the government to encourage
Malays to move into the commercial, business and professional sphere. Invariably, this has
led to an influx of rural migrants into the cities where such opportunities are ample. The
younger generation, better educated and aware of the opportunities and the attractions of city
life tended to leave their farmer parents to seek their fortune in the cities. This has created
a massive problem for the government in that there is currently a shortage of labour in the
rural farming sector. More and more, old farmers are beginning to leave their farm land
unfarmed (also known as 'idle land') because farm size are uneconomical (due to
fragmentation) and they no longer have the energy nor the desire to farm (Fong 1989 p294).
Most of them now receive contributions from their children who work in the cities. Although
damage to crops may be reduced because many farmers have stopped farming, the risk to
people may havl increased as households are now largely comprised of old couples (Chan
1991a). As a result, 'old' farmers and other rural inhabitants continue to be the most
vulnerable people affected by the flood hazard.
While Malays in urban areas have taken advantage of 'special privileges' outlined in the New
Economic Policy (NEP) (see Section 4.2.6), and have since developed into a working middle
class, the position of rural Malays in remote kampungs (in impoverished states) has not
improved much (Faaland et at 1990 p150). The authors have also demonstrated that East
Coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu have the highest proportion of poor households. Hua
(1983 p2) argues that communalism is deliberately being maintained so as to perpetuate the
ruling class's (mainly comprising the Malay aristocracy) power and wealth but the Malay
masses remain largely poor. The poor states and the Malay peasantry, therefore, remains
poor and vulnerable to flood hazards. The majority of Malays continue to live in the rural
areas which are traditionally flood-prone. Although rural-urban migration in recent years has
substantially increased the Malay urban population (Malays comprise 58.1 per cent of the
total urban population), only 35.0 per cent of all Malays are urban (International Law Book
Services 1991 p10). Even so, many Malays stay within their own communities in the cities
and towns. A significant portion of urban Malays are also living as squatters in urban areas,
notably on the banks of rivers which are highly flood-prone. Some examples are Kampung
Baru and Kampung Datuk Keramat in Kuala Lumpur and Jalan P Ramlee in Pulau Pinang.
As a result, the Malays continue to be the most flood-prone community simply by virtue of
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living in the hazardous areas, whether in rural farms or squatter settlements beside rivers
(Wan Abdul Halim bin Othman 1982). Political economy forces in the form of communal
politics have certainly contributed in no small measure to the exclusive nature of current
ethnically segregated settlements.
4.2.6 Income equity and poverty eradication
This section introduces the concepts of 'income equity' and 'poverty eradication' and analyses
them as facets of the political economy context influencing the flood hazard. In Chapter 8
'income equity' is dissected and examined in detail as a segment which cuts across the socio-
political, institutional and individual contexts relating to flood hazards.
Since independence in 1957, Malaysia's economy has grown rapidly. Malaysia is rich in
natural resources and the country has developed into a vigorous, dynamic economy where
industry has replaced agriculture as the largest sector in both production and exports (but not
employment), yielding a per capita income of approximately US $2,000 equivalent (Faaland
et al 1990 pv). Yet, beneath this glorious picture lie inequitable social structures which have
been planted and reinforced by political economy forces (colonialism and post-colonial
communalism) for more than a century. These are income inequality and poverty. By
themselves, they are normal problems faced by many developing countries but in Malaysia
they are central social and political issues because they take on an extra dimension, that of
being identifiable with ethnic group as Chinese are richer than Indians, and much richer than
Malays. Faaland et al (1990) have shown that the income disparity between Malays and non-
Malays have increased from $1,250 in 1967 to $1,475 in 1985 (in favour of non-Malays).
Furthermore, poverty remains high and the majority of poor households are in the traditional
rural areas which are almost exclusively Malay.
Equity and poverty eradication are therefore two related issues which successive post-colonial
governments have been trying to achieve. That their efforts have been largely ineffective was
manifested by the ethnic riots of 13th May 1969. This became a painful lesson which all
Malaysians would never want repeated. As a result, equity and poverty eradication became
the central concern of government from 1970, and the 20-year NEP (1970-1990) was
introduced. Not surprisingly, the NEP's objectives were: (a) to eradicate poverty; and (b) to
restructure society. As the majority of the poor were rural Malay peasant farmers, drainage
and flood mitigation became important tools towards achieving the first aim. In five Malaysia
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plans from 1966 to 1990, the government has spent $745 million for drainage and $425
million for flood control respectively. Under the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995), the
corresponding amounts to be spent are $123.3 million and $507.8 million respectively. Partly
as a result of drainage and flood control, rural standards of living have certainly improved.
The incidence of poverty as officially defined has since dropped from 49.3 per cent in 1970
to 17.1 per cent in 1990 (Government of Malaysia 1991a p120). However, drainage and flood
mitigation may have also given rise to a sense of 'false security' in flood protection schemes,
resulting in further floodplain encroachment. This has led to denser population densities in
floodplains and a higher flood damage potential. The second objective of the NEP aims at
restructuring society so that economic function cannot be identified by ethnic group. Until the
1970s, the majority of Malays were in the agriculture sector (padi farmers and tubber
smallholders) and the civil service, the Chinese in commercial and mining, and the Indians
in agriculture (rubber tappers) and unskilled labour. This was not a healthy situation as
resentment arose between the ethnic groups. Thus, the government encouraged Malays to go
into business, take up professional jobs, and gave them scholarships to acquire a higher
education. And because all these opportunities were in the major urban centres, rural-urban
migration became a flood-related problem (see Chapter 6). For instance, Malays only made
up 11.2 per cent of the total urban population in the peninsula in 1957. Positive
encouragement by successive governments has seen this figure increase to 14.9 per cent in
1970, 37.4 per cent in 1980, and 45.6 per cent in 1990 (International Law Book Services
1990 p10). The rapid increase in the urban population gave rise to a whole range of
problems, not least was the increased frequency of flash floods due to over-development of
the housing industry at the expense of forested areas, squatting on flood-prone areas, and
blockage of free flow of rivers caused by the dumping of rubbish into rivers (Low and Leigh
1972; Pang 1987).
With the end of the NEP in 1990, the government introduced the Second Outline Perspective
Plan (OPP2) which embodies the NDP. As with past practice, the NDP also makes use of
five-year development plans. The Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) marks the first phase of
this policy under the OPP2. The NDP is not unlike that of the NEP. Its objective is to
achieve balanced development in order to create a more united and just society (Government
of Malaysia 1991a p4). Its motto is 'growth with equity'. By this, the NDP aims to reduce
and ultimately eliminate the social and economic inequalities and imbalances in the country
in order to promote a fair and more equitable sharing of the benefits of economic growth by
ethnic groups, communities, regions and states. Towards this end, rural areas will again be
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given priority in development projects, particularly with reference to flood control and
drainage. In the urban centres, squatter settlements will either be relocated or provided with
flood protection measures. All these measures are aimed at improving the living standards
of the poor and eradicating poverty. However, their effectiveness remains debatable. For
example, although the NEP has brought about improvements in rural standards of living and
significantly reduced poverty levels, it has not reached its targets in both poverty eradication
and redistribution of incomes (through restructuring society). Malays have only attained
approximately 20.0 per cent ownership of the country's wealth, well short of the 30.0 per
cent target of the NEP (Faaland et al 1990 p233). Although poverty in its worst form is
gradually diminishing in the country, approximately 619,400 families in rural areas, mainly
Malays, are still in poverty. Of this total, 143,100 families are the hard-core poor
(Government of Malaysia 1991a p12). Thus, these families are still highly vulnerable to flood
hazards as most are located in the traditional rural sector where farming on floodplains or
fishing near estuaries and the coasts are the major occupations. There is thus still a long way
to go before both equity and poverty eradication can be achieved. As such, these facets of
the political economy context have important implications of population vulnerability and
flood hazard reduction. The nearer the government gets to achieving these two targets, the
less vulnerable the people would become and the more flood hazards would be reduced.
4.3	 Other contexts
In theory, there can be an unlimited number of contexts in which the flood hazard can occur.
Contexts are likely to differ if the same area is flooded by two different events (temporal
contexts). Likewise, contexts are also likely to differ when two different areas are flooded
by the same event (spatial contexts). It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss all
contexts, just as it is impossible to describe all flood events in the peninsula. The above
discussion only serves to outline the main contexts which are conceptualised to have an
important impact on the creation and perpetuation of the flood hazard in Peninsular Malaysia.
However, when describing specific flood events other contexts which are deemed important
and which are not previously explained will be discussed.
4.4 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated that flood hazards occur in specific contexts and have deeper
origins than their present or current manifestations. The contextual analysis on the two key
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contexts of socio-cultural and political economy has demonstrated the importance of macro
forces on the creation and perpetuation of flood hazards in Peninsular Malaysia. More
significantly, it has illuminated the importance of both the elements of time and space in the
occurrence of flood hazards. Both elements are manifested by the influence of both key
contexts on the flood hazard.
In terms of the time element, the notion that 'the past is the key to the present' is probably
best illustrated by the influence of the socio-cultural context. Its three facets of early historical
settlement, colonialism and ethnic culture are forces that have been shaped in the past. Yet,
so profound are their influences on the flood hazard that these forces are felt until the present
day. All three facets mould the current pattern of floodplain settlements in the peninsula,
influence flood hazard policies, and strongly affect traditional responses to flood hazards, all
of which largely determine the outcome of flood hazards. More specifically, The colonial
legacy has also deep-rooted influence on the current status of the Malaysian export-oriented
economy and its sub-ordination to metropolitan capital/neo-colonialism. On the other hand,
the time element of the political economy contexts is best reflected by the influence of post-
colonial government policies on rapid economic development, flood hazard management, and
its social, economic and political policies (viz, federal-state politics, equity, poverty
eradication, communalism, etc.). These facets have not only perpetuated the flood hazard in
many parts of the peninsula but also reinforced flood vulnerability within a large section of
the population.
In terms of the spatial element, the most distinct manifestation of flood hazard variability is
between East Coast and West Coast (there are of course intra-region variabilities as well).
Wide disparities in incomes and development exist spatially between the two coasts and this
is attributed to both the socio-cultural (mainly as a result of colonialism but also to a lesser
extent from ethnic culture) and political economy (mainly via post-colonial government
policies) contexts. This has created an East Coast which is relatively underdeveloped, deeply
entrenched in the traditional agrarian sector, impoverished and therefore very vulnerable to
flood hazards. On the other hand, rapid development of the West Coast has also caused
problems associated with increased erosion, rapid runoff, shortened lag time between rainfall
and flood flow, and is likely to have contributed to increased frequencies and magnitudes of
flooding. Research has indicated that many densely developed urban floodplains are highly
susceptible to flash flooding (Huan et al 1982; Jamaluddin 1985; Friends of Penang Hill
1991; Hamirdin Ithnin 1992).
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Socio-cultural and political economy contexts, however, do not stop short of merely affecting
the creation and perpetuation of the flood hazard. More significantly, they also have profound
influences on how institutions and organisations deal with flood hazards, and the way
individuals (as floodplain occupants and as government officers) perceive and respond to such
hazards. The ways in which both contexts affect institutions and organisations is examined
in detail in Chapter 5, and the extent to which they affect individual response analysed in
Chapters 6 and 7.
Thus, while this research accepts the important role of individuals in response to the flood
hazard (a key finding well documented by North American hazard researchers such as White
(1945), Kates (1962, 1971), and Burton et al (1978, 1993), it is also well aware of the
influence of macro contextual forces on individuals (key findings of researchers working
within the structural paradigm such as Wisner et al (1976), Hewitt (1983a), and more recently
Blaikie et al (1994) and Varley (1994). This research also takes into consideration the
important role of institutions and organisations, which themselves subject to macro socio-
cultural and political-economic forces, strongly limit and constrain the actions of individuals
(in terms of flood hazard reduction) (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986). So far, this research has
managed to demonstrate the importance of macro forces in the creation and perpetuation of
flood hazards. It has still to demonstrate the significance of institutional forces and the
important role of individual response in flood hazard reduction. But, the biggest challenge,
is to analyse the links between the macro forces, through institutional constraints, right down
to the individual response (Chapter 8). This is where the current research aims to advance
hazards theory as much as it aims to contribute to a better understanding of flood hazards in
Peninsular Malaysia.
This chapter has demonstrated how the socio-cultural and political economy contexts have
significantly influenced the creation and perpetuation of flood hazards in Peninsular Malaysia.
The next chapter focuses on how the institutional context affects the outcome of flood hazards
in the peninsula via an evaluation of the adequacy of flood hazard institutions and
organisations.
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5	 THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF FLOOD HAZARD RESPONSE
5.1	 Introduction
Socio-cultural (mainly colonial influence) and political economy contexts (mainly government
policies) have generated and created institutions' as vehicles to control and manage flood
hazards. Although these are the broadest forces influencing the creation and perpetuation of
the flood hazard, it is the institutional context which profoundly affects overall policies and
trends and their day-to-day operation. In Britain and many other developed countries, flood
hazard institutions and organisations' have been found to be the key forces which determine
the success or failure of policies and strategies in flood hazard reduction. (Penning-Rowsell
et al 1986). In the same way, once institutions are established, they in turn influence higher
level government policies, and lower level individual response. In terms of flood hazard
management, institutions have become an important tool as they form the link between the
government and the public (Mitchell 1990).
This chapter aims to demonstrate the ways in which flood hazard institutions affect the
outcome of flood hazards in Peninsular Malaysia. It focuses most closely upon current
legislative arrangements, organisational structures, attitudinal philosophies and sub-culture,
and policies and instruments. Their effectiveness are examined via an evaluation of flood
hazard institutions using the 'criteria approach'.
5.2	 Macro contexts and flood hazard institutions
Socio-cultural and political economy contexts are macro contexts which have a profound
effect on institutions. The ways in which current flood hazard institutions are set up, their
current characteristics and how they manage flood hazards are strongly influenced by macro
contextual forces such as colonial policies and their heritage, and current government policies
" In this research, the term institutions is broadly defined as comprising components of
legislation, organisational structures, attitudes and sub-culture, and policies and instruments.
53 Depending on the context, the term 'flood hazard organisation' is used in this thesis
to refer to a government department or agency which is directly involved with flood
management. Some examples are the DID, the MMS, the FDRPC, the Police Department and
the Army. A flood hazard organisation can be considered as a component of flood hazard
institutions, viz, the organisation structures component.
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and ideologies. This section focuses on the extent to which macro contexts influence flood
hazard institutions.
5.2.1 Socio-cultural context and institutions
The socio-cultural context affects flood hazard institutions and organisations in many ways.
Of the three facets of historical settlement, colonialism and individual culture, it is the
colonial facet that has the most profound effect on institutions. Historical settlement is not
envisaged to have a profound effect. Neither does individual culture, although the actions of
individuals may have a 'feedback' effect on institutions and organisations.
During British rule, laws and regulations on flood control, urban drainage, land use practice
and other aspects related to the flood hazard were set up by the British. Much of Malaysia's
legal system is based on British Law (The Economist 27.11.93 p83). The bulk of Malaysian
lawyers are trained in Britain and the British judicial system is often quoted as an authority.
Many laws were also passed during colonial times and have remained more or less unchanged
until the present day. For instance, the Waters Enactment of 1920 which outlines the general
usage of rivers was passed during colonial rule. Another is the Mining Enactment of 1929
which outlines mining regulations and issues related to erosion and flooding (the effectiveness
of these enactments are examined in Section 5.3.2 b). Both the above enactments are still in
force in the present day although some modifications and additions have been included over
the years.
Chapter 4 has demonstrated the considerable extent to which colonial policies have influenced
current flood management approach. To elaborate the point, it must be emphasised that the
British were largely responsible for the creation of many flood hazard organisations, amongst
them the DID and the PWD. The DID is an organisation not unlike the NRA and its
predecessors in Britain. Its main function is to provide drainage and irrigation for agriculture
land. Flood alleviation is only of secondary importance. Because of colonial policies, the DID
and the PWD are dominated by engineers and predominantly employ the
structural/engineering approach to redress flood problems. This technocentric approach has
largely benefited small scale urban floodplains in the West Coast (Pang 1987) but is
ineffective against large scale monsoon floods in the East Coast (Leigh and Low 1978).
Following the major flood in 1971, the main strategy to protect the federal capital has been
based on the technocentric approach. According to the then director-general of the DID, the
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Kelang Gates Dam would be enlarged and designed to contain flood water of a 100-year
event, the probability of the 1971 event (New Straits Times 7.7.79).
In Britain, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food exercises overall coordination of
flood alleviation and land drainage, as part of their wider responsibility for agricultural policy
and development. Flood hazard alleviation is, therefore, deeply rooted within a 'land
drainage' (agricultural) legal context which deeply pervades all institutional arrangements
(Penning-Rowsell et al 1986 p58). Likewise, the DID is an organisation functioning under
the umbrella of the Ministry of Agriculture. Flood hazard alleviation in Peninsular Malaysia
is also deeply entrenched within an agricultural context, viz, that of land drainage to produce
more land for agriculture. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that flood alleviation takes
secondary importance behind agricultural objectives such as land drainage and irrigation in
the DID's objectives. The role and function of flood hazard institutions and organisations are
therefore constrained within this 'agricultural force field'.
The British 'culture of secrecy', introduced in Chapter 4, is a characteristic prevalent in
Malaysian flood hazard organisations. In most western democracies, the philosophy of
freedom of information is usually guaranteed by legislation. Information is more or less
publicly available unless it falls into a politically sensitive area such as military defence. In
Britain, however, government information is seldom made available to the public.
Government officials also frequently feel the need to limit information flow. In a
comprehensive examination of the culture of secrecy in Britain, Ponting (1990) concludes that
the culture is almost endemic. His analysis shows that there are only about half a dozen
statutes that provide for mandatory disclosure of information compared to a hundred or more
that prohibit such disclosures. Evaluating emergency planning in Britain, Parker and Handmer
(1992 p261) point out that the British government appears to treat information as 'secret'
unless it decides to release it, although 'confidentiality' is the word preferred by the British
bureaucracy. This culture of secrecy has profound effects on hazard institutions and other
emergency planning bodies. Lack of information is often the cause of failures in many
disaster situations, as in the 1987 storm in Britain (Mitchell et al 1989) and general
emergency planning in Britain (Parker and Handmer 1992).
This culture of secrecy has been passed on by the British to successive post-colonial
Malaysian governments. Most government information is being withheld from the public,
with the exception of those governing general public safety such as in health and education.
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The passing and implementation of flood hazard schemes is usually discussed behind 'closed
doors' and information regarding these schemes are seldom released to the public. The laws
touching on the prohibition of unauthorised release of information include the Internal
Security Act 1960, the Printing Press Ordinance 1971, the Constitution Amendment Act
1971, amongst others. These laws ensure that the culture of secrecy is maintained.
Consequently, the public may not know about a scheme until work has begun on it. The
official guide book for government departments on flood disaster response procedures
(Kerajaan Malaysia 1992) is another example of bureaucratic secrecy. Although information
contained in it would benefit flood victims as it would enable them to respond more
effectively to the government flood relief machinery (see Figure 5.2), it is classified s'. In
Peninsular Malaysia, institutions and organisations also practice the culture of secrecy for the
sake of safe guarding their own interests. During the author's attachment at the federal DID,
information in many areas was hard to obtain. For instance, many flood reports, especially
on current flood mitigation schemes are classified 55. Another area in which information was
not released to the author was that of the details of funding allocations. Only total allocations
(which could be obtained in the Malaysia Plan) were released. This became a problem when
assessing the financial resources of an organisation. In terms of flood hazard management,
confidential information such as future expansion plans of the DID and the MMS are not
made available to one another. This can often lead to the purchase of similar equipment (e.g.
of telemetric rain gauges as both agencies run their own network of rain gauges in the
peninsula). There may be other areas where organisational secrecy can have a negative effect
of the overall effectiveness of flood management.
In a country which hinges on the intricately balanced ethnic harmony, the threat of opposition
parties and the press abusing and scandalising any sort of issue may perhaps partly explain
why the secrecy trait is perpetuated. Nevertheless, withholding information from one
organisation to another and from the public retards the effectiveness of flood hazard reduction
measures, whether it be in the selection and location of flood mitigation schemes, relocation
54 The author went through a great deal of trouble in order to get a copy of this book.
He was finally allowed a copy on the understanding that it would only be used for reference
in his thesis and under no circumstances was it ever to be released to the press.
55 Some schemes such as the Sungai Pinang Flood Mitigation Project (JICA 1990) and
the proposed construction of the Gombak Dam in Kuala Lumpur (The Star, 29.11.84) involve
the relocation of squatters and villagers. This adds a political dimension to flood management
and can become problematical.
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of floodplain occupants, or in disaster preparedness, relief or rehabilitation.
Flood hazard institutions and organisations are constrained by a multi-tiered administrative
bureaucracy set up during colonial rule. Although successive post-colonial governments have
made changes to the system, the core administrative bureaucracy remains essentially the
same. The administration hierarchy starts at the federal government, the state government,
the district office, the mukim committee and finally the village committee. The significance
of this hierarchy is that flood hazard management, particularly in relation to preparedness,
relief and rehabilitation follows its principle. The federal government (through the National
Security Council) runs the annual flood preparedness, relief and rehabilitation programme but
it has to depend on the state governments for support at the state level. State governments in
turn rely on district offices, and so on. Ultimately, the effectiveness hinges more on the
village committee than any other body. It is at this level that lives are either saved or lost.
This system has too many levels and information is often distorted or lost along the way. This
is true in the case of flood warning dissemination where intended warnings do not reach a
high proportion of the flood-prone population (this is discussed in detail in Chapter 8).
Administrative bureaucracy is also an undesirable feature which often hinders the smooth
running of flood mitigation schemes. An example is in the relocation of squatter families in
the Sungai Pinang area in Pulau Pinang. Construction companies could not start work on the
scheme as squatter families refused to move and the bureaucracy of the state government is
such that none of the government departments wanted to accept responsibility for moving the
squatters. Although the DID is in charge of the scheme it feels that squatters are not within
its jurisdiction. The Welfare Department which under normal circumstances look after the
squatters sees no reason to interfere. The Police Department does not want to get involved
either. This 'passing the buck' syndrome is often the result of too much bureaucracy. Finally,
it was the state government which had to act on behalf of the DID but work was delayed for
more than a year, during which time flooding occurred several times in the area.
5.2.2 Political economy context and institutions
Flood hazard institutions and organisations are results of policies developed by politicians and
civil servants acting within the influential and constantly evolving wider political economy
context. A shift in government policies towards a more comprehensive strategy of flood
management after the 1971 nation-wide flood saw the creation of many flood hazard
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institutions and organisations. For example, the DID was officially given the additional
function of flood management, a Permanent Inter-departmental Committee on Flood
Forecasting between the DID and the MMS was formed, permanent national and state flood
committees were formed (these later became the Federal Disaster Relief and Preparedness
Committee [FDRPC] and State Disaster Relief and Preparedness Committees [SDRPCs]), and
legislation relating to flood control was tightened up.
Political ideologies translated into government policies are political economy forces which can
influence flood hazard institutions and organisations. For example, major government policies
of poverty eradication and equity seek to increase the incomes of the poor and reduce
disparities between ethnic communities. They result in increased funding and emphasis on
developing the impoverished traditional agricultural sector which is rural based and mainly
concentrated in the East Coast, and are therefore more flood-prone. Since flood hazard
reduction can contribute to better incomes (through reduced crop and livestock loss, and other
damages), such policies inject more funding and other resources into flood hazard
organisations and enhance their capability. On the other hand, although rapid economic
development policies can increase incomes, they may also lead to major contradictions as
priorities are usually given to development institutions ahead of flood hazard institutions. This
can curb the effectiveness of the latter vis-a-vis the former, leading to the exacerbation of
flood hazards. A good example is encroachment of urban floodplains in Kuala Lumpur and
Georgetown caused by rapid economic development.
Chapter 4 examined the extent to which neo-colonialism can lead to exploitation of the
economy by foreign forces. The 'Look East' policy adopted since the 1980s reinforces
foreign domination of the Malaysian economy, in this case mainly Japan and to a lesser
degree Korea. Transfer of technology from these two countries has resulted in the
reinforcement of the technocentric approach to flood problems, resulting in flood hazard
institutions and organisations perpetuating such a lop-sided approach. Major flood mitigation
master plans for the peninsula and vital regions in the country such as Kuala Lumpur and
Pulau Pinang are prepared by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA 1982, 1989,
1990). Although non-structural measures are mentioned, they are relegated to minor
importance as all the above master plans strongly emphasise engineering solutions, i.e. where
money can be made. Japanese construction companies usually gain major shares of flood
mitigation works as they work closely with JICA. Despite the 'Look East' policy, British
firms still have considerable interest in Malaysia. This is evident during the Pergau Dam
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controversy when Malaysia threatened to boycott the allocation of Malaysian contracts to all
British firms (The Sunday Times UK, 27 February 1994). Australian consulting companies
have also transferred their flood management technology to Malaysia. Both British and
Australian firms also advocate the technocentric approach (Davison and Rufford 1994;
Australian Engineering Consultants 1974a, 1974b). Tied to this technocentric approach is
Malaysia's policy on science and technology as an integral component of socio-economic
development, mainly towards becoming a Newly Industrialised Country (NIC) envisaged in
its Vision 2020 objective. As flood hazard institutions and organisations are vehicles of the
government, they are compelled to follow the technocentric policy and are thus constrained
by macro political economy forces.
Malaysia's policy of 'Malaysia Incorporated', introduced in the 1980s, is a system in which
the public sector (i.e. the government) and the private sector work closely together to develop
the country (Jomo 1989). It aims to make the public/government sector perform like the
private sector. Efficiency and maximization of economic benefits are the keys. Tied to this
policy is the government's concept of privatization of government companies, public
enterprises and public projects. Many public services such as the electricity, water,
telecommunications and highway construction have been privatized. Ostensibly, the aim of
privatization is to rid the public sector of its lacklustre image'. Privatized agencies also
relieve the government the burden of funding and once privatized, these agencies survive on
their owe. In time, they generate profits and this is the ultimate aim of the government.
Increased productivity and profit-making are objectives of the privatization campaign.
56 The average incomes of government employees lag far behind those of their
counterparts in the private sector. In the past, there has been little motivation for government
employees who get a fixed rate of increment every year, irrespective of performance. This
has led to a rather 'lackadaisical' attitude at work. There was no apparent necessity to speed
things up or improve services to the public. It was mainly because of this attitude, that up to
the 1980s, flood hazard organisations did not perform as well as they ought to. Since the
Mahathir government came into force in the 1980s, the public sector has been improved.
Flood hazard organisations as well as their employees are now assessed annually and funding
and increments based on performance of the previous year.
57 During the recession in the mid-1980s, many unprofitable government organisations
were disbanded in an attempt to cut cost. Two examples are Majuikan, a fishery organisation
and Majuternak, a livestock organisation.
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Privatized and economically profitable public companies are therefore given priority in most
spheres of development. For example, when a conflict arise between a Local Authority (say
the City council) and the DID over the development of a floodplain area, it is the former
which will be favoured in the current climate of profit making. Flood hazard institutions are
set to lose out to other profit making institutions. Their effectiveness, therefore, are
constrained by political economy forces beyond their control.
Related to its profit making motives is the use of benefit-cost analysis 58 (BCA) in the
majority of government projects, including flood mitigation schemes. In the case of flood
management, BCA considerations inevitably lead to the favouring of densely populated and
densely built-up urban areas, viz, the major cities. These are areas where the economic,
social and other benefits are greatest resulting from a flood protection scheme. Poor, sparsely
populated rural agriculture areas are set to be neglected as they have always been. They will
remain largely unprotected although they remain relieved by preparedness, evacuation, rescue
and rehabilitation programmes. Flood hazard institutions are, therefore, subject to BCA
considerations (a political economy force) in their projects.
5.3	 Evaluating the adequacy of flood hazard institutions and organisations
While recognising the important influence of socio-political forces in the shaping and running
of institutions and the significance of individual cognition and adaptation to flood hazards,
researchers have found that institutions in many countries dominate the outcome of flood
hazards (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986; Handmer 1988). The extent to which flood hazards are
reduced is a function of the effectiveness of institutional attributes such as legislation,
organisational structures, attitudes and sub-culture, and policies and instruments. This section
evaluates the adequacy of flood hazard institutions and organisations based on the criteria
approach, the rationale being 'The more adequate institutions and organisations are the more
effective they are in protecting individuals through the reduction of risk, exposure and
vulnerability to flood hazards'.
58 Benefit-cost analysis is defined as 'an economic technique designed to compare the
inputs to measures (costs) and the resulting outputs (benefits)' (Davis et al 1987 p45).
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5.3.1 Introduction
In recent years, greater awareness of public accountability 59 and mounting pressures from
opposition parties and other pressure groups have forced the federal government to impose
more stringent monitoring procedures on its ministries, agencies and departments at all levels.
For instance, government departments and agencies responsible for managing the flood
hazard have been hard-pressed to 'perform' and 'deliver'. This is because, in the event of a
disastrous flood, the blame is usually put on the 'government' without referring to the
responsible department or agency.
Despite such developments, there have been few attempts to evaluate the overall adequacy
of flood hazard institutions, the exceptions being Leigh and Low (1978) and Hiew and Law
(1992). In terms of individual flood hazard organisations, there has been no attempt to assess
their adequacies in order to improve their overall effectiveness. What has been done is the
evaluation of individual flood protection or mitigation schemes, usually the structural schemeQ
constructed by flood hazard organisations (Australian Engineering Consultants 1974a; JIC)
1980, 1989, 1990; Ferng 1988; Government of Malaysia Undated). Also, much of the
assessment has been done 'internally' or at most by 'sister' agencies owned by the
government. To compound the problem, much of what is going on in governmen
departments and its institutions are often 'classified' and unavailable to the public, one of the
relics of British culture. This 'culture' of secrecy and confidentiality is one factor that has
hitherto resulted in less independent assessment of public institutions than would have been
appropriate. Because of the need to provide greater public protection from the flood hazard,
institutions need to perform to meet public expectations. In as much as such institutions need
to perform, there is an equally strong need for them to be assessed objectively so that
weaknesses and limitations can be reduced or eliminated. In the long run, this will serve to
improve the performance and image of these institutions and this has the ultimate effect of
benefiting the consumers or customers in terms of better and more efficient services.
59 'Accountability' may be defined as `...the process of participation that insures, through
both formal and informal means that beneficiaries influence the content and direction of the
activity with reasonable expectations of compliance by those in authoritative positions (Inter-
American Foundation 1977, quoted from Ressler 1981 p147).
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5.3.2 Using the Criteria Approach in evaluating flood hazard institutions and
organisations in Peninsular Malaysia
In the current study, a total of 4 criteria (see Chapter 3 Section 3.6.3) have been selected for
use in the evaluation of the adequacy of flood hazard organisations in Peninsular Malaysia
(Table 5.1).
(a)	 The extent to which organisational structures are adequate for effective flood
hazard management
Organisational structures for effective flood hazard management refer to the set-up of flood
hazard organisations (mission statements, objectives, functions, formal and informal
relationships) and institutional arrangements.
Every organisation should have a clearly stated purpose. 'Mission statements' can be expected
in the corporate plans of flood hazard organisations. Although the presence or absence of a
formal mission statement is the first step in the evaluation, a more important consideration
is whether statements are comprehensive. 'Corporate objectives' are elaborations of the
mission statements and can be a substitute for them. We should expect frequent review of
objectives. 'Functions' should also be clearly defined to enable organisations to manage flood
hazards effectively. Functions of one organisation should not overlap with those of other
organisations.
Although the Malaysian government's intention is to control floods and provide protection
and relief to the people, there are no specific mission statements or objectives indicating this
intention. In the Sixth Malaysia Plan which is the government's corporate plan for
development in the period 1991 to 1995 (Government of Malaysia 1991a), flood management
is only a small section on urban drainage within water resources management.
The DID is responsible for flood management and its mission statement is:
'To provide efficient, effective and quality service through the planning,
implementation and management of works and irrigation, drainage, river
engineering and coastal engineering facilities as well as through the interaction
and close relation with other departments/agencies and the public towards
achieving sustained national development' (Jabatan Pengairan dan Saliran
1992 p3).
151
Table 5.1:	 Criteria for evaluating institutions in flood hazard organisations
in Peninsular Malaysia
(a)	 The extent to which organisational structures are adequate for effective flood hazard
management
(b) The extent to which laws and regulations are adequately legislated and enforced for
effective flood hazard management
(c) The extent to which attitudes and sub-culture determine the outcome of flood hazards
(d) The extent to which policies and instruments are adequate to achieve equity,
environmental protection, and public consultation in decision-making
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The above statement does not suggest flood management as one of the DID's objectives. The
DID was initially set up to drain swamp lands and to convert them into productive
agricultural land. Therefore, drainage and irrigation are the main emphases. The DID's other
functions are river engineering, coastal engineering, hydrology and supporting civil
engineering services. Although the DID recently adopted a corporate plan strategy with well
defined functions and objectives, flood management was only a minor focus. Furthermore,
within its flood management focus, the DID's emphasis on 'flood mitigation', 'improve
rivers', 'control of coastal erosion', and 'engineering' suggests a strong technical/structural
approach. Alternative non-structural flood measures are not mentioned.
The main objective of the MMS is to maintain an efficient meteorological service to serve
the people's needs, but it does not yet have a mission statement. Its main function is weather
forecasting and the collection and provision of meteorological data. The MMS is in a joint
committee with the DID for flood forecasting. The MMS forecasts heavy rain and relates the
data to the DID which is responsible for forecasting flood levels at various points on the
major rivers. The MMS does not have a direct flood management objective and its role in
flood forecasting is secondary.
The Permanent Commission on Flood Control (PCFC) is a federal committee made up of
officers from different federal government departments. It is headed by the Minister of
Agriculture and its members are made up of officers from the DID, the MMS and other
government departments involved with the flood hazard. It does not have a mission statement
but its broad objectives are to prevent flood from occurring (Lim 1988). Because it focuses
on the term 'prevention', its concept of the flood hazard is only a partial one which advocates
the 'control' view. This suggests that its diagnosis of flood problems is limited to physical
processes. It does not address human causes and human processes contributing to flood
problems except where physical processes are modified by human action. Human aspects of
flooding, often the main reason for increased flood exposure and vulnerability (Blaikie et al
1994; Varley 1994), are ignored. Its objective is to find short-term measures for flood
prevention and research long-term measures for flood mitigation. In the event of unavoidable
flooding, its objective is to minimize flood damage in terms of loss of life and property. The
commission meets annually to review flood problems and plan strategies for their control.
Besides its apparent lop-sided approach to flood hazard reduction, there are other limitations.
It meets only once a year or whenever it is necessary (for example when a major flood
occurs). It is an advisory body and its effectiveness is limited to suggestions and
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recommendations of projects for flood control. Its biggest disadvantage is that it is a body
made up of individuals from different organisations, some of which may not have compatible
objectives. For example, the representative from the Ministry of Agriculture would not
readily agree with the DID's representative on land use control.
Another national committee dealing with the flood hazard is the Federal Disaster Relief and
Preparedness Committee (FDRPC). This committee is headed by the Minister of
Information and has its secretariat at the National Security Council in the Prime Minister's
Department (Figure 5.1). The FDRPC does not have a mission statement but its objectives
are: to ensure relevant government departments are well prepared for the seasonal monsoon
floods; to prepare the public for orderly response action during the event of a flood
emergency; to ensure that assistance and aid are provided to flood victims in an orderly and
effective manner; and to coordinate all relief operations at all levels (Majlis Keselamatan
Negara 1992). The committee meets every year during the month of October, just before the
Northeast Monsoon Season and it oversees all preparedness and relief operations for the
entire duration of the flood season.
The FDRPC focuses on disaster plans and emergency measures, often relying on military-
styled operations to manage flood disasters. Every year, just before the onset of the Northeast
Monsoon Season, the FDRPC activates its preparedness programme. Meetings of all
government departments involved in flood hazard reduction are called and officers briefed
on preparedness, relief and rehabilitation procedures. Getting ready for the flood season is
normal, and such preparedness appears positive in the government's aim for flood loss
reduction (flood disaster preparedness has probably saved many lives and reduced property
damage during past floods but there are no records to substantiate this). However, the
preparedness programme has its limitations. What appears to be a comprehensive programme
of disaster preparedness is actually only for government officers as the FDRPC concentrates
more on the training of government officers to carry out their duties during flood emergencies
than on the public. Although the training of government officers is an integral part of disaster
preparedness, and can be vitally important, ignoring the training of the public in preparedness
programmes can have negative results. Given the best trained officers in a flood emergency,
the overall flood loss savings would be minimal if the public fails to response effectively,
either due to ignorance (as a result of not being prepared sufficiently) or otherwise. People
living in flood zones often do not heed flood warnings and evacuation notices because they
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[ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
	 j	
FEDERAL DISASTER RELIEF AND PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEE
National Security Council (Secretariat)
Ministry of Information (Chair)
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of National Unity and Social Development
Federal Chief Secretariat
Ministry of Transport
Federal Police Department
Federal Armed Forces
FEDERAL SUB-GROUP
TRANSPORT/COMMUNICATIONS
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Internal
Commerce & Consumer Affairs, Ministry of
Health, Ministry of National Unity & Social
Development, National Padi Board, Federal
DID, Federal MMS, Kuala Lumpur City Hall,
National Security Council.
FEDERAL SUB-GROUP
WORKS/SUPPLIES
Ministry of Transport, Ministry
of Internal Commerce & Consumer
Affairs, Federal PWD, Ministry of
National Unity & Social Development,
Federal DID, Federal MMS, Federal
Police Department, Federal Armed
Forces, Federal Navy, Federal Air
Force, Kuala Lumpur City Hall,
National Security Council
STATE DISASTER RELIEF AND PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEES
State Security Council
State Police Department
State Armed Forces
State Department of Health
State Drainage and Irrigation Department
State Welfare Department
State National Padi Board
State Department of Commerce and Industry
State Department of Information
State Department of Education
State Public Works Department
Other State Government Agencies
All Voluntary Organisations
I
DISTRICT DISASTER RELIEF AND PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEES
District Office
District Police Department
District Public Works Department
District Health Department
District Welfare Department
Armed Forces Representative
District Drainage and Irrigation Department
Other District Government Agencies
All Voluntary Organisations
I 
i-MUKIM DISASTER RELIEF AND PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEES
Perighulu (Chief Headman) and village heads
Some advisers (Government officers) in certain cases 
I
VILLAGE DISASTER RELIEF AND PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEES
Village Head, Elders of the village
Flood Wardens (those villagers living closest to river)
Figure 5.1: The Federal Disaster Relief and Preparedness Committee (FDRPC) and its
sub-committees (Source: National Security Council of Malaysia)
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are not well prepared or well informed. Floodplain occupants in Peninsular Malaysia
generally have a high level of flood awareness (see Chapters 6 and 7), but are less aware of
the dangers of floods and government flood reduction schemes because of poor public
education programmes. Also, the FDRPC's compulsory evacuation programme often lead to
resentment amongst the flood victims. While voluntary evacuation can be a positive asset,
compulsory evacuation can retard the recovery process (Davis 1981 p28, 1984a p338).
The FDRPC's annual provision of flood relief and rehabilitation to victims have also led to
negative effects. According to one officer, many flood victims gradually get used to such help
from the FDRPC and become more and more dependent on government aid. They grow
complacent and less independent. The self-reliance and coping mechanisms built up by their
ancestors are eroded and they become more vulnerable. Thus, when government help is not
forthcoming during a flood, these people are especially hard-hit. Siew, a sundry shop owner
from Kuala Krai (Kelantan) laments that the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) did not
fulfil its duty of looking after the interest of the Chinese community during floods (see
Appendix H Case 4). He complains that the government did not provide enough food, shelter,
clothing and other help to the Chinese community during the many floods he has experienced
while living in Kuala Krai. Such stories are also not uncommon amongst the Malays. Malccik
Mabee from Pulau Pinang (Appendix H Case 1) complains that she never received sufficient
help from the authorities in times of floods. Being a squatter, she says she has been
victimised as flooded residents in nearby Jalan P Ramlee have received aid which she did not.
Accumulated flood loss due to frequent flooding has severely taxed Makcik Mabee and her
family and made them more vulnerable.
Institutional arrangements between flood hazard and related organisations, formal or
informal, are part of their organisational structures. Interlocking structures reflect the locus
of an organisation within the governmental hierarchy. Informal and formal relationships
determine the power of an organisation, the exercise of which will require inter-organisational
co-ordination, delegation and bargaining (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986 p26). Figure 5.2 shows
the flood disaster response machinery depicting the institutional arrangements between flood
hazard organisations involved with flood management in Peninsular Malaysia. This machinery
is coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC) 6° but the FDRPC is the body that
' The main role of NSC is to maintain national security of all sorts and a widespread
flood could threaten national security.
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Figure 5.2: The Flood Disaster Relief Control Machinery in Peninsular Malaysia
(Source: National Security Council of Malaysia)
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runs the machinery. Once the MMS forecasts a heavy rain spell, it transmits a 'heavy rain
warning' to the DID. The DID then forecast 'danger' flood levels along the major rivers of
the peninsula based on the received rainfall information and data from its own network of
telemetric rainfall and river level stations. The forecast is then faxed to the Malaysian Control
Centre and various State Flood Control Centres for appropriate action to be taken. When the
DID has forecast flood, the machinery is immediately put on alert. During the Northeast
Monsoon Season, the machinery is on standby or alert (that is, ready to be activated
anytime). The full machinery is activated when floods occur in several states or when a state
experiences a massive flood which cannot be adequately handled by the state authorities. In
the event of massive and widespread flooding seriously crippling several states (and weather
conditions are forecasted to deteriorate), then the NSC will advise the prime minister who
may then decide whether or not to declare the flooding as a national disaster.
The NSC is the secretariat for the FDRPC which is the overall coordinating body. The
FDRPC is divided into two sub-groups, one for transport and communications and the other
for works and supplies. The FDRPC coordinates all operations from the Malaysian Control
Centre in Kuala Lumpur. At the state level, there are 11 State Disaster Relief and
Preparedness Committees (SDRPC). Under each state are District Disaster Relief and
Preparedness Committees (DDRPC). Within each district are Mukim Disaster Relief and
Preparedness Committees (MDRPC). Each MDRPC is headed by a `penghulu''. Finally,
there are many Village Disaster Relief and Preparedness Committees (VDRPC) under each
mukim. Each VDRPC is headed by a `ketua kampung'.
The above organisational structure for flood defence appears complex but well designed as
a central flood hazard organisation is connected to other sister agencies/departments.
However, the flood disaster machinery will only be effective if all involved agencies do their
part. The lapses of one or more agencies could disrupt the entire machinery. For example,
the June 1991 flood in Pulau Pinang caused havoc in the city of Georgetown as the MMS
failed to issue warning of heavy rains and the DID also failed to forecast the flood and was
not in a position to issue any warning. As a result, rescue boats could not be transported from
their base to the flooded areas in time as the roads were all flooded and jammed by stalled
vehicles.
' A penghulu is the Malay term for headman to a group of villages. However, in some
areas the term is used synonymously with `ketua kampung'. Ketua kampung is literally
translated as village head, 'ketua' being head and `kampung' being village.
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The flood disaster machinery is closely bound by the FDPRC. Without its co-ordination, the
other agencies and departments are mere separate bodies unattached to one another. These
organisations work together only during the flood season under the directive of the FDRPC.
At other times there is little integration between them. Most flood hazard agencies are
independent and work on their own. Increased cooperation and support is needed to improve
overall reduction of flood hazards. At the moment, only the MMS and the DID work closely
in developing and improving flood forecasting systems. Feedbacks from informal interviews
with officers from some of these organisations revealed that there is insufficient teamwork
and mutual support between their organisations in relation to flood management. Most of the
time, they work independently of one another. For instance, the Health Department could
work closely together with voluntary organisations such as the Red Crescent and the St.
John's Ambulance Brigade in order to avoid duplication of work as well as provide mutual
support whenever necessary. Similarly, the DID and the MMS could also benefit from
working closely with academic institutions such as universities and private consultants in the
field of flood forecasting and warning.
Duplication of responsibilities between flood hazard organisations is a common characteristic
of poorly designed and wasteful organisational systems. However, in the case of disaster
emergency/flood emergency planning, it can be deliberately designed as a form of 'fail safe'
measure. Duplication and double communication links act as checks as failure of one
organisation is counter-checked by another. However, feedbacks from official interviews do
not suggest that such duplication in Malaysian organisations are deliberately plamed.
Consequently, the current overlapping of responsibilities between organisations is non-
productive. In the dissemination of flood warnings, for instance, the Police Department is
officially responsible but many other agencies also do the job. They include the DID, the
Army, the local authorities and others. Uncoordinated, this can be a wastage of human
resources resulting in some people being warned many times and others not warned at all.
However, with better coordination, some duplication can be retained as checks but others can
be eliminated.
The above flood disaster machinery appears to be too rigid which is often a common cause
of management failure (Davis 1986a p19). Although it is important that functions and
responsibilities are clearly demarcated, there should also be some flexibility in terms of
administrative discretion. For instance, the DID does not always have to wait for the MMS
for warnings on heavy rains to make its flood forecast. It already has its own network of
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telemetric rain gauges and river level gauges to rely upon. Also, warning dissemination must
have some flexibility. Based on the machinery, the DID makes the initial flood forecast. The
message is then relayed to the Malaysian Control Centre which then passes it on to the
National Security Council. The latter then advises the prime minister whether or not to issue
the warning nation-wide or region-wide. This bureaucratic process takes too long. The DID
should have the flexibility to relay the warning to the Police Department (responsible for
warning dissemination at the grass-root level) irrespective of whatever happens at higher
levels. The police can then quickly warn the people at the village level and even if the flood
does not materialise, it would not cause too much commotion and embarrassment as it has
not been broadcast over the national radio or television.
In other areas of flood management, it is the view of the author (based on attachment at
various agencies) that not enough discretion is given to administrators at different levels of
the administration hierarchy to make decisions, implement policies and carry out tasks
effectively without having to refer to higher level authorities. Often, effective flood hazard
management hinges on the flexibility and freedom of administrative discretion to 'get things
done' quickly and effectively without involving too much bureaucracy. The author's
attachment at the Kelantan state DID revealed that it took more than two years to get the
approval, the funds and then the purchase (includes tendering) and the final installation of
three telemetric rainfall stations in the upper stretches of the Kelantan River. According to
the officer in charge, there are just too many procedures to follow and too many stages to go
through. The current period is even worse as Kelantan is now under the PAS government and
the federal government (which allocates the funds) is not in the best of terms with it (The
Economist 27.11.93 p83).
Another problem is the lack of consultation and communication between flood hazard
organisations. Flood hazard organisations are independent statutory bodies and there is no
legal obligation that they should consult or seek approval from other organisations, except
in the case where their projects fall into the jurisdiction of another organisation. For instance,
when the DID needs to acquire state land for the construction of a dam, only then does it
need to seek approval from the state government concerned. As a result, flood hazard
organisations do not feel obliged to inform or consult other organisations about its activities.
Also, the culture of secrecy and bureaucracy reinforces such non-consultation. Furthermore,
some organisations often compete amongst one another and look upon one another as
competitors, and some activities may come directly into conflict or infringe upon those of
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other organisations. For instance, the Forestry Department is not obliged to inform other
organisations regarding its logging activities upstream although they affect the river regime
downstream. Similarly, the Kuala Lumpur City Hall is not obliged to inform the Kelang
Town Council about its development activities even though they have a profound effect on
stream flow characteristics downstream (Kelang is situated on the estuary of the Kelang River
downstream from Kuala Lumpur). For example, in the implementation of the Kuala Lumpur
Flood Mitigation Project, improvement activities upstream of the Kelang River are carried
out without any consideration of their effects downstream (Ferng 1988 p4). This lack of
consultation and communication is one reason that often leads to mismanagement of the flood
hazard and its consequent exacerbation.
Flood hazard organisations in Peninsular Malaysia are typically conservative and do not
possess the administrative flexibility to adapt to changes. Results from the survey on
government officers and flood hazard experts revealed that 87.8 per cent of those interviewed
were of the opinion that the current flood forecasting and warning systems employed by
Malaysian authorities did not use 'state of the art' technology. Although some amount of this
inflexibility may be attributed to cost constraints, it is not entirely so. The large amount of
money spent on structural flood mitigation schemes in the country suggests that there is
enough money to get even the best forecasting and warning systems.
(b)	 The extent to which laws and regulations are adequately legislated and enforced
for effective flood hazard management
Flood hazard management may be adequately legislated or under-legislated (Chapter 3).
Ferng (1988 p4) emphasised the importance of instituting an unambiguously defined legal
framework within the institutional framework in the attainment of comprehensive flood
management in Malaysia. It is envisaged that there may be considerable variation in the
extent to which different flood hazard organisations at different levels of government in
Peninsular Malaysia have adequate legal powers at their disposal to undertake each of the
above functions.
In Peninsular Malaysia legislation with respect to flood management is effected indirectly
through laws on river use, water, mining and land. For instance, the Waters Enactment
1920 is the basic law pertaining to river use. It provides that 'the entire property in and
control of all rivers in any state is and shall be vested solely in the Ruler of such state'. With
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respect to flood mitigation, the Waters Enactment contains provisions for:
prohibiting the construction of buildings and structures in the vicinity of a river or a
declared flood channel 'except in a case which may be expressly authorised by any
other law' or except in accordance with the terms of a written permission by the state
Authority'.
allowing the Ruler of a state, if he is satisfied that the bed of any river is insufficient
to contain flood waters, to declare by notification in the Gazette that the abutting land
of such river shall be a flood channel and be subjected to the state's control; and
empowering the state ruler to put a stop to all illegal acts and interference with the
bank of a river.
a written authorization is required from the Ruler-in-Council for the construction of
any revetment or erection of any building or structure within 15.2 metres of a river
bank or within any flood channel.
Unfortunately, because the enactment stipulates that river use is the prerogative of the state,
clashes of interests often occur between federal and state governments. As a result, federal
flood management policies and regulations may not be strictly adhered to. Often, a state may
feel that developments on land adjacent to a river may be necessary in view of economic and
other considerations. Thus, it is not uncommon to find buildings being built on the, edge oC
river banks in many cities and towns in the peninsula. Even in the federal capital, land
pressure and rapid development have necessitated the development of flood-prone stretches
of the Kelang River (see Plate 2.2). Some local authorities such as the Kuala Lumpur City
Council have often failed to heed the advice of federal agencies such as the DID. For
instance, the former had plans involving the beautification of the middle stretch of the Kelang
River which flows through the city. Apparently, the council put huge boulders into the river
channel to make the water cascade, against the DID advice that it can impede channel flow
and give rise to floods'.
There are other laws relating either directly or indirectly to flood hazard reduction. One is
the National Land Code (1965) which contains indirect provisions for dealing with flood
control, particularly with respect to non-structural measures. Land is the property of the state.
As such, the state authority has the right to reserve land for any public purpose by
notification in the Gazette. Since flood management is considered a public purpose, certain
62 This information was gathered through informal discussion with DID officials in
relation to flood management in the federal capital.
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flood-prone areas may be set aside as 'reserved land' and thereby not to be developed. This
law, in theory, is a kind of land use control to monitor floodplain encroachment. But,
unfortunately, federal laws and regulations are often not strictly followed by state
governments. The problem lies in the fact that the federal government has no direct control
over land matters. The state has absolute power over its land'. In practice, usually federal
procedures are followed (within certain limits) and state development projects involving
drainage and flooding require independent assessment and advice from the DID. But the
advice may not be heeded. For instance, housing development on the Paya Terubong Hills
in Pulau Pinang (Plate 5.1) has resulted in increased flooding frequencies and magnitudes on
the lower stretches of the Air Itam River". Another example is the proposed development
of the Penang Hill region, the only forested area left on the island. In this case, the state
government's priority in tourism may have outweighed all other considerations.
The Mining Enactment 1929 imposed restrictions on the siting of mines, retention of slimes
and the maximum permitted solid content of effluent discharged. All these are aimed at
controlling the siltation of rivers and other drainage networks, thus reducing the risk of
flooding indirectly.
The Drainage Works Ordinance 1954 also has provisions for the regulation of river and
land use which has bearing on flood control and mitigation. But in effect, it deals more with
the engineering aspects of drainage works rather than flooding.
The Land Conservation Act 1960 was introduced by the federal government to standardise
pre-existing state laws for the control of soil erosion, especially that which touches on the
cultivation of short-term crops on steep terrain. Thus, indirectly it also touches on flood
control through the regulation of land use. It also has provisions for the regulation of river
use.
63 Land owners may have rights over their land but even so, they have to relinquish their
land to the state when it is needed for the building of public structures (such as a highway).
A reasonable price is usually paid by the state for the acquisition of private land.
64 Information relayed to the author by State DID officers as well as residents in Them
Teik Estate and other flood-prone areas affected by the development.
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Plate 5.1: Housing development on the hills of Paya Terubong which has been claimed
(by respondents, newspapers, and DID officers) to be responsible for increased flood
frequencies and magnitudes at the lower stretches of the Air Itam River
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The Municipal and Town Boards (Amendment) Act 1975 empowers local authorities to
introduce related by-laws with regard to erosion and sedimentation, which are both closely
related to the flood problem (Yaziz and Sulaiman 1985). For example, the Kuala Lumpur
City Hall was the first local authority to introduce the Earthworks By-Laws 1975 which has
seen some success in controlling erosion and sedimentation of rivers from construction areas
in the federal capital (Hj Ahmad et al 1992 p8). The state of Selangor has also introduced its
own Earthwork By-Laws 1991 but other states have yet to follow. These by-laws relating
to the control of soil erosion and sedimentation of rivers also have their weaknesses and need
strengthening. The main problem is with enforcement. It is difficult to monitor erosion and
sedimentation once a contract has been awarded. Developers can submit plans within the
requirement of the by-laws but once the contracts are awarded it is often difficult to enforce
the regulations. As a result of poor enforcement, soil erosion and land slides are very
common in newly developed housing areas, especially those located on hill slopes (Friends
of Penang Hill 1991). Furthermore, in the absence of such by-laws in other states, the
erosion and sediment problems from development activities will continue to persist (Hj
Ahmad et al 1992 p8).
While the above laws governing the regulation of river use have some bearing on flood
mitigation, they are not sufficiently clear or forceful enough as measures of flood mitigation.
This is because economic development is often given priority over flood reduction. Federal
policies are also not strictly adhered to because land and rivers belong to state governments
and federal flood hazard agencies only act in an advisory capacity. Furthermore, in the
approval of land and river use the term flood mitigation is not clearly spelled out and is often
left to the discretion of the authorities concerned. These laws were formulated mainly for the
purpose of regulating and managing single sectoral water use. New laws must be passed to
enable the authorities to have direct control in all aspects of water use which may affect
flooding. This includes laws that clearly specify water rights administration, water resource
development, floodplain management and all aspects of flood mitigation (Lim 1988 p8).
Alternatively, the existing laws should be updated with a stronger emphasis on flood
mitigation.
Laws are only as effective as those who enforce them (Davis 1985 p29). Federal legislation
must be enforced at all levels. The present division of power between the federal and state
governments often results in the weakening of enforcement. This problem becomes most
pronounced when the state government is not ruled by the ruling political party in the federal
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government65 . This is exactly the case in Kelantan where the current ruling party is the Pan
Islamic Party (PAS). Politicking and non-cooperation on both sides weakens flood hazard
management. For example, when the Land Conservation Act 1960 was introduced by the
federal government, it was repealed in five states within a few years'. Furthermore, even
in those states that have retained it, enforcement has been minimal (Leigh and Low 1978
p62). In the light of these developments, differences between the federal and state
governments must be ironed out to facilitate the implementation and enforcement of flood
management legislation. Potential loop-holes must be plugged and existing legislation should
always have a clause capable of being upgraded or reviewed constantly in the case of any
such law being circumvented. Such enforcement and review of legislation will ultimately help
reduce, if not contain the flood hazard. Examples include effective enforcement of the Land
Conservation Act, Waters Enactments and Mining Enactment.
At the local level, enforcing the federal laws lies with the district office, and flood hazard
departments such as the DID cannot take independent action even when such laws are
violated. The DID must work through the district officer. Thus, the DID has very little
control over development within floodplains, even though it is recognised as the authority and
expert relating to river use, floods and other riverine aspects'. Land development agencies
need only consult the DID whenever development plans are related to drainage or flood
control. However, there is no need for development agencies to heed the advice of the DID
even if the DID views the development plans to be inadequate in terms of drainage, or
damaging in terms of high flood risks. As such, while the DID is officially recognised as the
authority on all aspects of river use, drainage, flood control and management, its influence
does not go beyond that of offering advice. Under the Malaysian Constitution, the states have
65 In Peninsular Malaysia, the electorate casts two votes - one for a member of Parliament
(in the federal government) and the other for a member of State (in the state government).
In some cases, the party that wins the federal elections is not the same as that which wins the
state elections. For instance, Kelantan and Sabah are states which have been captured by
opposition parties during the last election.
66 The Act was repealed in the states of Kedah, Pulau Pinang and Perak in 1965, and in
Perlis and Terengganu in 1966. In all these states it was repealed under a State Statute Law
Revision Enactment, which is described as 'An Enactment to repeal certain obsolete laws'
(Leigh and Low 1978 p62).
67 This situation is similar to that found in Britain where the NRA is the recognised
authority in flood defence, but it is the local authorities such as the County and District
councils that hold the key to success or failures in hazard management (Parker 1992 pp12-
14). The DID's situation is perhaps another case of colonial inheritance.
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the right over rivers within their jurisdiction. As such, it is difficult to envisage when they
will relinquish this right unless legislation is passed otherwise. At the moment, all the DID
can do is to give advice to the state authorities when a certain project concerning a river is
proposed. There is even no provision that a state authority needs to seek advice from the DID
with respect to developments relating to the river environment. Even if it does, it may not
adhere to the DID's recommendations. In the case of municipal and city master plans, there
are certain provisions for sufficient drainage and flood control but it is not mandatory for the
architect or planner to adhere strictly to the DID's proposals or suggestions. In most cases,
when a decision has to be made between development and flood management priorities, it is
the former that usually prevails. To ensure that common sense and safety standards are
adhered to, the only solution is to give the DID more legislative power. And to ensure that
flood mitigation is given due consideration in any project, the DID must be given legislative
powers to approve or reject development projects. This would be difficult, as legislation
would have to be passed by the federal parliament.
Insurance can be an effective flood loss reduction strategy (Harding and Porter 1969;
O'Riordan 1974; Burton et al 1993). Because flood insurance is largely under-developed in
Peninsular Malaysia, there is a large scope for developing this aspect of the insurance
industry. Unlike many parts of the developed world where publicly subsidised flood lnsuiance
is given (e.g. in the USA), there are no such subsidies in Peninsular Malaysia. Currently,
there is little legislation on flood insurance and private insurers are shying away from such
a market as they consider it too risky. Alternatively, insurers impose a heavy loading on such
properties thereby rendering the owners being unable to insure their properties. Insurance
companies appear disinterested in developing flood insurance because of the high incidence
of flooding in the country. The Persatuan Insuran Am Malaysia (General Insurance
Association of Malaysia) could be encouraged to draw up such a scheme and decide upon a
reasonable rate of premium to be charged, naturally taking into account the frequency and
magnitude of flooding in the area concerned. House-owners should also be made aware that
flood insurance policies exist and it is their prerogative to insure their properties. At the
moment, flood insurance on private properties is poorly developed. It is precisely because of
this reason that the majority of the public is not even aware that it exists (see Chapter 7). In
Peninsular Malaysia crops are also not insured. There is simply no such insurance. Farmers
have for centuries been at the mercy of the weather.
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(c)	 The extent to which attitudes and sub-culture determine the outcome of flood
hazards
Organisations often develop their own values, attitudes and sub-cultures which influence those
of their individual members. More significantly, these characteristics often influence decisions
relating to overall flood policies and strategies.
The concept of collective 'sticking together' could result in individuals making decisions or
taking stances which reflect the consensus of an organisation, but which may not necessarily
reflect their own convictions or be of benefit to society. While undergoing a placement period
at the DID the author found out that it was official policy to recruit only engineers to
perpetuate its emphasis on the technical approach to flood management. Within the DID,
there are less than a handful of professionals from other disciplines in middle and top
management. Consequently, many decisions favour structural/engineering measures to tackle
flood problems as this is the area where engineers are most comfortable and adept in. Thus,
despite some engineers who are in favour of recruiting professionals with a sociology,
geography, disaster planning background, they still stick together to perpetuate the emphasis
on engineering. Few are willing to change the culture which has roots dating back to the
colonial era. Engineers from the DID seldom see 'eye-to-eye' with academics from the local
universities during seminars and workshops for flood management. Suggestions for non-
engineering measures are resisted collectively by members of the DID. Collective sticking
together is also observed in other agencies. The MMS mainly employs meteorologists,
mathematicians, physicists and those with a technical background. And although the police
department is largely responsible for warning dissemination, there are no experts on
communications in the force.
Flood hazard organisations have also developed distinctive behavioural characteristics
reflecting their history, traditions, accumulated experience and collective perception of their
roles beyond those laid down officially. Some have developed perceptions of their
effectiveness amongst its members. For example, the FDRPC is run by government servants.
Thus, it has a bureaucratic structure which slows things down. As a disaster management
agency it is more inclined to view floods as unavoidable, and only evasive actions and loss
reduction are emphasised. This culture pervades through the ranks in this organisation, often
resulting in its members having a low opinion of the MMS and the DID in their roles as
flood forecasting agencies.
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Finally, an organisation may have developed self-sustaining mechanisms designed to
perpetuate both the organisation and its members. In the case of the DID, this mechanism is
manifested in its recruitment programme and its strong emphasis on engineering. Being under
the umbrella of the Ministry of Agriculture, the DID naturally emphasises agricultural land
drainage and irrigation in order to maintain its role and perpetuate its life. Neglecting its
agricultural objectives may result in its funding being severely reduced and its life threatened.
The above analysis reveals that values, sub-cultures and attitudes can determine the outcome
of flood hazards. The DID would be a much more effective agency if its values and cultures
were to be brought in line with current approaches to flood management. For example, the
NRA in Britain, still largely dominated by engineers, have now embarked on a multi-
disciplinary approach to flood management and other water resources issues (Gardiner 1991).
(d)	 The extent to which policies and instruments are adequate to achieve equity,
environmental protection, and public consultation in decision-making
Financial resources is an institutional instrument vital in flood management. The country's
expenditure on flood mitigation has increased substantially over the years. From a mere $17.7
million in the 1st Malaysia Plan (1966-1970), it has shot up to a massive $541.8 million68
(for the 6th Malaysia Plan (1991-1995), a 30 fold increase over a 20 year period (see Figure
4.1). However, while the total amount of expenditure has increased, an examination of the
breakdown of the expenditure reveals that the total amount spent on non-structural measures
has been low. In terms of expenditure on flood forecasting and warning, there was no
provision under the 1st Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) and 2nd Malaysia Plan (1971-1975). In
the 3rd Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) and 4th Malaysia Plan (1981-1985), a total of $3.8 million
was spent. This represented a mere 0.2 per cent of the total amount allocated to the DID and
1.8 per cent of total flood management works. In the 5th Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) and 6th
Malaysia Plan (1991-1995), the respective amounts allocated to flood forecasting and warning
systems were $2.9 million and $3.0 million. The figures represented 0.8 per cent and 0.3 per
cent of total allocation to the DID respectively. In terms of flood management related works,
they represented only 1.4 per cent and 0.5 per cent respectively.
Due to the low spending on flood forecasting and warning systems, the current technology
68 Both sets of figures are calculated at 1993 prices.
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of its forecasting and warning systems in Peninsular Malaysia is far from 'state of the art'.
Whether or not the MMS and the DID are aware of the current state of the art in forecasting
and warning technology is debatable. What is not, however, is the fact that both agencies are
using inferior technologies in their forecasting and warning systems. At the present moment,
the MMS can forecast heavy rainfall by using satellite and radar imageries but a closer
examination at its methodology reveals that it is more of a qualitative rather than quantitative
forecast. From its qualitative forecast, what is obtained is information that a certain area will
receive heavy rainfall within a certain time span. Such a forecast is not capable of predicting
the quantity of the forecasted rainfall which is vital in any flood forecasting system°. The
MMS may claim that quantitative rainfall may be obtained through its telemetric rain gauges
but such 'ground level' information is certainly always too late for flood warnings to be
effective. Moreover, the number of such telemetric rain gauges are few and inadequate for
any reasonable forecast to be made. On the other hand, the DID can reasonably claim to have
in their possession adequately run models of flood forecasting based on the empirical 'Stage
Correlation Method' (DID 1988a), the mathematical 'Tank Model' (DID 1990), the 'Black
Box Model' (DID 1988a) and others. However, a closer scrutiny of these models showed that
the forecasts made are usually of medium to long term duration, that is forecast made for a
few days to a week or more. Such forecasts seem to work reasonably well during the
Northeast Monsoon Season and presently the Tank Model is used to forecast flood flows in
many of the river systems on the East Coast. However, the Tank Model is not suitably
adapted to cope with shorter term forecasts such as those involving forecasts of less than 2
hours duration. In many urban areas such as Kuala Lumpur and Pulau Pinang, it is this type
of forecast that is needed. Another short-coming of the DID's forecasting system is that there
is no quantitative use of radar and satellite forecasted rainfall. Only rainfall received at
ground level from telemetric stations and river level gauges are used. As such, the lead time
of flood warnings is usually limited, if at all the message is conveyed to the public (see
Chapter 8).
Although the total number of telemetric stations for rainfall and river flow in the peninsula
seems large enough, a closer scrutiny would expose the inadequacies of uneven distribution.
° 'Real time' forecasting in the UK is currently based on quantitative forecasts of rainfall
by radar and satellite which are used as inputs in fully automated flood forecasting computer
programmes (see Haggett 1986; Haggett et al 1991; Chan 1994). Given the importance of
time in the issuance of flood warning, quantitative forecasting of rain is vital to flood
forecasting as it increases the lead time (time between the issuance of a warning and time
when a flood occurs).
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Most telemetric stations are located in populated areas while the sparsely populated areas,
especially highland watershed areas, do not have enough telemetric stations. The MMS and
the DID have also not utilised remotely sensed rainfall (radar and satellite sensed rainfall) as
an input in its forecasting models. This could have been deliberately overlooked because of
the high cost involved but real-time flood forecasting cannot be detached from the usage of
such techniques.
Human resources is another important institutional instrument in flood management. The
DID is an organisation dominated by engineers. Other than low level supporting staff such
as clerks, typists, drivers and labourers, almost the entire managerial staff of the DID have
engineering backgrounds. In the entire DID, there is only one member of staff who is
specially trained as a flood forecaster. The other staff in the forecasting section are not
trained for forecasting work and have to learn from this particular officer. During the flood
season, this officer is severely over worked. This is surely inadequate. Even technical staff
such as laboratory technicians, technicians for equipment, technicians manning hydrological
stations and maintenance technicians must have engineering or related background. The only
exception is in administration and finance where managerial staff have backgrounds from
economics, accounting and other social sciences. The same applies to the MMS who have top
management staff coming from a predominantly mathematics and physics background. As
there is a tendency for engineers concerned with floods to think primarily in terms of
engineering solutions (Parker and Harding 1978 p50), it is not surprising that the DID's
approach to flood management is almost entirely dominated by engineering measures.
In terms of staff adequacy (numbers), the qualitative survey with a number of high ranking
DID officers revealed that the DID's staff strength is adequate only for lower level staff from
clerical workers downwards. For officers in the A Category (those with degrees) the shortage
was about 15.0 per cent and for officers in the B Category (those with diplomas) the shortage
was about 10.0 per cent. In the case of the MMS, the shortage was estimated by their officers
at 10.0 per cent and 5.0 per cent respectively. This was becoming a serious problem as
young graduates were lured into the more lucrative private sector. One DID officer estimated
that staff shortage would continue to deteriorate unless the government make it more lucrative
for fresh graduates to work in the public sector.
The above discussion again serves to reconfirm the fact that Malaysian flood management
policies are too engineering oriented. While it cannot be denied that certain structural
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methods such as the building of multi-purpose dams and deepening river channels has reduced
flooding somewhat, they are very costly in economic and environmental terms. In many
cases, such methods may not be feasible, economically viable or environmentally sustainable.
Yet, the Malaysian Government has persisted by investing heavily in structural flood
mitigation methods. Besides this imbalance between structural and non-structural methods,
flood hazard management policies are also lop-sided in that over-emphasis is given to disaster
preparedness and relief while not enough emphasis has been allotted to flood forecasting and
warning systems. At a time when the government is openly advocating a policy of multi-
disciplinary approaches towards flood hazard management, this over-dependence on the
structural approach for flood hazard reduction needs to be rediessed urgently. More money
needs to be spent on non-structural methods in flood management, either as a supplement to
structural methods or as a replacement when costly structural methods are not economically
viable.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the analysis and discussion on both the colonial and post-colonial
reinforcement of communalism have demonstrated the importance of the equity issue in
Malaysian society. In fact, the progress and survival of the country hinges on an equitable
sharing of its wealth by all ethnic groups. Communalism has created and reinforced unequal
share of the nation's wealth, some groups being much better off economically than others.
Within the confines of such a scenario, there is always the threat of ethnic resentment and
conflict, often leading to undesirable incidents of which the May 1969 riots was the worse.
Post-colonial government policies, therefore, more than anything else, have concentrated on
this one aspect of equity. From the First Malaya Plan to the current 6th Malaysia Plan,
solving the equity equation has been the preoccupation of all successive post-colonial
governments. In the 6th Malaysia Plan, the main objective of the NDP is to attain balanced
development via a concept of 'growth with equity' (Government of Malaysia 1991a p4-5).
To what extent, then, do flood hazard institutions and organisations employ the equity
instrument to help attain the government's objective of equitable economic sharing between
the various ethnic groups in the country? This section attempts to answer this question".
The conventional governmental approach to flood defence is to view them as services to be
" This section focuses on how flood hazard institutions and organisations employ the
equity instrument in flood management. Later, in Chapter 8, 'income equity' is expanded and
used as a segment to analyse links between contextual forces and individuals.
172
delivered as public goods. This is because flood defence is 'indivisible', and it is rarely
possible to protect some and not others. In some countries such as Britain, welfare reasons
also demand that flood defence be a part of governmental service to the public (Penning-
Rowse11 et al 1986). Similarly, flood defence is viewed as a public good to be delivered by
the Malaysian government via its flood hazard institutions and organisations. It is largely
because of the 'indivisibility' of flood defence that the objective of equity is often not
achieved. For instance, it is difficult if not impossible to single out the poor from the rich and
give only the former group more protection in order to redress the equity problem. Also, the
siting of flood schemes in an area of predominantly one ethnic community may be politically
sensitive, and expose the government to criticisms.
The use of economic principles to gain best value for investment is another reason why
income equity is rarely tackled by flood hazard institutions and organisations. In Peninsular
Malaysia, prudent use of available resources, or the employment of sound economic
principles is employed by flood hazard organisations. Recession in the late 1980s has forced
the Malaysian government to adopt an 'austerity drive' and tighten its spending. Economic
instruments such as BCA are applied to most, if not all new flood mitigation projects. For
instance, most of the major river basin mitigation projects in the peninsula have BCA
considerations. The JICA has carried out research and consultancy on most of the major river
basins for flood mitigation, and BCA has always been featured in its suggestions and plans
(JICA 1982, 1990, 1991). Because of the government's objective to maximize benefits within
the constraints of its budget, BCA and other economic principles are applied and the result
almost always favour the rich. This is not surprising as the poor peasant farmers inhabit
sparsely populated rural farm land that does not justify the cost of an expensive flood scheme,
since the returns or benefits would be comparatively small. On the other hand, a flood
scheme located in a densely populated urban area where property prices are high would be
economically justifiable. Although the benefits in a BCA can be classified into various
categories such as monetary, social, environmental, political or even aesthetic (as in the case
of an archaeological site in a flood-prone area), it is the economic consideration that is most
often prioritised. As the majority of government flood schemes (and other projects) must now
go through a BCA, it is inevitable that the majority of such schemes are located in the richer
and more densely populated areas (JICA 1982). In flood management funding allocations
under the 6th Malaysia Plan (1991-1995), it is the federal capital (the single richest, most
developed and most densely populated area in the country) that is allocated the largest share.
Its total allocation for flood mitigation under the 6th Malaysia Plan is $103.7 million, or 22.4
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per cent of the total $507.8 million for the whole country (DID Undated b). In comparison,
the three poorer East Coast states of Kelantan, Pahang and Terengganu are allocated $56.4
million (11.1 per cent), $14.9 million (2.9 per cent) and $0.9 million (0.2 per cent)
respectively. Based on current BCA approach, it is unlikely that impoverished rural areas will
catch up with their urban counterparts. It is even more unlikely that income equity will be
achieved via the flood management sector.
Despite the overall ineffectiveness of flood hazard institutions and organisations in helping
to redress the equity problem, those involved with flood preparedness, relief and
rehabilitation have done a good job in helping the poor. Every year, thousands of floodplain
inhabitants are evacuated and relocated temporarily because of the seasonal monsoon floods.
Some are dislocated from their homes for more than a month. For instance, the family of Kak
Atikah from Pekan (see Appendix H Case 5) were evacuated to a school hall for more than
two months during the 1988 flood. During this flood, the back part of her house (located on
shallow waters in the Pahang River off Pekan Town) was washed away. According to her,
some of her unlucky neighbours had their houses completely destroyed and these people were
dislocated even longer as they took much longer to rebuild their houses. In general, the
majority of those relocated are the rural poor, mostly farmers, fishermen and other rural
inhabitants in the agricultural sector. The FDRPC provides those affected with temporary
shelter, food, clothing and even money to tide them over the flood period. Those whose
homes have been destroyed are even given loans to enable them to rebuild their houses. In
view of all the above help given by the FDPRC, the annual amount spent on preparedness,
relief and rehabilitation is substantial. Some examples of the aid given are shown in Table
5.2.
In a developing country pursuing rapid economic and industrial development, environmental
protection is an institutional instrument which is much mentioned but under-achieved. Flood
alleviation schemes are intended to be beneficial to floodplain occupants, they can also bring
about adverse and unintended effects on the environment. For instance, flood alleviation
schemes involving agricultural land drainage can impoverish many rich and varied wetland
habitats (particularly both fresh water and mangrove swamp forests) as well as irreversibly
change the natural landscape. In Peninsular Malaysia, as more and more wetlands are drained
(for flood alleviation and agricultural purposes), the ecology and the physical environment
is changed and this can have negative effects on both. Flood defence such as the building of
dams, artificial embankments and river barriers have potentially disastrous effects on not only
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Table 5.2: Total amount of aid given out by the Social Welfare Department to flood
victims in Peninsular Malaysia (1986 - 1991) (Source: Social Welfare
Department of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur)
Year	 Number of households	 Amount ($)
(1993 prices)
1986 10,432 462,835
1987 2,865 481,339
1988 4,519 153,021
1989 5,015 425,367
1990 13,453 193,159
1991 3,073 308,624
* The total amount given out to any household during any flood event is $5,000.
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the aquatic environment but also other environmental resources such as landscape, soil,
vegetation, and the hydrological cycle (not forgetting the impact of an architectural 'eye sore'
on the natural landscape). As such, an important consideration of the adequacy of a flood
hazard institution is the degree to which its policies safeguard and protect the environment.
Flood hazard projects need not be environmentally damaging if properly planned. Imaginative
projects can enhance environmental assets and resources. Penning-Rowsell et al (1986 pp120-
45) has demonstrated that this is possible in Britain. In Peninsular Malaysia, rapid economic
development is the government's key to making the country an industrialised one in the near
future but its policy on environmental protection is a positive one. Environment protection
is always an important consideration and is proven by many recent Malaysia Plans. For
instance, in the Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991-1995, one whole section is devoted to the
environment (Government of Malaysia 1991a p389-412). 'Balanced development' is the prime
consideration of the Sixth Malaysia Plan. To achieve balanced development the Malaysian
government aims to develop better techniques for integrating environmental considerations
in the formulation of programmes and projects. In terms of sustaining forestry and other
depletable resources, it aims to progressively control environmental degradation through
conservation of natural resources and preservation of the environment (Government of
Malaysia 1991a p389). The Malaysian government has also played an important role
internationally in the environmental movement. It initiated the Langkawi Declaration on the
environment when it hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)
in 1989 (Mahathir Bin Mohamad 1990 pp1-4).
Based on governmental policies on environmental protection, flood hazard institutions and
organisations can no longer brush aside the environmental component on any of their schemes
as 'unimportant'. In analysing the DID, the MMS, city councils and other organisations, it
was found that environmental considerations are always maintained in the majority of
projects. In fact, the concept of 'sustainable development' is usually embraced. According
to one officer, environmental conservation and beautification programmes are usually
incorporated into the majority of flood schemes. The DID constantly seeks to modify if not
reject strategies and policies which have adverse environmental effects. The DID also advises
other government bodies in their evaluation of development plans, especially if they have an
influence on flooding or are related to rivers and their corridors. The DID's advice invariably
includes environmental considerations over and above that related to flood prevention.
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The concept of 'sustainable development' is preached by the Malaysian government in its 6th
Malaysia Plan in the conservation of the country's natural resources (Government of Malaysia
1991a). In the light of rapid industrialisation, high population growth, increasing urbanisation,
growing scarcity of land, forest, water and other resources, this plan focuses on maintaining
a balance between the competing demands of growth and sustainable development. Flood
hazard institutions and organisations therefore adopt this approach in their management of
flood hazard projects. Officers in the DID, the MMS, the Forestry and other departments
confirmed that the concept of sustainable development is one of the considerations in their
approval of projects. However, as the concept is relatively new, its application and
enforcement have been problematic and slow. Some critics have argued that sustainable
development in Peninsular Malaysia is a myth as there is more lip-service than actual
implementation of the fundamental concept (Singh 1991 p32-98). The problem of drawing
the line between what is sustainable and what is not is another issue that needs to be solved
before the concept can be fully applied. At the moment, the identification of this line depends
largely on the discretion of flood hazard organisations.
As a result, most if not all flood mitigation schemes require independent Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) reports. Only schemes which have favourable EIA reports will be
passed. In some instances, even favourable EIA reports which are subsequently proven
environmentally unfavourable (by others) will not be approved. A good example is the recent
proposed development of the Penang Hill Region (the only remaining forested area) in Pulau
Pinang. Initial EIA reports from consultants have indicated that the proposed developments
would not be environmentally damaging but a subsequent report by a voluntary group
indicated otherwise (Friends of Penang Hill 1991). This has resulted in the non-approval of
the original development plans by the Pulau Pinang state government. Since environmental
factors are currently high on the Malaysian government's list of considerations for embarking
on development projects, including flood alleviation schemes, it can be said that the provision
of environmental protection measures by flood hazard organisations is adequate.
The extent of public consultation in decision-making has a strong influence on the
effectiveness of flood hazard schemes. Public consultation and choice of the majority' is
'In specific cases, the choice of minorities should also be accommodated where possible.
For example, in the relocation of squatters from the Air Itam River area in Pulau Pinang in
1991, the squatters were consulted and given a choice of various relocation sites by the Pulau
Pinang government.
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a basic feature in a democratic system. In many western industrialised countries where the
majority of the public is educated and affluent, major decisions which affect the people are
made after public consultation (either through an appointed panel or through public forums).
There are many reasons for public consultation and participation. While technical decisions
are best left to competent technical personnel within an organisation, those decisions that are
understood by the lay person should be given public consultation. Public consultation may
have the effect of weeding out mal-practices, favouritism and corruption. In all major
decisions, the public should have the right to know and the power to influence them. Such
public consultation is not unlike a form of public auditing. With public consultation, there is
less likelihood of misappropriation of funds or any other irregularities. Public consultation
is needed when a certain flood alleviation scheme involves access to land, payment of
compensation, environment protection agreements, scheme design, cost and contributions
from beneficiaries (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986 p148). Public accountability and consultation
are closely linked. According to Parker and Sewell (1988 p758), 'public accountability' is the
cornerstone of democratic government. It refers to the extent to which a flood hazard
organisation is responsible to the public for its actions or non-actions. In Arnstein's (1969)
ladder of citizen participation there are a total of 8 levels, ranging from non-participation to
citizen control (Table 5.3).
Malaysia is a democratic country where the government is voted in by the people every five
years or so. As such, one would expect public consultation to feature highly in the state's
development plans, especially with reference to flood management. Unfortunately, this is not
the case. All decisions with regard to development projects are made by the relevant
government authorities. Flood hazard management projects are no exceptions either.
Development projects directly relating to flood hazard mitigation has no input from the
public. This may be due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the public is not knowledgeable
enough to sit in decision-making committees which may be highly technical, as in the case
of engineering designs. This is especially so in flood-prone areas where the majority of the
people has a low level of education. Secondly, people are neither interested nor have the
spare time to sit in such 'voluntary' committees. Thirdly, the public feels that it is the
responsibility of the relevant authorities to do the 'job' and not rely on the public to make
contributions. Fourthly, the authorities are also reluctant to relinquish some of their decision-
making powers to the public as this may be seen as a sign of weakness or incompetence.
Fifthly, public consultancy is often seen as a nuisance as it slows down the process. Finally,
it may be viewed as an avenue for the opposition parties to criticise government projects. The
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Table 5.3:	 Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation
Level
	
Nature of involvement	 Degree of power sharing
1 manipulation	 rubber-stamp committees
J
non-participation
2 therapy	 power holders educate or
cure citizens
3 informing	 citizens' rights and options
are identified
/	
degrees of tokenism
4 consultation	 citizens are heard but not
necessarily heeded
5 placation	 advice is received from
citizens but not acted upon
6 partnership	 trade-offs are negotiated
7 delegated	 citizens are given management	 degrees of
power
	 power for selected or all 	 citizen power
parts of programmes
8 citizen
control
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government view this seriously as opposition parties often politicise on sensitive issues in
order to gain popularity. This can lead to public unrest and even stir-up unnecessary tension
amongst the different ethnic communities.
However, decisions regarding development plans that may have an adverse effect on the
environment usually requires an independent Environmental Impact assessment (EIA). This
can be developed as a form of public consultation but often the consultants commissioned to
undertake the EIA report may be biased as future contracts may be at stake. However, if the
public is not satisfied with an EIA report, voluntary environmental groups may conduct their
own EIA and publicise it. This is another form of more active public 'voluntary' consultation.
In some instances, public demonstrations, signing petitions and writing articles in the
newspapers may be other avenues for public participation. In the case of the former, it is
becoming very rare as demonstrators can be charged for disturbing the peace or worse still
be charged for endangering the security of the country. People (except the most `hardcore'
of them) are therefore reluctant and afraid to demonstrate. Many laws, the most severe of
which is the Internal Security Act 1960, also deter the public from openly criticising the
government. The FDRPC's preparedness, warning, evacuation, relief and rehabilitation
programme is completely run by government officials. There is little, if any, input or
consultation from flood victims. The programme can undoubtedly be more effective if flood
victims are allowed to indicate their preferences and impart their rich flood experience'.
The incorporation of informal traditional warning and evacuation systems into formal official
systems is one good example (see Chapter 8).
Based on the above discussion, it is evident that the level of public consultation in
government projects (including flood hazard mitigation projects) leaves much to be desired.
At the present moment, this level of participation is at best only degrees of tokenism on the
Arnstein's (1969) ladder. At most, citizens are heard but not necessarily heeded. In some
exceptional cases such as the Penang Hill Development Project where public outcry and
petition was very intense, the authority concerned may be forced to change their plans in
order to placate the public. In this case, citizens are heard and heeded, even though the
development of the project will still go ahead but with modified plans that have a lesser effect
on the environment.
n Studies elsewhere have shown that pre-disaster planning is of limited effectiveness until
the community that is affected participates actively in the programme (Ressler 1981).
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However, according to in-depth interviews with government officials, and the higher
incidence of public outcry (such as the Penang Hill controversy and the deforestation issue),
there seems to be a change in attitude both on the part of the government and the public. In
the future, the government will allow the public to play a more active role in major
development projects that are likely to captivate the awareness of the public. This is important
from the political point of view as it has a favourable effect on the image of the government.
Furthermore, decisions made after public consultation will at least exonerate the government
from total blame in the event of failure of the project or if adverse effects are felt after
completion of the project. As such, it is envisaged that public consultation will begin to play
an increasingly important role in decisions on flood hazard mitigation projects. While it is
unlikely that Arnstein's (1969) level of citizen participation will ever reach 'citizen control',
it is probable that the public will achieve at least the 'partnership' level with the authorities.
5.3.3 Summary and conclusions
In Peninsular Malaysia, flood hazard institutions and organisations have been set up by
politicians and run by civil servants working within the influential and constantly evolving
contextual forces of socio-cultural and political economy. As a result, institutional and
organisational decisions are a reflection of such forces, the significance of which is better
understood from a historical/colonial perspective and recent development trends relating to
these forces.
The above evaluation has demonstrated that flood hazard institutions and organisations in
Peninsular Malaysia are far from adequate. All four criteria are found to be inadequate in
some ways. Only the environmental protection aspect appeared adequate. Even so, its
application and enforcement of the concept of sustainability are problematic. Furthermore,
economic and political considerations often override environmental ones in decisions
regarding floodplain use. Two examples are the Penang Hill Development Project in Pulau
Pinang (Friends of Penang Hill 1991) and the Kuala Lumpur Flood Mitigation Scheme (Pang
1987).
The missions, objectives and statutory duties of most flood hazard institutions and
organisations are inadequate. Only the DID appears to be adequate in this respect but its flood
obligations are still only secondary to its other functions of drainage and irrigation. Flood
hazard organisations need to re-define and improve their objectives. Currently, the DID's
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objectives are too diverse, flood mitigation being just a minor objective. The Hydrological
Section of the DID, currently in charge of flood mitigation, can be up-graded into a separate
sub-agency specialising in flood mitigation. The objectives of other flood hazard organisations
are not well defined and this need to be rectified. The PCFC is just a disjointed committee
comprised of members from various government agencies whose meetings are irregular. Its
effectiveness is therefore limited. The FDPRC is doing a good job, but that is as far as
preparedness, relief and rehabilitation are concerned. The committee does not have a wider
application of other flood management functions. The flood disaster machinery is also too
rigid in its organisational set up. Organisational and administrative flexibility, as well as
discretion are not some of its attributes. The areas that need improvement include the
demarcation of responsibilities amongst agencies, more coordination and mutual support
during the flooding off-season, and the improvement of warning procedures amongst the
agencies involved. Although the NSC is the central controlling body for flood disasters, its
main task is one of 'short-term' preparedness and relief rather than 'long term' flood
prevention. The NSC is also not an expert body specialising in floods, although it deals
mainly with flood disasters in the absence of other disasters in the peninsula.
Disaster reduction programmes that are over-dependent on a technocentric approach are
unbalanced and are likely to prove ineffective (Horlick-Jones and Jones 1993 p34). Malaysian
flood hazard organisations are largely dependent on structural measures although the official
government policy (since the 1971 Water Resources Committee report) clearly favours the
more affordable non-structural measures. As a result, high cost structural measures still
feature strongly in the majority of flood mitigation schemes. While recognising the
importance of non-structural measures in flood hazard management, there has not been
enough effort to translate that recognition into action. Non-structural measures are seen, at
best, as secondary or supplementary to structural schemes. For instance, flood forecasting,
warning and evacuation procedures can still be substantially improved as the authorities have
not applied current state of the art methods. The authorities have also not exploited the
sociological aspects of adaptation to the flood hazard. Other non-structural measures that can
be further developed are flood insurance, legislation, development planning, flood risk
analysis, land use change, resettlement, flood proofing, and public education.
Current laws and regulations with regard to flood management is under legislated. Flood
hazard institutions need new legislation for more stringent flood management, particularly
with respect to floodplain use. Flood hazard organisations are not given enough legal power
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to carry out their duties and objectives. For instance, the DID has no legal power at all when
it comes to the crunch of deciding the outcome of a development scheme that involves flood
management inputs. Its position is at best one of an advisory nature. It is the state
government and local authorities such as city councils, municipal town councils and district
offices that ultimately make such decisions. Legislation should also be passed in order to
reduce if not eliminate conflict of interests between the federal and state governments with
regards to land and river use. The current situation with the latter holding the power appears
to work negatively as far as flood management is concerned. This is largely due to the
endemic problem in Malaysian politics of translating and enforcing federal policies in the
various states (often under opposition hands) in the peninsula. Until such a time when the
federal and state governments put aside political and ideological differences in favour of flood
hazard management, effective flood hazard reduction will always be constrained.
Both financial and human resources of flood hazard organisations are generally found to be
wanting. Although budgetary allocations have increased substantially since 1971, the actual
increase may not be large if inflation is taken into account. Furthermore, such increases are
mainly used in structural schemes and budgetary allocations for non-structural schemes are
relatively small. This needs to be addressed. Finally, staffing is found to be inadequate in
flood hazard organisations not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of the disciplinary
composition. The majority of staff in the DID and the MMS, the two main flood management
agencies, are engineers and physicists.
Finally, both the equity and public accountability issues are not adequately addressed by flood
hazard institutions and organisations. Despite the government's focus on the former over all
its 5 year Malaysia plans, flood hazard institutions and organisations have not built the equity
criterion into their set up. Flood hazard reduction can significantly reduce income inequalities
as the poor are the ones mostly affected by floods. Flood disaster preparedness, relief and
rehabilitation programmes run by the FDRPC have helped the poor cope better and
rehabilitate faster after a major flood. However, their effect is not significant as losses are
usually greater than the aid given. Flood projects also do not concentrate on poor rural areas
where the benefits are substantially less compared to densely populated urban areas. In terms
of the latter, there appears to be a gradual move towards more public consultation and
accountability in government activities, including flood schemes. However, governmental
culture of secrecy and the threat of opposition parties abusing and distorting information may
prevent public consultation and accountability from reaching a high level.
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5.4	 Institutions, organisations and individuals
This section analyses the ways and extent to which flood hazard institutions and organisations
affect individual response to the flood hazard in Peninsular Malaysia. However, detail
analyses of individual perception and response from the questionnaire survey is given in
Chapter 7.
Malaysian floodplain society is made up of individuals from all walks of life who have
different roles and aims, and suffer varying impacts in relation to the flood hazard. The
floodplain house owner, the DID engineer, the peasant farmer, conservationists, and
politicians are all actors who perceive and respond to the flood hazard through making
decisions that ultimately affect overall flood hazard reduction. According to Kasperson
(1969), the need to make decisions arises from 'stress' or 'pressure' caused by the flood
hazard. These stress and pressure forces are 'catalysts' as they provide the motivation for
taking action (Figure 5.3). In the case of the floodplain dwellers, these forces could be in the
form of anxiety and worry over future flooding, or it could be property damage and other
losses resulting from a recent flood. In the case of DID engineers, there could be the anxiety
of holding on to their jobs, seeking advancement and pressure from the public. Peasant
farmers are stressed by the extent to which future flooding would threaten their lives and
those of their families and destroy their crops, livestock and houses. Conservationists are
motivated to protect the river environment (from large engineering works) and swamp land
(mangrove) ecosystem (from agricultural drainage). Finally, politicians are motivated to retain
their voters support or to gain publicity to enhance their positions. Besides the catalysts,
institutional forces such as legal constraints, flood aid, etc. also affect the individual's
perception and response. In turn, institutional forces are themselves influenced by broader
'structural forces' belonging to socio-cultural and political economy contexts. The influences,
however, are not strictly uni-directional as individuals (either as floodplain users, pressure
group leaders, politicians, engineers of flood hazard organisations or government officers)
can influence institutions and organisations through their actions.
Regardless of the stress and pressure factors inducing individuals to take action to reduce the
flood hazard, the scope for individual action has been shown to be severely constrained by
institutional factors, i.e. external factors beyond the individual's control. In Britain, for
example, institutional factors are central to understanding flood hazard response as they
constrain and severely limit the scope for individual action (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986).
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5.4.1 Flood hazard institutions and their influence on individual response
In Peninsular Malaysia, flood hazard institutions such as laws and regulations have a
pervading influence on individual action relating to the flood hazard. First, they control and
restrict individual activities such as construction, farming, recreation and others which can
exacerbate the flood hazard. Second, they affect and constrain individual options when
responding to the flood hazard. For example, the National Land Code (1965) designates a
large proportion of flood-prone land as 'reserved land' and individuals cannot buy, farm,
develop or carry out any human use on such land. This puts a constraint on developers,
farmers and floodplain occupation by individuals (although squatters do not care about such
legislation). The above law also provides a framework within which government officers (as
individuals) can carry out their duties. Without the guidelines of such a law, it would be
difficult to monitor and control flood exacerbating activities. Consequently, this law can
effectively contribute to flood hazard prevention and subsequent flood loss reduction.
Similarly, the Mining Enactment 1929 restricts the siting as well as the areal extent to which
individuals can purchase or be granted concessions for mining. Regulations under this
enactment also control the retention of slimes and the maximum permitted solid content of
effluent discharged from mines. Mine owners are therefore constrained by these regulations
and have to work within the law. Another law, the Waters Enactment 1920 not only controls
the kind of activities individuals are allowed to carry out on rivers but also severely restricts
the usage of land adjacent to rivers. Individuals cannot build houses or erect any structure
which the state considers will have an adverse effect on the river regime and other related
issues such as flooding, water pollution, destroying the aquatic ecosystem, etc.. In the case
of the Land Conservation Act 1960, individuals are stopped from farming on steep terrain
(notably hill slopes) or from carrying out any other activity which can progressively lead to
soil erosion, siltation of river beds and increased frequencies and magnitudes of flooding.
There are other laws and regulations indirectly relating to flood hazard reduction which
restricts individual action. However, all the above laws and regulations are only effective if
enforcement is carried out. Otherwise, personal interests of individuals can circumvent
legislation and lead to the exacerbation of the flood hazard.
Legislation can also affect individual perception and response to the flood hazard. All the
above laws and regulations are geared towards flood prevention or control. This can lead
many individuals (especially the uneducated) to believe that floods have effectively been
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controlled. As such, many take a complacent attitude thinking that floods would not occur
again. Consequently, they are caught unprepared when the next flood occurs and do not
response in the normal way that they would. This 'weak' response then results in heavy
losses, sometimes even the loss of life.
On the other hand, ill-planned flood warning regulations can often lead the public to
disillusionment and scepticism. For instance, the ineffectiveness of the automatic solar-
powered siren on the Pinang River (centred on the Jalan Perak area) has resulted in the
majority of residents developing a negative attitude towards warning regulations. According
to one Pulau Pinang state DID officer, the siren was initially set to go off at 'too low' a river
level. This resulted in the siren going off many times without being followed by flooding.
Such 'false warnings' have had a negative effect on individuals as many do not pay any
attention to it any more. Later, the DID decided to raise the 'trigger' level in which the siren
would go off but the residents were not told about it. Subsequently, the siren went off
followed by flooding (as in the June 1991 flood) but people did not react to it and were
caught unprepared. Similarly, people in Kuala Krai (Kelantan) often do not heed warnings
as warning levels are too low resulting in the issuance of warnings not followed by flooding.
For example, in Kuala Krai, the warning level on the Kelantan River is fixed at 22.86 m.
From 1964 to 1993, a total of 24 warnings were issued (river level touched 22.86 m) but
only 12 resulted in floods (river level exceeded the danger level of 25.91 m) (Figure 5.4).
Likewise, residents in Kota Bharu and in the vicinity of Guillemard Bridge also receive more
warnings than actual flooding. This has also given rise to an indifferent attitude towards
warnings.
Policies and instruments are other attributes of institutions that can affect individual response
to the flood hazard. In Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.3) it has been demonstrated that governmental
flood hazard policies in Peninsular Malaysia over-emphasise structural measures as an
instrument of flood hazard reduction. There are two ways in which structural measures can
affect individual response to flood hazards. First, the large and well politicised structural
schemes (such as the Kenyir Dam in Terengganu) have the effect of making individuals think
that their flood problems have been solved. Thus, structural mitigation schemes such as dams,
floodwalls, levees, channel deepening and embankment of channels can result in a false sense
of security among the public. Informal discussions held by the author with floodplain
occupants, government officers and private consultants reveal that the majority of all three
groups of individuals believe that structural schemes are the answer to flood problems. Also,
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Figure 5.4: Recorded levels of the Kelantan River against pre-determined alert, warning
and danger levels at various points on the Kelantan River
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in the questionnaire survey on floodplain occupants, 29.8 per cent of those interviewed
mentioned structural measures as measures of flood prevention. Channel deepening was
mentioned as an effective method by the highest percentage of respondents (68.2 per cent).
The above percentages include only respondents who voluntarily mentioned each measure.
The percentage could be much higher if respondents were asked about the effectiveness of
each structural measure. As a result, individuals become passive and non-active in their
response to the flood hazard as they believe that it has been overcome by the structural
measures. This can lead to greater loss when the next flood occurs. For instance, the
construction of the Batu Dam and the raising of the existing Kelang Gates Dam by three
metres in 1987 have reduced flooding in the Kelang River Valley around the federal capital
(Sooryanarayana 1988 p8). The publicity that went with the completion of the two dams
probably gave floodplain residents a lot of confidence. Yet subsequent flooding occurred in
the many flood-prone areas such as the Old Kelang Road, Kampung Baru and Kampung
Pantai Dalam. In fact, the losses suffered were even higher as people were not as prepared
as before in taking action to reduce the effects of flooding. This was the general consensus
with residents from the Kampung Pantai Dalam and Kampung Baru areas (predominantly
Malays). The predominantly Chinese Old Kelang Road area, however, did not show any real
increase in flood loss. This area is mostly controlled by the opposition DAP party and
residents are very critical and sceptical of government projects.
Another example is the Pulau Pinang Flood Mitigation Scheme involving a section of the
Pinang River. This scheme did not prevent the June 1991 flood which inundated much of
Georgetown. Residents in the city, with the exception of those living in the highly flood-
prone areas, were perhaps led into a sense of belief (through wide publicity via the media)
about the effectiveness of the scheme. Another example is the multi-purpose Kenyir Dam in
Terengganu. Although widespread flooding appear to have decreased since the dam's
completion, local scale flooding still occurs and one DID officer remarked that there is
always the probability of a big flood hitting Terengganu in the future and that the dam's flood
control function was not infallible. Because of this sense of security, complacency may affect
individual perception and response to the flood hazard. Also, the constant employment of
structural schemes to combat the flood hazard by the government relegates the individual to
play a secondary, even non-active role in flood reduction. Because of this predominantly
structural policy, individuals become over-dependent on governmental response and they
gradually lose the important traditional coping mechanisms practised by their ancestors.
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Second, poorly planned structural schemes may also give rise to a negative attitude towards
the government. For instance, the many structural schemes carried out on the Kelantan River
have not reduced the flood hazard in Kota Bharu and its vicinity. This has led Kelantanese
to believe that such schemes are useless and that the federal government is not doing enough
for them. This gives rise to a sense of mistrust amongst the Kelantanese towards the federal
government (this is probably reinforced by opposition political parties which control much
of Kelantan state at the moment). Consequently, this negative attitude can spread into other
areas such as flood warning procedures, preparedness, relief and rehabilitation. In flood
warning, those who do not trust governmental flood mitigation schemes will also not trust the
warning system. As a result, warnings issued are often not heeded by the people and
individual response is often too late and rather limited. Furthermore, when people do not pay
attention to warning procedures, they often respond poorly when the warning is followed by
a flood. Similarly, not following preparedness procedures can severely increase individual
flood losses as the public are not aware of pick-up points (for evacuation), time to move,
where to go etc. Relief and rehabilitation programmes are also not as effective if the public
do not follow governmental procedures and instructions.
Policies which retard the development of non-structural measures result in individuals not
having a chance to learn and familiarise themselves with these measures. Some non-structural
measures which are not well developed are flood warning procedures, relocation, public
education and others. Because such measures are not well developed, their effectiveness is
low and since individuals are not well tuned to react to these measures and procedures, their
response is curtailed.
Not withstanding its over-emphasis on structural measures, the Malaysian government's main
non-structural flood reduction instrument is its preparedness, relief and rehabilitation
programme under the FDRPC. Every year the FDRPC carries out the programme in
anticipation of the seasonal monsoon floods. And each year, thousands of families are
temporarily evacuated from their homes, put up in relief centres, provided with food and
clothing, and even given loans to help them rehabilitate. Years of getting used to this annual
routine has made the flood victims extremely reliant on government flood aid. This again has
the effect of eroding many of their traditional coping mechanisms. Flood victims do not have
to worry too much because the government looks after them. This has given rise to an
apathetic attitude towards individual flood hazard response.
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5.4.2 Flood hazard organisations and their influence on individual response
Flood hazard organisations are made up of individuals who work within the organisation's
aims and functions. Individuals can, therefore, influence organisation decisions to a certain
degree. For instance, the elite or the top echelon of the management staff of an organisation
often make decisions on behalf of the organisation. However, the more profound influence
on flood hazard response is the other way around, i.e. by the organisations on the individuals.
Thus Penning-Rowsell et at (1986 p24) has demonstrated the naivety of interpreting the
individual's decisions in isolation from a wider analysis of administrative, economic and
political forces affecting them. As individuals are affected by institutions and organisations,
overall flood hazard response should be viewed within an institutional context. Although
Malaysia is a democratic country where freedom of choice is guaranteed by the constitution,
the constraints exercised by flood hazard institutions usually result in individual house
owners, farmers, floodplain squatters, flood victims, engineers and government officials
seldom being able to exercise that freedom fully. Institutions not only dominate collective
decisions but also affect the perception and response of individuals.
Organisational structures demarcate the responsibilities, functions and powers of an
organisation. In terms of flood hazard organisations, these attributes can have a profound
effect on individual response. For instance, flood hazard organisations can enhance individual
participation in flood hazard response through public education, flood hazard awareness, and
teach the public methods of flood proofing, evacuation procedures, survival techniques in
times of flood, etc. Flood reduction measures would be of limited success if the public does
not know how to respond appropriately to organisational advice. Although flood hazard
awareness and public education programmes have often been documented as unsuccessful
(Handmer and Milne 1981; Scanlon 1990 p233; Fordham 1992 p147), they remain important
instruments which, when planned carefully can effectively reduced losses resulting from
hazards and disasters (Davis 1982 pp8-9; Kreps 1992; Smith 1992 p88). In a compilation of
papers on risk communication, Handmer and Penning-Rowsell (1990) conclude that risk
communication is getting better (through improved public education programmes), but people
are not taking action or changing their behaviour. Public educational programmes are
important in ensuring not only public awareness and appropriate response but also public
support for organisation/government actions. Without such support, even the best conceived
programmes can go to waste. Fielderman (1990) acknowledges that public education
programmes can only be effective if planned properly and executed effectively through the
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media. This is because hazard information competes with other information in the media, and
to be effective hazard information must be relayed to consumers by information producers
in a way that would make a difference.
In Peninsular Malaysia, although public educational programmes, awareness and response
strategies are carried out by the DID, the Road Transport Department, Information
Department, and the Police Department, they are too infrequent and usually carried out on
an ad hoc basis. In many cases, the programmes are put forward during or just after a flood.
As such, the timing and place are far from satisfactory and flood victims are usually either
too devastated or pre-occupied, not to mention being in a highly stressed emotional state to
really absorb what is being relayed to them. Flood hazard awareness and response
programmes should ideally be on-going at regular intervals all year round, for instance just
before the flood season in September or October. An example is the circulation of awareness
pamphlets on how to response appropriately when flooding occurs (Plate 5.2). Another
example is the erection of sign boards with flood information such as forecasted time and
depth of flooding (in downstream areas) (Plate 5.3) and roads that are flooded and closed
(Plate 5.4). Hitherto, only heavy rains forecast are relayed via the radio network. Educational
programmes in relation to flood response aired on the national television network can be
effective but has not been attempted. The importance of quick response and prompt action
on the part of respondents should be stressed. Hitherto, the majority of floodplain occupants
rely too heavily on government assistance and guidance. Whether this situation has arisen due
to decades of government assistance and pampering is debatable. The reality is that flood
victims should be made to realise that their role in any flood situation is just as important if
not more so than the government's action in providing transport, food, clothing and
temporary shelter. By and large, Malaysians must be made to feel more responsible for
themselves instead of always relying on the government. It is only through education
programmes that this can be achieved.
At the moment, none of the flood hazard organisations in Peninsular Malaysia has such a
comprehensive programme of public education. The DID periodically sends out pamphlets
on proper response techniques and procedures. Local village flood committees sometimes
hold meetings to teach the people the best ways to respond to floods. And the media
(television, radio and newspapers) warn people of impending floods when nearing the
monsoon season and tell them how to react. But there is no single agency which is
responsible for public education on flood response. This is one avenue in which more
192
I,/ / // // ///
0 CIA mom PioANe JA4A seea3LIR.-GILIR
/ 24 JAM./	 //),
® PAWN& RAD10/111.
0, 104 sit p41TeRIAA earr4
/I Eikt. .C.EPKV Burlap /
W*, —DAN SAmx-SANA
/G21..;;-'
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Plate 5.3: Flood warning sign boards with information such as forecasted flood time and
depth of flooding (in downstream areas)
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Plate 5.4: Sign boards erected on major road junctions indicating location, time and
flood depth of flooded roads in the state of Pahang
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effective individual participation towards better flood reduction can be achieved.
The administrative structure of an organisation can also affect individual response to flood
hazards. A structure which is bogged down by bureaucracy and too many hierarchies is
invariably difficult for individuals to access. Getting information on floods from flood hazard
organisations should be made as easy as possible but government bureaucracy and the culture
of secrecy are major obstacles faced by the individual (not just floodplain user but also
researchers and individuals from other organisations). Although the DID is responsible for
flood management, they do not have a 'hot line' where people can phone in to get
information on various aspects of flooding. It is the same with the MMS (in charge of
forecasting heavy rains) and the Police Department (in charge of warning dissemination). The
typical government bureaucracy does not encourage the free flow of information to the
public, probably for reasons of security, politics and others. Consequently, unavailability of
flood information can severely inhibit individual response. Sometimes, ignorance on the part
of individuals can often result in the wrong response being made. Because of the
administrative bureaucracy, not many individuals know that the DID is in charge of flood
management, or that the Police Department is in charge of warning dissemination.
Organisations dealing with flood warnings have a vital role in ensuring their effectiveness.
The most important factor in an effective warning system is that it must instill confidence and
believe amongst the public. If the public has no confidence in it, then the system will not
work regardless of how sophisticated it is. Warnings must not be given out unnecessarily as
'false' warnings can have an adverse effect on future warnings. This is the case of the sirens
operating in the Jalan Perak area on the Pinang River in Pulau Pinang and the Kampung Dato
Keramat area in Kuala Lumpur. Residents in both areas are of the opinion that the sirens go
off unnecessarily, often not followed by flooding. As a result, the residents do not trust the
warnings and are often caught unaware when a flood warning is actually followed by a flood.
In Peninsular Malaysia, flood disaster preparedness, relief, rescue and rehabilitation
programmes have been carried out since the colonial period. Based on past experiences, these
programmes have been improved upon through the years. Flood hazard organisations such
as the FDPRC ensures that the programmes are carried out each year, regardless of whether
a flood will occur. Other organisations that play an important part in this programme are the
Social Welfare Department (food, shelter and clothing), the Police Department (warning
dissemination, evacuation and maintaining law and order), the Army (transportation during
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evacuation), the Health Department (looking after the health of victims and the prevention
of epidemics), voluntary organisations such as Belia (a youth organisation), the Red Crescent,
the St. John's Ambulance Brigade, and others. All these organisations contribute towards the
reduction of flood losses and other intangible impacts of flooding. The programmes help put
the flood victims back on their own feet and this in turn enables the latter to response better.
Organisational sub-cultures of flood hazard organisations also affect individual response to
flood hazards in many ways. Organisational sub-cultures affect their employees in their work
related to flood hazard management. For example, employees of the DID invariably approach
flood problems structurally via engineering methods as the DID's policies are based on such
an approach. DID employees have an important role to play as individuals because they are
largely responsible for the effectiveness of the flood management programmes. With the
constraints of sub-cultures within the organisation's structure, employees are restricted in
their response to the flood hazard. Similarly, it would be hard to convince the FDRPC that
structural measures are better than the non-structural ones practised by them. Employees of
the FDRPC would not attempt to introduce structural methods of flood response.
Organisational sub-cultures also influence floodplain users' response when each organisation
employs its own specific approach when interacting with the public.
On the whole, institutions and organisations in Peninsular Malaysia, as is in many other
countries, mainly address the physical cause of floods. With the exception of FDRPC and its
state and district versions, the majority deal with flood forecasting, flood control, land use
control, river embankment, dam construction and other physical/hydrological aspects of
floods. Human and sociological dimensions of floods such as risk, exposure and vulnerability,
all of which affect income and poverty levels, are largely neglected. Even though the NEP
and the various 5-year Malaysia plans advocate poverty eradication and equity, the majority
of flood hazard organisations do not have such objectives clearly spelled out in their mission
statements and objectives.
This chapter has demonstrated how the institutional context affects the outcome of flood
hazards in the peninsula via an evaluation of the adequacy of flood hazard institutions and
organisations. The next chapter examines the extent to which choice of settlement is
constrained by exogenous `structural/societal' forces beyond the individual's control.
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6	 CONSTRAINTS AND CHOICE IN PERSISTENT OCCUPATION OF
FLOODPLAINS
6.1	 Introduction
This chapter examines the extent to which choice of settlement is constrained by exogenous
'structural/societal' contextual forces which are beyond the individual's control. In theory,
Malaysia is a capitalistic country practising free enterprise, and individuals can expect to have
choices in residential location. However, in practice, exogenous forces such as socio-cultural,
political economy and institutional ones severely limit the choices of individuals. The more
individuals are 'controlled' by these forces, the more disadvantaged and vulnerable they are
to hazards. For example, impoverished East Coast farmers are more severely constrained in
their response to flood hazards than their better off West Coast counterparts. The range of
choices open to individuals, therefore depends on the extent to which they can free
themselves from the 'control' of such forces (Figure 6.1). Some examples of the constraints
and choice in persistent floodplain occupance by individuals in the peninsula are examined
in detail in Appendix H.
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 examine the reasons why a significant proportion of Malaysians persist
in inhabiting flood-prone areas (i.e. the stay option), focusing on structural forces which
'trap' them in their present locations. Sections 6.4 subsequently analyses the forces leading
floodplain occupants to adopt the move/migrate option. Thus, the scope for individual action
is expected to be severely constrained by these forces. The chi-square test in the SPSSPC
Statistical Package is employed as a test of association between variables. When this is not
appropriate, other tests of significance such as the t-test, correlation and regression are
employed to determine the important variables affecting the 'stay' or `move/migrate' options.
The significance level is taken at .05. Test results are presented in Appendix L.
The key point in this chapter, therefore, is that despite a high level of flood hazard
awareness, a high level of pessimism and a high level of expectation of future floods, the
poorer individuals seldom attempt to leave for more advantageous locations. They are instead
trapped in their present locations by structural/societal forces such as poverty and low
occupational and residential mobility, development policies favouring rapid urbanisation and
industrialisation and the emphasis on technical and engineering measures of flood control by
flood hazard institutions (institutional), amongst others. They are also, together with wealthier
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*4
INSTITUTIONAL	 POLITICAL-
FORCES	 ECONOMY FORCES
4	
SOCIO-CULTURAL
FORCES
	
RANGE OF CHOICE	
VULNERABILITY 	
	Key: 1	 East Coast poor farmer, poor fisherman and others living below the poverty
line.
2 East Coast average farmer, average fisherman, and others of average incomes.
West Coast poor farmer, poor fisherman, other poor rural floodplain
inhabitants and poor urban squatters.
	
3	 East Coast rich farmer, rich fisherman, and others with high incomes. West
Coast average farmer, average fisherman, and others with average incomes.
4 East Coast rural businessman, wage earner and others whose incomes are not
related to farming or fishing. West Coast rich farmer, rich fisherman, and
others with high incomes.
5 East Coast urban wage earner with moderate income not involved with
farming or fishing. West Coast rural businessman, wage earner and others
whose incomes are not related to farming or fishing.
	
6	 East Coast professional with high income in urban areas. West Coast urban
wage earner with moderate income not involved with farming or fishing.
7 East Coast wealthy urban businessman, large business corporations and other
rich individuals. West Coast urban professional with high income, wealthy
urban businessman, large business corporations and other rich individuals.
Figure 6.1: The hypothesised influence of exogenous structural/societal forces on the
scope of individual action in flood hazard response in Peninsular Malaysia
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individuals, strongly influenced to remain or stay by customs, traditions, ethnic values, the
kampung way of life, traditional land inheritance, and government relief and other forms of
agricultural and rural development aid. These forces exert a strong influence upon individuals
and largely control their range of choices and action in flood hazard response. Figure 6.2 is
a hypothesised model depicting individual choice to stay or move/migrate within the confines
of structural forces. The wealthier group of individuals and a minority of their poorer
counterparts (e.g. those who are fortunate to be resettled or chosen as settlers in government
land schemes, those who have wealthy relatives and the more adventurous) have access to the
move or migrate option. The majority of the poor are deprived of the move/migrate option.
Despite their relative freedom from structural constraints offering better accessibility to the
move option, the wealthier group may not move as they are influenced and constrained
by cultural forces. Therefore, like their poorer counterparts, they stay and seek to protect
themselves from flood hazards.
6.2	 Reasons for persistent occupation of floodplains
In Peninsular Malaysia, persistent occupance of floodplains is mainly caused by
'structural/societal' factors rather than individual choice. Research on flood hazards indicates
that although many floodplain occupants are willing to be relocated, the lack of opportunities,
choices and government incentives has prevented them from moving elsewhere (Chua 1972;
Jamaluddin and Ismail 1983). According to Kates (1962), there are five reasons why people
persist in occupying flood-prone areas:
1	 They do not know about the hazard and are therefore not unduly concerned.
2	 They know about the flood hazard, but personally do not expect a future flood, and
therefore are not duly concerned.
3	 They expect a future flood, but do not expect to bear a loss, and are therefore not
duly concerned.
4	 They expect to bear a loss, but not a serious one, and are therefore not duly
concerned.
5 They expect to bear a serious loss and they are concerned. Therefore, they have
undertaken or are planning to undertake some action to reduce the losses (Kates 1962
p135).
To these five reasons, Fordham (1992 p71) has added another two:
6	 They expect to bear a loss but accept this outcome as an acceptable cost of enjoying
n For the purpose of comparison in statistical testing, households with monthly incomes
of $2,000 and above are considered 'wealthy'. By comparison, 'poor' households have
monthly incomes of $350 and below (see pxx).
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the locational (environmental) benefits.
7	 They had little or no choice in location and/or have little or no choice but to stay.
While each of the above reasons is valid by itself in hazards research (most researches have
identified one or more of them), not all reasons will be applicable to floodplain occupants at
all times. In Peninsular Malaysia, reason 7 is the main reason why people persist in
floodplains. Historical, colonial and post-colonial 'structural/societal' forces were reasons put
forward in Chapter 4. To substantiate these reasons, the way in which such forces strongly
influence individual decision to continue to occupy floodplains is further examined. It is likely
that a combination of reasons 4 to 7 is responsible for people's persistence occupance of
hazardous floodplains in the peninsula. Survey results' are used to substantiate the
applicability of each reason for continued floodplain occupance in Peninsular Malaysia. The
following discussion examines each reason separately.
Although a high level of 'unawareness' of flood hazards has been found amongst floodplain
occupants (e.g. Parker and Harding 1979), the level of hazard awareness amongst those who
have lived in an area for some time is generally high (Chua 1972; Moline 1974;
Ramachandran and Thaicur 1974; Jamaluddin and Ismail 1983; Fordham 1992). In Peninsular
Malaysia, Reason 1 is unlikely as there are probably very few people who actually do not
know about the hazard (with the exception of some new residents who have moved into the
area from elsewhere). Survey results reveal that 436 respondents (70.6 per cent of total
respondents) voluntarily mentioned flood as the most important disadvantage in their locality
(before they were told that the interview was about flood hazards). This group of
respondents, therefore, has a high awareness of the flood hazard. However, when respondents
were asked whether or not their locality was affected by floods, 95.3 per cent of them gave
a positive reply indicating flood awareness.
Survey results indicate that the majority of floodplain occupants (66.0 per cent) expects floods
to occur in the future. Furthermore, 80.4 per cent of respondents are found to be pessimistic,
i.e. they expect a higher frequency of flooding compared to the actual. Thus, reason 2 is an
unlikely reason for continued floodplain occupance in the peninsula.
Hereafter, the term 'Survey results' refer to results from the current household survey
in this research, unless otherwise specified.
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Reasons 3 and 4 are probably only valid in the areas where the flood hazard is not so severe,
for example in areas with flood frequencies less than 1 in 10. Flood frequencies and
magnitudes are low in these areas (depth of flooding is usually lower than stilt height of
houses) and respondents may expect future flooding, but do not expect to bear a loss, or may
only expect to bear a minor loss. They are therefore not duly concerned. Results from the
current household survey indicates that 64.8 per cent of those living in areas with a flood
frequency of 1 in 10 or less believed that floods are not serious. Based on this, it can be
assumed that they did not expect to bear any great loss in future floods. Furthermore, only
48(37.8 per cent) out of 127 respondents living in areas with a flood frequency of 1 in 10
or less experienced a flood loss in the most recent flood.
Reasons 5 and 6 are two common reasons why people persist on the floodplains in Peninsular
Malaysia. Flooding occurs almost annually in the East Coast and other flood-prone areas on
the West Coast. People who persist in such areas expect to bear a serious loss and have or
are planning to take positive action to reduce the losses. They expect a loss and accept it as
an unavoidable cost of enjoying the locational benefits of cheap land, fertile soil, proximity
to work place and other reasons. In the current household survey, 84.5 per cent of all
respondents have taken steps to reduce flood losses. When respondents were asked to indicate
the most important advantage of living in their present area, 494 of them (79.9 per cent)
indicated various locational benefits as the reasons. These include the owning of land in their
kampung, proximity to nearby town, proximity to work place, proximity to relatives and
proximity to public amenities such as hospitals, schools, etc. Also, of those who intend to
remain on their present locations, 54.0 per cent gave reasons associated with locational
benefits.
Reason 7 is the main reason why a significant proportion of Malaysians live on floodplains
and also why the majority continue to remain on them. It applies most appropriately to the
landless and impoverished who neither have the choice nor the resources to move elsewhere.
A fifth of those interviewed do not own their houses and are landless. If squatters (they own
the houses but not the land) are included in this category, then 38.2 per cent of respondents
are landless. In Malaysian society, rural peasants and urban squatters are the two main groups
associated with this reason. In the current research, 21.8 per cent of those who reported that
they had no choice in location are squatters. Amongst floodplain squatters, more than half
revealed that they live there because they have no choice. Rural peasants (farmers and
fishermen) represent 25.2 per cent of those reporting the absence of choice in their location.
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More significantly, 32.3 per cent of farmers and 28.9 per cent of fishermen indicated that
they occupy floodplains because of the lack of alternatives. On the whole, a total of 533
respondents (86.3 per cent of total sample) indicated that they will continue to live in their
present location despite the flood problem. Given the magnitude and frequency of flooding
in the sample areas, this is a strong indication that floodplain inhabitants have little or no
choice but to stay. For example, 37.9 per cent of respondents who intend to remain in their
present locations quoted reasons such as 'I have no money to move', 'I have no where to go'
and 'It's the same everywhere'. All these reasons indicate that the respondents have little or
no choice but to continue to occupy floodplains. Farmers who attempt to move are either the
more well off or the more fortunate ones with external help (from relatives, friends or the
government). Even those who migrate to urban areas may be confronted. with high rents and
shortages of low cost housing, forcing them to occupy urban floodplains as squatters (see
Figure 6.2).
In the current research, 75.2 per cent of respondents who indicated that they have no choice
but to remain in their present location, are aware of the flood hazard. Obliviousness is,
therefore, not a valid reason why the majority of Malaysians continue to live on hazardous
floodplains. Being optimistic' s about economic opportunities, as has been documented by
Saarinen (1966) on Great Plain farmers, is also not a valid reason for Malaysian floodplain
occupants who exhibit a high degree of pessimism. For example, 78.9 per cent of all
respondents are classified 'pessimistic' as they over-estimated the number of flood years when
compared to the actual flood frequency. Amongst those who had no choice in location, 65.2
per cent are pessimistic. Furthermore, expectation of future floods is generally high amongst
respondents. For those who have no choice of location, more than half expect at least a 50.0
per cent chance that flooding would occur in the next few months. With the same level of
expectancy for future flooding in the next year, the number of respondents was 83.2 per cent.
More than three-quarters of those with no choice of location are certain flooding would occur
in the medium term (next 5 years) and long term (next 10 years).
Thus, despite high levels of awareness, pessimism and high expectations of future floods,
people continue to inhabit floodplains. This persistence, therefore, cannot be attributed to
75 Respondents are grouped as optimistic or pessimistic by comparing their estimation of
the number of bad years to the actual (based on number of flood years in an area). Optimistic
respondents are those who under-estimate the number of bad years while pessimistic ones are
those who over-estimate them.
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ignorance. Neither can it be attributed to 'optimism' or low flood expectancy'. People are
forced to inhabit floodplains by structural forces beyond their control.
6.3	 Structural forces leading to persistent occupation of floodplains
In Peninsular Malaysia, structural 'contextual' forces are hypothesised to be largely
responsible for the persistent occupation of floodplains. Political economy forces such as
landlessness, poverty, low levels of residential and occupational mobility, and ineffective
public policies relating to floodplain development and flood management can contribute to the
aggravation of flood problems. Similarly, socio-cultural forces such as ethnic culture can have
a significant influence on individual response to flood hazards. Malays, Chinese and Indians
are distinct from one another not only because of their physiognomy, language, religion, main
occupation and usual habitat, but more importantly because of their culture. Each group's
culture is deeply encoded with unique value systems and a code of ethics which clearly
differentiates each group. The `kampung way of life' is a unique cultural force which binds
the Malay community to its natural environment, and which can explain the Malay's
reluctance to move or migrate to urban areas. Other socio-cultural forces such as traditional
land inheritance, ethnic values, customs and traditions are also expected to influence decisions
to persist with floodplain location. Finally, other structural forces such as government aid in
rural development schemes (e.g. in agriculture, fishing and rural industries) and government
flood relief are also expected to play significant roles in reinforcing floodplain occupance.
This section seeks to test the above hypothesis that structural contextual forces have led to
the persistent occupation of floodplains. It draws on data gathered from the structured
questionnaire survey and unstructured qualitative interviews with selected farmers.
6.3.1 Poverty
Poverty due to the lack of access to resources is a fundamental cause of hazard vulnerability
amongst specific groups in society, and is a central theme in vulnerability studies (Davis
1978, 1984a, 1984b; Blaikie et al 1994; Cannon 1994). In Peninsular Malaysia, poverty is
one of the main reasons why many people persist on hazardous floodplains. Chapter 4 has
demonstrated how contextual forces have created poverty and perpetuated flood hazards in
the peninsula. This section analyses why impoverished floodplain inhabitants have little
locational choice and seeks to demonstrate how they have been forced by poverty (a
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structural/societal force) to live and persist on floodplains.
The Government of Malaysia (1991a p12) reports that the poverty level in the country in
1990 was still significantly high at 17.1 per cent. Most of the poor households are located
in the remote traditional kampungs (mostly Malays), deteriorating rubber plantations (mostly
Indians), new villages (mostly Chinese) and squatter settlements in urban areas (mixed
ethnicity). Poverty is a structural problem initially generated by colonial neglect but presently
reinforced by ineffective public policies and over-emphasis on economic development of
urban areas vis-a-vis rural areas. In the context of the flood hazard, because poor areas
roughly coincide with flood-prone areas, the majority of floodplain inhabitants in the
peninsula are either poor or living close to the poverty level (see Appendix H Case 10).
Figure 6.3 reveals that approximately 9.0 per cent of all respondents are 'hard-core' poor
households earning incomes below $175 while more than a quarter of respondents are poor,
earning monthly incomes below $350. A third of floodplain households are also low income
families living close to the poverty level with monthly incomes between $35t1 and r49. On
the whole, nearly two-thirds of all respondents are either poor or living close to the poverty
level. A majority of those who had no locational choice are from the lower income group,
with 61.4 per cent earning monthly incomes less than $750 and 43.9 per cent earning
monthly incomes less than $500. Considering that the 1993 poverty level is estimated at $394
(see pxx), a significant proportion of those who had no choice in location are either poor or
are living on the margin of poverty. In Figure 6.4, the income distribution of the four sample
areas indicates that households from the two East Coast areas are comparatively poorer than
their counterparts from the two West Coast areas. Therefore, househoMs from the East Coast
who are also more exposed to flood hazards, are expected to be more vulnerable to flood
hazards compared to those from the West Coast.
The capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of flood hazards
depends largely on an individual or household's economic situation. Generally, the wealthier
ones are less vulnerable because they have a greater capacity (at least economically) to
withstand floods. Accumulated wealth enables them to survive and recover with ease. In the
worst scenario, they have the option to move or migrate. In contrast, the poor are the most
vulnerable simply because of their limited ability and resources in the face of flood disasters.
Thus, on the basis of the high levels of poverty amongst floodplain inhabitants, vulnerability
to flood hazards is consequently high.
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6.3.2 Low residential and occupational mobility
Another structural reason why floodplain inhabitants continue to occupy floodplains is their
low residential as well as occupational mobility. As a measure of their residential mobility,
74.6 per cent of all households interviewed have lived in the present location for 10 years or
more. This low residential mobility is further confirmed as 45.1 per cent of households have
not moved for 20 years or more. Residential mobility is generally low amongst floodplain
inhabitants for a number of reasons. In rural areas, poverty, a general attachment to the
kampung way of life, low occupational mobility, low educational attainment, land ownership
and government policies (including disaster preparedness, relief and aid) have resulted in low
residential mobility (a detail analysis of these reasons is given below). In urban areas,
especially squatter areas on urban floodplains, the reasons for low residential mobility is
mainly the lack of alternative housing. Because of higher educational attainment, incomes and
economic opportunities, it is expected that West Coast respondents would exhibit greater
residential mobility than those from the East Coast. However, survey results reveal that there
was no significant difference. This is because respondents interviewed are all floodplain
inhabitants experiencing similar circumstances. Even though West Coast respondents are
relatively more well off than their East Coast counterparts, the high cost of living in the West
Coast have off-set it, forcing them to 'stay' or persist on hazardous floodplains. Low
residential mobility is an important structural reason partly responsible for the perpetuation
of a significant proportion of Malaysians on floodplains.
Occupational mobility is measured by the respondent's ability to earn as good a living or
better elsewhere. The ability to move from one job to another with ease usually gives one the
option of choosing one's home. For example, skilled workers find it relatively easy to move
from one place to another wherever there is work. A skilled worker can therefore get out of
hazardous floodplains by looking for a job elsewhere. Unfortunately, the majority of
floodplain respondents (73.1 per cent) in the current research, especially those in rural areas,
are either farmers, fishermen, unskilled labourers, unemployed, retired or housewives. These
people find it hard to move elsewhere because of their disadvantage of low occupational
mobility. Only a quarter of rural inhabitants are professionals, skilled workers or businessmen
who have the occupation mobility to move elsewhere when it matters. Therefore, the choice
to choose where one wants to live is an advantage seldom enjoyed by the majority of rural
floodplain inhabitants.
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In the current research, 53.2 per cent of respondents are certain that they will be able to get
a similar job or better elsewhere. However, the remaining 46.8 per cent believe they would
not be able to. It is this latter category that has low occupational mobility. Thus, nearly half
the respondents interviewed showed a low level of occupational mobility. Low occupational
mobility inevitably leads to low residential mobility as the two are closely linked. The
inability to take a job elsewhere (where there are less floods) traps the individual and his
household on floodplains. This is a structural reason severely limiting the individual's ability
to choose residential location. Farmers and fishermen are the ones most affected by low
levels of occupational mobility, and resultant low levels of residential mobility. For example,
46.4 per cent and 59.5 per cent of farmers and fishermen respectively are either not sure of
earning as good a living or better elsewhere or are sure they will not be abte to do so. iks
comparison, the corresponding figures for professionals and artisans are 36.7 per cent and
26.4 per cent respectively. On the other hand, 80.0 per cent of farmers and 71.4 per cent of
fishermen are sure they will continue to remain in their present locations. All these indicates
that rural farmers and fishermen have low levels of occupational mobility as well as low
levels of residential mobility. Both are structural reasons which have increased their
vulnerability to flood hazards as well as severely restricted their ability to relocate themselves
elsewhere.
6.3.3 Low educational attainment
Generally, floodplain inhabitants in Peninsular Malaysia have low levels of education (Figure
6.5). In the current research, 56.5 per cent of resposideMs dropped out from schoo1 alter
primary school education (see Appendix N Table N.19). A significant proportion of
respondents, 12.9 per cent, are illiterate and only 5.0 per cent have tertiary education. The
less educated respondents are from the two East Coast areas of Pekan and Kelantan. In the
former, 67.9 per cent of respondents have only primary education and 17.9 per cent are
illiterate. The corresponding figures for the latter are 56.7 per cent and 20.8 per cent
respectively. Low educational attainments generally give rise to low incomes, low
occupational mobility and low residential mobility. This reinforces vulnerability to flood
hazards and restricts one's ability to choose settlement location and respond effectively to
hazards.
For those who indicated that they have no choice in settlement location, 61.9 per cent of them
are educated only up to the primary school level. In the East Coast, the majority of them are
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educated in religious school rather than the normal academic or technical schools. This has
in some ways, influenced not only the respondents's ability to choose settlement location but
also his/her perception and response to flood hazards (see Chapter 7).
6.3.4 The `Icampung way of life'
The `kampung way of life' (Figure 6.6) appeals to the majority of rural Malays as they are
basically a contented people. Floodplains generate both resources and hazards and rural
farmers and fishermen lead a way of life which is well adapted to both. Farming by the river
banks and fishing in rivers and estuaries is an accepted traditional way of life that comes with
flooding and other risks. Rural Malays, especially the older generation, venerate this
traditional way of life are reluctant to leave their ancestral homes, their village, friends and
relatives and relocate elsewhere. They preferred to live with the flood risk. Family ties are
strong and the majority of peasant farming and fishing communities have occupied fertile
floodplains for many generations. For the majority of farmers and fishermen, farming and
fishing are often the only means of livelihood known to them. Although the younger
generation is now better educated and many have moved on to better jobs in the cities and
towns, the older generation still remains and is quite contented with the traditional kampung
way of life. In Peninsular Malaysia, rural society is bonded closely by kinship and friendship
ties that span generations and many are not keen to leave their kampung. Furthermore, many
respondents, particularly those who own family land in rural farming areas, hold great pride
over their plot of land and will not part with it. Remarks such as 'This is where I am born
and will be where I die', 'This is my kampung, my family is here, my friends and my life',
'I am happy here. Life in the kampung is very relaxed and the pace suits me'. Other remarks
include 'Here I farm my land, and I save a lot of entertainment cost' and 'My parents still
live here. I have to look after them, especially during floods'. According to Wan Hassan, a
farmer in Pekan district,
`...Life is pleasant here in the kampung. Its pace is slow and that gives me
a lot of time to spend with my family. The land is fertile and flat, ideally
suited for padi farming. I was born here, so was my father, grandfather and
great-grandfather. Our family has lived here for a long time and we have
always been farmers. We fish at other times when we are not working in the
padi fields but that is only a supplementary source of food. We do not sell the
fish we catch. If there is any surplus, we process them into salted fish which
can be kept as stored food for a long time. Salted fish and rice is our main
source of food during floods and other times when the harvest is not so good.
We can usually cope with the normal seasonal floods but sometimes the 'big
floods' are very dangerous. I was a teenager during the 1971 flood which
inundated the whole of Pekan town. Even the `istana' (palace) situated on
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high land was partly flooded. Quite a number of people drowned during this
flood but the biggest news was that a crocodile was trapped in the town
`padang' (field) which was fenced. It was a huge one, more than 7 metres
long. The army tried to catch it but somehow it escaped. It was really
exciting. In fact, this drama, watched by a lot of people was the high point
of this flood in Pekan. It attracted the people's attention and made them forget
about their flood woes. But according to my father, the 1971 flood was
nothing compared to the 'red flood' of 1926. This flood was termed 'red'
because the flood waters were red in colour and the flood level reached up to
roof level in his old house. Still, such big floods only come once in a very
long time. I think we now better prepared than our ancestors. Despite the
floods we will continue to live here for a long time, although some of our
children with government scholarships have gone on to live in the big cities
on the West Coast.'
Many villagers who are used to a lot of space and fellowship amongst each other also find
it difficult to live in towns and cities where they are confined to a small house with a small
compound, and where one hardly knows the neighbours. Remarked Hasbullah Jahi, a farmer
in Kampung Tendong in Kelantan,
`...In our kampung, we know all the neighbours very well. In fact, I think
everybody knows everybody in the kampung. All strangers are recognised
instantly. You must have realised how the kampung folks were staring at you
and your interviewers when you first came into this kampung. Well, because
of this, there is very little crime in the kampung. Thieves get caught easily.
That is why living in the kampung is safe and pleasant. Anyway, everybody
is poor and there is not much to steal. Because we know each other so well,
we help one another in all sorts of ways. For example, when someone gets
married, everybody in the kampung is invited and everybody helps out in the
`kendurr (feast). Well, you ask me about floods. When the floods come, we
get prepared and help one another. We warn one another about floods. For
example, Ali lives nearest to the river and his house is the first to get flooded.
So he is the one who warns others near to him, and in turn the others warn
those further away. So we can then prepare to move our children and the
women out to higher ground or to the relief centres. We also help the elderly
and the disabled to move during floods. For example, Makcik Hasnah is a
widow who lives alone and Pakcik Abdullah is a polio victim also living by
himself. I am responsible for the former while my neighbour Mohammad is
responsible for the latter. It is this kind of mutual help and understanding that
makes kampung life so enduring and satisfying. People are treated like human
beings here in the kampung. We are one big family. Of course it is very
inconvenient to move to the relief centres every time we are flooded but we
are used to it. It's the same everywhere in Kelantan. Everywhere gets
flooded. You cannot escape, unless you move to the mountains in the interior
and live amongst the aborigines! Do you want to do that? Well, I don't. So
I will continue to live in my kampung. So will many of my children and
grand-children. The smarter ones will get scholarships and move on to
professional jobs in cities but I can see that the majority will stay behind. We
love our kampung. If you live in the big city, you cannot say you belong to
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the city. But in this kampung, I can proudly say that I belong to it and vice
versa. I cannot see anything that would make me leave my kampung, unless
my wife wants to. But she loves this kampung as much as I do, and we will
live and die here.'
6.3.5 Customs and traditions
Rural Malay folks are also steeped in customs and traditions, both of which are commonly
practised in the village but are often eroded and non-existent in the towns and cities. The
`adat' (traditional custom) is very strong amongst rural Malays. It is a structural force which
ties them to their roots in the traditional kampungs. The adat is so strong that there is a
Malay proverb that says 'It is far better that our children die rather than our adat' (Mahathir
Bin Mohamad 1970 p105). For example, in relation to the flood hazard, customs associated
with padi farming (since it is located on floodplains) best illustrates this point. In padi
farming, the padi plant is seen not just as a food crop. To the Malays, it has evolved to
acquire a socio-cultural value which is evident in many of the elaborate customs and rites
associated with the entire padi planting cycle (Wilkinson 1957). The beginning of planting
is usually marked by feasts and ceremonies in the kampung. After the crop was planted, the
farmer either indulge in part-time fishing, traditional crafts such as batik printing or wood
carving, or pursue hobbies such as top and kite making. All are associated with some form
of ceremonies or other. For example, competitions for top spinning and kite flying are held
with colourful ceremonies in Kelantan and other East Coast states. While waiting for the padi
to ripen, there would be the occasional ceremony of a birth, a marriage or death, and
ceremonial rites would suddenly spring to life. Finally, the kampung would bustle with
activities during the harvest season, the highlight of a season of toil (Lim 1977 p228). The
kampung folks are captivated, sometimes even submerged in and obsessed with their
indulgence in customs and ceremonies which are often regarded as more important than the
main event. All these activities reinforce communal life and firmly bind kampung folks
together and it is perhaps not difficult to envisage why they loathe life in cities which are
devoid of such activities. Perhaps it is even less surprising to find that the majority of
kampung folks are reluctant to relocate elsewhere, despite the risk of floods.
According to Wan Ali, a farmer from Pasir Mas, Kelantan,
`...City life is despicable. I have been to my son's house in Kuala Lumpur for
a week and all we did was go to the super-market, walk around department
stores, eat in restaurants and see posh hotels. Almost everything is foreign.
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There is nothing Malaysian about the tall buildings, highways, hotels,
restaurants, etc. They try to put on traditional Malay dances in the hotels to
hoodwink the foreigners and city folks but all of them are frauds. Ceremonies
and customs are almost dead in the big cities. Even if they exist, much of
them are very artificial indeed. I attended a wedding in the city and the city
folks got it wrong in almost all the important ceremonies. They try to adapt
to convenience and made a mockery out of our traditional ceremonies and
customs. At least we in the kampungs carry on the customs and ceremonies
correctly. It is very important that we do. If we don't, we would have lost all
our identity. Life is not just a matter of day-to-day existence like what is
happening to my son. He lives in comfort but is slowly losing his roots. We
in the kampungs look forward to festivals, ceremonies and customs. In our
kampung, such events are the highlights to which every family looks forward
to outside of family life. It is what makes our life in the kampung so rich,
meaningful and interesting.'
Many older folks from rural areas are also 'shocked' at the clothes worn by city girls and the
general 'loose' morality in cities. Moral decadence is often the reason why many rural folks
dislike city life. Those who have children living in cities often see behaviour that is
unacceptable in the traditional kampung scene. Consequently, it is not surprising why the
majority of rural folks, especially the older generation, decide to remain in their kampungs.
This is especially so in the state of Kelantan which recently passed a law for the introduction
of the islamic `sharia' penal system to reinforce moral values. Under this law, passed by the
islamic based PAS state government, thieves could have their right hands amputated, drinkers
of alcohol receive 60 lashes apiece and adulterers be stoned to death-with, the bill specifies,
stones of medium size' (The Economist 27th November 1993).
6.3.6 Ethnic value system
Another major reason why rural Malays remained trapped in their kampungs can be found
in their value system. Unlike the Chinese and Indian who were previously poor immigrants
seeking their fortunes in a foreign land, Malays have always been less inclined to material
things in life. In fact, the early British administrators had described the indigenous Malays
as passive, indolent and in little haste to become wealthy (Lim 1977 p235). An understanding
of the value systems and ethical codes of the Malays is a prerequisite to understanding why
they prefer to remain in the traditional kampungs to lead a simple subsistence way of life
rather than move to the more lucrative locations of cities to try to seek riches. According to
Mahathir Bin Mohamad (1970 p157), the Malay views life as transient, as a time when one
prepares for the hereafter. Worldly life is therefore not to be dedicated to the preoccupation
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with worldly things such as the accumulation of wealth but to more serious religious pursuits.
Malays living in kampungs are contented but resigned to accept whatever fate befalls them,
and floods are seen with this philosophical attitude. Hence, their reluctance to relocate
themselves.
Religious values amongst rural Malays are partly responsible for increasing their vulnerability
to flood hazards. For example, one is the Islamic stigmatization of usury or `riba'. Because
of this religious belief, Malay peasants and fishermen regard interest as sinful and are
conditioned not to accept it. Thus, those with whatever little savings are unable to invest them
in ways which could earn them an interest. This problem is made worse by the fact that
Malays could borrow money even though they could not lend it to earn an interest.
Consequently, usurious non-Malays (non-muslims) who are not bound by such a belitf sesNe,
as money-lenders to Malays. This has often led to many Malay farmers owing considerable
debts to non-Malays. Ungku Abdul Aziz (1962) claims that one of the main causes of rural
Malay poverty is the high rates of interest charged by non-Malay moneylenders and
shopkeepers for their loans and credit extended to farmers. A notorious example Es that of
the `padi kuncha' system whereby shopkeepers would purchase padi 'futures' at a deipesstd
price from padi farmers and, in return, provide them with small loans and credit through the,
long months before padi harvest. The padi kuncha system is believed to have been one of the
reasons responsible for driving padi farmers into destitution, landlessness and immiseration
(Nonini 1992 p155).
As a result, economic advancement and the acquiring of material riches are never high on the
rural Malay's priorities in life. Rural Malays, therefore, perpetuated their traditional way of
life and seldom did many of them became rich. Although modern teachings of Islam has now
allowed muslims to save in banks and earn interest (these banks are run by religious
authorities, for example the Bank of Islam), many hard-core muslims in rural areas are
staunch in their thinking and beliefs and refuse to change. Besides, even if they did change
their attitudes, they do not have much to save. The analysis on poverty and incomes above
testifies to this claim. The vast majority, therefore, remain living close to or below the
poverty level. Although Malay peasants and fishermen are generally attuned to normal floods
due to their years of experience, they remain extremely vulnerable to major floods which
render many of them unable to recover without government assistance.
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6.3.7 Traditional land inheritance
According to Davis (1981 p14),
`...there have been many rather facile and politically expedient attempts to
treat the symptoms of vulnerability with planning bodies, bye-laws, etc. when
the real issue is clearly that of land tenure'.
In Peninsular Malaysia, land tenure is a major reason that binds the rural Malays in
floodplain locations. More specifically, traditional land inheritance is a structural force largely
responsible for the continued occupance of generations of Malays on floodplains. While
Malays do not subscribe to money-making and the accumulation of riches as Chinese and
Indians would, land is one possession that they value greatly and would hold on to. This is
understandable as without land, the peasant would be deprived of his livelihood. He would
then be forced into wage labour and be subject to exploitation by rich land-owners (Rajmah
A Samad 1978). Because of its importance to farming, land completely dominates the Malay
mind. Land constitutes most of the property Malays own, since the Malays are largely
peasants. For most Malays property and land are almost synonymous because apart from
land, the Malays have very little else that they regard as property (Mahathir Bin Mohamad
1970 p166-7). As a result, land is seldom sold to others. It is kept within the family at all
cost. Traditionally, the Malays hold on to their land by inheritance. A father's would be
equally divided amongst his children, and so on. Herein lies one of the most serious problems
faced by the rural farming community, viz, land fragmentation. The following example
clearly demonstrates this point:
`...Lahuma sat motionless. He was counting his seven children, as if he had
forgotten how many there were. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven. His
father had owned twenty relongs (1 relong approximates 0.53 hectares) of
rice-land. Six relongs had fallen into the hands of a Chinese through a
mortgage. That left fourteen relongs. And fortunately Lahuma was an only
child. All fourteen relongs of rice-land became his by inheritance. But the
fourteen relongs remained fourteen relongs. No less, no more. Not one inch
more. He had seven children. Two relongs each. What could be done with
two relongs? What indeed? Lahuma stared at the dusty earth. To try to
increase the number of relongs was out of the question. There was simply no
ways open in that direction. Nor was there any point looking for another
source of income. So far the fourteen relongs had served to feed him and his
family. He and Jeha had never yet starved. And his children had never had
to eat boiled tapioca or maize porridge for lack of rice. For this he thanked
God, Allah the Almighty. But what would happen after his death? The
fourteen relongs of rice-land would be divided up. Two relongs each. And
when his children had children of their own, their shares would again be
divided up. His grand-children would get very little each. And perhaps by the
time it got down to his great-grand-children, there would not be even a hand-
span left for each.' (Shahnon Ahmad 1972 p3)
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In the current research, the most common reason given by respondents for their willingness
to stay on is that they did not want to leave their farm and land. Elsewhere, people have been
found to locate themselves on hazardous sites because of the proximity to family land (Davis
1984a). In the current research, 40.5 per cent of all respondents cited land as the reason for
not moving. To Malaysians, especially the Malays, the importance of land ownership can not
be underestimated. Family land is almost sacred to the Malays and traditionally, it is the
responsibility of those inheriting it to pass it on to their children. This system of land
inheritance ensures that land is kept within the family. And because it is government policy
to improve the economic status of the Malays, it would defeat the objective if the Malays lose
their land to the other ethnic groups or to foreigners. As a result, many Malays have chosen
to stay even when their land is subject to the flood hazard. In this research, one in every five
Malay respondents mentioned that they have inherited land which they did not want to gatt
with. It would be infilial to leave inherited family land. Besides that, another popular reason
to stay is that business and farming in the area is good. 15.4 per cent of respondents said so.
According to one farmer, 'My ancestors have been farming here for generations and this
piece of land has been passed down to me. It belongs to my family and I cannot leave my
land. When I die my children will continue to farm on this land'. Another said, 'My land is
all I have. Farming is all I know. If I leave my land I would not know where to go or how
to find a living elsewhere'. In another earlier survey, Chua (1972 p66), noted that one
respondent said 'Here is my land, I own this house and a few acres of rubber nearby, it is
not worthwhile to move to another area'.
In the case of the landless and houseless, the most hazardous zones on the floodplain offers
free land where squatters and other illegal settlers have a free-hand. A prominent example
is Pulau Pekan Baru, an island settlement located in the shallow banks of the Pahang River
off Pekan Town where Cambodian refugees have settled since the 1970s (Plate 6.1). In the
cities and towns such areas are usually located on the banks of rivers where frequent flooding
has discouraged any form of development. These are places usually taken up by squatters
who can erect wooden huts faster than the authorities can tear them down (Squatting is
examined in detail in Section 6.4.2). Rural-urban migration (Section 6.4.1) adds a further
dimension to the housing problem. Because of the availability of such 'free land', the poor,
landless and houseless are attracted to the floodplains, even though such areas may be subject
to frequent flooding. On the whole, the pull of land over-rides the danger posed by the flood
hazard. People are generally willing to take the risk of flooding for something that is difficult
if not beyond their reach. The proliferation of squatter houses on the floodplain has
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Plate 6.1: Location of squatter houses in Pulau Pekan Baru in the shallow bank of the
Pahang River off Pekan town. Top - The author and interviewers board a sampan
(Malaysian canoe) in order reach the squatter settlement. Bottom - Squatter houses are
connected by wooden planks which serve as pathways as well as reinforcement binding
the houses together against the flood waters
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exacerbated flood problems in many areas. As such areas are not provided with basic
amenities, squatters dump rubbish and sewage into rivers, often blocking drains and river
channels which exacerbates flooding. Clearing of vegetation both for housing and agriculture
by squatters may also have compounded the problem.
6.3.8 Government aid
Government aid is another structural force which influences decisions to persist on
floodplains. For political, economic, strategic and other reasons, the Malaysian government
provides many kinds of aid and subsidies to farmers, rubber smallholders, fishermen and
other rural inhabitants. In the case of padi farming, maintaining self-sufficiency in rice (the
staple food of all Malaysians) is the ultimate objective for providing subsidies. The
government is trying to encourage the farmers to keep their farms going, despite the fact that
many farms are now uneconomical to operate due to land fragmentation, poor management
and disinterest on the part of aged farmers. As such, many government incentives such as
subsidies in the form of seeds, fertiliser, insecticide, marketing and price control are given
to farmers (Chan 1991a p78-98).
In the 6th Malaysia Plan, a total of $1,020 million is allocated to the in-situ development of
Integrated Agricultural Development Programme (IADP), of which three-quarters of this
amount is for the provision of drainage and irrigation infrastructure (Government of Malaysia
1991a p98). The provision of flood mitigation schemes in many floodplain regions has given
floodplain occupants a false sense of security (see Chapter 5 Section 5.4.1). Although such
plans and schemes are still not fully implemented yet, extensive publicity in the media
(Azman Awalludin 1991) and promises by politicians in charge of flood-prone constituencies
may well have influenced people's decision to stay on in the floodplain, if not even
encouraging floodplain encroachment. Examples of such schemes are the Kuala Lumpur flood
mitigation scheme (Ferng 1988), the Pulau Pinang flood mitigation scheme JICA (1990) and
the Kota Bharu flood mitigation scheme (Malaysia International Consultants Sdn. Bhd.
(Undated)).
To overcome the problem of 'idle land' (i.e. agriculture land, usually padi land, which has
become too small as a result of land fragmentation over generations, to be economically
76 For a more elaborate discussion on the problems of idle land, see Burrows (1980).
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farmed and therefore left idle), the government has commissioned the Federal Land
Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA) to consolidate and rehabilitate such
land. An estimated 150,000 hectares of idle land (constituting 40.0 per cent of total identified
agriculture idle land) will be rehabilitated during the 6th Malaysia Plan. This will cost the
government an estimated $905 million (Government of Malaysia 1991a p121). As a
significant proportion of such idle land is located in floodplains, padi farmers will therefore
benefit and justifiably remain in their present locations. The rehabilitation of padi land is
envisaged to replace padi with other crops such as oil palm and rubber.
6.3.9 Government flood emergency preparedness, relief and rehabilitation
Government flood emergency preparedness, relief and rehabilitation is another manifestation
of a structural force which often convinces floodplain inhabitants to continue to live in
floodplain locations. In Peninsular Malaysia, flood hazard preparedness, relief and
rehabilitation of flood victims is a major task of the federal and state governments every year.
Each year around October, just before the Northeast Monsoon breaks, the National Security
Council convenes the FDRPC and a meeting of the various members comprising federal
agencies responsible for flood forecasting, emergency planning, evacuation, relief and
rehabilitation (see Chapter 5). Procedures and responsibilities are discussed and allocated, and
manpower and other resources within each agency checked. A 'restricted' guideline of
flood emergency procedures is given in the 'Bulcu Peraturan Tetap Jentera Bantuan Banjir'
(Permanent Procedures for Flood Aid Machinery) published by the National Security Council
Emergency (Majlis Keselamatan Negara 1992). The procedures in the book are to be
followed by all government departments and voluntary bodies involved with preparedness,
relief and rehabilitation. From the moment the committee meets, the defence mechanism
against flood is activated.
Years of flood experience have attuned the floodplain inhabitant towards responding to this
mechanism. The men are supposed to know when to look out for floods, how to report
flooding to the ketua kampung or penghulu, when to listen to weather forecast and flood
warnings on the radio, and when to move the children and women, where to move them to
The term 'restricted' carries with it the connotation of confidentiality. Items, including
books, endorsed with this term are strictly for government use and not for the public. The
writer has been granted a complimentary copy of this book on application to the National
Security Council with the promise that it will only be used as a reference in this research.
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and finally when to evacuate themselves. According to one government officer, this defence
mechanism is likened to an 'immunity system' facing a virus attack. People respond
accordingly when flooding occurs without having to be told. Those living in the floodplains
in the East Coast are expected to know exactly what to do and where to go during times of
flood. Because the Malaysian government places a lot of emphasis and publicity on
emergency planning, relief and rehabilitation, a sizeable proportion of floodplain occupants
are bound to build up a false sense of security and actually believe they are 'safe' and
'protected' from floods by the authorities. In the current survey, when respondents were
shown the statement 'A flood won't happen again because the DID and other government
agencies can now control flooding through river and coastal management', 34.4 per cent of
all respondents agreed to it. Surprisingly though, 67.0 per cent of this group were urban
dwellers. This could be due to the fact that government schemes are usually built in urban
areas because of the high damage potential. Furthermore, such schemes are pobficisea l and
publicised in urban areas and urban dwellers also have better accessibility to the media. A
significant proportion of residential (43.3 per cent) and farming (31.6 per cent) households
also agreed to the statement but only a small percentage of commercial households (12.2 per
cent) believed so. This could be attributed to the fact that commercial households do not
receive any form of compensation from government relief other than evacuation and shelter.
And since they suffer the most losses (see Appendix K), they always feel that the government
has not done enough to protect them, hence the negative attitude.
Another reason why many floodplain occupants have chosen not to move elsewhere may be
attributed to their reliance on government flood warning schemes. In the current research,
39.0 per cent of all respondents relied on some form of government flood warning, be it an
automatic siren, police warning, or through the media. Of this total, 74.3 per cent were from
the East Coast, underlining the importance of warning there. Flood warnings are usually
more effective in the East Coast than the West Coast because rivers in the former are longer,
giving rise to a fairly adequate lead time. For instance, on the Kelantan River, upstream
telemetric rainfall and river level gauges enable the DID to forecast the river level at Kuala
Krai between 6 to 10 hours in advance. Further downstream in Kota Bhani the lead time is
about 24 hours. Towns and villages in between Kuala Krai and Kota Bharu receive flood
warnings between 6 to 22 hours (DID Kelantan 1991 p4). Through years of experience and
using a combination of computer forecasting based on the Tank model and conventional stage
correlations between upstream and downstream gauging stations, the forecasts made for
downstream stations are fairly accurate. Understandably, floodplain occupants on the East
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Coast feel secure as they rely heavily on the formal/official flood warning service (flood
warnings are examined in more detail in Chapter 8).
6.4	 Structural forces leading to migration/movement
While structural forces are largely responsible for persistent floodplain occupance, on
occasions they may also be mainly responsible for driving people (especially the youth) out
of their kampungs, new villages and estates into the cities and towns. Thus, the same
'poverty' force which traps impoverished farmers in their kampungs may also be driving a
significant number of farmers (especially the younger ones) from rural areas into urban areas
to seek a better life. Fragmentation of family land (leading to the problem of 'idle land')
through successive generations may be another structural force reinforcing rural poverty and
threatening the traditional farming community (Burrows 1980). The government's policy on
free education and easy access to scholarships for Malays under the NEP restructuring
objective have improved educational attainment of rural Malays (Government of Malaysia
1991a pp157-69). Together with increased awareness of the world beyond their kampungs
through wider accessibility of the television, radio and other forms of the mass media, young
Malays are encouraged by the government to migrate to urban areas to upgrade themselves
(Mahathir Bin Mohamad 1970 p109; Faaland et al 1990 pp251-2). Malay youths representing
a dispossessed rural peasantry migrate to the cities for further education, jobs, the 'bright
lights' and generally to seek a better life (Hua 1983 p127). Rural-urban migration is not just
confined to Malays. Chinese youths from new villages and Indian youths from rubber estates
are also involved in the process. Rural-urban migration has become an important structural
force which is exerting pressures on urban housing and other public amenities. It has led to
another structural force, that of squatting. The problem is intensified by international
migration of illegal immigrants, mainly Indonesians and Thais into the cities resulting in the
'mushrooming' of squatter settlements on major urban floodplains. This section, therefore,
aims to examine the extent to which these structural forces have contributed to the
move/migrate option, especially on the extent to which rural-urban migration has led to
encroachment of urban floodplains.
6.4.1 Rural-urban migration and encroachment of urban floodplains
Successful modernisation and growth in a developing country like Malaysia brought growth
to the urban sector with accompanying problems of urban unemployment, squatters and slums
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(Faaland et al 1990 p299). Since independence, there has been a rapid development of the
country's urban areas accompanied by a general rise in education level, especially among the
children of rural inhabitants. Education is provided free to all Malaysians by the government.
The NEP also emphasised improving the status and standard of living among the Malays
and most Malay school children get some form of scholarship. This has resulted in an influx
of young rural migrants into the major urban centres for education and employment
(Muhammad Razha 1978). While this influx has initially solved some of the problems of
labour shortages, it has now become a significant problem not only because it has exacerbated
urban unemployment (nor 1987 pp63-70) and put great demands on housing and other
public services, but more significantly because it enhances floodplain encroachment and
exacerbates flood hazards. According to Faaland et al (1990 p301), a net exodus of at least
375,000 Malays and 300,000 non-Malays migrated from rural to urban areas over the period
1967 to 1985. Some of these migrants may have moved directly into modern urban
employment, but the majority of them are forced into the low-productivity, high
unemployment, increasingly over-populated traditional urban sector. For housing, the
majority of migrants end up in low priority areas such as ex-mining land, hill slopes, and on
flood-prone riverine areas (see analysis on squatter settlements below). Rural-urban migration
has, therefore, increased floodplain encroachment and increased The flood vulnerable
population. Rapid urbanisation (induced by rural-urban migration) is a key factor in the
growth of vulnerability, particularly amongst low-income squatters (Davis 1981, 1987;
Blaikie et al 1994). People continue living in riverine squatter settlements in the cities despite
recurrent flooding simply because it is the only place they can afford to live iii. Rural-urban
migration can, therefore, be considered a structural force partly responsible for the creation
and perpetuation of people on floodplains. With the rapid development of the economy in
recent years, rural-urban migration is expected to have increased significantly bringing with
it an even greater threat to urban floodplain encroachment.
6.4.2 Squatting and floodplain occupance
In Peninsular Malaysia, squatting is a major structural force which creates and exacerbates
urban flood hazards. It results from a combination of poverty, landlessness, rural-urban
migration (to search for better paying jobs), influx of illegal immigrants (mostly Indonesians
78 NEP - New Economic Policy is an equity attainment government policy examined in
Chapter 4. See also Chapter 8.
225
and Thais) and other structural causes. Since urban floodplains are probably the only vacant
space left undeveloped in the cities, squatters inevitably occupy these hazardous flood-prone
areas, and consequently become exposed to flood hazards. In urban areas, squatters are the
most vulnerable group of people as they are amongst the poorest in Malaysian society (see
Chapter 8 Section 8.3.1), and least able to recover from a flood disaster. Because squatting
is a significant social problem in Peninsular Malaysia, this section examines the extent to
which squatters are forced by structural/societal forces into perpetuating on floodplains.
Squatting is both a historical as well as a modern phenomenon. During the colonial period,
squatters were mainly immigrant Chinese and Indians but after independence, squatting by
Malays due to rural-urban migration, also became a problem (Azizah Kassim 1982). In 1957,
one out of three persons in Kuala Lumpur was a squatter and there were as many as 20,000
squatter families (Fish 1957). By 1980, there were 48,709 squatter families in Kuala Lumpur
and it has been estimated to increase at a rate of 9.7 per cent per annum (Dewan Bandaraya
Kuala Lumpur 1982). Wan Abdul Halim (1982) has identified 202 squatter settlements in
Kuala Lumpur, the majority of which lie on flood-prone areas near the main rivers running
through Kuala Lumpur (Figure 6.7).
Squatting in Kuala Lumpur is only one example. All the major urban centres in Peninsular
Malaysia have squatter settlements. For example, Ipoh (Perak state), Johor Bahru (Johor
state) and Prai (Pulau Pinang state) have approximately 60,000, 50,000 and 20,000 squatter
families respectively (Khor 1989). In the current research, a total of 110 squatter households
(17.8 per cent of all households) were surveyed. The breakdown among the sample areas are
as follows: 36 squatter households in Pulau Pinang; 26 in Kuala Lumpur; 26 in Kelantan; and
22 in Pekan. Some examples of squatter houses in Kuala Krai (Kelantan) and Pulau Pekan
Baru (Pekan) are illustrated in Plate 6.2.
Squatting on flood-prone areas in the major in Peninsular Malaysia urban centres is a social
problem facing the authorities. Squatters live in the most hazardous of floodplains simply
because they are too poor to live any where else. In the current survey, it was found that
62.9 per cent of squatter households were flooded 10 times or more in the last 10 years
compared to 43.3 per cent of non-squatter households. The story of Malccik Mabee, a
squatter who lives with her family on the bank of the Air Itam River (Pulau Pinang) clearly
demonstrates the dangers and inconvenience due to flooding (Appendix II, Case 1). Over the
last decade, her house has been flooded on the average of at least 5 times a year. In 1992,
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Figure 6.7: Squatter areas in Kuala Lumpur (After Wan Abdul Halim 1982)
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Plate 6.2: Top: Squatter houses known as `rumah rakit' (raft houses) in Kuala Kral on
the Kelantan River. Bottom: Squatter houses in Pulau Pekan Baru (Pekan) located in
the shallow waters of the Pahang River
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it was flooded 7 times. Abdullah is a typical example of a poor kampung boy who has
migrated to the city with the hope of making his fortune, but ends up as a squatter (Appendix
H Case 9).
Thus, the squatters have little or no choice in location and/or have little or no choice but to
stay. According to Wan Abdul Halim (1982), squatting is a phenomenon arising from a basic
human need for shelter. There are many categories of people who become squatters: (1) those
who have just migrated to towns and cities; (2) those who have moved out of their parents'
house; illegal immigrants who have migrated into the country (mostly Indonesians and Thais);
(3) the landless and homeless who capitalise on empty unoccupied land; (4) others who
simply cannot afford housing of any sort.
Squatting is a process reinforced by broader socio-economic and political forces. These are
the contextual forces examined in Chapters 3 and 4. Social forces of rural-urban migration
is in response to a need to improve one's standard of living and the attraction of 'pull' factors
of the cities. In the rural areas, the younger generation is now armed with a better education
and finds farming and other rural occupations unrewarding. There is a tendency for them to
move to towns and cities to seek their fortune (Muhammad Razha 1978). Social forces of
housing shortages also reinforce the squatter problem as there is not enough low cost housing
for the growing population. Poverty, another social issue confronting the government is
another force that reinforces squatting. Political forces also reinforce squatting. First, it has
been documented that many political parties have their support at the 'grass root' level in
squatter settlements. For instance, Wan Abdul Halim (1982 p92-6) found that politics and
squatting are closely linked. Squatters have no legal rights in Malaysia. Thus, politicians are
quick to capitalise on this point. To gain support, local politicians set up local branches of
their parties supposedly to protect the squatters from being evicted from their houses. In the
case of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the basic requirement is only 50
members and this requirement is easily met. Thus, it is not surprising to find branches of
political parties in squatter areas. In the case of squatter areas which are too small to start a
branch, squatters are encouraged to become members of a nearby branch. Thus, through the
political system, squatting is reinforced to the extent of being 'institutionalised' albeit not
officially. However, not all squatter settlements support the ruling government. Some support
the opposition parties such as the DAP and the PAS. In such cases, the opposition parties
champion their cause by making the eviction of squatters into a political issue and often make
it extremely difficult for the government to enforce the law.
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Based on the above analysis, it is clear that squatting on flood-prone areas is not done by
choice. People who squat are those who are poor, have no land or house of their own, or are
illegal immigrants. This is reinforced by socio-economic and political forces which strongly
influence squatting and thereby the persistent occupation of floodplains and their increasing
encroachment. Consequently, given the high squatter population in the peninsula, it can be
said that a significant proportion of Malaysians have little choice but to remain on
floodplains. In the household survey, respondents who said 'they had no money', 'no where
to go' and 'same everywhere' are classified as having no choice. A total of 202 respondents
(32.7 per cent) in the current research are in this category.
Of the 202 respondents who implied that they had no choice, 52.8 per cent were either
farmers or fishermen. In terms of location, 81.4 per cent were from the East Coast and only
18.4 per cent from the West Coast. And 57.1 per cent were from Kelantan. This was
followed by 24.3 per cent from Pekan and 17.1 per cent and 5.7 per cent from Pulau Pinang
and Kuala Lumpur respectively. However, 41.8 per cent of urban folks were under the no
choice category as compared to 33.6 per cent of rural folks. Therefore, the hypothesis that
rural folks are more susceptible to the flood hazard does not hold. Rural folks may in fact
be more adaptable to floods as their livelihood has evolved around the occurrence of floods
for many generations (see Chapter 7).
6.4.3 Government relocation/resettlement schemes
Blaikie et al (1994 p211) classify relocation as the worst option, as it gives one the
impression that nothing else can be done about the flood hazard, and therefore floodplain
inhabitants have to be moved. Plans to relocate entire communities are rarely feasible. They
are costly as alternative locations and housing have to be provided (Davis 1984a). More
significantly, at least on the part of those being relocated, it provokes social disruption and
upheaval when people are bundled into an alien environment. Notwithstanding the influence
of structural forces examined earlier, people are also reluctant to be relocated far from
relatives, friends and their place of work (or schools in the case of children). In the literature
of hazards and disasters research, there is evidence of serious health and social consequences
resulting from relocation (Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982; Harrell-Bond 1986). Blaikie et al
(1994 p211-2) believe that relocation stems from political sources or landowning interests
using hazards as an excuse. Their research has demonstrated that relocation is an undesirable
response to hazards and that its success rate is low. While researching disasters and
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settlements, Davis (1981) discovered that relocation is of limited success. Other researches
have suggested that relocation has actually resulted in more deaths due to disease in the
receptive zones (Kebbede 1992). Elsewhere in the hazards literature, Alexander (1993 pp520-
2) has shown how relocated refugees can be subject to more hazards in foreign receptive
areas. Smith (1992 p69) has also demonstrated that urban relocation within a limited distance
has a limited degree of success as the relocated settlement was again hit by the same hazard.
The biggest problem with relocation is that the majority of resettled people tend to return to
their original settlements. A good example provided by Smith (1992 p68) is the relocation
of the entire population (264 people) of Tristan da Cunha, a remote South Atlantic island to
Britain following an eruption in 1961. Within two years, most of the inhabitants had returned
to the island.
Despite the unfavourable literature on relocation, it is a structural force which, when
employed appropriately, can effectively reduce flood losses. This section examines the extent
to which permanent resettlement has been successful in moving floodplain inhabitants and
thereby reducing flood hazards in Peninsular Malaysia.
In the state of Kelantan, the bulk of its population is concentrated in the Kelantan Delta
(around Kota Bharu) and its fertile river valleys. Consequently, the majority of its settlements
or kampungs suffer from river flooding during the Northeast Monsoon Season. It has been
estimated that a major flood such as the 1967 flood would inundate almost 70.0 per cent of
kampungs in Kelantan or affect nearly half of the state's population (Government of Malaysia
1978). Because of the magnitude and extent of the seasonal monsoon floods, a feasibility
study was commissioned to look into resettlement and other measures of flood reduction.
According to Malaysia International Consultants Sdn. Bhd. (Undated), relocation is a passive
and expensive method of overcoming the flood problem as it usually involves the relocation
of high valued property away from flood-prone areas. In the Pahang River Basin Study, a
relocation of 1 family is estimated to cost $18,000 (1974 prices). The number of families
affected in Greater Kota Bharu is about 14,300 and this would put the total relocation cost
at about $474 million' (current prices) for a flood of the 1967 magnitude. This figure would
be much higher if the commercial and public sectors, growth of prosperity, population growth
and the urban nature of most of the population are taken into consideration. It is therefore,
' This figure is calculated based on the Consumer Price Index with 1974 (100.0 percent)
as the base year.
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unfeasible to relocate people from townships such as Kota Bharu. However, resettlement can
be feasible in rural areas where land and property values are comparatively much lower than
in urban areas.
According to Government of Malaysia (1978 p20), kampung folks are flexible, and if given
the opportunity to achieve a better way of life, they will accept change of home site and
lifestyle. People are prepared to move to achieve a better life, not necessarily for themselves
but mainly for their children, and also especially if it is for the good of the state. Chua (1972
p73) also found that a greater percentage of Pekan floodplain residents are willing to resettle
elsewhere provided that the government assured them of a prospective job and a residential
area with prospective lands nearby.
However, rural peasants, especially the Malays, are extremely polite and tend to be very
agreeable. They will not usually speak out against the government or criticize flood schemes
unless their livelihood is threatened. Thus, according to Mahathir Bin Mohamad (1970 p116)
the Malay is courteous and self-effacing and he is always prone to giving way to others as
a sign of good etiquette. Often, when interviewed by government officials or private
consultants commissioned by the government, the rural Malay responses in a conformed
positive way, usually in agreement to what is asked of him. Willingness to relocate elsewhere
must be seen in the context of 'guarantees' from the authorities. Without the guaranteed
assurance of a job, home and land, it is very unlikely that rural peasants will be willing to
relocate and given the high cost of relocation, it is equally unlikely that the government will
embark on a costly scheme of mass relocation considering that the estimated floodplain
population is currently well above 2.7 million and the total flood-prone area is estimated at
approximately 29,000 km2 or 9.0 per cent of the total area of the peninsula (Lim 1988 p10).
Social attitudes and values must also be taken into account when attempting to resettle a
population that is almost endemic at a location. Many attitudes and values have been acquired
over a long time and the rural folks of Kelantan are quite satisfied and contented with their
unhurried traditional kampung way of life. People value their kampungs and grow very
attached to them. Kampung means home, familiar surroundings, relatives and neighbours. It
is their focus of life and activities, ranging from their padi plots to fellowship amongst friends
and relatives, communal rites, social functions, padi farming routine and most importantly
religious fulfilment. This feeling can sometimes be obsessive even though one is not openly
aware of it. Even those who have migrated to the towns and cities return on an annual
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pilgrimage to their kampungs during the Malay festive new year or 'Hari Raya'. The success
of any resettlement scheme will therefore depend on the extent to which the social attitudes
of kampung folks can be reoriented and attuned towards modern living and detachment from
their roots.
Relocation programmes for flood victims in Kelantan are carried out by the Lembaga
Kemajuan Kelantan Selatan (KESEDAR), a state agency, under its 'Traditional Kampungs
Development Programme'. However, its main objective is not to resettle flood victims but
to restructure the poor rural inhabitants by increasing incomes through resettling them in
more productive agricultural areas. And because the majority of those resettled under this
programme is located in the interior hilly areas, its effect on flood victims is minimal.
Because of this, resettlement of the flood-prone population in Kelantan is largely ineffective
(Hanisah bte Mat Jusoh 1990 pp167-9). In the current study, it was found that only 8.4 per
cent of the respondents were willing to move elsewhere. Within this group of respondents,
21.2 per cent are willing to relocate within the same mukim and another 11.5 per cent within
the same district. In Kelantan and most East Coast states, a major flood of once every five
years or so inundates a significant extent of these states. For example, the 1967 flood
inundated over 300,000 hectares which is equivalent to 20.0 per cent of the total area of
Kelantan (Takenada 1988 pp9-11). Thus, relocating in the same mukim or district is unlikely
to solve the flood problem.
In the federal capital, under the Kuala Lumpur Flood Mitigation Study, it is estimated that
the total cost of relocation of settlers to make way for the building of the Batu and Gombak
Dams and Reservoirs (both for flood mitigation and water supply) is about 2.3 million and
0.6 million respectively at 1979 prices (United States Department of the Interior 1981 p3).
The corresponding adjusted current prices are approximately $3.7 million and $1.0 million
respectively. The Batu Dam was completed in December 1987 but as of June 1988, the
proposed Gombak Dam was cancelled. The official reason given is the difficulty relating to
problems associated with land acquisition. However, in reality, land acquisition problems
arose because land and house owners have opposed the scheme and were unwilling to relocate
(The Star 29.11.84).
In the Pahang River basin, it has been estimated that more than 60,000 people live in rural
kampungs within the basin inundated by a flood of 20 year return period and half this number
is inundated by a five year flood (Australian Engineering Consultants 1974a). In 1974, the
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Australian Engineering Consultants (1974a p10) reported that the ideal target for rural
resettlement in Pahang was to relocate all inhabitants within the 20 year flood area to areas
above the 50 year level. However, the Pahang state government only adopted a programme
which targeted at relocating about 30,000 people, which is about half the number flooded in
a 20 year event. However, a study carried out by the Australian Engineering Consultants
(1974a p10-11) revealed that existing resettlement schemes are generally incomplete and
lacking in proper amenities and facilities, and in order to ensure their success, it is necessary
to provide more extensive services to make them fully acceptable to settlers. By the end of
the 1980s, it was reported that the Pahang state government had resettled only 2,600 families
(approximately 15,600 people, based on the average household size of 6 in the current
household survey). This is only half its original target.
There is no official resettlement scheme for flood-prone inhabitants in Pulau Pinang, although
some individual squatters along the banks of the Air ham River have been relocated to nearby
flats. The number of families relocated is relatively small (personal communication by flood
duty officer of the state DID in Pulau Pinang).
In Peninsular Malaysia, the issue of relocation is expensive and further complicated by
political and ethnic sensitivities. It is therefore only used as a last resort. Chua (1972) studied
the possibilities of resettling inhabitants of the Pekan floodplain. Her study concludes that
it is difficult to persuade Malaysians to break off from their cultural and social ties. Unless
the Malaysian government can guarantee the inhabitants jobs and residential land, they are
unlikely to move. Thus, the resettlement of floodplain occupants is a delicate matter as it has
widespread economic, social as well as political implications. In-depth sociological and
economic studies must be carried out to determine the best possible approach prior to any
resettlement effort. But policies on resettlement have always been closely tied to political
reasons. Floodplain squatters are not relocated because the ruling party does not want to lose
their support or give the opposition avenues for making it an issue. The worse scenario is one
in which the squatters are of one ethnic origin. Any resettlement action on the part of the
government may be seen as 'ethnically motivated' and is potentially 'explosive' in a multi-
ethnic society which has bad memories of the 1969 racial riots (Charnhuri Siwar and Nik
Hashim Nik Mustapha 1988 p24). Opposition political parties and other pressure groups
which champion squatter rights can also contribute to the escalation of ethnic tensions.
Consequently, this results in non-action on the part of the government as maintaining ethnic
harmony may override flood management strategies.
234
Even without ethnic complications, many resettlement schemes face problems because
floodplain occupants are often against relocation. At the moment, resettlement schemes do
not go hand-in-hand with that of educating the public. Floodplain occupants (especially urban
squatters) should be taught and told about the danger of residing on flood-prone areas. The
government should offer alternative places which are at least of the same quality in terms of
land prices, agricultural potential, accessibility, public amenities and others. Otherwise, it is
highly unlikely that the people will be willing to relocate themselves. Squatters who occupy
riverine areas illegally also have human rights even though the law is not on their side. These
people have been squatting in such land for decades, some even a generation or more. As
such it is extremely difficult to force them to move. To prevent further squatting, the
government should make sure that such land is not occupied illegally through more stringent
enforcement. Any attempt at illegal construction of houses should be dealt with promptly. For
so long, securing the vote has been the ultimate objective. Yet, the government has a moral
duty to its people, whether they be poor illegal riverine squatters or rich tax-payers who have
expensive river-side properties. If and when the government decides that a certain location
is not feasible for flood protection, then all occupants in the area should be prepared for
resettlement. If undertaken properly, resettlement can be one of the most successful means
of reducing the effects of the flood hazard (Australian Engineering Consultants 1974a p11).
On the whole, permanent resettlement is a positive structural force which leads to flood
hazard reduction but it can dislocate communities. However, such programmes have not been
employed to their full potential either as A measure of restructuring rural society or reducing
flood losses. In many flood mitigation schemes employed in the peninsula, resettlement
schemes are only employed as minor measures. Some prominent examples of such schemes
are the Pahang River Basin Study (Australian Engineering Consultants 1974b), the Kelantan
River Basin Study (Government of Malaysia 1978), the Kuala Lumpur Flood Mitigation
Project (Ferng 1988), the Kelantan Flood Mitigation Studies (Takenada 1988), and the
proposed Flood Mitigation Scheme of the Kelang River Basin (JICA 1989). Consequently,
the potential of resettlement schemes as measures of flood reduction have seldom been
realised as they are often overlooked and other measures preferred because of a wide array
of difficulties and constraints. It is this reason, more than any other, that has made
resettlement appear ineffective.
Finally, the existence of many constraints towards resettlement often make it unpopular and
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ineffective. The attachment of rural folks to their kampungs and land has already been
examined. Others are reluctant to move because of the uncertainties of being pushed into new
environments with which they are not familiar. On the part of the authorities, resettlement
schemes are expensive, alternative land and houses have to be allocated to those resettled,
amenities and facilities have to be installed, and other social welfare such as health and
education provided. Furthermore, political forces can also affect the outcome of resettlement
schemes as opposition parties and other pressure groups capitalise on sensitive issues related
to resettlement which make the government look bad. An example is the proposed
resettlement of about 8,000 people to make way for the construction of the Gombak Dam in
Kuala Lumpur. Residents of the area affected formed an action committee to oppose the
proposed dam project and even sent a petition to the Prime Minister urging him to consider
other sites (The Star 29.11.84). Because of its political implications, the authorities treat
resettlement with great caution and scepticism. Hence, many resettlement schemes never take
off. Because of public pressure, negative publicity and its unpopularity, the Gombak Dam,
first envisaged in the late 1970s was shelved for two decades and finally officially cancelled
in 1988.
6.5	 Other forces influencing persistent occupation of floodplains
Location is a prominent non-structural force influencing persistent occupation of floodplains.
For example, the more developed and commercialised West Coast offers floodplain occupants
better opportunities to choose the move option than the under-developed East Coast. Survey
results reveal that more than three-quarters of interviewed respondents are aware of places
with less or no floods where they can find a similar (if not better) living, but the majority
(91.1 per cent) have little choice but are instead forced to take the stay option and continue
to live in the same place. However, the tendency for West Coast respondents to move
elsewhere is slightly higher than their East Coast counterparts. This difference is explained
by the fact that the West Coast offers greater employment and other economic opportunities
than the East Coast. Thus, Pekan (94.9 per cent) and Kelantan (92.5 per cent) have higher
percentages of respondents who are forced to stay than Pulau Pinang (87.7 per cent) and
Kuala Lumpur (89.0 per cent). Thus, despite being more flood-prone, more people are being
forced to persist on floodplains in the East Coast. This is especially so in the case of Pekan
where floods occur annually and flood depths reaching roof level of houses are not
uncommon (Plate 6.3).
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Plate 6.3: The 1971 flood in Pekan town. Top - The old market was flooded up to its
roof. Bottom - The old court house is half submerged
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Although flood characteristics such as frequency, recency and severity are initially expected
to affect decisions to move or stay, survey results reveal that they do not have any significant
influence. Despite high flood frequencies and severities, and the occurrence of recent events,
floodplain occupants continue to live on floodplains. This implies that they are constrained
in their capacity to move by other forces. Other than height of stilts, house type and other
building characteristics do not appear to have any significant influence on respondents'
decisions to move or stay. It was hypothesised that respondents living in buildings with high
stilts may feel safer and are less bothered by normal floods. They therefore show more
willingness to remain. This hypothesis was proven correct as a significantly higher percentage
of respondents living in houses with stilts 1.5 m or higher were willing to stay as compared
to those living in houses with stilts less than 1.0 m.
Length of residence was initially envisaged to have an influence on respondents' willingness
to move or stay. However, the chi-square test revealed that there were no significant
associations. Other than economic well being examined under the issue of poverty (Section
6.3.1), the socio-economic characteristics of respondents do not appear to have any
significant influence on their decision to move or stay. Attitudes and beliefs also do not have
any significant effect on their decision to move or stay. For example, there were no
significant differences to move or stay between respondents who believed that flood is an 'act
of God' and those who believed it is an 'act of humans'. Also, there does not appear to be
any correspondence between respondents who accept and those who deny the existence of
floods and their decision to move or stay.
Perceptual characteristics also do not appear to influence the move or stay options although
it was envisaged that the respondent's awareness of other places without floods where a better
living can be found would influence willingness to move. The chi-square test revealed that
there were no significant differences in willingness to move between those who are aware and
those who are not. The chi-square test also revealed that there is no apparent association
between awareness of past floods and decisions to move or stay. For instance, for those who
chose the stay option, the percentages between those aware of floods and those who are not
is about the same, i.e. 90.9 per cent and 91.7 per cent respectively. It was initially envisaged
that optimistic respondents would be more willing to remain where they are while the
pessimistic ones will be more willing to move. However, the chi-square test indicates that
there is no clear association between optimism or pessimism and the willingness to move or
stay.
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In terms of future flood expectation, respondents are asked to give their estimate of the
number of flood years if they were to live 100 years. Their perception is then cross-tabulated
with their willingness to move or stay. The chi-square test revealed that there is no significant
association between those who over-estimated future floods and those who under-estimated
them.
This chapter has demonstrated how the choice of settlement is constrained by exogenous
`structural/societal' contextual forces largely beyond the individual's control. The next chapter
examines the influence of 'structural' and `non-structural' contextual forces on individual
flood hazard perception and adoption of flood reduction strategies.
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7 INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTION AND RESPONSE TO FLOOD HAZARDS
This chapter examines the influence of structural and non-structural contextual forces on flood
hazard perception and response of individuals. Variations in individual perception and their
choices in the adoption of hazard loss reduction strategies are strongly influenced by both sets
of contextual forces.
7.1	 Contextual forces influencing individual flood hazard perception and response
Research on how people perceive hazards is a means to understand how and why they
respond to hazards in the way that they do. People living with flood hazards for a long time
develop specific perceptions and respond with specific hazard reduction strategies, often
coping reasonably well. Despite their limited scope, individual strategies based on
local/traditional coping mechanisms have evolved over a long time and are often well adapted
to flood hazards. Usually, such strategies are practical, inexpensive and based on household
level responses. They often prove to be much more effective than modern imported
technical/engineering solutions which do not have a clear understanding of local conditions
(Waddell 1983 p35; Watts 1983 pp246-9).
In Peninsular Malaysia, survey results reveal that the majority of floodplain occupants have
attempted (employed strategies) at one time or another to reduce flood losses (Figure 7.1).
The results also reveal that Malaysians choose from a wide range of flood reduction strategies
(Figure 7.2). Government should therefore capitalise on traditional mechanisms and help
individuals more effectively respond in the way that they do. Instead, government often
ignores how individuals respond and selects some form of response strategies that prove
ineffective. Housing Third World disaster victims in western-styled prefabricated houses is
one of many examples of ineffective official strategies (Davis 1978). According to Green
(1992 p181), government can use its scarce resources more effectively to help the public
adopt the most effective response, or to improve the effectiveness of the response adopted by
the public. Understanding individual perception (including beliefs, attitudes and expectations)
can help government plan and choose flood reduction strategies that complement individual
responses. This is true in Peninsular Malaysia where common extensive flooding, especially
in the East Coast, puts a severe limit on the use of engineering solutions. There are just too
many rivers and too wide an area to protect through expensive engineering works.
Capitalising on local/traditional individual response mechanisms by improving on their
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Kelantan
	 Kuala Lumpur	 Pekan
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	 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
	
Pulau Pinang
Figure 7.1: Percentage of respondents who have employed flood reduction strategies
during past floods against those who did nothing
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Figure 7.2: The employment of different types of flood reduction strategies in Peninsular
Malaysia
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effectiveness is one area where there is much potential for flood hazard reduction without
incurring too much cost on the part of the government.
Many contextual forces are hypothesised to strongly influence individual perception of and
response to, flood hazards. Some of them may be structural/societal forces while others are
not. Structural/societal forces such as poverty, low educational attainment, cultural
background, squatting, and government policies are expected to strongly influence people's
perception and response. Non-structural/non-societal forces such as residential location, flood
characteristics, building characteristics, and the respondent's socio-economic characteristics,
attitudes and perceptual characteristics are also expected to be important. Both quantitative
and qualitative interviews are employed to examine the extent to which both sets of forces
influence individual perception.
The analysis aims to reveal that the ways in which individuals perceive flood hazards and the
range of reductive options open to them are strongly influenced by these forces. Statistical
tests of associations such as the chi-square test, t-test, correlation and regression in the
SPSSPC Statistical Package were employed to determine the important variables affecting
perception and the adoption of strategies. The significance level is taken at .05. With so many
inter-related variables, it is likely that many significant associations will be statistical artifacts
and not substantive. The analysis is, therefore, limited to those relationships which are
considered to be of interest, important and subject to logical interpretation. However, all test
results are presented in Appendix L.
7.2	 Structural/societal forces influencing individual flood hazard perception and
response
Hazard-prone communities often perceive and respond to hazards in a wide variety of ways
reflecting their unique circumstances and situations. Despite extensively studying the process
of adaptation, Burton et al (1978) have found that people often appear ignorant of the hazard
or seem prepared to take unnecessary risks, thereby making the process of modelling their
decisions difficult. To compound the problem, people are not completely free when it comes
to making choices. Their behaviour is often constrained by socio-economic and cultural
forces, and everyday problems, and people therefore act according to the logic of their
circumstances (Horlick-Jones and Jones 1993 p27).
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7.2.1 Poverty
(a) Flood hazard Perception
Poverty is an important structural force which shapes people's perception of flood hazards.
As the majority of the poor generally occupy the most hazardous areas on floodplains, and
are mostly farmers and fishermen who are poorly educated with low residential and
occupational mobility, their perception of flood hazards is different from that of the wealthier
group. This section examines differences in flood hazard perception between the poor and the
wealthier group.
Survey results reveal that the poor have a greater awareness of flood hazards than those from
the wealthier group. The poor are also generally more optimistic than their wealthier
counterparts. They also have a lower expectation of future floods, the wealthier group being
more inclined to expect flooding to be almost certain in the near future. This may be due to
the fact that the wealthier ones have more to lose and are more anxious about their flood loss
when compared to the poor (who have few material possessions). The majority of the poor
(89.7 per cent) live in stilt houses and treat seasonal flooding as normal and may even
consider normal floods as 'high waters'. In contrast, only 3.7 per cent of the wealthier group
live in stilt houses.
The wealthier respondents also have a greater tendency to believe that flooding will worsen
in the future. They are also more inclined to believe that flooding could happen any time as
compared to a greater inclination of the poor to believe that flooding is regular or seasonal.
While the majority of respondents generally do not believe that the government is able to
control the flood hazard, the poor generally have more confidence in the government in this
respect than the wealthier ones.
In their perception of specific flood prevention solutions, the poor have a higher inclination
to mention praying as a form of flood prevention and reduction. In contrast, the wealthier
ones are more inclined to mention the use of artificial drainage and cover crops to prevent
and reduce floods. They also perceive the flood proofing of properties, flood forecasting and
warning, the use of cover crops, and removing debris from rivers as forms of flood
reduction. Many of the above strategies are expensive and beyond the reach of the poor. For
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example, the cost of flood proofing is high and the poor cannot afford it. The majority of the
poor also live in old wooden houses which are not worth flood proofing. In the case of
squatter houses, the flood proofing cost may be more than what the run-down huts are worth.
On the other hand, the poor believe in using a boat as a form of flood reduction while the
wealthier respondents do not. This is because the majority of the poor live in rural areas,
many by the banks of rivers, and own boats which are used for fishing, transportation and
as a vehicle of flood loss reduction (moving people, livestock, food and household contents)
during flood emergencies.
On the whole, the richer an individual, the more preventive and reductive strategies he/she
can afford to employ. Thus, poverty determines the extent to which an individual perceives
flood prevention and reduction. Even though the poor perceive a specific strategy to be
effective, and if the cost of employing it is beyond them, then it would be considered
inappropriate. The research results reveal that the wealthier respondents show a greater
tendency to mention more flood reduction strategies than the poorer ones.
(b)	 Adoption of flood hazard reduction strategies
This section examines the extent to which poverty influences the scope for individual adoption
of flood hazard reduction strategies. As a force which strongly influences perception, poverty
is also expected to largely determine the range of reduction strategies adopted by individuals.
Often, the strategy adopted or not adopted is dependent on whether or not individuals can
afford it. Poverty, therefore, operates at the broadest level and determines the 'room' for
manoeuvre in which individuals have on flood hazard reduction.
Although some flood reduction strategies such as moving family members and house contents
upstairs, warning family members and others, and turning off the electricity mains do not
incur any expense, the majority of flood reduction strategies usually involve some degree of
expense on the part of the individual. For example, evacuating family members elsewhere
can be costly not just in terms of the transportation cost but also in the expenditure incurred
for temporary accommodation, food and other expenses. According to Wong Ah Sun (sundry
shop owner in Pekan),
`...Every time it floods I have to spend money on temporary evacuation of my
family. If the flood lasts a week, it is about $350. More if it lasts longer'.
Parking one's car far away (to avoid being flooded) can also increase transportation cost as
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well as parking cost. According to Richard Anthony (a taxi driver from Jalan P Ramlee in
Pulau Pinang),
'...My taxi is my life. Without it my family will starve. I have to take good
care of it. Because my house floods so frequently I need to park it in my
boss's compound and he charges me $100 a month for it. On top of that, I
have to commute by bus to and from my boss's house. This extra cost is at
least $2 a day ($30 a month) and I lose an hour each way. I could have
earned an average of $30 during those two hours, more if I am lucky'.
Some strategies such as elevating the floor level of the house, flood insurance, moving
livestock (permanently), and permanent flood proofing of property are potentially expensive
and often beyond the reach of most floodplain occupants. For example, one respondent
revealed that raising the floor level 1.5 metres by adding planks on top of the existing floor
cost him $5,000. Another confided that he spent $9,000 by building a one metre high brick
wall all around his house (permanent flood proofing). Another complained that no
insurance" company would insure his property against flood losses as it was too flood-
prone. The insurance salesman told him that even if the company were to accept his
coverage, the insurance premium would be excessively high. Even listening to the weather
forecast requires the purchase of a radio or television (including the annual fees charged on
such services). Taking leave from work can also result in lost incomes which the poor can
rarely afford. Therefore, the type and number of flood reduction strategies adopted depends
to a large extent on whether or not an individual can afford them. Without the necessary
resources, the range of such action would be limited.
Consequently, the poor are therefore most vulnerable to flood hazards not because they are
apathetic and do nothing out of choice. Rather, they do nothing because they cannot afford
to employ flood reduction strategies which often cost more than the flood loss. Poverty,
therefore, limits the range of choices available to the individual. It sets a constraint to the
effectiveness of overall individual flood hazard response in poor communities. And because
the majority of floodplain inhabitants are poor or living close to the poverty line, it is a very
' Flood insurance is not well developed in Peninsular Malaysia (see Chapter 5 Section
5.3.2 b). In the household survey, only 9 respondents (1.7 per cent) out of 522 respondents
who attempted flood reduction strategies used insurance to protect their properties. This could
be due to both the poorly developed nature of the industry as well as the public's general
scepticism about using insurance. Only 28.7 per cent of respondents feel that insurance would
be an effective flood loss reduction strategy. Even in developed countries such as the United
Kingdom, flood insurance has been found to be problematical (Harding and Parker 1976).
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significant structural problem which needs to be addressed (by the authorities/government)
before any improvement in individual flood hazard reduction can be achieved. The constraints
of poverty on the adoption of flood reduction strategies is demonstrated by the following
cases:
(1) `...What can I do? The flood waters are so unpredictable. One year the flood depth
is just a metre or so, the next it can be as high as four or five metres. According to
my father, many kampung houses were swept away during major floods such as the
1926 and 1954 floods. The recent 1988 flood submerged half my house, about a
depth of two and a half metres. The only thing I can do is either to sell my house and
to buy another one on higher ground (permanent relocation), or to build another
house with much higher stilts (permanent flood proofing). The former is impossible
because my current house will only fetch a low price because of its proneness to
floods. The latter is also beyond my reach as I will have to tear down my house and
build it all over again. It costs too much. So the only thing to do is to be well
prepared, move out temporarily, survive on government charity (aid) and pray that
a big flood like the 1926 flood would not occur again. If it does, I am afraid my
house would be washed away.' (Hashimah, a widow from Pasir Mas, Kelantan).
(2) `...I cannot even afford to live in a proper house. That is why I live in this hut near
this God-forsaken river. You think I want to be a squatter? I wished I had the money
to get myself and my family a nice house in Bangsar Park on top of that hill. What
strategies can I use to reduce flood loss other than to move my family and my
motorbike to my brother's place temporarily (even my brother is sick of me troubling
him every time my hut gets flooded)? I store my house contents in the attic, but even
the attic gets flooded sometimes. It is a dog's life here. There is nothing I can do.
The poor gets poorer and the rich gets richer. Only we poor people are subject to
such hazards. Mind you, it's not only floods that affect this area. There is the danger
of fire as most of the huts have roofs built of 'atap' (palm) leaves. A few years ago,
the adjacent village was almost burnt down by children playing fire crackers. This
area is also terrorised by gangsters and the environment is filthy. People treat the
river as an open sewage and rubbish dump. I hate this area but what can I do?
(Muthusamy, a labourer from Kampung Haji Abdullah Hukum, Kuala Lumpur).
(3) `...When the floods come, all I can do is make sure my wife and the younger
children go to the government flood relief centre in the school hall on top of the hill.
My son and I stay behind to guard our belongings from thieves. During one big flood
(I think it was in 1970 or 1971), our refrigerator, television and furniture were stolen
when we were all forced to evacuate by the police. At least, we can still repair the
refrigerator or television if they were flooded. My son and I also try to save our padi
crop by removing floating garbage and tree branches from our padi field. If not, these
floating things will crush what is remained of our padi crop. It is the only thing we
can do. Perhaps, we should go back to the primitive days of our ancestors by living
on top of trees! Otherwise, there is little we can do to reduce flood losses. We cannot
afford to leave our land and go elsewhere. All we can do is live with the floods.
Losing material things is alright. As long as I am healthy and alive, I can work and
earn a living. I only pray for my safety and that of my family. What else can I do?'
(Pak Kadir, a farmer from Pekan).
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Survey results reveal that significant associations exist between poverty and the adoption of
flood reduction strategies (Appendix L dl). For example, poor households are less likely to
adopt flood reduction strategies than their wealthier neighbours. Although there is no
significant difference in the total number of strategies adopted, the wealthier households have
a greater tendency to adopt more expensive strategies than the poor households. This
indicates that they can afford such strategies while the poor cannot. For example, wealthier
households have a greater tendency to: move vehicles elsewhere; move belongings; employ
permanent flood proofing of property; employ emergency flood proofing of property; and
take leave from work. They also indicate a greater inclination to experiment or try different
strategies during future floods.
On the other hand, the poor are more inclined to adopt strategies that do not incur much
expenses. For example, they have a greater tendency to: pray; prepare for evacuation; move
upstairs; move out of building; move livestock; buy provisions; and get the boat ready.
The above analysis confirms that poverty has a strong influence on individual perception and
adoption of hazard reduction strategies. More significantly, it reveals that the poor's response
to flood hazards are constrained by their inability to pay for strategies involving high
expenditure. In other words, poverty determines the range of action available to them.
7.2.2 Educational attainment
(a)	 Flood hazard perception
Educational attainment influences one's attitudes, beliefs and understanding (especially if it
involves technical issues) in relation to flood hazards. Survey results reveal that the more
educated one is, the more one is aware of flood forecasting methods. A higher percentage
of tertiary educated respondents also perceive weather forecasting as a way of predicting
floods compared to lower educated respondents who are more inclined to perceive less
scientific methods of predicting floods such as signs in nature, rats migrating, body aching,
and others. The percentage of those not knowing any method of flood forecasting is also
higher amongst the poorly educated.
The results also indicate that the more educated one is, the less likely one would perceive
floods as an act of God. This is not to imply that the highly educated are less religious. It is
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due to their greater awareness of floods and their general knowledge associated with the
problem. The highly educated are more inclined to believe that human activities and/or
natural phenomena are the cause of floods. They are also much more likely to believe in
flood prevention and reduction solutions than the less educated. They also show a greater
tendency to suggest more strategies than the less educated.
Thus, because the majority of floodplain occupants in Peninsular Malaysia are poorly
educated (about half are primary educated and 12.9 per cent illiterate), the influence of
education (as a structural force) on their perception is significant. The results above testify
to this claim. The less educated are less likely to believe that floods can be prevented or
reduced but are conversely more likely to relate the flood hazard to the supranatural.
(b)	 Adoption of flood hazard reduction strategies
On the whole, although educational attainment does not appear to have a significant influence
on the adoption of the majority of specific flood reduction strategies, it does have an effect
on some aspects of flood hazard response (Appendix L dl). For example, respondents with
secondary education and above have a greater inclination to adopt flood reduction strategies
than those who have attained only primary education or lower. This is initially hypothesised
to be a result of greater awareness of the benefits of reduction strategies as a result of being
better educated. However, when respondents living in areas of similar flood frequencies were
compared, there was no significant difference in the inclination to adopt reduction strategies
between respondents of different educational attainment. Similarly, when the poor and the
wealthy respondents were tested separately, there was also no significant difference in the
inclination to adopt reduction strategies between respondents of different educational
attainment. Thus, the effect of education on the adoption of strategies is a 'spurious' one, the
likely reasons being that of flood frequency and/or poverty.
Despite the above analysis, some test results are significant. For example, respondents with
higher educational attainment have a greater tendency to adopt the following strategies: move
upstairs; move vehicle elsewhere; take leave; and are more likely to adopt different/new
strategies when the next flood occurs. In contrast, those with lower educational attainment
have a greater tendency to get the boat ready but are less likely to adopt different/new
strategies when the next flood occurs.
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7.2.3 Cultural background
One of the commonest failures in disaster management concerns the lack of understanding
of the social and cultural mitigation measures of the local community (Davis 1981 pp 15-9,
1985 p35). The sociological literature on hazards recognizes the importance of cultural forces
in human response to hazards (Bailey 1971; Douglas 1986, 1992). Modes of human response
to hazards synthesised by Burton et al (1978) also recognises cultural adaptation, and suggests
that the roots of decision-making in the face of potential hazard may be deeply embedded in
cultural formations (Horlick-Jones and Jones 1993 p28). One's cultural background is,
therefore, a structural influence which shapes one's perception as well as behaviour in
response to hazards.
(a)	 Flood hazard perception
In Peninsular Malaysia, culture is manifested in many attributes, but the two which have a
more profound influence on flood hazard perception are ethnicity and religion. Ethnicity
strongly influences individual perception. Individuals from different ethnic origins with
different (sometimes contrasting) cultural backgrounds are expected to perceive flood hazards
differently. For example, Malays who are culturally more experienced and attuned to floods
are expected to perceive flood hazards with a more 'casual' attitude than Chinese or Indians
who are less experienced and therefore more 'concerned'.
In general, although the majority of floodplain respondents are pessimistic in nature, Malays
appear to be slightly more optimistic than Chinese and Indians. Survey results also reveal that
Malays are most aware of floods and Chinese the least aware. Indians fall in between the two
groups. This is due to the fact that the majority of Malays live in flood-prone rural areas in
the East Coast and other floodplains on the West Coast. They are, therefore, more adapted
to floods. In contrast, because of their occupational inclination for business, the majority of
Chinese occupy urban centres in the West Coast which are relatively less flood-prone. Indians
equally inhabit both urban and rural areas. Because of their cultural roots, urban Malays are
also more aware of floods than urban Chinese and Indians, but there appear to be no
significant differences in awareness amongst rural Malays and rural Chinese as both
communities occupy rural floodplains. Rural Indians, however, are less aware of floods,
mainly because a large proportion of them live and work in rubber estates which are located
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on the foothills where flood hazards are less frequent.
In order to establish whether or not ethnicity has a 'real' effect on awareness, households of
different ethnic origins are grouped in terms of flood frequencies and then analysed. For
example, households of different ethnic origins are grouped into those experiencing flood
frequencies less than once in three years and more than once a year. In the first group, it was
found that there are no significant differences in perception of flood awareness between the
various ethnic groups. In the latter group, however, Malays (89.2 per cent) showed greater
awareness than Chinese (70.7 per cent) and Indians (86.7 per cent). This indicates that, for
areas of low flood frequencies, ethnicity is not a significant force affecting flood hazard
awareness but it is statistically significant in areas of high flood frequencies. Overall, Malays
generally show a greater level of flood hazard awareness than the other ethnic groups in
Peninsular Malaysia.
Expectation of future floods amongst the various ethnic communities is tested by comparing
those living in areas with similar flood frequencies. For example, for those living in areas
of low flood frequencies, Chinese (generally sceptical), tend to have the highest expectancies
of future floods in the immediate future (next few months) followed by Malays and Indians
respectively. In areas of high flood frequencies (flooded more than once a year), Chinese
again appear to have the highest future flood expectations, closely followed by Malays and
Indians respectively. Thus, despite living in areas of higher flood risk, Malays are found to
have the greatest propensity to underestimate the risk. This implies a high propensity of 'risk
denial' by Malays.
The Malays' attitude to life is also characterised by an almost total acceptance of fate. To the
Malays, life and death, wealth and poverty, and human society are all intricately related to
fatalism. Fatalism affects almost every facet of Malay life. It makes acceptance of everything,
whether good or bad, including natural disasters, possible with unprotesting tolerance and
resignation (Mahathir Bin Mohamad 1970 p158). Even death is accepted calmly by the
Malays. It is also accepted by close relatives and friends. As a measure of this acceptance,
there is usually no wailing when someone dies although the closest relatives may sob quietly.
And there is no very great distinction between the death of an old man and the death of a
young man or a child. All deaths are treated the same, a pre-ordained thing which one can
do very little about and which one accepts as fated (Mahathir Bin Mohamad 1970 p164).
Hence, when death and other losses from disasters are attributed to fate, they are calmly
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accepted.
Significant differences in the perception of 'flooding as an act of God' exist amongst the
ethnic groups. In general, Malays show a far greater tendency to agree to the statement than
Chinese and Indians. However, this is due to differences in religion amongst the various
ethnic groups. The survey results show that 93.7 per cent of muslims believed that floods are
acts of God (in theory, all Malays are muslims in Malaysia). The corresponding percentages
for christians, buddhists/taoists and hindus are 67.5 per cent, 40.0 per cent and 29.8 per cent
respectively. The chi-square test value of .00 indicated significant differences in the belief
that God created floods between respondents of different religion.
To the Malays, all of whom are muslims, almost everything on earth may be attributed to
God. And although many of the modern educated Malays are aware of the human and natural
dimensions of flooding, they tend to consider flooding as an act of God. The Malays believe
that life is a gift of God and so is death. Good fortune and tragedies in one's life can all be
attributed to God's will. Hence the common muslim saying, 'God willing I will do this or
that 	 ', even when it involves merely day-to-day chores. This can be carried to the
extreme. For example, in the more conservative rural communities, life is almost exclusively
a period of preparation for the hereafter (Mahathir Bin Mohamad 1970 p162). God gives and
takes and the Malays comply and accept. It is not for them to question God's will. Hence,
flood and other forms of natural disasters are accepted calmly in the Malay community.
Because of this strong faith in God, especially amongst the uneducated, the majority of
Malays are willing to leave their fate to God. Thus, they stay put and risk living in flood-
prone areas. To them, 'Life and death, dearth and plenty, are in the hands of God. In the
hands of Allah the Almighty' (Shahnon Alunad 1972 p1). This is the prevailing attitude of
the majority of the Malay peasants interviewed, and the belief that God determines one's
fortune in life is best demonstrated by the following quotation:
`...Each human born into the world has his `rezeki' -his share of food and the
world's goods. God allots this rezeki. Lahuma's grandchildren and great-
grandchildren would each receive his rezeki. It was up to God to decide the
kind of life each person was to have. It was up to Allah the Almighty. But
Lahuma never made a value judgement on the rezeki given. For good and
plentiful rezeki, one needed faith in hard work as a way of life. One must
extend one's land. But if one led a beggar's life, it was still rezeki. If one had
to eat carcases floating down the river, it was still rezeki. Even if one had to
go naked night and day, still one lived and breathed. For Lahuma, the
question of eating carcases and going naked was entirely up to God. Up to
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Allah the Almighty. What could he do if Allah wanted him to eat carcases?
What could he say if God wanted his descendants to go naked? (Shahnon
Ahmad 1972 p5).
As for the Chinese and Indians, the relatively low percentage of respondents who believe that
'flooding is an act of God' do not necessarily mean that they are less religious compared to
the Malays. The difference lies in the fundamental teachings of the religions embraced by
these two immigrant communities, mainly Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism, and Christianity
to a smaller extent. This research does not go into great depth about religious differences as
it is not within its scope. However, a brief analysis is given here for the purpose of providing
a better understanding of perceptual differences amongst the various ethnic groups. Buddhism
is in fact, not as much a religion as it is a way of life. Thus, Buddhists believe in leading a
good life but rarely attribute life and death to God. Taoists also believe in leading a good
life so that one can enjoy a better 'after-life' but good fortune is probably the main concern
of most taoists. Therefore, Taoists believe in luck, and good and bad events are attributed
to luck rather than God. When a flood drowns a Taoist the relatives and friends will say it
is just bad luck. Similarly, Hindus are also firm believers of luck/good or bad fortune. But
Christians are a minority group. Their religious thinking is not unlike muslims. They too
believe that life and death are in the hands of God. However, because the majority of
Christians in Malaysia comprise the better educated section of society, they tend to attribute
the cause of natural disasters to more practical reasons such as human activities or changes
in the natural system. Religion as a structural influence is also tested in the perception of
whether or not anything be done to prevent floods. The results revealed that muslims are
more inclined to believe that 'nothing can be done' compared to the other religious groups.
Also, the majority who indicated that praying to God may either prevent or reduce floods are
muslims.
(b)	 Adoption of flood hazard reduction strategies
Like their perception, individual response in terms of strategy adoption is strongly moulded
by cultural forces. Indigenous Malays, the majority of whom are still predominantly living
in areas affected by seasonal floods, are more exposed to flood hazards than Chinese who
dominate the cities and towns, and Indians who populate the rubber estates. Because of higher
levels of exposure to flood risks, floods have become and still are an integral part of Malay
culture and an accepted part of their lives.
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Disasters often act as 'agents of change', resulting for example, in innovations in hazard-
resistant architectural and construction designs (Davis 1983). In Peninsular Malaysia,
probably the most unique adaptation that has evolved in response to flood disasters is the
Malay stilt house (Figure 2.8). The stilt house originally evolved as an adaptation to the
occupation of swamp-land and frequent flooding in riverine/coastal areas. This permanent
form of flood proofing is still predominant in the traditional rural areas where frequent
flooding is prevalent. Elsewhere, despite the absence of floods, Malays have perpetuated the
architectural form as a unique cultural trait. However, modernisation and economic
consideration are forces which increasingly put the stilt house beyond the reach of the average
Malay. Although the building of modern day stilt houses is still influenced by the Malay
culture and tradition (socio-cultural influences), other structural forces such as poverty (low
household income vis-a-vis building cost), institutional influences (legislation on housing and
housing loans, flood management and flood relief schemes, etc.) and politics (government
policies which advocate low cost terrace houses and flats) are threatening the end of the stilt
house in the more urbanised and densely populated areas'. According to one respondent
living in an old stilt house,
`...My son Fauzi is going to get married next year and as you can see he is
building a new house beside mine. Notice that his new house does not have
stilts. It is too expensive to build stilt houses. A stilt house will cost at least
$5,000 more and we poor people cannot afford it. Furthermore, skilled
carpenters are needed to build a stilt house and we have to pay someone to
do it. My son cannot afford to pay a skilled carpenter to build his house. He
is not a skilled carpenter, but since he has to build his house himself, he has
no choice but to build a simple one without the complication of stilts. But
then, what can poor people like us do? We know houses without stilts will be
flooded easily but we have no choice. Only the richer farmers can afford to
build stilt houses nowadays. My stilt house is nearly 50 years old and I make
sure I reinforce the stilts by a layer of fresh cement every other year. If not,
the constant flooding will erode them and the house will collapse. This was
what happened to poor Mat Zin during this year's (1992) flood (Plate 7.1).
He did not check or look after his stilts. He has since moved to live with his
son in another kampung because he cannot afford to build another stilt house.
If my house collapses, I think I will have the same problem. I dare say that
most of the people in this kampung will have the same problem because we
are mostly poor farmers. My son has no choice. He knows his new house will
be easily flooded. I think he and his wife will have to spend at least a month
a year living in my house during the monsoon season. My son intends to have
cement flooring and at least two feet of bricks all around the base of the four
81 Rural Malays love their stilt houses and are generally reluctant to move into
government aided prefabricated low cost houses or small flats. Thus, unlike the poor Indians
of Andra Pradesh whose 'view over the fence' of 'pukka' reinforced concrete houses is
'greener' (Davis 1979), rural Malays prefer their traditional flood proofed stilt houses.
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Plate 7.1: A collapsed house in Kuala Krai, Kelantan after the 1992 flood
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walls of his house. This way, the effects of floods will be less and the rubbish
easily cleaned after the floods have subsided. But his new house will not last
as long as my old house because of frequent flooding in this area.' (Azizi Haji
Ahmad, a farmer from Kuala Krai, Kelantan).
The stilt house remains a very important form of adaptation to flood hazards in Peninsular
Malaysia, particularly in rural areas. In the current study, 364 respondents (58.9 per cent)
live in stilt houses (Figure 7.3). In general, a much higher percentage of houses in the East
Coast have stilts compared to those in the West Coast, the highest percentage being in Pekan
and the lowest in Kuala Lumpur. Of those living in stilt houses, 70.6 per cent are Malays
while only 17.6 per cent and 5.5 per cent are Chinese and Indians respectively. While the
above figures indicate that the stilt house is predominantly a Malay cultural feature, they also
suggest that other ethnic groups living in flood-prone areas are gradually adopting it as a
flood loss reduction strategy.
Although stilt houses are originally built as an adaptation to floods, Malaysians rarely
consider them as a flood reduction strategy. Only a small minority of less than 6.1 per cent
of all respondents did so. This is because a stilt house is a necessity if one were to live in a
flood-prone area. Stilt houses are therefore considered as a normal form of habitat in flood-
prone areas. According to one respondent,
`...In this kampung, one would have to be mad not to build one's house on
stilts. Normal floods come often, on an average of a few times a year and a
major flood every four or five years. Everyone in this kampung lives in stilt
houses. We do not think stilts are a flood reduction strategy. It is a must! It
is too dangerous to live here in a house without stilts, especially if one has
young children. Only the shop-keepers have their houses built without stilts.
They need the space and since their shops are adjacent to the main road, the
highest land in the kampung, only the major floods will affect them.'
Even so, the stilt house serves an important function as it keeps out waters from normal
floods. Although more than four-fifths of respondents reported that their houses were flooded
during the most recent flood, flood waters did not enter the houses of all these reported
households. People tend to consider that a flood had occurred when their compound or the
road is flooded. By comparing stilt height and flood depth during the most recent flood, it
was found that all houses without stilts were flooded, but less than a third of stilt-houses
experienced the same fate (Figure 7.4). However, during a major severe flood, even stilts
will not be able to keep the flood waters out (Figure 7.5).
Ethnicity is a cultural trait that influences one's way of life, values, attitudes, thinking,
256
Percentage of houses
loo
PM	 Peninsular Malaysia
EC -	 East Coast
WC -
	 West Coast
PP	 PI111111 Pinang
KB	 Kelantan
XL	 Kuala lAimpur
PR -	 Pekan
PM EC WC PP	 KB	 KL	 PK
Location
With stilts Without stilts
Figure 7.3: Percentage of houses with and without stilts in Peninsular Malaysia
257
• *
	 •
0
0
0.
•
0
2
O 0 00	 0
• •
O.
o o	 0
• •
co
Figure 7.4: Percentage of houses flooded during the most recent flood in different parts
of Peninsular Malaysia
258
UI
=as
a.
Figure 7.5: Percentage of houses flooded during the worst flood in different parts of
Peninsular Malaysia
259
perception and hence one's selection of flood reduction strategies. Results from the current
research reveal that significant differences exist between the various ethnic groups in terms
of their adoption of flood reduction strategies. For example, Chinese appear to be most ready
to take steps to reduce flood losses, closely followed by Indians and Malays. This seems
surprising as Malays live in the most flood-prone areas and are expected to be most eager to
take such steps. There are many reasons for this. Malays are so attuned to floods that they
have developed a resigned attitude towards it. Malays are muslims who believe that flooding
is an 'act of God' and therefore beyond human control (see below). Year in and year out they
are required to evacuate temporarily and living in stilt houses give them a further sense of
security. On the other hand, Chinese and Indians are generally not as attuned to floods as
Malays. Few of them live in stilt houses and because of this, their houses are more
vulnerable to floods. They therefore treat flooding with greater concern and are thus more
eager to take steps to safe-guard their lives and properties.
In terms of the adoption of specific strategies, Malays have the greatest tendency to: pray (see
discussion on religion below); prepare to evacuate; move livestock; and buy provisions.
Malay farmers have also developed specific strategies to reduce crop losses from flooding.
Farmers traditionally go into their rice plots to remove all kinds of floating litter which are
brought by the current from upstream. If not, the weight of the litter will crush the rice
plants. The following account of a farming family's struggle against floods by Shahnon
Ahmad (1972 p139-40) most appropriately illustrates the point:
`...Sanah and Milah and Jenab went down to the ridge which was already
covered with rushing water. The water already reached up to Jenab's waist.
They waded towards the rice-plots. They moved aside the areca nut flower-
sheaths blocking their way. Brittle stems, branches of fallen trees, dead
weeds, sodden pieces of paper, empty tins, bins, and all kinds of filth, they
pushed aside to be swept away by the currents which were growing faster.
...When they reached the rice-plots, the water had risen to the tops of the rice
plants; only the shoots could be seen quivering far apart above the water. But
most of the shoots were bent under the weight of litter and branches from
upstream. Sanah pushed away the litter from corner to corner with her stick.
The litter floated away and clung to another section. She kept pushing the
litter till it reached the edge. Milah started by removing a tree-stem as big as
a forearm. The stem had destroyed nearly ten rice-plants along the ridge. She
pulled the stem aside. She pushed it to the edge and the stem rolled
about...wobbled and floated under a pile of litter and moss.'
One interesting adaptation amongst Malay fishermen in Kampung Sabak Tengah and Dasar
Sabak (Kelantan) is the dismantling of their wooden houses just before the Northeast
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Monsoon Season and move further inland to rebuild them temporarily on higher grounds
(New Straits Times 1.12.92). The fishermen engage themselves in the cottage industry or
become part-time padi farmers during the monsoon season when they cannot fish. When the
monsoon is over, they return back to their kampungs and rebuild their houses, and resume
their normal lives.
In contrast, Chinese and Indians do not have the rich variety of flood reduction strategies as
Malays, mainly because the majority of them do not live in flood-prone zones. Still, for those
who do, Chinese have the greatest tendency to: move upstairs; move vehicles, employ
emergency flood proofing of property; ring authorities for advice; and take leave from work.
Indians, however, have the greatest tendency to move their belongings and are keenest to
adopt new/different strategies when the next flood occurs.
Religion is another cultural trait that significantly affects many aspects of strategy adoption.
For example, Buddhists/taoists have the greatest inclination to take steps to reduce flood loss.
They are closely followed by Christians, Hindus and Muslims respectively. It should be
reiterated that muslims have the lowest tendency to take steps for flood reduction because of
their staunch belief that flooding is an 'act of God'. This 'passive acceptance of risk' (Burton
et al 1978) is a kind of religious resignation. It reduces the muslim's propensity to adopt
flood reduction strategies. To thoroughly understand the muslim's beliefs and actions, one
must delve into the 'Koran' but suffice to say here that attributing the cause of flooding to
God gives rise to a resigned attitude that 'nothing much can be done about flooding'.
According to one farmer,
`...Allah gives and takes away. My life depends on Allah. If it floods, then
it is Allah's will. It is Allah's punishment for people's sins. It is Allah's
reminder for the people to lead a good and religious life. What can a mere
human like me do? I can only pray to ask for forgiveness. Nothing else.
People try raising the stilts and the flood waters become even higher. No one
can escape the flood. No one can escape from Allah's hold.'
Besides being more resigned about flooding, muslims also have the greatest tendency to:
pray; prepare for evacuation; move livestock; buy provisions; and get the boat ready. On the
other hand, buddhists/taoists have the greatest tendency to: move upstairs; move vehicles
elsewhere; move belongings; and employ emergency flood proofing of property. They also
have the greatest inclination to employ the most number of flood reduction strategies. Finally,
christians have the greatest tendency to take leave from work and hindus have the greatest
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tendency to employ new/different strategies when the next flood occurs.
7.3	 Non-structural/societal forces influencing individual flood hazard perception and
response
7.3.1 Location
(a)	 Flood hazard perception
Location has been shown to affect hazard perception significantly (Baker and Patton 1974;
Hankins 1974; Waterstone 1978; Fordham 1992). In Peninsular Malaysia, differences in
location between East and West Coast, study areas, and urban or rural sites, are expected to
affect one's perception. In general, survey results reveal that East Coast respondents are more
aware of the flood hazard than their West Coast counterparts, with residents in Kelantan and
Pekan being more aware of the flood hazard than their counterparts in Pulau Pinang and
Kuala Lumpur. Rural respondents are more aware of floods than their urban counterparts
(Appendix L a).
West Coast respondents are generally more optimistic than those in the East Coast, with
respondents from Pulau Pinang being the most optimistic and those from Pekan being the
most pessimistic. East Coast respondents tend to have higher expectations of future floods
compared to those in the West Coast. Kelantan has the highest percentage of respondents who
perceive that future floods in the short term would be a certainty. This is followed by Pulau
Pinang and Pekan. Kuala Lumpur respondents have the lowest expectations. In perceiving
flood frequencies in the long term, Pekan respondents have the highest expectations, followed
by Kelantan and Pulau Pinang respondents. Again, Kuala Lumpur respondents have the
lowest expectations.
East Coast respondents generally have a better memory of past floods. A significantly higher
percentage of East Coast respondents remembered floods before the 1980s. The majority of
West Coast respondents, however, remembered only recent floods in the late 1980s and
1990s. This could be due to the fact that the majority of floods in the West Coast are flash
floods and are therefore not as severe as the monsoon floods in the East Coast. People tend
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to remember infrequent major flood events rather than frequent smaller ones.
Despite wider flood hazard experience, East Coast respondents are less aware of flood
forecasting methods than West Coast respondents. East Coast respondents also show a greater
tendency to believe that 'floods are an act of God' and 'floods come at regular interval'. They
are also convinced that they are more adapted to floods than West Coast respondents. In
contrast, West Coast respondents are more likely to believe that 'floods are an act of human
activities' and/or 'floods are a combined act of humans and nature'. They are also more
convinced that 'floods are likely to worsen' and that 'floods can happen anytime'. However,
they tend to have more faith in government flood control than their East Coast counterparts.
Thus, Kuala Lumpur and Pulau Pinang residents show a greater tendency to agree that flood
is an act of human and/or nature than their counterparts in Kelantan and Pekan. They are also
more likely to believe that 'floods can happen any time'. Respondents in Pulau Pinang have
the greatest tendency to believe that floods will become worse in the future while those from
Kuala Lumpur are most likely to believe that the government can control floods.
In general, West Coast respondents show a greater tendency to perceive that floods can be
prevented or reduced than their East Coast counterparts. In contrast, East Coast respondents
show a greater tendency to perceive praying both as a method of flood prevention and
reduction. They also believe that dams and reservoirs would prevent floods. Similarly, East
Coast respondents also show a greater tendency to perceive floodwalls, embankments, levees
and dykes, the use of river diversions, retention ponds, and the use of boats (for flood
reduction only) as measures of flood prevention and reduction. On the other hand, West
Coast respondents tend to perceive channel improvement as a method of flood prevention and
reduction.
Because of their greater exposure to flood hazards, East Coast respondents tend to perceive
a greater number of flood preventive solutions than their West Coast counterparts.
Furthermore, East Coast respondents have a greater capacity to perceive most flood reduction
strategies as effective than West Coast respondents (Table 7.1)
(b)	 Adoption of flood hazard reduction strategies
Significant differences exist between East and West Coast respondents in adoption of flood
reduction strategies (Appendix L al). A higher percentage of East Coast respondents live in
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Table 7.1: Perception of specific flood reduction strategies as effective by East and West
Coast respondents in Peninsular Malaysia and the chi-square significance level
Strategy West Coast East Coast Chi-square
(% Respondents) (% Respondents) Test Value
N=286 N=332
Pray 51.8 81.0 .00
Prepare to move 75.0 89.1 .00
Move upstairs 74.0 84.4 .01
Move out of building 76.9 95.9 .00
Move livestock 68.1 94.6 .00
Move vehicles 93.0 98.1 .01
Flood proof building (P) 43.9 55.8 .02
Flood proof building (C) 29.1 44.3 .00
Flood proof building (E) 32.8 47.7 .00
Flood insurance 40.8 53.9 .01
Warn others on site 69.5 87.3 .00
Warn others elsewhere 67.0 88.1 .00
Buy provisions 77.5 93.9 .00
Turn off electricity 91.2 86.7 .10 (NS)
Listen to weather forecast 62.7 94.4 .00
Phone authorities 45.2 67.0 .00
Elevate floor 44.4 72.1 .00
Change cropping pattern 21.5 56.2 .00
Prepare boat 64.5 95.3 .00
Take leave 66.0 93.4 .00
Fix switches higher 75.8 94.6 .00
P - Permanent (e.g. building a raised bund around the building).
C - Contingent (e.g. building a removable flood proof door).
E - Emergency (e.g. using sand bags).
NS - Not significant
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stilt houses with higher stilts (see Appendix N Table N.10). With higher stilts, East Coast
houses are rarely flooded during normal floods but the results of major floods are similar on
both coasts (Figure 7.6). East Coast residents are, therefore, more adoptive of the stilt house
as a flood reduction strategy than their West Coast counterparts. East Coast respondents also
appear to have a greater tendency to adopt more strategies than their West Coast counterparts.
For example, during the most recent flood, East Coast respondents adopted an average of
four strategies compared to three by West Coast respondents. Half of East Coast respondents
used more than three strategies as compared to a fifth of West Coast respondents. East Coast
respondents also show a greater tendency to adopt flood reduction strategies (Table 7.2).
In contrast, West Coast respondents are more likely to attempt different/new strategies in
future floods than East Coast respondents. This indicates that the former are not yet well
adapted to flooding and are still in the process of adapting to it. In the East Coast, flood
reduction strategies have evolved for a long time and are quite 'fixed' or stable. East Coast
respondents are, therefore, well adapted to floods and are not likely to attempt anything
different. East Coast respondents are also more resigned to the fact that seasonal flooding in
the East Coast is unavoidable.
During the most recent flood, Kelantan and Pekan respondents adopted more flood reduction
strategies than their Pulau Pinang and Kuala Lumpur counterparts (Table 7.3). In Pulau
Pinang, respondents have a greater tendency to adopt strategies such as moving upstairs,
moving vehicles, moving belongings, turning off the electricity mains and warning others.
In Kuala Lumpur, flood proofing of buildings appear to be a common strategy along with
moving out of building, moving vehicles, and moving belongings. Because of the high
concentration of Malays and muslims in the East Coast, respondents from Pekan and Kelantan
are much more likely to resort to praying as a form of flood reduction strategy. People pray
not for flood reduction to their property but mainly for the safety of their families. They are
also more likely to move livestock, buy provisions, prepare boats and listen to the weather
forecast other than the usual moving upstairs, moving out of building, moving vehicles and
moving belongings. Because they are used to seasonal monsoon flooding, people from Pekan
and Kelantan are also far more likely to prepare for evacuation than those from Pulau Pinang
and Kuala lumpur.
However, the urban or rural characteristics of a location do not appear to have significant
influences on the adoption of flood reduction strategies. In instances where significant chi-
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Figure 7.6: 'Percentage flooded' of stilt houses of different stilt heights, all houses and
reported flooding by respondents in the East and West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia
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Table 7.2: Adoption of specific flood reduction strategies during the most recent flood
by floodplain occupants in Peninsular Malaysia and the chi-square significance level
Strategy	 West Coast
(% Respondents)
N=286
East Coast
(% Respondents)
N=332
Chi-square
Test Value
Pray 3.6 15.8 .00
Prepare to move 12.0 45.4 .00
Move upstairs 22.1 37.7 .00
Move out of building 22.5 26.0 NS
Move livestock 7.2 25.3 .00
Move vehicles 32.1 36.3 NS
Move belongings/house contents 79.1 52.4 .00
Flood proof building (P) 11.6 10.3 NS
Flood proof building (E) 9.2 2.9 .00
Warn others on site 6.0 5.5 NS
Warn others elsewhere 5.6 3.3 NS
Buy provisions 3.6 27.5 .00
Turn off electricity 8.4 11.0 NS
Listen to weather forecast 4.4 25.6 .00
Phone authorities 2.0 3.7 NS
Elevate floor 4.4 8.1 NS
Prepare boat 10.4 32.6 .00
Take leave 3.6 2.9 NS
Fix switches higher 2.4 3.3 NS
Used > 3 strategies 22.1 50.2 .00
Used > 6 strategies 1.6 10.3 .00
P - Permanent (e.g. building a raised bund around the building)
E - Emergency (e.g. using sand bags)
NS - Not significant
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Table 7.3: Adoption of flood reduction strategies by respondents from different sample
areas in Peninsular Malaysia during the most recent flood
Strategy P.P. Kel. K.L. Pek. Chi-square
Test Value
Pray 3.8* 11.3 3.3 21.1 .00
Prepare to move 4.5 38.7 25.0 53.7 .00
Move upstairs 31.2 34.0 7.6 16.3 .00
Move out of building 11.5 41.3 40.2 33.3 .00
Move livestock 8.3 34.0 5.4 14.6 .00
Move vehicles 33.1 48.0 30.4 22.0 .00
Move belongings 83.4 54.0 71.7 50.4 .00
Flood proof building (P) 7.0 2.7 19.6 19.5 .00
Flood proof building (E) 6.4 3.3 14.1 2.4 .00
Warn others on site 7.0 5.3 4.3 5.7 .84 (NS)
Warn others elsewhere 8.9 4.0 0.0 2.4 .00
Buy provisions 5.7 34.0 0.0 19.5 .00
Turn off electricity 11.5 14.0 3.3 7.3 .03
Listen to weather forecast 5.7 24.0 2.2 27.6 .00
Phone authorities 3.2 4.7 0.0 2.4 .20 (NS)
Elevate floor 7.0 4.7 0.0 12.2 .00
Prepare boat 12.1 22.0 7.6 45.5 .00
Take leave 2.5 3.3 5.4 2.4 .59 (NS)
Fix switches higher 1.3 2.0 4.3 4.9 .23 (NS)
Used >3 strategies 22.3 55.4 21.8 43.9 .00
Used >6 strategies 1.3 8.7 2.1 12.2 .00
P.P. - Pulau Pinang (N=172)
Kel. - Kelantan (N=192)
K.L. - Kuala Lumpur (N=114)
Pek. - Pekan (N=140)
* Figures are percentages of respondents in each sample area
P - Permanent (e.g. building a raised bund around the building)
E - Emergency (e.g. using sand bags)
NS - Not significant
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square results are obtained, they are likely to be due to some other variables. For example,
rural respondents are more likely to be poorly educated, belong to the lower income group,
mostly of Malay origin and have less occupational as well as residential mobility.
7.3.2 Flood characteristics
(a)	 Flood hazard perception
Flood characteristics such as frequency, recency, type, and magnitude/severity may affect a
person's perception. The influence of hazard frequency and recency is well documented by
Kates (1962), White (1974), Harding and Parker (1974). However, although
magnitude/severity has been shown to be influential by some researchers (Kates 1962; Baker
and Patton 1974), its influence has also been found to be insignificant by others (Harding and
Parker 1974).
In the current research, flood type is either riverine, tidal or a combination of both, i.e.
riverine-tidal. Flood severity is defined in terms of total actual damage. Of the four flood
characteristics, frequency appears to significantly affect perception as seen by the significant
chi-square results of the majority of the questions (Appendix L (b)). Flood recency and flood
type appear to be influential for only a minor section of the questions while flood severity is
generally not significantly associated with almost all questions pertaining to perception.
In terms of flood frequency, those flooded more frequently are more aware of the flood
hazard, are more optimistic, and have higher expectancies of future flooding. They are also
less likely to perceive flooding as a freak event (i.e. more likely to perceive flooding as a
common event), and believe that floods could happen any time rather than occurring at
regular intervals. They are more convinced that flooding is likely to worsen, and less likely
to believe in the government's ability to control floods. They are more concerned about flood
prevention and reduction strategies, and pay more attention to the media when such strategies
are broadcasted. Those who are flooded only once a while generally do not pay much
attention to such broadcasts but are instead more concerned about day-to-day problems such
as unemployment, inflation or other more pressing issues confronting them. Finally,
frequently flooded respondents are rather optimistic about the effectiveness of flood reduction
strategies but those flooded on the rare occasion are not knowledgeable about such strategies
and are sceptical of their effectiveness.
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Flood recency does not appear to be significantly associated with most of the answers on
perception but there are some exceptions (Appendix L b). Those flooded more recently are
more aware of the flood problem, show a higher expectancy of future flooding, and are likely
to believe that flooding is caused by nature and/or humans. They perceive flooding as a
common event occurring irregularly (at any time), are convinced that floods would worsen
in the future and believe that they are used to floods.
In terms of flood type, those living in areas flooded by a combination of river and tidal
floods (for example in estuaries and delta areas) are more aware of flooding as this is the
most severe and frequent flood type and people are therefore more concerned and aware
about it. They also believe that raising the ground/floor level of houses would help reduce
flood losses. This is because a significant percentage of the respondents occupying areas
affected by river-tidal floods live in traditional wooden houses whereby floors can be easily
raised by adding in another layer of planks. Those living in areas affected by river floods also
believe this method would work. In contrast, those affected by tidal floods live in concrete
houses in urban centres and raising the floor level may prove difficult and expensive.
Respondents living in areas affected by tidal floods have a greater tendency to perceive future
flooding as almost certain. This is because tidal floods are regularly occurring, and in many
of the lower-lying areas affected by such floods, the frequency of occurrence is twice a
month. They also have the highest estimate of future flooding over a 100 year period, have
a greater tendency to perceive flooding as a common occurrence and that it is not serious.
They do not believe that the government have flooding under control.
In the perception of the effectiveness of methods of flood reduction, there is generally no
significant difference in perception amongst respondents living in areas with different flood-
type. However, respondents affected by tidal floods are less inclined to believe that moving
out of the building will work because they are not too bothered about tidal flooding which
is not as severe as river flooding. They are more inclined to believe that warning others on
site or elsewhere would help reduce flood loss. In contrast, those affected by river-tidal
floods show a greater tendency to believe that listening to the weather forecast would
effectively reduce flood loss.
The results of tests of associations in Appendix L (b) revealed that there are generally no
significant differences in perception (in the majority of the questions asked on perception)
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between respondents who experienced different degrees of flood severity (in terms of flood
losses suffered during the worst flood).
(b)
	 Adoption of flood hazard reduction strategies
In general, tests of associations reveal that flood characteristics (frequency, recency, type and
severity) do not appear to have significant influences on the adoption of flood reduction
strategies (Appendix L bl).
However, there are some exceptions. Those who are flooded more frequently have a greater
tendency to employ reduction strategies, show a greater tendency to prepare for evacuation
but have a lesser tendency to move belongings. This is due to the fact that they are well
prepared and have previously moved their belongings (for example storing them in the attic).
Those flooded more recently (within the last three years) are more likely to have adopted
flood reduction strategies, resorted to praying but are less likely to have employed flood
proofing (emergency and permanent).
Respondents flooded by a combination of tidal and river floods are most likely to have
adopted flood reduction strategies than those affected solely by either river or tidal floods.
They are also more likely to have prayed, used permanent flood proofing of their properties
(except emergency flood proofing), bought provisions, listened to the weather forecast and
had the boat ready for evacuation. They also tend to employ the most number of strategies.
Finally, those flooded by tidal floods are most likely to move belongings.
7.3.3 Building characteristics
(a)	 Flood hazard perception
In many rural flood-prone areas, respondents living in stilt houses may perceive and respond
to floods quite differently from those who live in houses without stilts. Other than the stilt
variable, building characteristics such as house type, wall type, age of house and floor type
are also tested against all questions on perception.
Results in Appendix L (c) indicate that building type, wall type, floor type and whether or
not the building is built on stilts are the variables that have a significant influence on people's
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perception. However, further cross-checking between these variables indicates that the 'stilts'
variable is the predominant one. The other variables show up significantly because they are
highly associated with the stilt variable. For example, 75.0 per cent of detached buildings are
built on stilts, hence the 'detached' characteristic of buildings does not have a 'real' effect
on perception, the likely effect of which comes from the stilt variable. It only has what is
termed a 'spurious effect'. The correlation test revealed a significant value (at .001 level) of
.33 between building type and `with/without stilts'. Similarly, wall type and floor type are
also two variables highly correlated with the stilt variable, yielding a correlation coefficient
of -.52 (significant at .001) and -.49 (significant at .001) respectively. These variables are,
therefore, not further analysed with respondent's perception in this section, but the chi-square
test values are indicated in Appendix L (c). In contrast, building age does not appear to have
significant correlations with the stilt variable and is further tested against all the perception
questions. However, the focus of this section is on the 'stilt' variable, as it is expected to be
the main influence on perception.
Respondents living in houses with stilts are more aware of floods, more optimistic, and have
higher expectancies of future floods. They also tend to believe that flooding is an act of God,
a common occurrence, and occurs at regular intervals. More significantly, they tend to
believe that they are 'used to' floods. They also show a significantly greater tendency to
resort to praying as a form of flood prevention and reduction, and tend to perceive the
majority of individual flood reduction strategies to be effective.
In contrast, respondents living in houses without stilts show a greater tendency to agree that
flooding results from 'human activities' or from a combination of 'natural phenomena and
human activities'. As a result, they are more inclined to perceive structural methods such as
artificial drainage, the removal of debris from rivers, improving river channels, flood
proofing of buildings and the use of cover crops as forms of flood reduction. They perceive
that floods are freak events, likely to worsen, can happen any time, and do not believe that
they are being controlled by the authorities. Finally, they tend to believe that floods can be
prevented and reduced.
Building age does not appear to have any significant effect on the perception of respondents
living in newer or older houses for the majority of the perception questions. However, the
few exceptions are highlighted here. In general, respondents living in houses more than 60
years old are more aware of flooding than those occupying houses between 11 to 60 years
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old. However, respondents living in houses less than 11 years old are most aware of
flooding. This is due to the fact that the majority of them are squatters living in flood-prone
areas. If squatters are taken out of the analysis, then there are no significant differences in
perception between those living in old and new houses.
(b)	 Adoption of flood ha7ard reduction strategies
On the whole, building characteristics do not appear to have significant effects on the
adoption of adjustment (Appendix L cl). However, in many instances, respondents living in
houses with stilts are found to respond differently to flood hazards than those living in houses
without stilts. For example, those living in houses with stilts show a greater tendency to pray,
prepare for evacuation, move out of their houses, move livestock, buy provisions, listen to
the weather forecast and get the boat ready. They also tend to adopt a greater number of
flood reduction strategies.
In contrast, as might be expected, those living in houses without stilts show a greater
tendency to move upstairs, move vehicles elsewhere, move belongings, and adopt emergency
flood proofing of property. They are also more likely to adopt new or different strategies in
future floods.
7.3.4 Socio-economic characteristics and flood hazard perception and adoption of flood
hazard reduction strategies
The influence of socio-economic variables on hazard perception and adjustment is well
documented (see Appendix I). In the current research, the independent variables are length
of residence, age, education, family size, ethnic group, religion, occupation, income, gender,
tenure and group membership. These variables are tested against all questions on perception
and the results in Appendix L (d) indicate that the majority of socio-economic variables do
not have significant associations with perception and the adoption of flood hazard reduction
strategies, with the exception of ethnic group and religion. The influence of these two
variables (as structural forces) on perception has been examined earlier in Section 7.2.3 (a).
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7.3.5 Attitudes
(a)	 Flood hazard perception
In relating attitudes to flood mitigation schemes against perception, Fordham (1992) has
shown that those who had a higher expectation of flooding are more likely to show support
for flood hazard reduction schemes while those who are more prepared to live with the flood
risk tended to show less support. However, survey results indicate that attitudes (e.g. on
religious beliefs and attitudes towards government) affect only a minority of the questions on
perception (Appendix L e).
Those who believe that flooding is an act of God are more optimistic, more aware of floods,
and have higher expectancies of future flooding. They tend to resort to praying as a form of
flood prevention and reduction and perceive it as an effective method. In contrast, those who
do not believe that flooding is an act of God have a greater awareness of flood forecasting
methods, have a greater tendency to perceive flooding as due to natural and/or human
activities, are more inclined to perceive that it is getting worse and that it could happen any
time. They believe that floods can be prevented and/or reduced. Consequently, they tend to
believe in human methods of flood reduction such as artificial drainage, the use of cover
crops and the removal of river debris. They also tend to suggest shifting house contents as
a form of flood reduction and have a greater tendency to suggest more methods of flood
reduction.
Attitudes towards the government also influences a respondent's perception. For exarnp)e,
those who have a positive attitude towards the government (i.e. they believe that the
government is capable of controlling floods) are more aware of floods and have a greater
tendency to believe that flooding is an act of nature. They also tend to believe that floods can
be prevented and/or reduced and believe in improving river channels as a form of flood
reduction. They also believe in telephoning the authorities to get information to help them in
flood reduction.
In contrast, those who have a negative attitude towards the government tend to believe that
floods occur at regular intervals and that the floods would worsen. They also tend to believe
that the authorities have not studied and understood the flood problem thoroughly. They tend
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to believe in self-help strategies" such as evacuation, raising floor levels, getting boats
ready, shifting contents and planting cover crops as forms of flood reduction. Because they
do not believe in government flood management, they tend to rely more on themselves and
consequently have a greater capacity to perceive and suggest more strategies for flood
prevention and reduction.
(b)	 Adoption of flood hazard reduction strategies
The chi-square test results in Appendix L (el) generally show that attitudes do not have
significant influences on the adoption of flood reduction strategies. However, there are some
exceptions. For example, those who believe that flooding is an act of God have the greatest
tendency to adopt the following strategies:(1) pray; (2) prepare for evacuation; (3) buy
provisions; and (4) listen to the weather forecast. In contrast, those who believe that flooding
is due to human activities (an objective attitude) have the greatest tendency to: (1) prepare
for evacuation; (2) employ permanent flood proofing of property; (3) employ emergency
flood proofing of property; (4) warn others elsewhere; (5) take leave from work; and (6) use
new/different strategies when the next flood occurs.
Respondents who believe that floods are a common phenomenon (i.e. possessing a more
'concerned' attitude towards flooding) in their locality generally show a greater tendency to
take steps to reduce flood losses. In contrast, those who believe that floods are uncommon
or not serious in their locality (i.e. possessing a less concerned attitude towards flooding)
show the least tendency to do so.
Those who have a positive attitude towards government flood management (i.e. believe that
the government can control floods) have a greater tendency to move out of their properties
when flooding occurs. Many of these are floodplain occupants who have benefited in some
ways from government flood mitigation schemes. This may be in the form of flood warnings,
temporary evacuation and shelter, food, rescue, relief and rehabilitation, and other forms of
aid. Respondents living in cities may also have benefited from structural/engineering flood
mitigation schemes. Political propaganda via the media can also influence attitudes towards
" Self-help or self-reliance of the local community is a well documented strategy in
disaster management. When confronting disasters many vulnerable communities from Third
World countries cope reasonably well in adversity through self-reliance (Davis 1981; Blaikie
et al 1994 pp61-70).
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such schemes. This group of respondents are less active when it comes to the adoption of
flood reduction strategies as they rely heavily on official help. Years of over-reliance on
government aid have developed a positive attitude towards the government but has rendered
them more vulnerable to floods as 'self-help', 'survival instinct' and the ability to recover by
various traditional flood reduction strategies are gradually lost through leaving the fight
against floods to the authorities.
In contrast, those with a negative attitude towards government flood hazard management have
a greater tendency to adopt strategies such as moving vehicles elsewhere, moving belongings,
and buying provisions. This group of respondents consists of those who have either not
received any form of aid from the government, or those who have received insufficient help.
Some may also have received warnings which are not followed by actual flooding. In the state
of Kelantan where the people support the opposition PAS government, it is not surprising that
their attitude towards the federal government would not be favourable. This group of
respondents are therefore more inclined to act positively in times of floods. They do not
'trust' government promises/schemes and would rather 'help themselves' in their adoption of
flood reduction strategies.
7.3.6 Perceptual characteristics
(a)	 Flood hazard perception
It is envisaged that perceptual characteristics such as flood awareness, outlook in life
(optimistic or pessimistic) and perception of future flood risk can have significant influences
on how people perceive other aspects of floods. Survey results reveal that those who are
aware of floods in their locality are generally more optimistic, have higher expectancies of
future flooding, and are more aware of flood forecasting methods. They are more inclined
to agree that flooding is an act of God and, therefore, are more likely to believe in praying.
They perceive floods as serious problems but are also likely to believe that they are used to
them. They tend to perceive floods as common rather than freak events and are more likely
to believe in the government's ability to manage floods.
Survey results also reveal that optimistic respondents are more aware of floods, have higher
expectancies of future flooding, and are more aware of flood forecasting methods. They tend
to believe that flooding is an act of God, that it is a common occurrence, and are more likely
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to believe that they are used to it.
The perception of flood frequency is measured by Question 11. Respondents are asked to give
their expectation of the number of floods occurring in their present property if they were to
live 100 years. The results in Appendix L (f) reveal that respondents with different perception
of flood frequency in their locality perceive flood hazards differently. For example, those
who perceive flood frequencies 1 in 3 years or less are more likely to be pessimistic, less
aware of floods in their locality and believe that the chances of future flooding is almost
negligible. They are less aware of flood forecasting methods, believe that flood is a freak
event and perceive flooding as not serious.
In contrast, those who perceive flood frequencies 1 in 1 year or more are more likely to be
optimistic, more aware of floods in their locality, and believe that the chances of future
flooding is almost certain. They are more aware of flood forecasting methods and believe that
flood is a common event which can happen any time. They perceive flooding as a big
problem but believe that they are used to them. They feel that flooding is likely to worsen
in the future although they believe that floods can be reduced.
(b)	 Adoption of flood hazard reduction strategies
Respondents who are aware of floods generally have a greater tendency to take steps to
reduce flood losses compared to those who are not (Appendix L fl). They are also more
likely to adopt strategies such as moving livestock, buying provisions, and getting the boat
ready. In contrast, those not aware of floods are more likely to adopt impromptu strategies
such as moving vehicles, moving belongings and attempting emergency flood proofing. Plate
7.2 shows the likely result of not moving one's vehicle.
Whether a person is optimistic or pessimistic in perception also affects the adoption of
strategies. For example, those who are optimistic have a greater tendency to move out of
buildings when flood occurs. This is because the majority of the optimistic are East Coast
farmers or fishermen who are evacuated frequently or are warned frequently to evacuate.
Moving out of buildings is therefore a normal routine to them. The optimistic also have a
greater tendency to get the boat ready as a form of precaution. On the other hand, the
pessimistic have a greater likelihood to move their vehicles elsewhere. This is expected as
they have a higher expectation of floods than the actual. The pessimistic also have a greater
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Plate 7.2: Top: A rusted motorbike (estimated value $1,500 when it was roadworthy)
destroyed during one of the frequent floods in Kampung Seronok, Pulau Pinang .
Bottom: A motorcar (estimated value $7,000 when it was roadworthy) destroyed by
floods is cannibalised and left to rust in the Kota Bharu area. Note the flood mark of
the recent flood on the wall of nearby building.
278
inclination to adopt emergency flood proofing methods.
The perception of flood frequency also has an effect on strategy adoption. In the current
research, those perceiving a high flood frequency are more likely to take steps towards flood
loss reduction than those perceiving a low flood frequency. For example, 90.3 per cent of
respondents perceiving a flood frequency of at least once a year have taken steps to reduce
flood loss. On the other hand, only 77.8 per cent of respondents perceiving a flood frequency
of once in three years or less do so. Respondents perceiving a high flood frequency also have
a greater tendency to prepare for evacuation and buy provisions as flood reduction strategies.
In contrast, respondents perceiving a low flood frequency have a greater tendency to move
their vehicles elsewhere and move their belongings. This is expected, as those perceiving low
flood frequencies generally live in less flood-prone areas. As such, an unexpected flood
inevitably results in frantic moving of furniture, carpets, electrical appliances, clothes etc..
On the other hand, those perceiving high flood frequencies generally live in the most flood-
prone areas and are well adapted to floods. As such, they have already put away their
belongings in high places. For example, electrical appliances, furniture and other expensive
belongings are usually put on the first floor or in the attic (Plate 7.3) while the ground floor
is usually empty and used as a play area for children and for storing inexpensive things.
When electrical appliances are located on the ground floor, they are usually propped up to
prevent them from being flooded (Plate 7.4).
7.4 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated that both structural and non-structural contextual forces affect
(to varying degrees) individual perception and response to flood hazards. It indicates that
structural forces such as poverty, educational attainment and cultural background (mainly
ethnicity and religion) strongly influences individual perception and adoption of flood
reduction strategies. Likewise, non-structural forces such as location, flood frequency,
building type (with or without stilts), attitudes and beliefs, degree of optimism and flood
hazard awareness are also significantly associated with individual perception and response.
Although structural forces have been shown to put constraints on an individual's situation and
hence limit the scope of action, they are not totally inhibitive. People do have some room for
manoeuvre/action in the face of disasters. Blaikie et at (1994 p61) assert that 'people faced
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Plate 7.3: The storing of electrical appliances and other expensive belongings on shelves
in the attic of two house's in Kampung Pantai Dalam, Kuala Lumpur
280
Plate 7.4: Top: The propping up of a refrigerator to prevent it from being flooded.
Notice the high location of electrical sockets as a form of flood damage reduction (from
a respondent's house Kampung Tendong, Pasir Mos, Kelantan). Bottom: The propping
up of cooking utensils in the same house
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with disasters develop strategies to try to secure their livelihoods and are not passive
recipients of a profile of opportunities hedged about by constraints of the political-economy
of which they are a part'. Thus, there is a consistent evidence of the high 'coping ability'
amongst disaster victims (Davis 1981 p14). In Peninsular Malaysia, the majority of floodplain
occupants have attempted (employed strategies) at one time or another to reduce flood losses.
Malaysians were generally found to have developed a wide range of individual flood
reduction strategies, the most unique of which is the stilt house. Incorporating the principle
of the stilt house into modern low cost houses may be an effective government strategy.
Government should therefore capitalise on traditional mechanisms and help individuals more
effectively respond in the way that they do.
This chapter has examined the influence of structural and non-structural contextual forces on
individual flood hazard perception and adoption of flood reduction strategies. The next
chapter focuses on an in-depth 'segment analysis' of the 'flood warning and evacuation' and
'income equity' segments.
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8 SEGMENT ANALYSIS ON 'FLOOD WARNING AND EVACUATION
SYSTEMS' AND 'INCOME EQUITY' IN RELATION TO FLOOD HAZARDS
8.1	 Introduction
Segment analysis is pioneered in this research as a method of investigating links between
'contexts' (contexts may also be termed 'contextual forces'). In segment analysis, contexts
affecting flood hazard creation and human vulnerability are visualised as spheres of influence,
with broader contexts having spheres which encompass narrower contexts within them.
Individuals are conceptualised as situated at the core of all the contextual spheres which affect
them. The broadest contexts, i.e. those having the greatest influence, are situated at the
outermost spheres. They include the socio-cultural, the political economy and the institutional
contexts. Segments are issues, problems, ideas or political ideology which cut across all these
spheres. Because of this, the analysis of segments reveals links and relationships between
contexts which may have profound influences on one another. The methodology on segment
analysis has already been examined in detail in Chapter 2.
This chapter focuses upon two key 'segments' or components of the flood hazard in
Peninsular Malaysia, viz, the flood warning and evacuation segment and the income equity
segment, and traces them through from the socio-cultural and political economy contexts, to
the institutional context and to individuals (Figure 8.1).
The flood warning and evacuation segment is selected because warning and evacuation are
important responses to flood hazards in Peninsular Malaysia, both as formal/government
response and as traditional/cultural response". While informal warning and evacuation of
the traditional kind have been practised by floodplain inhabitants in the peninsula for centuries
and are still an important part of seasonal response to monsoonal floods, many formal"
83 In this research, official/government flood warning and evacuation systems set up and
managed by the FDRPC and other government agencies are termed 'formal flood warning
and evacuation systems'. In contrast, traditional/cultural flood warning and evacuation
systems which are organised and operated by flood victims are termed 'informal flood
warning and evacuation systems'.
" Formal flood warning and evacuation systems are official systems operated by flood
hazard organisations (e.g. the FDRPC) set up by the government. In contrast, informal flood
warning and evacuation systems are traditional systems largely operated by flood victims
themselves, usually on a kampung scale.
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OUTER SEGMENTS
FLOOD WARNING &
EVACUATION SEGMENT
INCOME EQUITY SEGMENT
KEY:
1 Flood wardens, ketua kampungs, District officers, mayors,
elected members of parliament, other government officers
and flood victims
2 Official/formal flood warning and evacuation systems, DID,
MMS, Police Department, Information Department, District
Office, local authorities and other agencies
3	 Technocentric approach, economic policies, transfer of
technology, neo-colonialism, and federal-state politics
4	 Traditional/informal flood warning and evacuation systems,
ethnicity, culture, religion, and attitudes
5 Flood victimi who are impoverished farmers and other rural
inhabitants, wealthy urban businessmen and other well to do
urban inhabitants, and other middle income earners
6 State Economic Development Corporations, Federal Land
Development Authority, Welfare Department, Municipal
Councils, City Halls, political parties voluntary
organisations
7	 Communalism, NEP, Sixth Malaysia Plan, National
Development Policy, and Vision 2020
8	 Colonialism, economic function with ethnic group, ethnic
values, religious influence, and ethnic harmony
Figure 8.1: The 'Flood warning and evacuation' and 'Income equity' segments within
spheres of influence of contextual forces
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systems were established fairly recently. More interestingly, formal 'flood warning and
evacuation systems' (FWESs) have incorporated many of the practical aspects of informal
FWESs. As such, the scope for individual action and self-determination is expected to be
greater when responding to warning and evacuation than would, say the choice to live in
flood zones. In Peninsular Malaysia, flood hazard policies translated from political ideology
emphasise evacuation procedures. By tracing through the contextual spheres of influence of
the segment, the chapter aims to reveal the intricate links and influences each level has on
one another. For example, it aims to discover the extent to which socio-cultural and political
economy contexts from the top constrain and limit the effectiveness of formal FWESs of
institutions in the middle, and how both these contextual forces in turn impact upon individual
response to warnings and evacuation. Likewise, the extent to which institutional contextual
forces influence decisions at the top and how individual action affects flood warning and
evacuation effectiveness at both the institutional and socio-political levels are also analysed.
The income equity segment is selected because it is a central issue in the development of
modern Malaysia. Peninsular Malaysia is a first class example of a divided society in terms
of income and ethnicity, and also in other terms including the marked division between its
East and West Coasts, rural and urban populace, and between the sexes (gender). Tracing
through the equity segment enables the researcher to examine the extent to which socio-
cultural (ethnicity, religion and others) and political economy (political ideology, economic
policies and others) contextual forces reinforce or reduce inequality. It is hypothesised that
individuals have far less room for manoeuvre in the quest for income equity, an issue largely
created by structural contextual forces. Analysing the influences between the contextual forces
at various levels not only establishes the links but also bring to the surface the question of
whether or not the equity issue is being tackled. Because income equity is linked closely to
poverty, the key questions explored by this segment, then, are: (1) To what extent are
contextual forces ranging from the socio-cultural, political economy, through to the
institutional reduce people's vulnerability towards floods?; (2) To what extent do flood
hazards contribute towards undoing wealth accumulation and reinforcement of poverty?; and
(3) To what extent do flood hazard policies recognise (1) and (2) and attempt to support (1)
and reduce (2)?
Investigating the income equity segment will entail discovering whether or not income
inequality amongst the ethnic groups (mainly between Malays and non-Malays) is being
reduced by flood hazard response at all levels. Successive Malaysian governments since
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independence (including the current one) have been trying to bridge income and other
inequalities between Malays and non-Malays. Thus, are flood hazard policies and those
relating to it, institutional response and individual response bridging such inequalities? For
example, flood mitigation schemes targeted at reducing flood losses in the poverty-stricken
rural agrarian sector (mostly Malay) can contribute significantly to reducing income
inequalities but when such schemes are targeted in densely populated urban areas (wealthy
areas comprising mainly Chinese), then the inequality gap would widen further. These are
the other questions in which this section aims to explore.
8.2 The flood warning and evacuation segment
This section analyses the extent to which socio-cultural and political economy contextual
forces influence individual response to FWESs" via institutions. There are two sub-sections:
(1) Section 8.2.1 examines the damage-savings accruing from FWESs. Specifically, it aims
to establish the importance and potential of these damage-savings to individuals in terms of
flood hazard reduction. Damage-savings reflect the scope for individual action. For example,
the amount of damage-savings is dependent on how effectively individuals take advantage of
FWESs through actively taking part in both formal and informal FWESs; (2) Section 8.2.2
is the main section on segment analysis which attempts to identify the links between the
socio-cultural and political economy contexts (macro level), the institutional contexts (meso
level) and individuals (micro level) via the flood warning and evacuation segment. While the
influence of contextual forces at all levels on one another is analysed, the scope for individual
action (especially in actively taking part in informal FWESs and responding effectively to
formal FWESs) is emphasised.
The overall effectiveness of FWESs is complicated and is seen as a web of links between all
three levels in which inadequacies at any level will weaken the entire warning and evacuation
system. Such inadequacies are demonstrated by the negative impacts of warning and
evacuation systems on individuals/households. In other words, the effectiveness of warning
and evacuation systems from the end user's (individual floodplain inhabitant) viewpoint is
examined.
" When it is not specified whether the system is a formal or informal one, the term
FWES is then used in a general sense and/or implies relating to both formal and informal
systems.
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8.2.1 Damage-savings of flood warning and evacuation systems
The risk, exposure, vulnerability and flood damage potentials of flooding in many parts of
the peninsula has increased substantially in recent decades because of progressive if not
accelerated developments in floodplains (JICA 1991; Chan and Parker Forthcoming). Chapter
2 (Section 2.1.3) and Appendix K demonstrate that the level of annual flood damage suffered
both by individuals and public bodies in the peninsula is substantial. Effective FWESs can
help reduce flood loss and damage or alternatively increase damage-savings. This is an area
where individuals are expected to play a more active role as they are not expected to be
constrained by structural or other contextual forces. Because of this freedom and greater
scope for action and self-determination, individuals are expected to take advantage and
develop/play active roles in informal FWESs and heed official advice by responding more
positively to formal FWESs86.
Warning systems are non-structural/non-engineering flood mitigation measures the principal
benefits of which are to help save lives and reduce flood loss. There is a considerable volume
of literature supporting the beneficial effects of such systems on reducing flood damages (Day
and Bugliarello 1969; Gruntfest 1977; Chatterton and Farrell 1977; Penning-Rowsell and
Chatterton 1977; Penning-Rowsell et al 1978; Penning-Rowsell et al 1983; Smith and
Handmer 1986; Neal and Parker 1989; Turnstall et al 1991). Using a linear model, Parker
(1991b) found that flood damage savings can be significantly increased with improved
reliability of the flood warning system, although the proportion of households available to
receive a warning, and the proportion able to respond to a warning effectively, are also
important.
In Peninsular Malaysia, the benefits of warning systems have been noted by The Technical
Sub-Committee for Flood Control (1968), Leigh and Low (1978), DID (1983, 1988b), Jamal
Abdullah (1991, Undated). As early as 1968, after the 1967 major flood which affected much
of the peninsula, The Technical Sub-Committee for Flood Control (1968 pix) reported that
expenditure (usually involving large outlays which severely taxes the country's financial
86 However, it is recognised that certain groups such as the elderly, children, the disabled
and those with health problems are more vulnerable during disasters and would encounter
difficulty when responding to flood warning and evacuation systems (Welsh Affairs
Committee 1990; Blaikie et al 1994).
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resources) on major structural/engineering flood mitigation projects (such as flood control
reservoirs and major river-mouth dredging operations) are not warranted. Instead, it
suggested a number of practical measures concerned with the modification of loss potential
(which would not over-burden the financial resources of the country), one of which was the
improvement of forecasting and warning systems. Despite improvements on warning systems
over the years, this flood damage mitigating potential has not been fully realised as such
systems are inadequately funded and have not been developed to their full potentials (see
Chapter 5). Therefore, there is still a great potential for flood loss reduction to be gained by
fully developing forecasting and warning potentials and bringing the systems up-to-date.
Flood damage savings are benefits from responses taken as a result of receiving a flood
warning before the onset of flooding. In the current research, the average amount of
estimated damage savings attributed to warnings varies according to sample area, with
households in the two West Coast areas estimating much higher damage savings than the two
East Coast areas (Table 8.1). Kuala Lumpur households, by virtue of having higher incomes,
better houses, more house contents and other belongings (notably cars) have the highest
damage savings estimates. In contrast, relatively poorer households in the Pekan area have
the lowest damage savings estimates. Damage savings per household in the peninsula can be
substantially increased if a greater percentage of flooded households are warned. In the most
recent flood, only 36.4 per cent of households were warned. Furthermore, warning lead times
have not been sufficiently long enough for households to respond effectively to reduce
damage to belongings. Figure 8.2 reveals that 37.0 per cent of households flooded in the
most recent flood received warnings just as they were about to be flooded or later. These
households have, therefore, little time to respond effectively to save their belongings. This
is a constraint imposed by institutional/organisational contexts of ineffectiveness (see Section
8.2.2).
Furthermore, Malaysians generally have a low level of awareness of formal flood warning
systems. This is again due to institutional ineffectiveness in publicising them. In this research,
only 45.1 per cent of respondents reported the existence of such systems in their locality. The
remainder either live in areas without formal warning systems or are oblivious of their
existence. Even fewer are aware of flood hazard organisations responsible for flood
forecasting and/or flood warning dissemination. Only 5.2 per cent of respondents are aware
that the DID is the organisation responsible for flood forecasting. However, 37.1 per cent of
respondents were aware of various agencies responsible for flood warning dissemination,
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Table 8.1: Number of respondents reporting flood damage savings as a result of
receiving a flood warning during the most recent flood
P. Pinang
N=172
Kelantan
N=192
K. Lumpur
N=114
Pekan Total
N=140
Don't know 1 3 1 7 12
Did not save any 6 12 15 11 44
<$1,000 11 47 5 35 98
$1,000-$1,999 5 17 9 8 39
$2,000-$2,999 1 2 1 1 5
$3,000-$3,999 2 0 5 0 7
Total 26 81 36 62 205
Average savings
per household
$865 $667 $1,625 $516 $705
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N=618
Figure 8.2: Reported warning lead times during the most recent flood in various parts
of Peninsular Malaysia
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most notably the police and the media. Thus, if flood warning awareness can be increased
and flood warning systems improved (in terms of accuracy and lead times), the amount of
flood damage savings could be increased substantially.
Evacuation systems are also non-structural/non-engineering flood mitigation measures of
which the principal aim is to save lives. The life saving benefits of timely evacuation before
the onset of disasters are well documented (Cutter and Barnes 1982; Smith 1992 pp277-8;
Alexander 1993 pp413-4). In Peninsular Malaysia, tens of thousands of people are routinely
evacuated during the seasonal monsoon floods which hit many parts of the East Coast every
year (see Table 2.2). On the West Coast, the occurrence of monsoon floods (due to the spill-
over effects of the Northeast Monsoon) along the major floodplains, and flash floods in major
cities and towns also result in the evacuation of thousands of people. As a significant
proportion of those evacuated are the aged and children, it is fair to assume that many lives
are saved as many would drown (even those who can swim get into trouble in the swift
currents) if they were not evacuated.
An effective FWES, therefore, is a pre-requisite for effective flood loss reduction (in terms
of lives saved) and increased flood damage savings (in terms of reduced property damage).
Flood hazard policies are generated by political economy contextual forces via institutions,
both of which indirectly determine the outcome of warning and evacuation systems.
Consequently, the effectiveness of a FWES depends on flood hazard policies, other
development policies, allocated funds and other considerations, all of which are translated
from political economy contexts via institutions and impacted upon individuals. All three
components from political economy through to institutions and individuals play impoitani
roles in the final outcome of FWESs.
8.2.2 Links between socio-cultural and political economy contexts, institutions and
individuals in relation to flood warning and evacuation systems
The overall effectiveness of FWESs depends not only on a combination of contextual forces
operating at the macro socio-cultural and political economy level through to institutions (meso
level), but also inputs by individuals (disaster victims) at the micro level. This section
examines the links between contextual forces and how these links affect the overall
effectiveness of FWESs. Some of these links are identified in Figure 8.3. For example, the
influence of socio-cultural contextual forces is seen in traditional warning and evacuation
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SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXT
* traditional FWESs
* ethnic culture
* value systems
* self-reliance
& mutual-help
POLITICAL ECONOMY CONTEXT
* restructuring society
* poverty eradication
* technocentric focus
* reactive approach
* aid and subsidies
* federal-state politics
* low salience of flood
management
* communalism
* rapid economic development
& floodplain encroachment
* other federal policie
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
* formal FWESs
* public accountability
* Flood management policies
* engineering approach
* organisational structure
* sub-culture
* instruments
* use of BCA
* legislation
* commitment to flood reduction
* public education programmes
* publicity & image enhancement
* `levee' effect
INDIVIDUALS
* confidence in formal FWESs
* exert public pressures
* self-reliance & mutual-help
* participation in traditional
& formal FWESs
* key individuals in society
* key individuals in institutions
* flood wardens & ketua kampungs
* awareness of formal FWESs
* attitudes
* ethnicity & religion
* socio-economic characteristics
* involvement in politics
* social integration/net-work
* stress and worry
* Flood experience
Figure 8.3: Links and influences between macro socio-cultural and political economy
contexts, meso institutional contexts, and individuals (micro contexts) in relation to the
flood warning and evacuation segment
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mechanisms" which have evolved through generations of flooding experience. Malay
peasants whose ancestors have lived with floods just as they do now, have developed crude
warning and evacuation systems which are still practised in the remote villages and still play
a vital role in saving lives. A simplified version of this kind of traditional warning and
evacuation mechanism is illustrated by the following account:
`...Kampung Tendong (Barn 3) is one of tens of villages located on the
floodplain of the Kelantan River near the town of Pasir Mas. It has a total of
slightly more than two hundred houses and a population of about slightly
more than a thousand inhabitants. Its ketua kampung Haji All (village head)
heads a village committee on flood warning and evacuation (Figure 8.4). Haji
Ali has appointed several of his residents who live nearest to the river (those
who get flooded first) as flood wardens. These wardens report to Haji Ali as
soon as the flood waters rise above the banks of the river. Haji Ali alerts all
villagers about the river breaching its banks. However, no evacuation order
is given yet. Some families, usually those living nearest to the rivers may
decide to evacuate to their relatives' place in other kampungs. The wardens
usually move their wives and young children but they stay behind because of
their duty. Once the river has overtopped its banks, the rise and fall of the
river level are then monitored day and night by the wardens. When the water
level has reached a certain level (usually above the normal stilt height of
about 1.5 metres) and is still rising, the wardens abandon their posts and
report to the ketua kampung who then orders all villagers to evacuate (usually
to the mosque or school which are usually located on the highest ground in
the kampung). The ketua kampung then informs the other ketua kampungs of
nearby villages about the flooding in his kampung by telephone. This process
is then repeated by the ketua kampungs of other villages when their villages
are subsequently flooded. However, in remote kampungs without the
telephone, the message is sent by a dispatch rider (usually on a motorbike).
The above informal traditional warning and evacuation mechanism has worked well, mainly
because local expertise and self-reliance are employed as important inputs". Supplemented
by modern technology such as the telephone and the use of sirens (to warn villagers),
informal FWESs are used effectively by many kampungs in the East Coast which have no
87 These are informal FWESs.
" Disaster management systems operating solely with inputs from outside the affected
community are often of limited effectiveness. Plans need to be built around people's needs
and perceptions rather than requiring people to fit into pre-determined plans without
consultation (Davis 1986b). Thus, the importance of considering local needs and
incorporating local expertise and social mechanisms (e.g. self-reliance through local coping
mechanisms) into official disaster management programmes (Davis et al 1987).
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RIVER LEVEL
RISING
RIVER LEVEL
SUBSIDING
FLOOD WARNING/SIGNAL
TO KETUA KAMPUNGS OF
DOWNSTREAM VILLAGES
KETUA KAMPUNG OF
UPSTREAM VILLAGE1
KETUA KAMPUNG OF
UPSTREAM VILLAGE2
FLOOD WARDENS
KETUA KAMPUNG
FLOOD WARNING AND
EVACUATION
ANNOUNCEMENT TO
VILLAGERS
1
VILLAGERS EVACUATE
TO RELIEF CENTRE
V
FLOOD SUBSIDES
V
VILLAGERS RETURN
HOME
THE ABOVE WARNING AND
EVACUATION PROCEDURE
CONTINUES WITH VILLAGES
DOWNSTREAM
Figure 8.4: The traditional flood warning and evacuation mechanism practised by Malay
peasants living in remote villages in Peninsular Malaysia (The ketua kampung is the one
who first makes the announcement for evacuation)
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formal warning and evacuation systems. This is because the mechanism is an 'active' system
whereby people can actually see the flood and they need little convincing to take responsive
action to save their lives and those of their families. This is in contrast to a formal FWES
whereby the flood forecast is made by the DID based on rainfall (which falls in the
catchment) and river levels (in the catchment). People living in villages downstream who are
warned about impending floods actually do not see any heavy rainfall or the river rising
above the danger level. Furthermore, a radio broadcast of impending floods without the actual
signs of flooding does little to convince people to evacuate. This situation is certainly not
helped by the many 'false warnings' (warnings not followed by flooding) which are often
issued by the authorities. And because people living in flood-prone areas are flooded so often,
they are 'hardened' by years of experience and begin to rely on themselves and the traditional
mechanism which has served them for so long. The main shortcoming of the traditional
mechanism is the short lead time before flooding occurs, which often is minutes.
The influence of the political economy contexts is manifested by current political ideologies
of the Malaysian government relating to flood management. A 'two-pronged' flood
management policy is employed: (1) predominantly employing structural/engineering
measures in small but densely populated and developed urban floodplains (mostly involving
towns and cities on the West Coast); and (2) predominantly employing a 'reactive' rather than
preventive approach in the vast agrarian sector located in less densely populated rural
floodplains (mostly involving the traditional padi farming and fishing areas on the East
Coast). This reactive approach involves emphasising the use of disaster preparedness,
FWESs, rescue and relief operations and rehabilitation. As a result, FWESs are strongly
emphasised in the East Coast states.
Political economy contexts also manifest themselves in terms of government policies which
favour rapid economic development rather than reinforcing and improving flood management.
As a result of fast growth rates in recent years development policies are firmly focused at
maintaining if not increasing this level of growth. The country also aims to be a newly
industrialised country (NIC) in the near future. As a result, rapid economic growth such as
industrialisation, forestry and commercial/plantation agriculture (all income earners) generally
takes priority over 'expenditure based' projects such as flood management. Although
protecting densely populated and intensively developed urban areas (e.g. cities) from floods
is a prime concern (these are areas where damage potentials are highest), the protection of
rural inhabitants and the environment (especially when both are located in poorly developed
295
rural areas with little economic potential) is not a high priority on government agendas (see
Chapter 5). The salience of flood hazards is therefore low on government spending, resulting
in inadequate development of flood management. This in turn has a negative effect on the
effectiveness of formal FWESs as funding allocations, human resources and infrastructure and
other investments into such systems are severely short of what is needed. Appendix M
presents a detailed examination of the low salience of flood hazards on government agendas
and the inadequacy of government spending and development of formal FWESs.
Political economy contexts are also found in ideologies which the government are trying to
communicate to the rural populace (which has a much lower standard of living compared to
their urban counterparts). One is that of 'self-help to better oneself'. This is in line with the
government's efforts in raising rural standards of living. The idea is that the government can
only do so much and the rest is left to the people to take advantage of what is provided, and
help themselves. This self-help ideology is best demonstrated by the traditional warning and
evacuation mechanism. The government realise that people living in flood-prone areas are
well adapted to floods and have looked after themselves for a long time. Thus, political
economy contexts manifest themselves in government policies which incorporate such
traditional coping mechanisms into official flood management. Realising that floodplain
inhabitants are well attuned to their traditional warning and evacuation mechanism, the
authorities have not been slow to adapt it to the formal FWES. Basically, the formal FWES
can be broken down into three distinct parts: (1) flood forecasting; (2) flood warning
dissemination; and (3) evacuation procedures. While government agencies are involved in all
three parts, the traditional warning and evacuation mechanism is incorporated into the second
and third parts.
In Peninsular Malaysia, warning systems can be roughly divided into two types: (1) Those
targeted at seasonal/monsoonal floods on the larger and longer rivers, mostly on the East
Coast. An example is the flood warning system for the Kelantan River in the state of
Kelantan. Initial forecast of heavy rains by radar and satellite imagery is done by the MMS
and relayed to the DID which uses them and its own network of telemetric rainfall and river
level gauges in the state as inputs in its computerised flood forecasting Tank model. This
model is further supplemented by conventional stage correlation flood forecasting between
upstream and downstream gauging stations (DID 1990). Through years of flooding
experience, the correlation models provide fairly accurate forecasts for downstream stations.
When a flood forecast is made by the DID, the formal FWES is activated. Floodplain
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occupants living on the lower stretches of the Kelantan River are warned through the mass
media, flood warning notice boards, the village head, the police, and other local authorities
(see the Kelantan formal FWES below).
(2) Those targeted at flash floods on the relatively short and swift-flowing rivers in urban
areas, particularly those flowing through the major cities such as Kuala Lumpur and
Georgetown. For example, in Kuala Lumpur, the DID Kuala Lumpur employs a warning
system based on a 'Flash-Flood Warning Model' s' in which the forecast of flash flood is
obtained using computed data of four parameters, viz, soil moisture deficit, the average
rainfall in the last 24 hours, the average rainfall in the last hour and the duration of
rainfall/storm (DID Kuala Lumpur 1984). Based on the above parameters the water level at
Jambatan Sulaiman on the Kelang River is forecast. When this forecast level is above the
danger level of 26.80 m, the DID will inform the police who then activate the warning and
evacuation mechanism in the areas that would be flooded. Based on past experience, these
areas are (with flood depths given in the parentheses): Kampung Pasir Lama (0-1.5 m),
Kampung Pasir Baru and Old Kelang Road (0-1.5 m), Kampung Ban' (0-1.5 m), Kampung
Chendana (1-1.5 m), Kampung Dato' Keramat (0-0.5 m) and Brickflelds (0-1.0 m).
However, according to the DID officers in Kuala Lumpur, continuous dredging of the Kelang
River, the completion of several dams, and the starting of new flood mitigation works along
the river have changed the river regime and rendered the above model obsolete. Forecasts
are now inaccurate and a new model has to be developed. So far, this has not been done and
flood warnings are still based on the obsolete model. In some areas, however, solar-operated
automatic sirens are located at strategic points along the Kelang River, for example at
Kampung Dato Keramat. Sirens serve as a supplementary warning system, especially for
those living in the vicinity, but their effectiveness is low (see Chapter 5).
In the state of Kelantan, political economy contexts (in terms of funding and policies)
determine the FWES adopted. The policies and the system is then put into effect by flood
hazard institutions who impose them on to individuals. Conversely, individuals partly
influence institutions and policies by adhering to their traditional warning and evacuation
mechanism, thereby forcing the authorities to incorporate it into the formal system. Likewise,
institutions can influence federal policies by their feedback reports and suggestions on the
" This model was first launched in 1981, but changes to the Kelang River system has
made it obsolete in the current context.
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Figure 8.5: The formal flood warning and evacuation mechanism in the state of
Kelantan, Peninsular Malaysia
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mechanism and provide the means such as warnings, transportation, temporary relief centres,
food, clothing, health care, law and order, and others (thus, the human resources in terms
of government personnel involved are substantial). When the traditional mechanism is
incorporated into the formal system, many flood victims are not even aware of it. Thus, they
would respond to the formal system just as they would to the traditional mechanism. With
the traditional mechanism incorporated, flood wardens actually get flooded and village heads
initiate the warning and evacuation procedures, and the village folks respond accordingly.
They respond positively as they actually see the flood waters rising, or a neighbour's house
being flooded. In contrast, there are probably just as many kampungs without traditional
FWESs as they are those with them. Residents living in kampungs without traditional FWESs
either rely on themselves or on the formal FWES (if there is one). These are the kampungs
in which the formal FWESs do not appear to work well as people are not attuned to them.
Survey results indicate that formal FWESs which have not incorporated the traditional
mechanism do not work as well with the people, mainly because the people do not see the
signs of danger. In such a scenario, they would take some convincing to evacuate.
Current government policy is to make science and technology an integral component of socio-
economic planning and development, especially on building a science and technology culture
(Government of Malaysia 1991a p5). This technocentric policy (a political economy context)
is translated into an institutional context when it is directed towards government agencies.
Thus, flood hazard institutions such as the MMS and DID place emphasis in the first instance
on developing the scientific and technological aspects of flood warning and evacuation, viz.
improving the accuracy of flood forecasting (through the use of radar and satellite generated
rainfall and weather forecast, telemetric rainfall and river level gauges, computerised
forecasting programmes, etc.) and the timeliness of flood warning (automatic sirens, advanced
communication equipment, etc.)". However, the increase in warning benefits with improved
accuracy of flood forecasting and timely issuance of warnings would be small if the warning
dissemination system breaks down and/or the public do not respond positively to it (for
example by ignoring the formal warning). For example, research has shown that seldom is
the entire target population available to receive a warning and it is even more unlikely that
" The main advantage of employing remotely sensed data and telemetric computer
forecasting is the increase in warning lead times (Collier et al 1993). Such techniques when
applied simultaneously with well planned data management using Geographic Information
System (GIS) can effectively reduce the vulnerabilities of communities to disasters (Davis and
Bickmore 1993).
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all those receiving the warning will respond effectively. Parker (1991b) found that for
residential properties: the proportion of residents available to respond to a warning is about
55.0 per cent; the proportion of households able to respond to a warning is 75.0 per cent;
and the proportion of households who respond effectively is about 70.0 per cent. All the
above will have to be taken into account in order to ascertain the actual benefits of a warning.
Thus, while scientific and technological inputs are important to improve the accuracy of
forecasts and increasing the warning lead times (Neal 1989 p16), efforts must be aimed at
improving the warning dissemination system and educating the target population to respond
effectively. The 'accuracy' and 'efficiency' of warnings have to be balanced against the
'effectiveness' of warnings as measured by public behaviour and response (Horlick-Jones and
Jones 1993 p25). And such behaviour and response can only be effective if the public is well
attuned to warnings through comprehensive preparedness, awareness, education systems and
systematic evacuation procedures. At the moment, warning dissemination and public response
are not emphasised as much as forecasting. Research has revealed that such a lop-sided
approach on the use of technology to improve forecasting and warning systems (an essentially
'technocentric' approach) is an ill-conceived and common misconception of hazard reduction
(Jones 1991 p37).
In the Kelantan River, the formal FWES appears to work well in the few kampungs with the
traditional mechanism incorporated but not elsewhere. Survey results revealed that only 42.0
per cent of flooded households received a formal warning (although a significant number of
respondents do not receive a formal warning because they are not concerned enough to switch
on the radio, check readings on the flood warning board regularly, check with their village
head, or are at work). According to the DID, formal warnings are usually given in advance
of flooding. For instance, there is a time lapse of between 6 to 10 hours for the flood waters
in the catchment area to reach Kuala Krai. Further downstream in Kota Bharu the time lapse
is about 24 hours. Towns and villages in between Kuala Krai and Kota Bharu receive flood
warnings between 6 to 22 hours (DID Kelantan 1991 p4). Therefore, flood warnings are
usually given out well in advance by the DID. Yet, people lose their lives and have their
properties and belongings damaged because they do not heed the warning. There are many
reasons for this. The main reason is because there are too many warnings issued during the
monsoon season. The warning is often announced over the radio a day in advance (similar
to a weather forecast). As such, people tend to take it easy and many even forget about it as
they are concerned with other more pressing problems. Also, people think they can cope with
floods as they are used to them and this is partly true in the case of 'normal' floods but they
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get caught out when a major flood occurs. A vivid picture of how people get caught is given
by the following account given by a victim of the 1981 flood in Kelantan:
`...10.00 am-Ahmad is warned by fellow villagers about possible flooding as many
living nearest to the river are already flooded. He shrugged off the warning and
prepares to go to work in his padi fields as such warnings are not uncommon during
the monsoon season. 12.00 noon-Ahmad comes home for lunch. His wife informs
him that the river is still rising and that fellow villagers are preparing to evacuate.
Some have already evacuated to the relief centre. Ahmad nods calmly and tells his
wife to get their children from the school while he has his lunch. His 65 year old
mother instinctively starts to pack her things as well as things for the family. After
lunch, Ahmad moves all his furniture and valuable belongings to the attic. His wife
packs clothes and food for the family. It is 2.00 pm now and the flood waters have
reached Ahmad's house. His three children aged between three to twelve are excited
and start to play in the flood waters in the house compound. Ahmad shouts at them
and instructs them to follow their mother to the relief centre but the eldest boy wants
to stay behind with Ahmad. For a second, Ahmad thought it might be a good idea
since the boy could swim now and it was around this age that Ahmad experienced his
first flood watch with his deceased father. But the stare from his wife said 'no'. The
kampung is now almost chaotic with people running and shouting. Women are trying
to round up their children and scores of villagers running towards the main road
which leads to the mosque, the designated relief centre located on a hill. Ahmad sees
his family off to the relief centre but remains behind to guard his house and
belongings. Often, thieves take the opportunity to burglarize deserted houses. So it
is normal for an adult male to stay behind until the last minute when he will escape
by his 'sampan' (small Malay canoe). Ahmad prepares his sampan and ties it securely
to his house. He sits back and waits. From a distance he can hear the faint voice
through a loud hailer, probably the police, telling all villagers to clear out. He looks
towards the other houses and finds his neighbours Atan, Ramli and Zul all in their
respective houses without their families. They are all in the same boat. It is 4.00 pm
now and the flood waters have just exceeded stilt height and are rushing into his
house. Through experience, Ahmad thinks it is still okay as many times the waters
had subsided. However, his neighbour Atan is getting ready to evacuate as the latter's
house is built on lower stilts and on lower ground. The flood waters had submerged
a third of his house. Ahmad motioned for Atan to come and join him. Atan rowed
his sampan over. At least he would have company and could still look after his house
from that distance. 4.30 pm- the waters were still rising and Ramli and Zul are
getting ready to abandon their houses. Ahmad and Atan motioned them over. They
come with their sampans and joined the other two in Ahmad's house, which to them
is still 'okay'. 5.00 pm-the waters were still rising and show no signs of subsiding.
They all decide it was time to go. Zul's sampan was trapped in some tree branches
and he had to get into Ahmad's. The currents were too strong and they could not
control the sampans to go to the relief centre. The currents just carried them along
and soon Ahmad and Zul lost sight of the others. On their way they saw scores of
other men escaping in their sampans. Some were swimming, presumably because
their sampans capsized but there was nothing they could do. One sampan crashed into
the crown of a coconut tree and capsized. The owner hung on to the tree crown and
stayed there shouting for help. No one could help him. It was every man for himself.
Ahmad and Zul were drifting in their sampan for nearly an hour before a police
patrol and rescue boat picked them up and re-united them with their families. They
were the lucky ones. The Star (3.12.81) reported that there were others who were not
so lucky.
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The above events took place in the day time when people are awake. When floods happen
at night when people are sleeping the proportion of those caught unaware is higher. Thus,
night floods are more hazardous than day floods. Some kampung folks have evolved a flood
watching role during the monsoon season. For example, the aged folks reverse their sleeping
pattern during the flood season by sleeping in the daytime and staying awake at night, to keep
an eye on flooding, especially when it rains. Besides the elderly, some of the more anxious
would not be able to sleep when it rains heavily during the flood season. Thus, people's
attitudes to floods, their reluctance to leave their houses until the last minute, the unique role
of the elderly in flood watching, and possibly other roles, and their cultural and sociological
characteristics, must be studied and incorporated into the formal warning and evacuation
system in order to maximize the benefits of improved forecasting and warning dissemination.
If the people do not cooperate or respond effectively, even the best FIVES would be
unproductive.
Institutional contexts (through flood hazard organisations) play an important role in
determining the effectiveness of formal FWESs which is reflected in their impacts on
individuals. Section 8.2.1 has demonstrated that many aspects of the formal FWES are found
to be wanting, frequently resulting in flood victims receiving warnings late, receiving 'false
warnings', or not receiving any warning at all. As a result, individuals often have little time
to take action for flood loss reduction. This is a constraint imposed by the institutional context
of ineffectiveness. Because of late warnings, evacuation notices are often late resulting in
transport (army trucks) not being able to reach the public as roads are already flooded. For
example, during the June 1991 flood in the city of Georgetown (Pulau Pinang), boats
belonging to the police (the boats were kept in various locations outside the city) could not
be deployed because the roads leading to the worst-hit areas in the city were flooded and
jammed by stalled vehicles. As a result, many families were trapped. One was Makcik
Mabee's family (Appendix H Case 1) who had to endure the entire night in the attic of their
house praying that the flood waters would not rise above the attic. The total number of rescue
boats available in each district is also limited, and often fishing boats (belonging to the
victims) have to be used.
Negative impacts of formal warning systems on individuals are manifestations of institutional
ineffectiveness. In this research, the evidence show up in the results of the questionnaire
survey. For example, only 36.4 per cent of those flooded in the most recent flood had
received a formal warning. Of this group, 37.0 per cent received the warning just as they
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were being flooded or later, severely constraining the extent to which they can respond
effectively. In fact, only 8.0 per cent of those flooded were first aware of flooding through
a formal warning (Figure 8.6). In general, formal flood warning systems do not appear to
work well in the peninsula as there are a high number of floods not formally warned (Figure
8.7). During the most recent flood, an average of about 54.0 per cent of those flooded in the
peninsula were not formally warned (Figure 8.8). Generally, the percentage of flooded
respondents not warned are highest in the two West Coast areas. Conversely, only 33.0 per
cent of all respondents are warned and flooded. The total number of 'false warnings' (taken
to mean 'warnings not followed by flooding') is highest in the Pulau Pinang area (84.0 per
cent) followed by the Kuala Lumpur area (58.0 per cent). Finally, as Neal (1989) has shown,
the effectiveness of warning systems is best evaluated through customer satisfaction. The
customer in this case is the floodplain inhabitant who gets flooded. Results from the current
research indicate that 40.5 per cent of all respondents are dissatisfied with the performance
of the formal flood warning system during the most recent flood. Because of the general poor
performance and 'unreliability' of formal warning systems, the public become sceptical about
their effectiveness. Consequently, the public develop their own informal warning mechanisms
and refuse to heed warnings from formal systems. In this research, the ineffectiveness of
formal warning systems have resulted in much public scepticism towards them. For example,
61.0 per cent of respondents revealed that they do not rely on formal warning systems at all
(Figure 8.9). In contrast, only a small minority from all areas indicate that they rely
completely on formal warning systems. Figure 8.10 indicates that the low reliance on formal
warning systems are mainly due to institutional ineffectiveness of late warnings, non-publicity
of the system resulting in public unawareness, and general lack of faith in the system. The
above analysis reflects the negative influence of institutional contexts on individual response
to flood warnings.
Individual influence on institutions and macro structural contexts is largely through the
exertion of public pressure on official organisations and government policies. For example,
as a result of losses suffered, there is increasing public awareness and anxiety about floods.
The educated public are no longer content with explanations of floods as a natural hazard
beyond society's control. Even farmers and fishermen are influenced by modernisation and
technology. More significantly, as people become more educated and informed they also
become more inquisitive and demanding. Every flood event (especially flash floods) must be
explained and is followed by an enquiry as to who is responsible and who is to be blamed.
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Figure 8.7: Reported total number of floods not formally warned in Peninsular Malaysia
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In Peninsular Malaysia, flood hazard management is still very much a function of the
government (at least through its appointed agencies such as the DID, the MMS, the police,
and the local authorities). Because of this, the educated public hold the government
responsible for flood occurrences. In view of this, there is increasing pressure for the
government and its agencies to perform and improve on the efficient management of floods.
Public pressure is, therefore, one area where individuals can exert influence on institutions
and structural contexts (e.g. policies). Often, public pressure can contribute to the
development of many flood schemes (including the improvement of formal FWESs) and the
influencing of public policies. From the government's point of view, effective public flood
management strategies can improve people's confidence in the government (thereby relieving
public pressure), and contribute to better political support as well as more effective flood loss
reduction on the part of the people.
Individuals can also influence institutions and policies through political pressures at the grass-
roots level. For example, an example was given in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.5) when opposition
parties took advantage of the issue of squatter relocation along the Pinang River and put
pressure on the authorities to change flood mitigation plans. This has a negative effect as the
implementation of the scheme was delayed considerably. Elsewhere, squatter and residential
rights have also demonstrated the powerful influence of individuals over institutions and
policies. The abandonment of the Gombak Dam scheme was brought about by individuals
who refused to be relocated, albeit being prompted by opposition political parties (see Chapter
6 Section 6.4). Finally, the rivalry between the UMNO which forms the dominant party of
the federal government and the PAS which rules the Kelantan state government, has projected
the views of individuals to the forefront. Flood issues affecting individuals are often
politicised to gain popularity and support contributing to the significance of public pressures.
However, federal-state politics can also work against individuals as states which are
opposition strongholds are often victimised through reduced funding allocations and other
political means (see below).
The links between socio-cultural, political economy, and institutional contexts and the
individual are probably best demonstrated by the formal evacuation system. Integration of
informal evacuation systems into formal systems take into account the important role of social
and cultural factors in effective reduction of vulnerability (Horlick-Jones and Jones 1993
p34). In many parts of Peninsular Malaysia, particularly in the East Coast states, it is
probably no exaggeration to say that evacuation is a way of life. Annually, tens of thousands
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of floodplain inhabitants are routinely evacuated during the 'flood season'. For example,
during the 1967 major flood, the number of flood victims evacuated total hundreds of
thousands (see Table 2.2). The bulk of such evacuation is temporary as flood victims are
housed in community centres, mosques, schools, multi-purpose town halls, police stations and
even on the palace grounds of the Sultans (usually located on a hill). The victims gradually
return to their homes once the flood has subsided. However, a significant proportion of flood
victims are often left homeless when their wooden huts are swept away or destroyed by the
strong currents during the flood. These victims then have to move in with relatives, moved
to low cost housing areas, or stay on in the relief centres until they have found a place to
live. This local response to disasters is a vital coping mechanism as Davis (1977 p30)
discovered that 90.0 per cent of homeless disaster victims are absorbed by families and
friends. Some fortunate ones are provided with aid by the government to help them rebuild
their houses. They eventually rebuild their houses and move back into their village by which
time the following season's flooding would have begun. Usually, major floods occur on the
average of once in a few years, sufficient for most victims to rehabilitate and get back to their
normal way of life. However, there are instances where two major floods have occurred
simultaneously as in 1971 and 1972. During such floods, the most vulnerable victims (usually
the aged and the poorest) cannot rehabilitate sufficiently and have to survive for long periods
on government aid. Many of the aged are eventually forced into old folks homes.
Political economy contexts can also manifest themselves in federal policies that can have a
'retarding' effect on FWESs in states dependent on federal funding (see Chapter 4 Section
4.2.4). For example, in the state of Kelantan, which the federal government lost to the
opposition PAS party in the recent general elections, political economy contexts translate
directly into reduced development funds over the 6th Malaysia Plan, including that for flood
management. This had a negative effect on the state of Kelantan, contributing to the reduced
effectiveness of flood hazard institutions (e.g. the DID). The development of forecasting,
warning, evacuation, relief and rehabilitation systems were also severely retarded.
Finally, political economy contexts such as the politicising of FWESs via institutions often
generate a false sense of security on the part of the public (in the case of those who support
the ruling party and believe in their policies). This will then influence the public's decision
to remain on floodplains. In Chapter 6, it was found that one of the reasons why many people
continue to inhabit hazardous floodplains and not move elsewhere is the existence of formal
flood warning schemes in their localities. Approximately 39.0 per cent of all respondents in
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this research reported relying on some form of formal flood warning system. Of this total,
the majority are from the East Coast where warning systems are generally more effective
because longer rivers, better forecasting systems (using radar estimates of rainfall and
telemetry) and a better coordinated warning dissemination system allow for a fairly adequate
warning lead time.
8.3	 The income equity segment
Income equity (encompassing poverty eradication) was introduced as a central issue in
Malaysian development in Chapter 4. This section elaborates on this issue. More specifically,
it analyses the extent to which socio-cultural, political economy and institutional contexts
relating to flood hazard management work towards contributing to income equity between the
ethnic groups and in the process reduces and eradicates poverty in Peninsular Malaysia.
There are two sub-sections. Section 8.3.1 sets the scene by examining the magnitude of
income inequalities and incidence of poverty in Peninsular Malaysia. It examines the extent
to which flood hazards contribute towards undoing wealth accumulation, reinforcing poverty
and widening income disparities. More specifically, it demonstrates how high incidence of
poverty amongst indigenous Malays has given rise to wide disparities in incomes between
Malays and the non-Malays, making the former one of the most vulnerable groups to flood
disasters. The section further attempts to show how income inequalities between regions,
states, urban and rural areas, specific groups in society (e.g. squatters), occupational types,
and specific sub-groups within each ethnic groups have increased vulnerability of certain
regions and groups to flood disasters. Section 8.3.2 focuses on identifying and explaining the
links between the socio-cultural, political economy, and institutional contexts and individual
response in relation to flood hazard reduction via the income equity segment. It is a critical
analysis of government and institutional policies on equity achievement through reforms such
as poverty eradication and society restructuring, and flood hazard management policies. It
examines the extent to which policies (socio-cultural, political economy and institutional)
reduce people's vulnerability towards floods. It also analyses the extent to which flood hazard
policies emphasise vulnerability reduction, recognise that flood hazards contribute to poverty
and income inequity and attempt to support the former while reducing the latter. If, for
example, policies are focusing on the less well off in traditional rural areas, then they are
reducing poverty and income inequity. If, however, they are focusing on urban, well
developed and wealthy areas, then they would be aggravating poverty and income inequity
(through pursuing economic efficiency at the expense of equity).
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8.3.1 The magnitude of poverty and income inequity
Poverty makes people more vulnerable to floods simply because the poor are ill-equipped to
cope with them. The analysis on flood damage in Appendix K and Section 8.2 have both
demonstrated that the magnitude of flood damage is significant when viewed in the context
of low average household incomes of floodplain dwellers, especially those in the traditional
agrarian sector. For example, during the most recent flood, the average damage incurred by
each flooded household was $1,393 (see Appendix K), or one and a half times the average
monthly household income of floodplain residents which is $917. During the most severe
flood experienced, the average damage incurred was $1,837 which is twice the average
monthly household income. By comparing flood damage against average monthly household
income, the gravity of the problem is brought to light. Table 8.2 illustrates clearly that the
proportion of households incurring flood losses greater than their average monthly incomes
are higher in the lower income groups. Thus, although the poor incur lower levels of flood
loss compared to the wealthy, they are proportionately worse off. Malays also suffer the
highest proportion of flood loss to income. Farmers and fishermen are also badly hit with a
high ratio of flood loss to average income (although the latter appeared to have incurred a
low level of flood loss in the most recent flood). On the whole, the above analysis verifies
that flood hazards cause significant reduction of incomes to floodplain inhabitants, and that
those who are worst affected are the poor and the Malays. Even though the most recent flood
can be considered as a normal flood event the magnitude of flood damage is substantial.
Flood damages reported for the worst flood is very severe. Consequently, the poor who have
hardly any savings are made more vulnerable and are forced to rely on government aid and
help from relatives.
Flood hazards, therefore, are at least responsible for undoing wealth accumulation amongst
poor floodplain households. This has reinforced poverty, and even though the majority of
rural floodplain households are well adjusted to normal seasonal floods, the occurrence of
severe floods every once in a few years (e.g. in Kelantan the approximate statistical return
period of severe floods is about 1 in 5) severely taxes these households. Although government
flood aid is available, it is hardly adequate as only food, shelter and clothes are received
during the flood period. A few of the more fortunate families may get financial help in terms
of small loans to help them rebuild their houses but the majority remains unaffected. As a
result, much of what little savings they possess are readily spent on coping and recovery from
floods, and repairs to their houses. Rural floodplain occupants are mostly leading a life of
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Table 8.2: Flood damage incurred by households during the most recent and worst flood
experienced in relation to average monthly household income
Income level/ Households incurring 	 Mean flood loss	 Mean flood loss
ethnic group/ flood losses greater 	 during most	 during worst
occupation	 than monthly income	 recent flood	 flood
Most recent Worst
	 $ at 1993	 $ at 1993
flood (%)
	 flood (%)	 prices	 prices
All respondents 45.9 68.0 1,393 (917)* 1,837
Income level:
< $175	 50.0 87.8
$175-$349	 48.6 76.3
$350-$499	 36.6 66.7
$500-$749	 34.4 51.4
$750-$999	 30.3 29.4
$1,000-$1,499	 0.0 29.9
$1,500-$1,999	 20.7 33.3
$2,000-$2,499
	 0.0 34.7
$3,000 +	 12.5 28.6
Ethnic group:
Malay	 46.3 71.5 976 ( 625) 1,530
Chinese	 35.4 55.1 2,062 (1,418) 2,433
Indian	 30.0 47.3 1,630 (1,320) 2,036
Occupation:
Professionals	 37.5 57.1 3,044 (3,542) 4,667
Farmers
	
64.8 90.0 916 ( 346) 1,532
Artisans
	
34.8 59.3 1,054 ( 959) 2,025
Labourer	 46.2 61.3 1,373 ( 606) 1,510
Fishermen	 18.2 67.6 268 ( 325) 1,076
*Figures in parentheses are average monthly household incomes.
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marginal subsistence. Farmers, fishermen and other agrarian workers are amongst the lowest
income groups in the country (Table 8.3). They are, therefore, already vulnerable to flood
hazards. Living in hazardous flood zones has aggravated their situation as the burden of flood
damage firmly anchors them to the base of the income ladder. Consequently, large sections
of the rural population are subject to high vulnerability to flood hazards.
And because the rural agrarian sector is largely dominated by Malays, this has reinforced
income inequity which first became apparent during the colonial period. Chapter 4 has
demonstrated that mass Malay poverty and backwardness vis-a-vis the other ethnic groups is
embedded in the economic system of the country, reflecting nearly a century of neglect,
discrimination and exploitation by the colonial masters and the inability of post-colonial
governments to redress the issue'. Malay poverty is also largely caused by low
productivity, exploitation and victimization, neglect and government policies with an urban
bias (Ungku Aziz (1975). An important addition to this list of causes is the negative effects
of floods which impose their 'taxes' on floodplain users for the contribution they make in the
replenishment of fertile alluvial soils after each flood. Floods are, therefore, significantly
responsible for perpetuating high incidence of poverty amongst rural Malay floodplain
occupants.
Poverty and income inequity are important issues which successive post-colonial governments
have attempted to address. Chapter 5 (Section 5.3.2) has also demonstrated that institutional
policies (especially those relating to flood management) have been largely ineffective in
addressing the two issues. Policies have mainly concentrated on increasing agricultural
productivity in the Malay dominated rural traditional sector. Malay peasants have been given
incentives and subsidies and other encouragement to increase productivity and thereby raise
their standard of living (Ooi 1979 p302-3). Despite much effort in this area, including the
opening of land schemes by the Federal Land Development Authority', employing the
91 This is not surprising as the 20 year time constraint of the NEP (1970-1990) is hardly
enough to rectify a structural feature that has been reinforced for nearly a century. To this
end, Malays argue that their ancestors, having been colonised for centuries with devastating
effect on them and their economy, would find it impossible to reverse the trend in 20 years
(Quoted from Faaland et al 1990 p183-4).
92 FELDA land schemes are expensive and their effects on the rural populace is small
(Silcock and Fisk 1963). Although such schemes have benefited rural peasants somewhat and
have indeed raised their income level, their overall effect is limited as the number of settler
families selected are minimal compared to the number of applicants (Nonini 1992 pp150-154).
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Table 8.3
	
Incidence of poverty by occupational groups and urban-rural areas and
between selected states in Peninsular Malaysia
Occupational Groups:	 Percentage of households in poverty
Padi farmers	 57.7
Coconut smallholders	 46.9
Rubber smallholders	 46.9
Fishermen	 27.7
Rural-Urban: 
Rural areas	 24.7
Urban areas	 8.2
Region: 
East Coast:
Kelantan	 31.6
Pahang	 12.3
Terengganu	 36.1
West Coast:
Federal Territory* 	 5.2
Pulau Pinang	 12.9
Selangor	 8.9
National Average:
	
17.1
* Synonymous with federal capital
(Source: Government of Malaysia 1984 Household Income Survey; Faaland et al (1990
p123); and Government of Malaysia 1991a).
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concept of the Green Revolution (Jegathesan 1977), loans and credit facilities, and other
benefits, peasant farmers still remain one of the poorest sections of Malaysian society (Chan
1991a). Today, even as the country forges ahead as one of the most rapidly developing
countries in the far east, peasants continue to lag well behind their urban counterparts (mostly
Chinese and Indians). Even the disparity between rural Malays and urban Malays has
widened and the former continue to be left behind by development policies which have not
hitherto changed their traditional lifestyle and poor standard of living (Khor 1987 pp68-9;
Chandra 1989 pp26-7; Government of Malaysia 1991a pp12-13). Stressing the continued
existence of wide income disparities between urban and rural Malays, Faaland et al (1990
p189-90) remarked:
`...Just in case some of them have forgotten their roots, or want to forget
their roots because of their new found affluent styles of Guccis and Pierre
Cardin and the social company they keep in the country clubs, during their
short stay in the kampungs (during Hari Raya, an annual Muslim festival at
the end of the fasting month) they are reminded again of their origins by the
many unemployed rural youths queuing for jobs and by their parents
petitioning about their inability to provide a decent livelihood for their
families and the difficulties they encounter. These Malay better-off are
reminded constantly about rural poverty and inequality vis-a-vis the modern
sectors.'
Table 8.4 shows the wide income disparities and incidence of poverty between ethnic groups,
regions, states and occupations. The figures, however, are not a true representation of all
Malaysian households as this research is concerned only with floodplain inhabitants.
Nevertheless, corresponding figures for all households (given in parentheses) are shown as
comparisons. The income and poverty figures indicate that Malay floodplain households lag
far behind their Chinese and Indian counterparts. Similarly, East Coast floodplain inhabitants
do not compare well with those from the West Coast and farmers and fishermen are amongst
the poorest of the occupational groups. Rural floodplain inhabitants also trail way behind their
urban counterparts as their incomes are low and incidence of poverty high. However,
impoverished areas are not solely confined to the East Coast. Other areas of low incomes and
high incidence of poverty are also widely found in remote kampungs, new villages and rubber
estates on the West Coast, notably in the states of Kedah and Perlis (Vokes 1990).
Finally, a significant proportion of urban dwellers are also poor. These are the urban poor
who live in the slums/squatter settlements of the cities. Unlike their rural counterparts who
are mostly Malays, the urban poor comprise all ethnic groups. The squatters settlements are
mostly located on hazardous flood-prone land which are 'too risky' for any form of economic
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Table 8.4
	 Mean Monthly Household Incomes of floodplain inhabitants in Peninsular
Malaysia (1993 prices)
Mean Monthly
Household
Income
Ratio to
National
Average
Incidence of
poverty (below
$350 per month)
National average: 1,378* 17.1
Floodplain households 917 0.67 27.0
Ethnic group:
Malay 625 (1,012)** 0.45 35.2
Chinese 1,418 (1,785) 1.03 16.8
Indian 1,320 (1,300) 0.96 6.7
West Coast: 1,353 0.98 5.3
Federal Territory*** 1,655 1.20 1.9
Pulau Pinang 1,151 0.84 7.6
East Coast: 550
629
445
0.40
0.46
0.32
45.2
41.3
50.3
Kelantan
Pekan
Occupation:
Professionals
Farmers
Fishermen
Labourer
Artisan
3,542
346
325
606
959
2.57
0.25
0.24
0.44
0.70
0.0
64.2
56.1
17.4
8.4
Urban/rural:
Urban
Malay
1,247 (1,831)
770
0.90
0.56
15.7
24.5
Chinese 1,860 1.35 8.5
Indian 1,410 1.02 5.7
Rural 529 ( 979) 0.38 40.2
Malay 503 0.37 44.1
Chinese 648 0.47 31.1
Indian 641 0.47 16.7
* This is the national mean monthly income for all households in Malaysia at 1993 prices.
It is converted from the 1990 national average of $1,254 (Government of Malaysia 1991a
p38).
**Figures in parentheses are mean monthly incomes for all households in Peninsular Malaysia
converted to 1993 prices (International Law Book Services 1991 p235).
*** Synonymous with federal capital
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development. In the current research, approximately a fifth of squatters households have
monthly incomes below $350 and are therefore poor. Their mean monthly household income
is $743, significantly higher than those of farmers and fishermen but it must be seen in the
context of the location where that income is earned and spent. Most of the squatters live in
cities where costs of living are much higher than in rural areas. If the 1993 poverty level of
$394 and the higher cost of living in urban areas is taken into consideration, the percentage
of squatters living below the poverty line would be higher.
The above analysis demonstrates that flood hazards contribute significantly towards undoing
wealth accumulation, reinforcing poverty and widening income disparities between ethnic
groups, regions, rural and urban locations, and occupational groups. The fact that the East
Coast is subject to greater flood risks (because of seasonal exposure to the Northeast
Monsoon) suggests that the poor peasant farmers and fishermen seldom have the chance to
accumulate wealth. Surplus income earned during good years are quickly spent on coping
with and recovering from floods. More significantly, the analysis shows that flood hazards
have more adverse effects on Malays than they have on Chinese and Indians, resulting in high
incidence of poverty amongst Malays. Flood hazards have, therefore, reinforced income
disparities and are a hindrance to equity attainment.
8.3.2 Links between socio-political and institutional contexts and individuals within the
income equity segment
In view of persistent problems of poverty and income inequalities, the key question in this
segment is whether or not contextual forces ranging from the socio-cultural, political
economy, through to the institutional recognise the magnitude of flood damage and attempt
to reduce both human vulnerability towards floods as well as flood hazards themselves.
Normal floods occurring every year cost the government millions of ringgits annually in
disaster preparedness, evacuation, rescue, relief and rehabilitation. More significantly, the
occurrence of severe 'major' floods every few years puts a heavy toll on the government's
treasury (see Chapter 2). The estimated annual flood damage potential of $92.2 million in the
peninsula is high and set to escalate with the current trend of rapid economic development
on major floodplains (Chan and Parker Forthcoming). Within such a scenario, flood hazard
reduction can be a potentially effective tool in achieving income equity. Reducing poverty and
income inequalities can be achieved by increasing incomes of the poorer regions/states and
groups, reducing the losses they suffer through hazards or both. Flood loss reduction can be
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in the form of lives saved, reduced damage to crops and livestock, properties and work, all
of which contribute to better incomes. Better incomes reduces vulnerability and the poor are
able to recover and get back to income generating activities faster.
There is a complex web of links between contextual forces and individuals who are affected
by poverty and income inequity in relation to flood hazard vulnerability (Figure 8.11).
Colonial policies have largely contributed to increased poverty and income inequity but post-
colonial policies have both positive and negative effects. While focus on the modern
commercial sector widens income disparities, the emphasis on redistributive policies in the
rural sector reduces poverty and vulnerability to floods. This section examines the effects of
the development of both sectors on poverty and income inequity.
Socio-cultural contexts play an important role in the quest for income equity. For example,
all ethnic groups have lived together for a long time, and attitudes and values (cultural
attributes) amongst all ethnic groups must change in order to attain income equity. As long
as Malays (mostly muslirn) believe that it is against their religion to accumulate wealth, and
therefore do not put in extra effort to improve their economic condition, they will remain
lagging behind the other ethnic groups. And as long Malays wish to remain on floodplains
to continue their traditional mode of production and to pursue religious and traditional
gratification ahead of economic advancement, they will always be subjected to the vagaries
of flood hazards. Furthermore, as long as Malays view flood hazards as normal events and
largely attributed to God, then they are less likely to take flood loss reduction response. Such
attitudes have negative effects on flood hazard institutions and policies as scepticism and non-
cooperation often limits their effectiveness. Many examples of such non-cooperation have
been given in terms of reluctance to relocate (Chapter 6) and not heeding flood warnings
(Section 8.2).
Similarly, other ethnic groups must also change their attitudes to enable income equity to be
achieved. As long as Chinese and Indians do not open up their business world to Malays
(according to Mahathir Bin Mohamad 1970, Chinese business is firmly confined within the
Chinese community through a series of guilds), Malays will never catch up with them. This
will foster resentment and may yet again erupt in racial violence which none of the ethnic
groups want to see repeated. Socio-cultural contextual forces of prejudice and mistrust against
one another have a communal origin which dates back to the colonial period, but they are still
present in modern day Malaysia. Not only are communalism present amongst the masses but
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it is being reinforced by political parties and institutions which work under the guise of
promoting ethnic harmony (see Chapter 4). Malaysians must, therefore, change their attitudes
and not identify themselves as Malays, Chinese or Indians but as 'Malaysians' and be proud
of it.
Radical socio-cultural changes in attitudes and values take time but are now gradually taking
place. More significantly, they have influenced institutions many of which have been set up
to foster ethnic relations, harmony and the re-structuring of society (one of which is income
equity). Institutions such as KEMAS (Community Development), MIDA (Malaysian Industrial
Development Authority), RISDA (Rubber Industry Smallholder Development Authority),
FELDA (Federal Land Development Authority) and many others have been restructured to
deal with such cultural changes. They all have one common objective, i.e. to help Malays
improve their economic position and reduce income inequity. Through their schemes and
projects, these institutions in turn affect individuals who benefit through their participation
in them. For example, FELDA settlers are acknowledged as significantly better off compared
to traditional rural Malay peasants. There are currently better chances and more avenues open
to urban Malays for economic advancement, but rural Malays are still hampered and
constrained by poor access to these opportunities and avenues. Urban Malays are now more
practical and open-minded about investments and making money from business and Islam is
also viewed as more accommodating in this respect. Malays are currently doing well in
business and are culturally evolving. In stressing the need for Malays to learn the business
acumen from Chinese, the current Prime Minister has in the past been accused of trying to
turn Malays into Chinese (Mahathir Bin Mohamad 1970). That Malays have benefited from
these institutions is a fact, but there remains much to be done before income equity is
completely achieved.
Institutional contexts are linked to structural ones through institutions and organisations. For
example, political ideology is a structural context which, when translated into action, come
into contact with the public via institutions. Although flood hazard institutions are not
expected to directly reduce poverty and restructure society' (their policies are concerned
93 'Restructure society' in the Malaysian context refers to the transforming of an
inequitable society (in terms of income and opportunity) to an equitable one. It also involves
restructuring of the work force into one which is not identifiable by race. Currently, most
Malays are in agriculture and government service, Chinese in business and the private sector.
Indians are equally involved in agriculture (rubber tappers) and business.
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with only flood management and related issues), they are important vehicles that can be
harnessed towards contributing to such goals. Referring to Figure 8.11, institutional
contextual forces come into effect in many areas. For example, post-colonial policies of
redistribution of income and poverty eradication are mostly put into action by government
agencies. Some examples mentioned earlier are FELDA, MIDA, RISDA and KEMAS. In
terms of flood hazard reduction, the examples are DID, MMS, FDRPC, and the Welfare
Department. These organisations carry out programmes designed to reduce flood hazards and
their impacts on people and their properties.
The extent to which flood hazards and people's vulnerability are reduced depends largely on
the effectiveness of these organisations. For example, if flood hazard organisations and non-
flood organisations are aiming towards poverty eradication and equity attainment, then their
effect on individuals would be positive. If however, they are more concerned in maintaining
economic principals through the application of BCA methods, then it is likely that the poor
will be over-looked and the rich protected instead. For example, the application of such
methods is severely prejudiced against the less developed East Coast states or the poorer
sections of society. East Coast states and poor floodplain occupants have low economic
potentials, low population densities, and less built-up area per square kilometre. As such,
they do not justify the federal institutions spending large sums of money on them for flood
management purposes. Thus, the building of expensive dams, channel deepening,
embankments, and other structural/engineering schemes are usually found in the more
developed West Coast states or in more commercially developed urban areas. Therefore, poor
East Coast floodplain inhabitants are 'less' protected than their West Coast or wealthier
counterparts. Instead, a less expensive approach to flood management is planned for the East
Coast and to this end, the government has decided on the current annual disaster
preparedness, relief and rehabilitation (inclusive of warning and evacuation) programme.
This, inevitably results in a reactive rather than proactive response, therefore exposing people
and property to flood hazards rather than protecting them. This has often led to significant
flood losses amongst East Coast states and the poorer floodplain occupants (see Appendix K),
thereby reinforcing poverty and income inequity instead of reducing them.
Chapter 5 has demonstrated that institutional policies on flood management also do not have
a clear-cut objective of poverty eradication and equity attainment, and also do not appear to
work very well. Such policies were found to contribute little towards achieving the two
objectives. Allocations of major flood mitigation funding were found to favour more
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developed West Coast states and densely developed and populated urban areas rather than
more the hazardous rural floodplains where the majority of the poor are located. This again
serves only to protect and benefit the wealthy rather than the poor. Consequently, institutional
flood hazard policies suggest that poverty and income inequities are being perpetuated.
Political economy contexts manifested in federal policies such as 'poverty eradication' and
'restructuring society' can be vehicles for the reduction of flood hazards and vulnerability
amongst the poor. The huge gap between the modern commercial and traditional agrarian
sectors (due to colonial favouritism and ineffective post-colonial policies) have given rise to
wide disparities in regional, sectoral and social development, all contributing to an
increasingly unequal society. Since the May 13 tragedy (see Chapter 4 Section 4.2.6), rapid
rural economic development strategies have been introduced by the government to reduce
income inequity and poverty. To this end, poor regions and states were given more emphasis
for economic development and regional integration was employed as a strategy to redress
economic and structural inequity in society. The NEP (a structural policy), therefore, has a
direct effect on institutions as government agencies (flood hazard and otherwise) are geared
towards achieving equity objectives. In turn, the effectiveness of these institutions will affect
individuals. Thus, by examining the extent to which the NEP and other structural policies
work towards achieving income equity, the links between the structural, institutional and
individual contexts are identified.
Income equity is closely tied to the issue of poverty. As the majority of the poor are Malays
and the majority of the wealthy, non-Malays, eradicating poverty then becomes crucial to
successful attainment of income equity. This section examines the links between structural
policies, institutions and individuals, and the extent to which these links have contributed to
poverty reduction. Despite many attempts at its eradication, poverty is still at large in
Malaysian society. Its presence on the agendas of all recent Malaysia plans verifies that it is
still present. Despite a 20 year period, the NEP has been unsuccessful in eradicating poverty.
The NEP's links with individuals has been the improvement of rural standards of living and
increased rural incomes (mostly Malays), making rural inhabitants less vulnerable to flood
hazards. But, more significantly, the NEP's objectives on maintaining rapid economic growth
in the commercial sector and in urban areas have resulted in greater increase in urban
incomes (mostly amongst non-Malays). Thus, while Malay poverty has been partly reduced,
Chinese and Indian wealth have also increased making income disparities even wider. Equity,
therefore, remains an elusive long standing objective yet unattained.
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There is much evidence from this research to suggest that structural policies have not been
sufficiently successful to eradicate poverty. For example, the overall incidence of poverty for
the country was 17.1 per cent in 1990, with rural poverty higher at 21.8 per cent. Some of
the poorer Malay dominated states such as Kelantan and Terengganu have rural poverty levels
in excess of a third of all households (Government of Malaysia 1991a p12). In absolute
figures, there were more than half a million poor households in 1990 and of this number, a
quarter were classified as the hard-core poor. Most of the poor households are located in the
remote traditional kampungs, new villages, rubber plantations and squatter areas in some
urban centres. Coincidentally, these are often floodplain areas highly prone to flood hazards.
Some notable rural examples are on the banks of the Kedah and Muda Rivers, the Kelantan
River floodplain (outside Kota Bharu), the Terengganu River floodplain and the Pahang River
floodplain (outside Pekan). On the other hand, urban squatter settlements are found on the
banks of the Kelang River in Kuala Lumpur, on the banks of Sungai Pinang in Pulau Pinang,
and off the banks of the Pahang River in Pekan. These are areas of high flood risk, which
when coinciding with human exposure, produces high vulnerability to flood hazards. In a
comprehensive appraisal of the effectiveness of the NEP, Faaland et al (1990) came to the
conclusion that the reduction in income equalities at all levels is somewhat short of its
objective. Thus, the authors remarked:
`..In Malaysia, in spite of considerable efforts, poverty continues to rule to
an unacceptable extent in rural areas: there are considerable differences in the
prosperity of the states comprising Malaysia.' (Faaland et al 1990 p149).
Chapter 6 demonstrated that two-thirds of the floodplain households interviewed are either
poor or living close to the poverty level. Of this total, 74.4 per cent are Malays, with
Chinese and Indians making up 17.9 per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively. In contrast, 63.6
per cent of the wealthy households (those with monthly incomes in excess of $2,000) are
Chinese with Malays and Indians both making up 18.2 per cent each. Income inequity is
therefore still prevalent in Malaysian society, at least amongst floodplain households. The
magnitude of current income inequity has also been highlighted in Section 8.3.1. Table 8.5
reveals that the income disparity between Malay squatters and non-Malay squatters is small
but the difference between Malay non-squatters and non-Malay non-squatters is large. This
means there is little income difference amongst the poor, irrespective of ethnic group.
Restructuring society is a key government objective targeted at income equity attainment.
This is largely because, compared to non-Malays, the majority of Malays are poor.
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Table 8.5
	 Mean Monthly Household Incomes of floodplain squatter households in
Peninsular Malaysia (1993 prices)
Mean Monthly
Household
Income
Ratio to
National
Average
Incidence of
poverty (below
$350 per month)
Squatter 743 0.54 19.0
Malay 875 0.63 14.9
Chinese 981 0.71 8.3
Indian 650 0.47 11.8
Non-squatter 951 0.69 28.6
Malay 584 0.42 38.5
Chinese 1,451 1.05 17.4
Indian 1,585 1.15 4.7
Urban-squatter 894 0.65 8.8
Malay 964 0.70 6.5
Chinese 1,047 0.76 10.0
Indian 664 0.48 12.5
Urban non-squatter 1,326 0.96 17.3
Malay 720 0.52 29.2
Chinese 1,945 1.41 8.3
Indian 1,733 1.26 2.7
Rural squatter 515 0.37 34.2
Malay 703 0.51 31.3
Chinese 650 0.47
Indian 425 0.31
Rural non-squatter 531 0.39 41.2
Malay 484 0.35 45.4
Chinese 648 0.47 32.2
Indian 677 0.49 16.7
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The 20-year NEP (introduced after the May 13 racial riots in 1969) accorded special
privileges to Malays in the fields of education, commerce, banking and other fields. That the
NEP has improved Malay economic status is undeniable, but has it effectively reduced
income inequity? The fact remains that Malays have not caught up sufficiently with their
Chinese and Indian counterparts. This is because, the NEP favoured those Malays with access
to it, viz, the urban middle class and rich upper class Malays who lived in towns and other
urban areas. They were the ones who benefited most, but they only constitute 35.0 per cent
of the total Malay population. The majority of the Malays who live in the traditional rural
areas continued with their impoverished way of life. Increased government expenditure and
activities in the agricultural sector have not sufficiently raised rural standards of living.
Instead, it was the rich farmers who form the main base of the Malay state bourgeoisie that
benefited most (Hua 1983 p156). Faaland et al (1990) analysed income equalities between the
ethnic groups and are of the opinion that the NEP objective of restructuring society has not
been totally achieved. Perhaps the most obvious evidence that the NEP has not achieved its
target after the 20 year period is that the current outlines of the NDP embodies much of the
same objectives of the NEP it has replaced.
In many instances, many are also living in locations too remote to realise the economic
benefits to be gained in the NEP. This is especially so in the case of the older generation of
Malay farmers, who neither possess the resources nor the desire to pursue economic gains.
Informal discussions and qualitative interviews conducted by the author revealed that they are
quite unconcerned over issues of restructuring society. As far as they know, living in a
remote kampung within a homogenous society, there is no need for restructuring as almost
all are poor. In general they are contented with their life. Remarked one farmer,
` ..I have lived here all for 80 years. Society has always been the same. All
my relatives and friends are poor but we are happy. We help one another
when times are bad, for instance when there is a flood. I do not know how
the Chinese or Indian live in the towns, or whether they are rich or poor. Of
course I have visited relatives in towns where they live in small flats in tall
buildings that I have difficulty climbing the stairs. You tell me they are better
off but they live within a small enclosure and have no space for their children
to play. After just one day I wanted to come home to my kampung. I am
happy that three of my six children have government scholarships and have
become successful in their lives. But they now live in towns and I do not get
to see them and my grandchildren often, and I resent that. Since I cannot
stand living in towns, I do not visit them often. My other three children are
not so smart but thank Allah they are still living in the same district although
in different kampungs. At least I get to see them and my other grandchildren.
Even these children and grandchildren of mine do not like to visit their
cousins in the towns.'
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Because of this attitude, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the NEP to redress society
sufficiently, the majority of the Malay peasantry remains poor and vulnerable to flood
hazards. The current research reveals that farmers (78.9 per cent Malay) and fishermen (33.3
per cent Malay) still have the lowest incomes in Malaysian society. The ratio of farming and
fishing households to the national average are 0.25 and 0.24 respectively. Within the farming
community, Chinese farmers have higher average monthly household incomes ($391)
compared to Malay farmers ($334). In contrast, the ratio of the incomes of professionals
(52.6 per cent Chinese and 26.3 per cent Malay) is more than two and a half times that of
the national average. Chinese professionals earn an average monthly income of $2,369
compared to $1,032 earned by Malay professionals. Indian professionals have a mean
monthly income of $2,053. Elsewhere, the 6th Malaysia Plan reported that the ratio of Malay
mean income to Chinese in 1990 was 58.8 per cent and that of Indian to Chinese stood at
75.9 per cent (Government of Malaysia 1991a p38). In terms of floodplain residents, the
current research reveals that the ratio of Malay and Indian incomes to that of Chinese are
0.44 and 0.93 respectively (at 1993 prices). Thus, in spite of considerable efforts, income
disparities between the ethnic groups continue to persist. Although the average Malay
standard of living has improved over the NEP period, the other ethnic groups have forged
even further ahead. This suggests that political economy contexts have largely been
unsuccessful in reducing income inequity in relation to flood hazard reduction.
The NEP and its development policies have also been largely ineffective in redressing
economic disparities between regions and states. Because the traditional sector of the
economy is largely concentrated in the East Coast, the underdevelopment of this region is
inevitable (Faaland et al 1990 p5). Policies of rapid growth under the NEP was necessary for
raising incomes in the traditional sector, especially lifting rural poor households over the
poverty line. However, rapid economic growth has increased urban incomes more vis-a-vis
rural incomes as the modern sector has taken advantage of the opportunities generated by
such growth. Rapid industrialisation and growth of commercial agriculture and mining has
favoured the modern sector more than the traditional sector. Consequently, wide development
disparities reflected in large differences in incomes and living standards have perpetuated
between regions/coasts, states, districts and even within different sections in cities and towns.
Arguably, nowhere is the difference as pronounced as that between the East and West Coasts.
For instance, infrastructure such as roads, railways and other means of communication is well
developed in the West Coast but is still poorly developed in the East Coast. There are also
wide disparities in per capita GDP and mean household incomes (Table 8.6). Because of such
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Table 8.6
	
Per Capita Gross Domestic Product and Mean Monthly Household
Income By State in Peninsular Malaysia for 1990
State	 Per Capita GDP	 Ratio to	 Mean Monthly	 Ratio to
(in 1978 prices)	 National	 Household	 National
Average	 Income	 Average
West Coast:
Federal Territory* 7,608 1.73 2,102 1.68
Selangor 6,558 1.49 1,790 1.43
Pulau Pinang 4,934 1.12 1,375 1.10
East Coast:
Kelantan 1,739 0.40 726 0.58
Pahang 3,278 0.75 1,092 0.87
Terengganu* 7,124 1.62 905 0.72
* Synonymous with federal capital.
** Terengganu has a high Per Capita GDP due to the discovery of off-shore oil and gas
fields. But this figure is misleading as the majority of its population remain poor, as indicated
by the low mean household income.
(Source: Government of Malaysia 1991a Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991-1995, p38)
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differences, a very much poorer and less developed state such as Kelantan is more
vulnerable to the flood hazard, especially during the occurrence of major floods. In the same
way, the poorer sections of cities and towns on floodplains are also highly vulnerable to
floods.
The above analysis demonstrates the continued existence of spatial and communal income
disparities in Peninsular Malaysia, but more significantly, it confirms that the NEP has fallen
short of its targets. Regional income and other economic disparities have perpetuated and
flood hazard reduction have not been effectively employed as a means to achieve that equity.
Poor regions with poor inhabitants are generally the most vulnerable to floods. The
occurrence of a severe flood of the 1926 or 1971 magnitude can severely cripple a poor state
such as Kelantan or Perlis, which do not have the resources to cope with it. In such a case,
relief and rehabilitation are functions heavily supported and in many instances provided by
the federal government. In terms of poor individuals or households, there is clearly a direct
relationship between vulnerability and poverty (Wisner et al 1976). This has been discussed
above it is important to mention here that regional income disparity cannot be detached from
the issue of poverty. There is also a close relationship between `peripherality' and poverty
in Peninsular Malaysia (King and Parnwell 1990). Table 8.6 also illustrates regional
disparities in per capita GDP and mean household incomes. It reveals that .wide economic
disparities still exist between regions and states further testifying to the inability of post-
colonial governments to redress regional economic and development disparities.
In the same way as the colonial policies have created vulnerability to the flood hazard
amongst East Coast states, post-colonial policies have reinforced such vulnerability. Because
of favoured development in the urban areas of the West Coast, many of the traditional
farming and fishing areas in the East Coast are peripheral areas where the inhabitants' are
largely leading a marginal existence. In these impoverished areas, often the physical
environment is less conducive to economic development (of which seasonal flooding is a
major problem), soils may be poorer (badly drained and peaty) and terrain (swampy and
thickly forested) and accessibility may present difficulties. Some examples are rural kampungs
such as Kampung Tendong in Pasir Mas, Kelantan and Pulau Pekan Baru in Pekan, Pahang
Kelantan is fast gaining the reputation as the poorest state in Peninsular Malaysia. It
has the most number of hardcore poor households. Of the total 50,079 hardcore poor
households in the peninsula, a total of 16,209 (32.4 per cent) are in Kelantan (The Star,
24.8.94).
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9	 CONCLUSIONS
This research set out to investigate a number of broad research questions set within specific
boundaries in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2). It aimed to examine the importance of flood hazards
and their effects, to analyse contexts responsible for their creation and perpetuation, and to
explain human vulnerability to them in Peninsular Malaysia. The theoretical focus was based
on a 'hazard response-in-contexts' model which aimed to explain individual perception and
response to flood hazards within the influence of wider 'socio-political' and institutional
contexts. It further aimed at investigating the response of institutions and organisations (which
also function within the influence of socio-political contexts) to flood hazards. To this end,
an investigation on the adequacy of current institutional and organisational strategies and
policies (i.e. governmental) in flood hazard management based on the 'criteria approach' was
attempted. Finally, the research used formal flood warning and evacuation systems and
official policies on income equity as segments to demonstrate the importance af c.;NstexZ15t>on
individual flood hazard responses.
This concluding discussion focuses on these specified areas of study. It summarises the main
findings and, where appropriate, suggests recommendations arising from these.
9.1 Research Question 1: The importance of the flood hazard and its effects in
Peninsular Malaysia
This research has demonstrated that flooding is a major natural hazard in Peninsular
Malaysia. It is frequent, widespread and of two types - 'normal' and 'major'. While normal
floods occur almost every year, major floods are more irregular occurring once every few
years. Major floods of the magnitudes of those in 1926, 1954, 1967, 1970, 1971, 1988 and
1993 have been demonstrated as disastrous as their effects resulted in significant loss of life
and damage to properties, crops and livestock, businesses, industries and public amenities.
Even the annual occurrence of normal seasonal monsoon floods (not considered severe) were
shown to put strains on the country's resources. Annually, floods were shown to account for
almost the entire reported national cost for disaster preparedness, mitigation, relief and
rehabilitation. The household damage survey in this study revealed that both tangible and
intangible, as well as direct and indirect flood damages and their effects were not high, but
become significant when they are compared to mean household incomes. Damage to building
contents and structures, crops and livestock, and vehicles were the main categories of flood
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loss suffered by individual households. Intangible effects such as stress, worry and health
were also shown to be important. The survey also revealed that damages to commercial
properties and their businesses, especially in large urban centres such as Kuala Lumpur and
Georgetown were substantial. Finally, industrial damages were also shown to be substantial
and under-reported.
The importance of flood hazards are, however, not just in terms of related losses. For five
months a year, from November to March, life in the East Coast is structured and revolves
around the monsoon season. Padi planting, fishing and other forms of the traditional economy
are adapted to the monsoon or locally termed the 'flood season'. For example, public
examinations, seasonal migration of labour (e.g. from fishing to padi farming), tourism and
other activities are all affected by the floods. More significantly, Malay culture is intricately
bound to the monsoon season and floods. The stilt house, informal traditional flood warning
and evacuation systems and many other adaptive mechanisms have evolved in response to
floods. In the East Coast, it was discovered that floodplain occupants are used to normal
seasonal floods and can cope reasonably well. They only become vulnerable to major 'severe'
floods which they cannot cope with and recover from, and have to receive aid from the
authorities. In the West Coast, however, although life does not revolve around seasonal
monsoon floods, unpredictable flash floods affect many urban floodplains. Urban flooding
is closely linked to social issues of squatting and poverty, which further complicate the flood
issue. Current rapid development of urban floodplains have also exacerbated flood problems
resulting in high potential flood damage in such areas. The debate on deforestation is still
unresolved as research relating flood occurrence to deforestation has been inconclusive. Yet,
to treat deforestation as insignificant would be dangerously naive as deforestation has
certainly changed hydrological parameters and contributed to flooding, especially that of
urban flash flooding.
Finally, this research reveals evidence that flood risk, exposure and vulnerability are all
increasing in Peninsular Malaysia. With the sustained rapid economic, industrial and
agriculture development expected well into the next century, the country's urban and rural
floodplains are expected to grow. More people are expected to live in flood zones as
encroachment becomes an inevitable solution to population and land pressures. Greater
exposure and vulnerability will lead to greater damage potentials and exacerbation of flood
hazards.
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9.2 Research Question 2: The important contexts responsible for the creation and
perpetuation of flood hazards, and vulnerability to flood hazards in Peninsular
Malaysia
A combination of natural and human factors have contributed to increasing flood hazards in
Peninsular Malaysia. While natural characteristics such as exposure to cold surges and
monsoon depressions leading to heavy seasonal rainfall, intense convection rain storms, low-
lying topography, poor drainage and other local factors are responsible for high flood risk
in many parts of the peninsula, inadvertent and deliberate human use of floodplains (both past
and present) such as padi farming, plantation agriculture (mostly rubber and oil palm), tin
mining, city and town expansion and others have resulted in increased human and material
exposure and vulnerability.
More significantly, although floods have evolved to become a common feature in the lives
of a significant number of Malaysians, increased exposure and vulnerability were
demonstrated to be largely influenced by contextual forces. The socio-cultural, political
economy and institutional contexts were identified and subsequently demonstrated as key
contexts responsible for trapping individuals on floodplains, thereby increasing exposure and
vulnerability. Within each key context are many facets which work independently or in
tandem with other contexts to perpetuate human occupance on floodplains. This research has
also demonstrated that the scope for individual action in response to flood hazards was
severely constrained if not largely determined by contextual forces, many of which are
'structural'.
9.3	 Research Question 3: The importance of `socio-cultural' and 'political economy'
contexts in flood hazard response
Socio-cultural and political economy contexts are macro structural forces which impinge
upon, and strongly influence individuals and institutions in Peninsular Malaysia. They operate
at the broadest level and can be abstract (e.g. beliefs) or real (e.g. poverty), but their
common characteristic is that they pervade almost every aspect of flood hazards and were
demonstrated to contribute significantly to the creation and perpetuation of flood hazards in
the peninsula. In examining these contexts, both the elements of time and space (contexts by
themselves) were also substantiated as important in the occurrence of flood hazards.
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The socio-cultural contexts comprise many facets but three were identified as key facets
affecting flood hazards: historical settlement; colonialism; and ethnic culture. Although some
facets are historical, they were demonstrated as significant forces in shaping current flood
hazards. For example, historical settlement and human use of rivers and their adjacent land
precipitated the current pattern of riverine settlements. The majority of key cities and towns
are located on floodplains, and as they grew, increasingly more hazardous zones were
developed and occupied leading to increased exposure, vulnerability and flood damage
potential.
The colonial facet was demonstrated as one exerting profound influence on current flood
management approach, mainly through the DID (which originated as a colonial agency) and
its lop-sided structural/engineering approach to flood problems. Colonial exploitation of the
country's economy contributed to depleted national resources, leading to inadequate finances
for development in general and flood management in particular. Colonial policies of uneven
regional and sectoral development resulted in the neglect of the East Coast and the traditional
rural agrarian sector, which to this day remain largely undeveloped. East Coast states,
therefore, stagnated under colonial rule and became largely poor, as did its inhabitants,
resulting in high vulnerability to flood hazards. In contrast, emphasis on resource exploitation
(mainly tin and rubber) rapidly developed the West Coast. Large tracts of virgin forest were
cleared for mines, rubber estates, settlements, roads and railways and other urban land use.
Floodplain encroachment also became a feature of urban areas. These activities radically
changed the hydrological cycle and were likely factors that contributed to increased flash
floods in the West Coast.
This research also indicated that colonial policies on communalism had been prejudiced
against indigenous Malays and favoured immigrant Chinese and Indians. The former,
considered by the colonialists as only suitable for padi farming and other forms of traditional
agriculture were left behind in the main stream of development. In contrast, the colonialists
found Chinese and Indians useful in their exploitation of tin and rubber respectively and
encouraged them into these activities. These two communities, therefore, lived in towns and
rubber estates on the West Coast, areas which are relatively unaffected by seasonal floods.
They also became wealthier vis-a-vis the Malays, of whom the majority became
impoverished. Colonial oppression towards Malays gave rise to wide income disparities
between Malays and the other ethnic groups. Malays continued to live in rural agriculture
areas, mainly on fertile floodplains, river mouths, deltas and low-lying coastal areas, mostly
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in the East Coast (although a significant proportion have been forced to occupy marginal
lands). Even when Malays started planting rubber in smallholdings, they were suppressed by
the colonialists through a series of rubber production control schemes, the most notorious of
which was the Stevenson Scheme. Consequently, Malays became the most impoverished
ethnic group and since they largely live on floodplains, they were the most exposed and
vulnerable to flood hazards.
When the colonialists introduced cash cropping in the peninsula, a significant number of padi
farmers were attracted by the lucrative crop and switched to rubber smallholdings. While the
majority still firmly remained in the production of traditional food crops, those who made the
switch suffered the most when rubber prices plunged during world recessions. They were also
suppressed by rubber production control schemes mentioned above. Thus, during times of
floods, these individuals have lost their traditional coping mechanisms resulting in weakened
resistance and increased vulnerability.
Colonialism also exerted its influence strongly in moulding current flood hazard policies,
most notably in forming the DID in the 1930s and of reinforcing the structural/engineering
approach. The exploitation of the Malayan economy for more than three-quarters of a century
also drained the country of vital resources, contributing to a less than comprehensive flood
management strategy.
The colonialists have come and gone. While Malaysians are generally grateful to them for
developing and modernising the country, there remain many areas in which their influence
has been negative and counter-productive. The perpetuation of flood hazards is one of many
such areas. It is now nearly four decades since the colonialists left. One might be tempted to
argue that Malaysians ought to have redressed the negative aspects of colonial rule during that
period. Yet, this study has demonstrated (as have other studies) that many colonial legacies
are too deep rooted and complicated to be fully redressed yet. Try as they may, successive
post-colonial governments have been only partly successful in reducing but not wholly solving
these issues. They, therefore, must take some of the blame for the perpetuation of flood
hazards but some are tempted to argue that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to undo
structural forces that have been implanted and reinforced for more than three-quarters of a
century. Nevertheless, it is the contention of this research that colonial rule, through its
policies, administration and exploitation of the peninsula's resources has, in more ways than
one, contributed to increased human vulnerability as well as the creation and perpetuation of
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flood hazards in present day Peninsular Malaysia.
This research has also demonstrated that ethnicity is a vital ingredient in all aspects of
Malaysian society, including flood hazard response. Research findings indicate that the ethnic
culture facet strongly influences decisions to persist on floodplains. For example, ethnic
values, beliefs, attitudes, religion, customs and tradition, particularly those of the Malays,
were discovered to be crucial elements which bond them to a life of farming, fishing or other
traditional activities on floodplains. Malays were found to resent modern living and preferred
the lampung way of life'. They were also more interested in religious and cultural pursuits
rather than the accumulation of wealth which the immigrant communities were more attracted
to. The Malay family system of land inheritance also firmly traps them in their ancestral land,
usually in kampungs on floodplains. More significantly, all these have been shown to give
rise to low standards of living amongst Malays who often live below the poverty line and are
therefore highly vulnerable to flood hazards.
Therefore, despite the fact that many are trapped on floodplains by exogenous 'structural'
contexts, there are also many who live there as a matter of choice. Although attachment to
place is a well documented reason in the hazards literature (White 1974), there is little
contention of the view that 'People choose to live in hazard zones because they have lived
there for a long time, are familiar with them, love their way of life and want to remain
there'. A most interesting finding in this research, is the fact that a large section of
Malaysians, particularly rural Malays, live near rivers (i.e. on floodplains) simply because
it is a highly revered traditional way of life (a cultural context) that is treasured.
Further analysis of contexts revealed that many aspects of Malaysian society are influenced
by political economy contexts. Flood hazard management (including emergency planning,
relief, rescue and rehabilitation) in Peninsular Malaysia was discovered to be fundamentally
affected by the pervasive forces of the political economy context. International contextual
forces such as neo-colonialism exert considerable influence on the Malaysian economy which
is heavily export-oriented and commodity based. Shifts in prices in the international market
and exports, largely controlled by powerful imperialistic countries were shown to adversely
affect the Malaysian economy. Protectionist strategies of developed countries or groups of
them have also suppressed the country's trade. The power of foreign capital (which is still
substantial in the country) is also demonstrated to have been responsible for Malaysia's
subordination to neo-colonialism. Malaysia's industrialisation efforts have also been exploited
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by MNCs, mainly from Japan and the United States, and to a lesser degree from Britain,
Korea and Taiwan. Imperialistic control and exploitation of the Malaysian economy was
demonstrated as having a negative effect on the country's revenues resulting in fewer
resources (financial or otherwise) for flood management.
Research findings revealed that political and economic ideologies translated into national
policies have significant influence on flood hazards. For example, policies on rapid economic
development and the 2020 vision of making the country an NIC by the year 2020 were found
to have negative effects on flood hazards. Such policies favoured industrialisation, tourism,
rapid urbanisation, rural-urban migration, and the opening of more forest land for agriculture
and other human land use, all factors leading to increased encroachment of floodplains. Rapid
economic growth in vulnerable Third World countries often create new problems (related to
disasters) faster than the development of measures to deal with them (Davis 1985 p35). This
research has demonstrated that rapid economic development policies have given rise to
increasing flood risk, exposure and vulnerability (amongst certain sections of Malaysian
society, viz, rural agrarian based peasant communities and urban squatter communities), and
flood damage potential. Development policies have been shown to have lesser benefits on the
rural traditional economy which remains the most vulnerable to flood hazards.
In Peninsular Malaysia, flood hazard policies are mainly based on a technocentric approach
and have been shown to largely favour structural/engineering measures. The building of flood
control dams, channel deepening, desilting, flood walls, embankments and levees, retention
ponds and flood channels were discovered as some of the common measures. Non-structural
measures are mainly practised in the East Coast but are focused only on emergency planning
procedures. Flood warning systems are currently still under-developed as are other measures
such as legislation and land use control.
It was found that many hazard-response decisions were fundamentally political in nature.
Controversies and friction between federal and state governments retard the effective
implementation of federal flood policies. This often leads to state governments straying from
federal objectives, especially with regards to land, forest and river development. Similarly,
the federal government has been shown to have financial control over some state
governments, especially in the case of the poorer states. Friction between the two levels of
government was demonstrated as having negative effects on flood hazard reduction.
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Finally, post-colonial policies on communalism, equity attainment and poverty eradication
were shown to have increased vulnerabilities amongst sections of Malaysian society. For
example, communalism amongst the various communities continues to segregate Malays from
Chinese and Indians. While Malays in rural areas remain poor and vulnerable to flood
hazards, non-Malays have forged further ahead (i.e. economically) in cities and towns.
Chinese and Indians have also not learned flood adaptation methods from the more
experienced Malays, although those living amongst Malays in the rural areas are beginning
to do so. Rural-urban migration has resulted in encroachment of urban floodplains and
increased exposure and vulnerabilities. Equity attainment policies have brought about
increased standards of living amongst Malays, but unfortunately only urban Malays
(approximately one-third of the total Malay population) are the beneficiaries. Such policies
have negative effects on poor Chinese and Indians who do not benefit from them but are
tapped in their new villages and rubber estates. They too become vulnerable to flood hazards
when affected. Poverty eradication is, however, theoretically practised across the board
irrespective of ethnic group. So all the poor groups are expected to benefit. However, this
research (and others) has shown that the NEP and its related policies have not done
sufficiently enough to eradicate the problem. Poverty has certainly been reduced but currently
more than half a million people (a large proportion estimated to be living on floodplains) are
still classified by official statistics as poor. Results show that poverty is a fundamental cause
of vulnerability. The poor are, therefore, the most vulnerable to flood hazards and the
assertion that 'a disaster is a great leveller, striking all social groups irrespective of wealth'
is indeed a myth (Davis 1978). Poverty reinforces low residential and occupational mobility,
both of which trap people in flood-prone zones. Consequently, there remains a large section
of Malaysian society which is exposed and vulnerable to flood hazards.
9.4 Research Question 4: The importance of institutional and organisational contexts
in flood hazard response
In Peninsular Malaysia, the institutional context is found to be a main driving force in flood
management. This is because flood hazard institutions (which include organisations) are set
up by the government who is responsible for flood management. Effective flood hazard
reduction, therefore, depends to a large extent on the effectiveness of institutions. In this
research, the institutional context comprises four main facets of laws, organisational
structures, attitudes, values and culture, and policies and instruments. An evaluation via the
criteria approach revealed that the adequacy of flood hazard institutions and organisations in
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Peninsular Malaysia is far from satisfactory. Institutions and organisations evaluated were
found to be largely inadequate in all four criteria assessed. Only the environmental protection
criterion appeared sufficiently adequate. Even so, its application and enforcement of the
concept of sustainability remained problematic as economic and political considerations often
override environmental ones in decisions regarding forests and land use change (especially
relating to floodplain use).
In terms of the organisational structures facet, the missions, objectives and statutory duties
of most flood hazard institutions and organisations were discovered to be inadequate. Only
the DID appears to be adequate in this respect but its flood obligations are still only
secondary to its other functions of drainage and irrigation. Flood hazard organisations were
found to require re-definition and improvement in their objectives. They were also discovered
to over-emphasise structural/engineering measures although the official government policy
clearly favours the more affordable non-structural measures. In this respect, non-structural
measures that have potential and can be further developed are flood insurance, legislation,
development planning, flood risk analysis, land use change, resettlement, flood proofing, and
public education.
The findings also revealed that the laws and regulations facet in relation to flood management
is under legislated. Existing laws were found to be largely inadequate in regulating floodplain
use, especially in relation to the conflict of interest between federal and state governments.
It was further discovered that flood hazard institutions need new legislation and greater
enforcement power for more stringent flood management. At the moment, flood hazard
organisations (e.g. the DID) were found to lack legal power to enforce regulations pertaining
to flood hazard management. It was also discovered that the insurance industry for flood
losses is currently under-developed and is one area which has immense potential both for
floodplain users as well as for insurers.
In terms of the policies and instruments facet, flood hazard organisations were found wanting
in financial and human resources. Although total budgetary allocations have increased since
1971, the increase in 'real' terms is not large after inflation is taken into account. More
significantly, such increases were mainly channelled into structural/engineering flood control
schemes. Budgetary allocations for non-structural schemes remained relatively small and need
to be substantially increased. This can only be done if major flood hazard organisations such
as the DID and the MMS discard their current 'engineering' oriented approach and embark
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on a more multi-disciplinary approach with greater emphasis on non-structural measures of
flood reduction. Staffing was found to be inadequate in flood hazard organisations not only
in terms of numbers but also in terms of disciplinary composition. The majority of staff in
the DID and the MMS, the two main flood management agencies, were engineers, physicists
and mathematicians. It was also discovered that both the equity and public accountability
issues were not adequately addressed by flood hazard institutions and organisations. Despite
its focus on the former over all its 5 year Malaysia plans, flood hazard institutions and
organisations have not built the equity criterion into their planning. The majority of flood
projects did not concentrate on poor rural areas where the benefits were substantially small,
but were largely targeted at densely populated urban areas where benefits vis-s-vis costs are
justified. There appeared to be a gradual move towards more public consultation and
accountability in government flood schemes but governmental culture of secrecy and the
threat of opposition parties abusing and distorting information were found to prevent public
consultation and accountability from reaching a high level.
Finally, organisations were found to develop their own values, attitudes and sub-cultures, a
facet which influenced the outcomes of flood hazards. The concept of collective 'sticking
together' was found to pervade the DID and other organisations. In the case of the DID, it
was official policy to recruit only engineers in order to perpetuate its engineering culture and
thereby its technocentric approach to flood management. In the case of the MMS, mainly
meteorologists, mathematicians, and physicists are favoured. Flood hazard organisations such
as the FDRPC have also developed distinctive behavioural characteristics reflecting their
history, traditions, accumulated experience and collective perception of their roles beyond
those laid down officially. Its bureaucratic structure were found to slow things down and it
tended to view floods as unavoidable where only evasive actions and loss reduction are
emphasised. Organisations have developed self-sustaining mechanisms designed to perpetuate
both the organisation and its members. In the case of the DID, this mechanism is manifested
in its recruitment programme, strong emphasis on engineering and its preoccupation and
focus on agricultural land drainage and irrigation. The above analysis reveals that values, sub-
cultures and attitudes can determine the outcome of flood hazards.
9.5	 Research Question 5: Significant factors in individual perception and response to
flood hazards
Findings from the four case studies of floodplain residents in Peninsular Malaysia supported
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to varying degrees the hypothesised relationships, confirming the importance of location,
flood frequency, building type (with or without stilts), ethnicity and religion, attitudes and
beliefs, degree of optimism and flood hazard awareness on both individual perception and
response to flood hazards. For example, the ethnicity variable was found to be highly
significant in flood hazard perception and response. Rural Malays are found to be well
adapted to living on floodplains and are attuned to normal seasonal floods. They have a high
level of flood hazard awareness and are likely to view floods as common events which are
often seen as less threatening than they actually are. Because of higher levels of exposure to
flood hazards (due largely to their occupance of hazardous flood zones), Malays view floods
philosophically. Floods are so common that they have become an integral and accepted part
of their lives. Another variable which was found to affect perception and response was
religion. It has a particularly strong influence on Malays and their view of flood hazards.
Malays show a far greater tendency to believe that flooding is an act of God than the other
ethnic groups. As a result, they possess a more fatalistic attitude to life and are more likely
to show resignation in the face of flood disasters.
Although the scope for individual response to flood hazards is limited and constrained by
powerful socio-political contexts, such contexts are not totally inhibitive. Thus, despite their
position in society being heavily determined by contexts, people do have some room for
manoeuvre/action in the face of disasters. Malaysians were generally found to have developed
a wide range of individual flood reduction strategies, the most unique of which is the stilt
house. The stilt house is an adaptation to floods even though its modern version (in cities and
towns) are built more for aesthetic and architectural reasons. In fact, the majority of rural
Malays do not consider the stilt house as a form of flood proofing. It is a necessary house
type for those who live on floodplains. Thus, the adoption of adjustments is found to be
significantly associated to ethnic culture. Other than the stilt house, ethnic culture influences
one's selection of flood reduction strategies. Chinese appear to be most ready to take steps
to reduce flood losses, even though Malays live in more hazardous locations and are more
exposed to floods. This is because the majority of Malays live in stilt houses and are not too
bothered by normal floods than are the Chinese. However, because of their greater exposure,
Malays were found to possess a richer and wider variety of flood reduction strategies than
Chinese and Indians.
However, many of the hypothesised independent variables did not significantly affect the
majority of answers on perception and response (i.e. the dependent variables). These include:
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flood characteristics such as flood type, recency and severity; building characteristics such
as building type, wall type, building age, stilt height, and stilt type; and respondent's socio-
economic characteristics such as length of residence, age, education, family size, occupation,
gender, tenure and group membership.
9.6 Research Question 6: The effectiveness of formal flood warning and evacuation
systems and income equity policies in addressing flood hazards
The segment analysis in Chapter 8 revealed that although damage savings were significant
and could be substantially increased, the effectiveness of formal flood warning and evacuation
systems were wanting in many respects. For example, warning lead times reported were
inadequate for more than a third of respondents. The proportion of respondents receiving a
first warning from formal FWESs was less than a tenth. Conversely, the total number of
floods where the respondents did not receive a formal warning was high. Only about one
third of respondents who were warned were actually flooded (i.e. effective warning) as
compared to more than half who were not warned but flooded (i.e. no warning). However,
the proportion of respondents given 'false' warnings (i.e. warned but not flooded) was
generally small, except for Pekan where a tenth of respondents reported so. Finally, a high
proportion of respondents indicated that they do not rely on formal FWESs, with the majority
either not aware of the existence of such systems or preferring to rely on their own
judgement. Therefore, it is not surprising that formal FWESs are looked upon with scepticism
by floodplain residents. On the whole, formal FWESs are found to be largely ineffective.
However, 'informal' traditional FWESs were found to be very effective when incorporated
into formal FWESs. This is because people are well attuned to their traditional FWESs and
are not asked to do anything different from what they have been used to. Also, traditional
FWESs are based on 'real time' situations and people actually see signs of the river rising
or their neighbours being flooded. In such cases they do not need any convincing to evacuate.
Analysis of the income equity segment revealed that the magnitude of income inequity was
still pronounced, especially amongst ethnic groups, occupational groups, states/regions, and
specific groups (e.g. squatters). This was closely linked to the problem of poverty. Annual
flood losses were found to be significant vis-a-vis low household incomes, thus reinforcing
poverty. Socio-cultural contexts reinforce Malay poverty and thereby reinforce income equity
between them and the other ethnic groups. Similarly, political economy contexts also fail to
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adequately address poverty and income inequity, although some progress has been made.
Likewise, institutions have also not incorporated income equity and poverty eradication more
comprehensively into their flood management programmes. This has a retarding effect on
income equity attainment.
On the whole, the analysis of segments identified close links between contexts at various
levels. Macro structural contexts were demonstrated to have links with meso institutional
contexts which in turn affect individuals at the micro level. Although these links were largely
operating from the macro to the micro levels, they are not exclusively uni-directional. Thus,
individuals can influence institutional as well as political economy decisions. Likewise,
institutional contextual forces often bring about radical policy changes at the socio-political
level. However, it was found that the presence of too many contexts tends to blur the links
between the various levels and complicates the flood hazard scenario. Nevertheless, analysis
into links via segments uncover intricate relationships which can be further explored to
maximize flood hazard reduction.
9.7 The importance and appropriateness of the 'hazard response-in-contexts' model
as an explanatory model for flood hazard response
This section examines the limitations and strengths of the hazard response-in-context model
in Peninsular Malaysia based on the results and findings of this research. It also analyses the
appropriateness and applicability of the model.
9.7.1 The strengths and limitations of the hazard response-in-context model
The hazard response-in-context model is a composite model largely based on a combination
of the structural and behavioural paradigms. Thus, a major strength of the model is its ability
to handle both the influence of structural contexts and individual response in relation to flood
hazards, two contrasting perspectives which previous hazard models handled separately (Kates
1971; Hewitt 1983a). Unlike many previous research which either work within the 'dominant'
behavioural paradigm and remain bound by its theoretical framework (White 1974; Parker
and Harding 1979; Smith and Tobin 1979), move incrementally away from it (Penning-
Rowse11 et al 1986; Fordham 1992), or deviate radically from it (Waddell 1983; Hewitt
1983a; Blaikie et al 1994; Varley 1994), the model in this research begins with the admission
that no single model or paradigm can justifiably claim to explain human response to the wide
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variety of hazards in a multi-cultural world which is at the same time dynamic and ever
changing. By the same token, the hazard response-in-context model does not claim to be
universally applicable in explaining human response in all situations.
Another strength is that the model possesses an extra dimension of 'contexts' which gives it
added versatility. In its broadest form the model largely resembles the structural model as the
influence of macro structural contexts on choice is emphasised. However, in its most detailed
form, individual perception and response to flood hazards are modelled. Most significantly,
the model attempts to advance hazards theory through explaining the creation and
perpetuation of flood hazards in a rapidly developing country scenario. This is another
strength as the model can be applied in developed, developing, or rapidly developing
countries.
The model is a dynamic one and is able to take into account changes over time and space.
For example, time and space changes in the natural system resulting in increased flood risk,
similar changes in the human use system resulting in increased exposure and vulnerability,
or the unexpected occurrence of critical events which affect hazards (e.g. world recession,
international disputes and changes in policies) can be taken into account by the model. The
effects of each of these changes can be explained in their contexts. All these changes were
found in Peninsular Malaysia and are explained in the model. However, changes in contexts
render previous explanations obsolete. These changes, therefore, needs to be updated all the
time for the model to be valid and this can become a limitation. For example, during the
course of this research, it was discovered that Malays are now encouraged by the government
to venture into business and making money is gradually not being considered as taboo
amongst muslims (except to the most fundamental of muslims). Such a change in attitude and
values may be viewed as a change in context. This change will need to be investigated in
further research to ascertain the extent to which it has influenced Malay response to flood
hazards.
A limitation of the model is its generality. For any specific time and space, there may be
many contexts affecting choice and decisions. It is difficult to include all of them. Thus, only
key contexts can be explained and the rest left out. This reduces the comprehensiveness of
the model in explaining choice in floodplain occupance and response to hazards. Thus,
besides structural contexts, individuals in Peninsular Malaysia may be influenced by their own
situational characteristics such as their health, degree of support from relatives and friends,
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and influence in the community. These are also contexts themselves and need to be addressed
as no two individuals are exactly alike. The model cannot take into account individual
contexts. In the current research, only vignettes or descriptive accounts of the situational
contexts of individuals were examined and presented as individual flood experiences, both in
the main text and in Appendix H.
While the influence of individual attributes are quantifiable and can be statistically tested, the
influence of structural contexts are generally not (although structural contexts such as poverty
and cultural beliefs [religion] were treated quantitatively). As a result, the influence of
structural contexts are largely based on qualitative survey, historical analysis and secondary
data. This may not necessarily be a limitation (as there are advantages when using these
research methods, see Chapter 2), but the strength to which a broad structural context
influence individual flood hazard response is not as directly measurable as would an attribute
like gender or age.
Finally, the lack of literature in contexts relating to hazards research is a disadvantage.
Because of this, contexts identified and modelled in the current research are largely based on
hunches and hypotheses of the author's personal experience and sources outside the hazards
literature. However, this is again not necessarily a limitation as it represents a major
challenge in this research.
9.7.2 Performance of the hazard response-in-context model
A central focus of the hazard response-in-context model is on contexts. The influence of
macro structural contexts in trapping a significant proportion of inhabitants on floodplains
were found to be well represented by the model (see Section 9.3). For example, floodplain
inhabitants in Peninsular Malaysia were discovered to live in flood zones mainly due to
structural contexts. Early major settlements on floodplains (the historical facet of the socio-
cultural context) largely pre-determined a large proportion of people (largely indigenous
Malays) in flood-prone zones. Socio-cultural contexts, manifested in customs, beliefs,
attitudes and a sedentary (kampung) way of life were demonstrated to contribute significantly
to persistent occupation of floodplains by Malays, traditionally a riverine people whose
society and culture revolve around rivers and their adjacent land.
Individual choices are also strongly influenced and sometimes severely constrained by
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colonial forces, a structural context which still pervades into many areas of current Malaysian
society. The model was found to demonstrate the colonial influence effectively.
The influence of political economy contexts is also effectively represented by the model. Post-
colonial governments endeavoured to raise Malay incomes, reduce their disparities with other
ethnic groups and eradicate poverty but were hitherto only partly successful. Thus, ineffective
post-colonial policies is another structural context that was effectively modelled. Together
with the control of neo-colonialism, high incidence of poverty, low educational attainment,
low residential and occupational mobility, many Malaysians (still largely rural Malays but
increasingly more rural Chinese and Indians) continue to languish on floodplains and lead a
vulnerable existence. Added to this group of rural Malays are rural-urban migrants of all
ethnic groups who try to escape from the grip of rural poverty (rural-urban migration is
another structural context examined via the model). These are the squatters who make it to
the cities and towns but end up living in slums and squatter settlements, mostly on hazardous
urban floodplains (squatting is yet another important structural context monitored by the
model). More recently, Indonesians and Thais have crossed the international borders (largely
illegally) into the peninsula to seek their fortunes. They too largely end up in squatter
settlements, Indonesians in Kuala Lumpur and the southern part of the peninsula and Thais
in Kelantan and the northern parts. Thus, flood hazard vulnerability amongst this combined
group of rural Malays, urban squatters and illegal immigrants is explained by structural
contexts in the model.
The influence of flood hazard institutions, manifested as the institutional context is also
adequately represented in the model. The four facets of legislation, organisational structures,
attitudes and sub-cultures, and policies and instruments were modelled via the criteria
approach (see Section 9.4). These facets were analysed in-depth individually in the model.
While the model allows for the broad interpretation of institutional contexts on the outcome
of flood hazards, it also allows detailed examination of the influence of their facets. As was
with the analysis of other structural contexts, the approach to institutional analysis was based
more on qualitative than quantitative accounts. Thus, historical/colonial perspectives, past
records, reports and more recent development trends of these forces were used. Research
findings are therefore largely based on qualitative inferences and lacked quantitative details.
This is unavoidable but qualitative analysis does not necessarily invalidate the results. On the
contrary, it is empirical and the findings verify to its effectiveness in emphasising the
influence of institutional contexts on flood hazards.
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More significantly, the model was also able to link institutional contextual forces to macro
contextual forces and individuals. Individuals and institutions were found to be closely
related, each affecting the other. Institutions were found to affect individual response through
legislation, organisational structures, attitudes and sub-culture, and policies and instruments.
The strength of the model also lies in its ability to link institutional contexts to higher level
contexts (e.g. political economy) and lower level contexts (e.g. individuals) (Chapter 8).
However, because of its generality, some contextual forces were not as fully explored as
would have been the case if there were a limited number of them. For example, while the
model identified rural-urban migration as contributing to increased vulnerability, it was not
able to separate whether or not such migration was due more to a change in attitudes amongst
the migrants, the result of official policies, or simply the need to escape from perpetual
poverty on rural floodplains. Much greater detailed analysis into the subject would be needed
to uncover the answers.
Finally, the hazard response-in-context model allows for the quantitative measurement of
individual perception and response to flood hazards. Since a significant proportion of
Malaysians are located on floodplains, and their work and livelihood centre in and around
floodplains, they are invariably forced to make choices in response to flood hazards. In
general, Malaysian floodplain occupants are highly aware of floods but are not as objectively
knowledgeable about their characteristics as the flood expert. Thus, within the influence of
structural contexts, they were found to make choices mainly through bounded rationality. In
this respect, the extension of Kates' model into the 'model of individual flood hazard
perception and mitigating adjustment' (Figure 3.6) was found to be appropriate. Research
findings indicated that the ways in which individuals perceive and make decisions/choices in
response to flood hazards closely resemble that hypothesised in the model. The majority of
hypothesised relationships were measured by the model, the evidence of which is found in
the research results (see Section 9.5 and Chapters 6 and 7).
9.7.3 Summary
A common pattern is identifiable amongst researchers working within the dominant paradigm
who begin with a basic version of Kates's 1971 model (a ready made model), then testing it
in the field and finally fitting in the results to prove its appropriateness (e.g. White 1974;
Burton et al 1978, 1993; Fordham 1992). Unlike the above, this research draws on past and
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current developments in hazards theory and adds incremental advances to it. It begins with
a model with a strong foundation of established theory but largely based on current thinking.
More significantly, it comprises original contributions/increments to both in terms of a hazard
response-in-contexts model. Only then it seeks to verify the appropriateness of the model via
research findings. This research has revealed that it is possible to build a composite model
of hazard response from widely opposing perspectives. Despite a combination of the
behavioural paradigm, the structural paradigm and the current emphasis on hazard contexts,
the hazard response-in-context model in this research has managed to explain the creation and
perpetuation of flood hazards in Peninsular Malaysia (including human perception and
response to them) quite effectively.
Results of the analysis on individual response in this research revealed that the behavioural
model which emphasises the role of individuals is still valid and can be justifiably used to
explain floodplain occupants' perception and response behaviour to flood hazards (albeit
taking into account contexts). Thus, it verifies that, despite its limitations the Kates model is
important because individual response to hazards is a significant part of overall societal
response. The model should, therefore, be viewed as powerful within its own context, i.e.
based on self-help, individualism and free enterprise in a rapidly developing country.
Similarly, although strongest in the context of developing or Third World countries, this
research has revealed that the structural paradigm can be applied to rapidly developing
countries in analysing hazard vulnerabilities of deprived or disadvantaged communities within
them. Structural models largely contend that individualism is limited in impoverished
countries, thus limitingtheirscope (Smith 1992 p43) but when a structural model is combined
with a behavioural one, both sets of influence are represented. This research indicates that
structural forces of the historical, socio-cultural, political economy and institutional contexts
can be effectively modelled side by side individual response by the hazard response-in-context
model.
9.8	 Methodological issues
This research has employed both quantitative and qualitative methods in a triangulation
strategy by engaging a combination of complementary research methods which includes the
'cultural insider' observer (i.e. the author himself), historical analysis, institutional analysis
using the 'criteria approach', quantitative and qualitative surveys, and case studies.
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The 'cultural insider' method was found to be useful in the analysis of government, institution
and individual response to the flood hazard. However, the effectiveness of the method relies
heavily on the expertise of the insider and the level of objectivity of the researcher involved.
Much also depends on the extent to which the insider is received and treated in the institution
being researched. A great deal of tact and circumventing of red tape and bureaucracy is also
needed for its success.
Historical analysis was found to be a fairly straight forward but tedious method as in most
cases it involves the scrutiny of historical records. Nevertheless, is was discovered to be very
effective in studying how broader socio-political contexts with a historical background have
created and perpetuated the flood hazard. However, the output of this method is more
inferential than empirical.
Institutional analysis based mainly on the criteria approach but some observer participation
was also found to be extremely useful in evaluating flood hazard institutions and
organisations. However, confidentiality and secrecy in the institutions studied were major
obstacles encountered. Nevertheless, the use of both quantitative questionnaires and
qualitative interviews in the analysis allowed for greater depth of evaluation.
The use of case study areas solved the sampling problem as the floodplain population was
unknown. The four study areas selected represent a cross section of different sets of
conditions (physical and human) in relation to the flood hazard. However, the use of both
quantitative and qualitative surveys within each of four selected case studies is a major
strength.
Finally, this research has pioneered a method of analysis that allows researchers to identify
and evaluate the links between different contexts affecting hazards. Segment analysis allows
the researcher to analyse the extent to which macro structural contexts condition institutions
which in turn largely determine the effectiveness of formal FWESs in the peninsula. In turn,
the influence of structural and institutional contexts on individuals also determine their
response and thereby the effectiveness of the system. The results reveal that individuals are
extremely versatile and active in informal FWESs, which some local authorities have
incorporated into the formal system. Therefore, structural and institutional contexts are less
prohibitive in their influence on individual response but are instead benefiting from the
experience of local traditional systems which have evolved over long periods of time.
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Similarly, examining the influence of official policies on income equity reveals that
individuals are firmly constrained in their response to the flood hazard. The income equity
segment is different from the warning and evacuation segment simply because those who are
most affected, i.e. the individual floodplain occupants, are helpless in the context of their
poverty. The room for individual manoeuvre to attain income equity is limited. Segment
analysis, informs us of the importance of contexts upon individual flood hazard response.
9.9	 Future research directions
This research has demonstrated as well as reinforced the importance of contexts in current
hazards research. Even while key contexts were examined in this research, some were found
to change over time and space. The same contexts, therefore, need to be re-appraised as they
change. Furthermore, new contexts continue to be discovered. Others appear to emerge as
the factors affecting them change. Contexts are dynamic and rapidly changing. As contexts
change, flood hazards will be affected as will human perception and response to them
(Penning-Rowsell Forthcoming). Therefore, contexts remain a very challenging area in which
hazard researchers can explore. Currently, contexts are largely under researched and there
is a dearth of information on them (Mitchell et al 1989 p406). Because of this, contexts
represent a vast frontier in hazards research. Currently, very little is known about contexts
and the exogenous factors that drive them. Future research directions should, therefore,
concentrate on contexts, their interaction on one another, and their influence on human
vulnerability, perception and response to hazards.
As focus upon contexts is relatively new, it poses new challenges for the development of
innovative research methods. In this research, segment analysis was developed as one such
method. Other contexts may require different approaches and research designs as the analysis
of contexts should be dynamic. While focusing on the study of contexts, researchers should
also come up with new research designs and methods to be developed to study new contexts
and associated phenomena.
Previous hazards research have largely concentrated on developed or Third World countries.
This research revealed that the conditions that create hazards in a rapidly developing country
with a colonial background is very different from both sets of countries above. Hazards
research should, therefore, also focus on rapidly developing countries in the world. These
are countries where changes are rapid giving rise to equally rapid changes in contexts. This
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is another area where future research should focus upon. Research findings from rapidly
developing countries allow for a comparison with research results from developed countries
such as the United States (e.g. Burton et al 1978, 1993), the United Kingdom (e.g. Penning
Rowse11 et al 1986) and Australia (Handmer 1988, 1991), and from Third World countries
(Wisner and Mbithi 1974; Winchester 1992; Blaikie et al 1994) which have been widely
researched.
Future research focus should also be on Malaysia, a country on the verge of industrialisation.
Policies on economic development, ethnic equity, poverty eradication, environmental
protection and sustainability are likely to change in the near future. Consequently, the
contexts affecting them will also change as will new contexts emerge. Such changes need to
be monitored if flood hazards are to be managed and not exacerbated to an uncontrollable
degree.
For example, as more Malays become wealthier, more educated and their value system
changes, the contexts to which flood hazards affected them in the past will change. Will
rural-urban migration and squatting give rise to more pressing urban flood problems than will
poverty in rural agriculture areas? Will policy changes integrate Chinese and Indians with
Malays, and will the former two groups learn from the latter group about flood hazard
reduction (e.g. adopt the Malay stilt house as a flood proofing strategy)? Or will legislation
on floods reduce or exacerbate flood hazards? All these questions and more, need to be
addressed. Their answers lie in the contexts which affect them, and these need to be
researched.
In this research, only key contexts are explored. There are other contexts which have not
been studied. They may or may not be important and the only way to find out is to research
them. This should be another focus of future research.
This research has demonstrated the importance of cultural contexts in flood hazard perception
and response of individuals. Although the current research has examined the influence of
cultural values, attitudes, beliefs, religion, customs, and tradition on flood hazard perception
and response, there remains other cultural aspects that have not been examined. Even the
examination of many of these aspects have not been deep enough in a sociological sense.
Thus, collaboration between geographers, anthropologists and sociologists in this area would
greatly enhance and deepen the analysis on culture.
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The 'hazard response-in-context' model developed in this research is versatile and can be
adapted and applied to developed as well as developing countries. It would be interesting,
both from an academic as well as applied stand point, to apply it in western developed
countries such as the United States and Canada (from which the traditional paradigm
originated) and the United Kingdom (from which the institutional perspective had strongly
evolved). Equally, it would be interesting to see how the model fits in the impoverished Third
World (from which the structural paradigm evolved).
Finally, it is worthwhile pointing out that in their frantic quest for modernisation and
industrialisation, many rapidly developing countries (including Malaysia) are falling into the
same trap as their western developed counterparts had done so in the past, i.e. the over-
emphasis on the technocentric approach employing structural/engineering measures. This is
where Malaysia should learn from its own flood experiences as well as from those of other
countries. Unfortunately, societies have extreme difficulty in learning from their own past and
there is even less chance of learning from other countries (Davis 1981 p210). While other
factors including political ones have often intervened and watered down the lessons of
experience (Parker and Handmer 1992), it is evident that many have not learned as much as
they should from the advantage of experience (Parker 1994 p16). Flood hazards will always
be present in a country where physical conditions and human use continuously foster them.
We can, therefore, never eradicate floods from Peninsular Malaysia, but if we are to
successfully manage them with a balanced strategy of structural and non-structural measures
(incorporating both modern and traditional coping mechanisms), and also move towards
sustainable development, then we would be moving on the right track towards their reduction.
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APPENDIX A
MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY
Flood Hazard Research Centre
FLOOD DAMAGE, PERCEPTION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY FOR PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
For Residential, Farming, Fishing, Commercial and Government Establishments
Notes for Interviewer
1	 Any statement that is underlined should be read out to respondent
2	 Any statement in parentheses is for interviewer's information only
3	 All coded answers are for interviewer information only. They should
not be read out to respondents unless SPECIFIED so in the question.
4	 If any question is not applicable, write in 'NA'
5 Information on pages 2 & 3 is to be filled in by interviewer before
the commencement of the interview (interviewers may refer to the
respondent in the event of any ambiguity)
APPENDIX A:1
Signature:
Minutes
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
Coast:	 East Coast	 1
West Coast	 2
Region:
Northwest
	 1
Northeast	 2
Southwest
	 3
Southeast
	 4
Site:
Pulau Pinang
	 1
Kota Bharu
	 2
Kuala Lumpur	 3
Pekan	 4
Urban/Rural:	 Urban	 1
Rural	 2
Type of flooding: River	 1
Tidal & River	 2
Tidal	 3
Address
Questionnaire No:
Type of Establishment:
Residential	 1
Farming	 2
Commercial	 3
Public/Government	 4
Fishing	 5
Interviewer Number: 	
Interview date: 	
Time interview started:
	
Time interview ended: 	
Duration of interview:
I	 CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSE/SHOP/BUILDING
lal	 Type:
Bungalow	 1
Detached	 2
Semi-detached	 3
Terraced	 4
Flat	 5
APPENDIX A:2
I(b) Outer Wall:
Brick/concrete 1
Brick(Lower)/wood(Upper) 2
Wood 3
Others 4
(Specify
(c) Age:
> 100 years 1
81-100 years 2
61- 80 years 3
41- 60 years 4
21- 40 years 5
1 1- 20 years 6
<	 11	 years 7
(d) Floor:
Terrazo/marble 1
Carpet 2
Cement 3
Wood/parquet 4
Plastic/vinyl 5
Sand 6
Bamboo 7
Others,
(Specify
8
(e)(i)	 Stilts:
Yes 1 [GO TO Q(e)ii]
No 2 [GO TO Q(g) I
(ii)
	
If Yes, how high are the stilts?
1 feet	 1
2 feet	 2
3 feet	 3
4 feet	 4
5 feet	 6
> 5 feet
	
6
(f)	 What are the stilts made of?:
Concrete/brick/cement 	 1
Concrete(lower) & Wood(upper)	 2
Wood	 3
Bamboo	 4
Others	 5
(Specify	
(g)(i)	 Does the premise have a basement?:
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q(g)ii]
No	 2 [GO TO Q1 ]
(ii)	 If Yes, what is it used for?
Storage	 1	 Dwelling	 2
Parking	 3	 Business	 4
Others, specify 5
APPENDIX A:3
(TO BE READ OUT TO RESPONDENT)
We are carrying out a survey for the Universiti Sains Malaysia. The aim of the survey is to find out
how people perceive natural hazards and the ways in which they react to them in Peninsular
Malaysia. The survey is also partly supported by the Drainage and Irrigation Department and the
Flood Hazard Research Centre at Middlesex University (UK). The survey is completely confidential.
Unless permission is given by the participants, their names and views will not be revealed. The
results will be published in statistical and unidentifiable form only.
ll	 PERCEPTION
1
	
Are you the owner of this property/land/business?
Yes	 1
No	 2
2	 (a) How many years have you lived/farmed/been in business in this village/town?
Years
(FOR FARMING, FISHING & BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS ONLY. OTHERS GO TO Q3)
(b) During the years you have worked here how many years would you say your
harvest/business has been: (by 'good', we mean in terms of your income)?
Good	 	 years
Bad	 	  years
Regular	 	  years
3	 (a) What are the main advantages of living/farming/doing business in this village/town?
(RECORD VERBATIM. PROBE 3 TIMES)
(b) Most important advantage: 	
(c) Total number of advantages: 	
4	 (a) What are the main disadvantages in living/farming/doing business in this village/town?
(RECORD VERBATIM. PROBE 3 TIMES)
(b) Most important disadvantage: 	
(c) Total number of disadvantages: 	
5	 Are there more advantages or disadvantages to living/farming/doing business in this
village/town?
More advantages	 1
Equal	 2
More disadvantages 	 3
6	 List any hazards noted by respondent in 4(a):
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7	 Do the people living in this village/town have any trouble with floods?
Yes	 1
No	 2
Don't know	 -9
8	 (a) Do you belong to any group/organisation associated with flood problems?
Yes	 1 IGO TO 1:18(b)]
No	 2 [GO TO C19 1
(b) If Yes, specify group/organisation:(PROBE FOR ADDRESS & TEL. NO.)
9	 How many times has this property/building been flooded in the last 10 years?
None 0 7 times 7
Once 1 8 times 8
Twice 2 9 times 9
3 times 3 10 times 10
4 times 4 > 10 times 11
5 times 5 Don't know -9
6 times 6
10	 How likely do you think this property/building will be flooded at least once in the
following time periods on a scale of 0 (no chance) to 10 (almost certain)?
(SHOW CARD 1, READ OUT AND ENTER ONE CODE FOR EACH TIME PERIOD)
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 -9
no	 almost	 DK
chance	 certain
In the next few months
In the next year
In the next 6 years
In the next 10 years
In the next 50 years
11	 If you were to live 100 years, how many times do you expect this property/building to
be flooded? 	 times
12	 How many times has this village/town been flooded in the last 10 years?
None 0 7 times 7
Once 1 8 times 8
Twice 2 9 times 9
3 times 3 10 times 10
4 times 4 > 10 times 11
5 times 5 Don't know -9
6 times 6
13	 Please can you tell me all the years this village/town was flooded since you started living
here?
Years (Start with the most recent and going back as far as you can remember)
APPENDIX A:5
14	 When was the worst year for floods in this village/town? Year
15	 How likely do you think this village/town will be flooded at least once in the following
time periods on a scale of 0 (no chance) to 10 (almost certain)?
(SHOW CARD 1, READ OUT AND ENTER ONE CODE FOR EACH TIME PERIOD)
0	 1
	
2	 3	 4	 6	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 -9
no
	 almost
	
DK
chance	 certain
In the next few months
In the next year
in the next 5 years
In the next 10 years
In the next 50 years
16	 If you were to live 100 years, how many times do you expect this village/town to be
flooded?	 times
17	 (a) Are there other places in MALAYSIA with fewer/no floods where you could earn as
good a living as you do here? (READ OUT ANSWERS TO RESPONDENT)
Yes, certain
Possibly yes
Probably not
No, certain
Don't know
(b) If Yes, where?
Within the same mukim
Within the same district
Within the same state
Other West Coast states
Other East Coast states
1 [GO TO Q17(b)]
2 [GO TO Q18 ]
3 [GO TO Q18 1
4 [GO TO Q18 1
-9 [GO TO Q18 ]
1
	 East Malaysia
2
	 Others, specify
3
	
Don't know
4
5
6
7
-9
18	 (a) Knowing what you do now, do you think you will continue to live/work/do business
in this village/town for many more years?
Certainly Yes	 1 [GO TO Q18(b)]
Possibly yes	 2 [GO TO Q18(b)]
Probably not	 3 [GO TO Q18(c)]
Definitely No	 4 [GO TO Q18(c)1
Don't know	 -9 [GO TO Q191
(b) If Certainly & Possibly Yes, what is the main reason stopping you from moving?
No money 1 My farm/business is here 6
No where else to go 2 Farming/business is good 7
All my relatives & friends are here 3 Floods not serious here 8
I can't leave my inherited land 4 Others, specify 9
It's the same everywhere
(c) If Probably Not & Definitely No:
6 Don't know -9
(i) Where do you think you will move to?
Within the same mukim 1 East Malaysia 6
Within the same district 2 Thailand 7
Within the same state 3 Indonesia 8
Other West Coast states 4 Others, specify 9
Other East Coast states 5 Don't know -9
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(ii) When do you think you will move?
Within 1 year 1 Within 6 to 10 years 4
Within 1 to 2 years 2 > 10 years 5
Within 3 to 5 years 3 Not sure/don't know -9
19	 (a) To your knowledge, are there any ways of knowing that a flood is coming?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q19(b)[
No	 2 [GO TO Q20]
Don't know
	
-9 [GO TO Q201
(b) If Yes, specify (List all the ways known to respondent):
20 Here are some statements that have been made about the flood problem in this
village/town. Can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with them, based on
a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree)?
(SHOW CARD 2, READ OUT AND ENTER ONE CODE FOR EACH STATEMENT)
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
strongly	 agree	 neither agree	 disagree	 strongly
agree	 nor disagree	 disagree
(a) A flood is an act of God
(b) A flood is an act of the devil
(c) A flood is an act of nature (weather , climate etc)
(d) A flood is an act of man's activities
(e) A flood is a combination of nature and man's activities
(f) Past flooding in this area was a freak event, unlikely to happen again
(g) Floods are very common here. Happens all the time
(h) The likelihood of flooding in this area is increasing and becoming worse
(i) A flood could happen again any year
(j) Floods come regularly every once in so many years
(k) Floods is a big problem to us
(I) We don't have real/serious floods here
(m) We have been living with floods for a long time. We are used to them
(n) A flood won't happen again because the DID and other government agencies can now
control flooding through river and coastal management
(o) The authorities have not studied and understood the local flood problem thoroughly
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III	 MITIGATION STRATEGIES
21	 (a) Can anything be done to prevent floods?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q22(a)i & THEN BACK TO 021(b)]
No	 2 [GO TO Q21(b)]
Don't know	 -9 [GO TO Q21(b)]
(b) Can anything be done to reduce the effects of floods?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q22(a)ii]
No	 2 [GO TO Q23]
Don't know	 -9 [GO TO 0231
22	 (a) If Yes to Q21(a)	 and/or Q21(b), what
MENTIONED. PROBE 'ANYTHING ELSE' 3 TIMES)
can be done?
(i)
Prevent floods
(CODE ALL THAT ARE
(ii)
Reduce floods
Yes No Yes No
Pray 1 2 1 2
Use bomoh (witch doctor) 1 2 1 2
Dams and Reservoirs 1 2 1 2
Floodwalls, Embankments, Levees, Dykes 1 2 1 2
Channel deepening, straightening, etc 1 2 1 2
River Diversions, Relief channels 1 2 1 2
Storage reservoirs/retention ponds 1 2 1 2
Improve artificial drainage system 1 2 1 2
Flood abatement (plant trees to retain
flood waters in upper catchment)
1 2 1 2
Evacuation/emergency Action 1 2 1 2
Raising Ground Level of building 1 2 1 2
Flood Proofing of building 1 2 1 2
Land use Regulation/zoning plans 1 2 1 2
Flood Insurance 1 2 1 2
Flood Forecasting & Flood Warnings 1 2 1 2
Artificial rain-making 1 2 1 2
Planting cover crops/trees on exposed land 1 2 1 2
Removal of floating logs/debris from rivers 1 2 1 2
Prepare boat 1 2 1 2
Shift belongings/house contents 1 2 1 2
Others, specify 1 2 1 2
(b) Total number of strategies for flood prevention:
(c) Total number of strategies for flood reduction:
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23	 Have you, personally, taken any steps to reduce flooding or flood damage to your family,
property & its contents, land or crop in the past?
Yes	 1 [GO TO 0.24(a)1
No	 2 [GO TO Q24(b)1
24	 (a) During the most recent flood, what did you do? (LET RESPONDENT VOLUNTARILY
MENTION ALL THE STRATEGIES. PROBE 'ANYTHING ELSE' 3 TIMES)
(b) Besides the things you have done, the following are some of the things that others
have done during a flood. (ASK THE RESPONDENT EACH REMAINING STRATEGY THAT
HAS NOT BEEN USED BY HIM/HER IN SECTION (a))
(i ) Do you think they are good or bad?
(ii) Why do you think they are good or bad?
Section a	 Section (b)(i)	 Section(b)(ii) 
Yes= 1	 Good = 1;Bad = 2; See codes
No = 2	 DK = -9	 below
Nothing
Pray
Use bomoh (witch doctor)
Prepare to move
Move household members upstairs
Move household members out of premises
Move livestock/animals/pets elsewhere
Move vehicles elsewhere
Move contents/machinery/goods etc
Flood proofing (permanent)
Flood proofing (contingent)
Flood proofing (emergency)
[eg. Prevent water entering premises)
Flood Insurance
Warn others on site/at home
Warn others elsewhere
Buy provisions
Turn off electricity
Listen to weather forecast
Ring fire brigade, police, MP, etc
Elevate the floor
Change cropping pattern/crops
Prepare boat
Take leave
Fix switches higher
Others, specify	
(c) Total number of strategies used by respondent in the most recent flood: 	
[DO NOT ASK RESPONDENT. JUST SUM UP THE TOTALS OF SECTIONge))
APPENDIX A:9
26	 (a) When a flood comes the next time, would you do anything different?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q25(b)]
No	 2 [GO TO Q26 ]
Don't know	 -9 [GO TO 026 1
(b) If Yes, what would you do? (LET RESPONDENT VOLUNTARILY MENTION ALL THE
STRATEGIES. PROBE 'ANYTHING ELSE' 3 TIMES).
Yes No
Nothing 1 2
Pray 1 2
Use bomoh(witch doctor) 1 2
Prepare to move 1 2
Move household members upstairs 1 2
Evacuate household members out of premises 1 2
Move livestock/animals/pets elsewhere 1 2
Move vehicles elsewhere 1 2
Move furniture 1 2
Flood proofing (permanent) 1 2
Flood proofing (contingent) 1 2
Flood proofing (emergency) 1 2
[Prevent water entering premises]
Flood Insurance 1 2
Warn others on site/at home 1 2
Warn others elsewhere: neighbours/relatives 1 2
Buy provisions 1 2
Turn off electricity 1 2
Listen to weather forecast 1 2
Ring fire brigade, police, MP, etc 1 2
Elevate the floor 1 2
Change cropping pattern/crops 1 2
Prepare boat 1 2
Take leave 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
(c) Total number of different strategies respondent is willing to adopt during the next
flood: (DO NOT ASK. JUST ADD UP (b)):
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IV	 FLOOD WARNINGS
26	 (a) If you were given a '2 hour' warning before the most recent flood occurred, would
you have done anything different by way of preparation?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q26(b)1
No	 2 IGO TO C127 1
Don't know	 -9 [GO TO 027 1
(b) If Yes, what would you have done? (LET RESPONDENT MENTION ALL STRATEGIES.
PROBE 'ANYTHING ELSE' 3 TIMES)
Yes No
Nothing 1 2
Pray 1 2
Use bomoh(witch doctor) 1 2
Prepare to move 1 2
Move household members upstairs 1 2
Evacuate household members out of premises 1 2
Move livestock/animals/pets elsewhere 1 2
Move vehicles elsewhere 1 2
Move contents/machinery/goods etc 1 2
Flood proofing (permanent) 1 2
Flood proofing (contingent) 1 2
Flood proofing (emergency) 1 2
(Prevent water entering premises)
Flood Insurance 1 2
Warn others on site/at home 1 2
Warn others elsewhere: neighbours/relatives 1 2
Buy provisions 1 2
Turn off electricity 1 2
Listen to weather forecast 1 2
Ring fire brigade, police, MP, etc 1 2
Elevate the floor 1 2
Change cropping pattern/crops 1 2
Prepare boat 1 2
Take leave 1 2
Stop children from going to school 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
(c) Total number of strategies respondent would have adopted if warned:
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27	 During the most recent flood, how much did you manage to save as a result of receiving
a warning? (IF DID NOT RECEIVE A WARNING: How much do you think you would be
able to save if a warning had been received prior to flooding? 	 (PROBE FOR AN
ESTIMATE)
($)
Did not save anything 0
< 1,000 1
1,000 - 1,999 2
2,000 - 2,999 3
3,000 - 3,999 4
4,000 - 4,999 5
5,000 - 5,999 6
6,000 - 10,000 7
> 10,000 8
Don't know -9
28 Is there an official flood warning system/service in this village/town? ('Official' refers to
warnings from the Drainage and Irrigation Department, Malaysian Meteorological Service,
Police, other government departments, flood warden, farmers association, village
headman, local authority and warning via the media)
Yes	 1
No	 2
Don't know	 -9
29	 (a) Do you know which organisation/authority is currently responsible for forecasting
floods and issuing flood warnings in this village/town?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q29(b)I
No	 2 [GO TO Q30 I
(b) If Yes, can you tell me who that is? (Probe name of organisation/authority)
(c) Would you know where to contact this organisation if you wanted to? (PROBE FOR
LOCATION, ADDRESS OR TELEPHONE NUMBER)
Yes	 1
No	 2
30	 (a) Do you know which organisations/authorities are involved in delivering official flood
warning messages to the public in this village/town?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q30(b)]
No	 2 [GO TO Q31 ]
(b) If Yes, can you tell me who they are? (PROBE FOR NAME OF
ORGANISATIONS/AUTHORITIES)
(c) Would you know where to contact these organisations by telephone if you wanted to?
(PROBE FOR LOCATION, ADDRESS OR TELEPHONE NUMBER)
Yes	 1
No	 2
APPENDIX A:12
31	 Have you ever been warned about possible flooding
at this address?
(SHOW CARD 3, READ OUT AND FILL IN ONE CODE
by any of the following while living
FOR EACH ORGANISATION)
No	 Don't knowYes
Police 1 2 -9
Drainage and Irrigation Dept. 1 2 -9
Malaysian Meteorological Service 1 2 -9
Other government departments 1 2 -9
Specify:
Flood Warden 1 2 -9
Local Authority 1 2 -9
Media (TV/Radio/Rediffusion) 1 2 -9
Village Headman 1 2 -9
Farmer Association Representative 1 2 -9
Others, specify 1 1 2 -9
2 1 2 -9
32	 (a) How many official flood warnings have you received since living at this address?
(b) How many of these warnings were actually followed by flooding? 	
(c) How many of these warnings were not followed by flooding? 	
(d) How many times were you not warned but flooded ever since living here?
33	 (a) To what degree do you rely on the current flood warning system?
Completely	 1 [GO TO Q341
Considerably	 2 [GO TO Q341
Slightly	 3 [GO TO Q341
Not at all	 4 [GO TO Q33(b)1
(b) If answer is 4, ask: Why not?
Don't trust warning system	 1
Warning is always given too late 	 2
I rely only on my own judgement	 3
Others, specify	 4
(READ OUT): DURING THE MOST RECENT FLOOD IN
	 (MONTH)	 JYEAR),
FLOODING OCCURRED ALONG THE RIVER
	 AND OTHER WATER COURSES IN THIS 
AREA AND ELSEWHERE. 
34	 During that time, was your property flooded?
Yes	 1
No	 2
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I contacted them	 1
They got in touch	 2
officially warned? OR When did you
> 20 hours before flooding 1
11-20 hours before flooding 2
6-10 hours before flooding 3
0.02 - 5 hours before flooding 4
0 hours before flooding 5
0.02 - 5 hours after flooding 6
6-10 hours after flooding 7
> 10 hours after flooding 8
Don't know -9
contact them?(d) When were you
35	 During that time, was your village/town flooded?
Yes	 1
No	 2
Don't know	 -9
36	 During that time, can you tell me how you first became aware of the possibility of
flooding?
(FILL IN ONE CODE ONLY, DO NOT PROMPT)
Water entered property	 1
Own judgement	 2
Message from neighbour
	
3
Message from relative/friend
	 4
Warning from Drainage and Irrigation Department 	 5
Warning from Malaysian Meteorological Office
	 6
Warning from the police	 7
Warning from other government departments
	 8 Specify
	
Warning from flood warden	 9
Warning from village headman	 10
Warning from farmers association	 11
Warning from local authority 	 12
Warning from the Media (TV/Radio/Rediffusion) 	 13
When neighbour is flooded	 14
Heavy rains for many hours 	 15
Warning from neighbourhood flood-watch committee 16
Others, specify	 20
37	 (a) During that flood, were you officially warned?
Yes	 1 IGO TO Q37(b)1
No	 2 IGO TO 0.44 )
(b) If Yes, who was the first to officially warn you?
Police	 1
Drainage & Irrigation Dept.	 2
Malaysian Meteor. Service
	
3
Other government depts.	 4 Specify
Flood Warden	 5
Local Authority	 6
Media (TV/Radio/Rediffusion)
	
7
Village Headman	 8
Farmer Association Rep.
	
9
Others, specify	 	 10
Siren	 11
Information Department
	
12
(c) Did you contact them or did they get in touch with you?
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38	 Can you remember how you were first officially warned?
(SHOW CARD 4, READ OUT AND FILL IN ONE CODE ONLY)
Telephone 1
Loud hailer 2
Warning notice board 3
House call 4
Personal contact elsewhere 6
Police siren 6
Radio/TV 7
Others 10
No, can't remember -9
39	 Did you receive any further warning(s)?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q40]
No	 2 [GO TO Q421
Don't know
	
-9 [GO TO Q421
40	 If Yes for Q39, what further warnings did you receive? Please answer YES or NO for
each type of warning and tell me, if you were warned by a neighbour, relative or
organisation, whether you contacted them yourself or they got in touch with you.
(SHOW CARD 5 AND FILL IN ONE CODE FOR EACH TYPE OF WARNING)
Warning Received Contacted them They got
Yes No
myself	 in touch
Message from neighbour 1 2 1 2
Message from relative 1 2 1 2
Warning from Drainage and Irrigation Department 1 2 1 2
Warning from Malaysian Meteorological Office 1 2 1 2
Warning from the police 1 2 1 2
Warning from other government departments 1 2 1 2
Warning from flood warden 1 2 1 2
Warning from village headman 1 2 1 2
Warning from farmers association 1 2 1 2
Warning from local authority 1 2 1 2
Warning from the Media (TV/Radio/Rediffusion) 1 2 1 2
Information Department 1 2 1 2
Siren 1 2 1 2
Member of State/Parliament 1 2 1 2
Others 1, specify 1 2 1 2
Others 2, specify 1 2 1 2
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41	 Can you remember how you were warned by each of the following? (SHOW CARD 6,
READ OUT AND FILL IN ONE CODE FOR EACH ORGANISATION)
Drainage and Irrigation Department
Malaysian meteorological Service
Police
Other government department
Flood Warden
Farmer Association
Village Headman
Local Authority
Means of warning:
Telephone 1 Police siren 6
Loud hailer 2 Radio/TV 7
Flood warning board 3 Others, 8
House call 4 Can't remember -9
Personal contact 5
42 In any 'official' warnings, that is from the Drainage and Irrigation Department, Malaysian
Meteorological Service, Police, other government departments, flood warden, farmers
association, vi (age headman, local authority or warning via the media, were you told any
of the following?
(a) How long it would be before you were flooded?
Yes	 1
No	 2
Don't know	 -9
(b) How deep the flood might be at a particular place?
Yes	 1
No	 2
Don't know	 -9
(c) What to do if your property was affected?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q42(d)]
No	 2 [GO TO Q431
Don't know
	
-9 [GO TO Q431
(d) If yes, what were you told to do? (PROBE AND RECORD ANSWER VERBATIM)
43	 (a) How satisfied were you personally with the way the flood warning system worked
during the most recent flood in 	 (month)	 (year)? (READ OUT AND ENTER ONE
CODE ONLY)
Were you:	 Completely satisfied	 1
Quite satisfied	 2
Not very satisfied	 3
Not at all satisfied	 4
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(b) Why is that? (PROBE AND RECORD ANSWER VERBATIM)
(READ OUT): WE NEED TO KNOW WHAT YOU WOULD LIKE FROM AN 'IDEAL' FLOOD WARNING
SYSTEM SO THAT FUTURE FLOOD WARNING SYSTEMS CAN BE IMPROVED. 
44	 (a) Can you tell me how you would prefer to be warned initially?
(SHOW CARD 7, READ OUT AND FILL IN ONE CODE ONLY)
Personal call by police, DID, MMS, other govt depts or flood warden 	 1
Telephone call by police, DID, MMS, other govt depts or flood warden 	 2
Police siren
	
3
Police loudspeaker or loud hailer in area	 4
Alarm siren sounded	 5
Radio announcements	 6
TV announcements 	 7
Notices posted locally on a warning board 	 8
Emergency telephone number or answerphone to contact 	 9
Personal call by village headman	 10
Others, please specify 	 	 11
(b) And how would you prefer to be kept informed subsequently?
(SHOW CARD 7 AGAIN, READ OUT AND FILL IN ONE CODE FOR EACH WARNING
CATEGORY)
Yes No
Personal call by police, DID, MMS, other govt depts or flood warden 1 2
Telephone call by police, DID. MMS, other govt depts or flood warden 1 2
Police siren 1 2
Police loudspeaker or loud hailer in area 1 2
Alarm siren sounded 1 2
Radio announcements 1 2
TV announcements 1 2
Notices posted locally on a warning board 1 2
Emergency telephone number or answerphone to contact 1 2
Personal call by village headman 1 2
Others, please specify 
	 1 2
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45 In general, it has been shown that the longer the warning lead time, the less accurate
would be a warning. Bearing that in mind, when would you prefer to receive a warning?
(SHOW CARD 8, READ OUT AND FILL IN ONE CODE ONLY)
When there is only a possibility of a flood occurring eg. > 12 hours
before it is expected 1
When a flood is more likely but not for some hours 2
When a flood is almost certainly going to occur within the next 2 hours 3
When upstream is flooded & it is going to hit me in the next 1/2 to 1 hour 4
Others, specify 5
Don't know -9
46	 Do you think your household/business needs to receive an official flood warning or are
you prepared to rely on your own judgement about the possibility of flooding?
Need to receive an official warning 1
Prepared to rely on own judgement 2
It depends on circumstances 3
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V	 DAMAGE
Now I would like you to try and remember back to the worst ever flood and the most recent flood
experienced by you since living in this property 
47	 (a) At what height above the ground would the flood water start coming into your
property/building?
(b) At what height above the ground would the flood water become damaging to your
property/building?
(c) At what height above the ground would the flood water become damaging to your
family/business?
Code for 047 (a), (b) & (c)
1 feet 1
2 feet 2
3 feet 3
4 feet 4
5 feet 5
6 feet 6
7 feet 7
8 feet 8
9 feet 9
10 feet 10
> 10 feet 11
Don't Know -9
WORST FLOOD IN
48	 (a) Were you living/in business at this address at the time of the WORST flood in	 ?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q48(b)]
No	 2 [GO TO 0541
(b) Were you f ooded at the time of the WORST flood in 	 ?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q48(b)i]
No	 2 [GO TO Q54I
If answer is Yes, (i) What was the depth of the flood waters?
(USE SAME CODES AS 047 FOR DEPTH OF FLOOD WATER)
(ii) How long did the flood last?
< 1 hour 1 3 - 4 days 7
1 - 2 hours 2 5 - 7 days 8
3 - 5 hours 3 8- 10 days 9
6 - 12 hours 4 11 - 30 days 10
13 - 24 hours 5 > 1 month 11
1 - 2 days 6 Don't Know -9
49	 Did the WORST flood cause any damage, however minor, to this property, its contents
or your business/crops/etc?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q50(a)]
No	 2 [GO TO Q50(i)1
50	 If Yes, was there any damage, however minor, to your:
Yes	 No	 Cost($)
(a) Building: Floor 1 2
Wall 1 2
Stilts 1 2
Stairways 1 2
Basement 1 2
Garden 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to building: (S)
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(b)	 Contents: Yes No	 Cost($)
Carpet 1 2
Furniture 1 2
Electrical appliances 1 2
Air conditioning 1 2
Foodstuffs 1 2
Pets 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to contents: ($)
(c) Vehicles: Yes No	 Cost($)
Tractor 1 2
Lorry/truck 1 2
Van 1 2
Car 1 2
Motorbike 1 2
Bicycle 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to vehicles: ($)
(d) Livestock & crops: Yes No	 Cost(S)
Crops 1 2
Cattle 1 2
Goats 1 2
Poultry 1 2
Pigs(Do not ask Muslims) 1 2
Fish 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to livestock & crops: ($)
(e) Humans: (PLEASE BE TACTFUL WHEN YOU ASK THIS QUESTION)
Yes	 No	 Cost(5)
Killed 1 2
Taken ill 1 2
Anxiety, stress, worry 1 2
Loss of work 1 2
Loss of schooling 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to humans: (5)
(f) Memorabilia: Yes	 No	 Cost($)
Photographs	 1	 2
Antiques	 1	 2
Jewellery	 1	 2
Paintings	 1	 2
Others, specify	  1	 2
Total cost of damages to memorabilia: ($) 	
Yes	 No	 Cost(S)
(g) Any other damages?: Clothes	 1	 2
Shoes	 1	 2
Machinery	 1	 2
Goods	 1	 2
Total cost of all other damages: (5)
(h) Total cost of all damages in the WORST flood in 	 =$ 	
(DO NOT ASK RESPONDENT. INTERVIEWER SHOULD SUM UP ALL DAMAGES TO
ARRIVE AT THE FIGURE FOR TOTAL DAMAGES)
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Yes	 1	 [GO TO Q51(b)il
No	 2 [GO TO Q541
is Yes, (i) What was the depth of the
1 feet 1
2 feet 2
3 feet 3
4 feet 4
5 feet 5
6 feet 6
7 feet 7
8 feet 8
9 feet 9
10 feet 10
> 10 feet 11
Don't Know
(ii) How long did the flood last?
< 1 hour
-9
1
1 - 2 hours 2
3 - 5 hours 3
6 - 12 hours 4
13 - 24 hours 5
1 - 2 days 6
3 - 4 days 7
5 - 7 days 8
8 - 10 days 9
> 10 days 10
Don't Know -9
If answer flood waters?
(i) How lonq did it take you to clean up the entire property after the flood?
< 1 hour 1
1 - 2 hours 2
3 - 5 hours 3
6 - 12 hours 4
13 - 24 hours 5
1 - 2 days 6
3 - 4 days 7
5 - 7 days 8
8 - 10 days 9
> 10 days 10
Takes weeks 11
Takes months 12
Takes years 13
Don't know -9
MOST RECENT FLOOD IN
51	 (a) Were you living/in business at this address at the time of the most recent flood?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q51(13)1
No	 2 [GO TO Q541
(b) Were you flooded at the time of the most recent flood in
52	 Did the most recent flood in	 cause any damage, however minor, to this property
or its contents?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q53(a)1
No	 2 [GO TO Q53(01
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53 If Yes, was there any damage, however minor, to your:
Yes No	 Cost($)
(a) Building: Floor 1 2
Wall 1 2
Stilts 1 2
Stairways 1 2
Basement 1 2
Garden 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to building: ($)
(b)	 Contents: Yes No	 Cost($)
Carpet 1 2
Furniture 1 2
Electrical appliances 1 2
Air conditioning 1 2
Foodstuffs 1 2
Pets 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to contents: ($)
(c) Vehicles: Yes No	 Cost($)
Tractor 1 2
Lorry/truck 1 2
Van 1 2
Car 1 2
Motorbike 1 2
Bicycle 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to vehicles: ($)
(d) Livestock & crops: Yes No	 Cost(S)
Crops 1 2
Cattle 1 2
Goats 1 2
Poultry 1 2
Pigs(Do not ask Muslims) 1 2
Fish 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to livestock & crops: (5)
(e) Humans: (PLEASE BE TACTFUL WHEN YOU ASK THIS QUESTION)
Yes	 No	 Cost($)
Killed 1 2
Taken ill 1 2
Anxiety, stress, worry 1 2
Loss of work 1 2
Loss of schooling 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to humans: (5)
(f) Memorabilia: Yes No	 Cost(S)
Photographs 1 2
Antiques 1 2
Jewellery 1 2
Paintings 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to memorabilia: ($)
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Yes	 No	 Cost($)
(g) Any other damages?: Clothes	 1	 2
Shoes	 1	 2
Machinery	 1	 2
Goods	 1	 2
Total cost of all other damages: ($)
(h) Total cost of all damages in most recent flood in 	 (year) = $ 	
(DO NOT ASK. INTERVIEWER SHOULD SUM UP ALL DAMAGES TO ARRIVE AT THE
FIGURE FOR TOTAL DAMAGES)
(i) How long did it take you to clean up the entire property after the most recent flood in
?
< 1 hour 1
1 - 2 hours 2
3 - 6 hours 3
6 - 12 hours 4
13 - 24 hours 6
1 - 2 days 6
3 - 4 days 7
5 - 7 days 8
8 - 10 days 9
> 10 days 10
Takes weeks 11
Takes months 12
Takes years 13
Don't know -9
54	 Please indicate the accuracy of each of the above estimates according to the scale below:
(al The WORST flood: 
Very accurate	 1
Accurate	 2
Moderately accurate
	
3
Inaccurate	 4
Very inaccurate	 5
(b) The most recent flood: 
Very accurate	 1
Accurate	 2
Moderately accurate	 3
Inaccurate	 4
Very inaccurate	 5
55	 Now I would like you to rate the consequences of the following floods on your
household's life, based on a scale of 0 (no effect) to 10 (most serious effect).
(SHOW CARD 9, READ OUT AND ENTER RATING FOR EACH FLOOD)
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
no	 most serious
effect	 effect
(a) The worst flood in 	 (	 )
(b) The most recent flood in 	  l	 I
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56 Now I would like you to try to summarise your experience of the most serious flood and
its effect on your household's/business's life ever since you moved into this area and rate
it on the same scale of 0 (no effect) to 10 (most serious effect).
(USE SCALE ON SHOW CARD 9 AGAIN, ENTER RATING)
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
no	 most serious
effect	 effect
Effect upon your health and your family's/workers' health
Having to leave home/the building
Damage to replaceable items eg furniture, contents, etc
Worry and stress about flooding in future
Loss or damage to irreplaceable objects/memorabilia
All the problems and discomfort whilst trying to get the house/building back to normal
Damage to the house/building itself
Effect on gardens, land and outbuildings
Foul smell of f ood waters
Inconvenience caused by road and bridge flooding/transport problems
Effect on business/crops
57	 (FOR AGRICULTURE, FISHING AND COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS ONLY. OTHERS
GO TO 058)
Did you suffer any loss/es in crop harvest/business during each of the floods below that
was not made up during the period after the flood?
(a)(i) During the WORST flood in 	
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q57(a)iil
No	 2 (GO TO Q57(b)i]
Don't know	 -9 (GO TO Q57(13)i1
(ii) If Yes, how much was the % loss from normal?
1 - 10 % 1 71 - 80 % 8
11 - 20 % 2 81 - 90 % 9
21 - 30 % 3 91 - 100 % 10
31 - 40 % 4 > 100 % 11
41 - 50 % 5 Don't know -9
61 - 60 % 6
61 - 70 % 7
(b)(i) During the most recent flood in
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q57(b)ii(
No	 2 [GO TO Q581
Don't know	 -9 [GO TO Q58I
(ii) If Yes, how much was the % loss from normal?
1 - 10 % 1 71 - 80 % 8
11 - 20 % 2 81 - 90 % 9
21 - 30 % 3 91 - 100 % 10
31 - 40 % 4 > 100 % 11
41 - 50 % 5 Don't know -9
51 - 60 % 6
61 - 70 % 7
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68 (a) Have there been any long term effects of flooding in general on your
property/land/business or contents ever since you have been living/farming/doing
business in this location ?
Yes	 1 [GO TO Q58(b)1
No	 2 [GO TO Q591
Don't know	 -9 [GO TO Q591
(b) If Yes, specify:
VI	 PERSONAL INFORMATION
The remaining questions are standard in most questionnaire surveys and are only used for our own
classification purposes. Your answers are completely confidential. 
59	 Position of Respondent:
Head of house	 1
Wife	 2
Son	 3
Daughter	 4
Manager	 5
Worker	 6
Others, specify	 	 7
60	 Gender:
Male	 1
Female	 2
61	 _act:
<21	 1
21-30	 2
31-40	 3
41-50	 4
51-60	 5
>60	 6
62	 Ethnic Group:
Malay	 1
Chinese	 2
Indian	 3
Others	 4
63	 Reliqim:
Muslim	 1
Christian	 2
Buddhist	 3
Hindu	 4
Taoist	 5
Others, specify	 6
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64	 Occupation:
Professionals	 1
Farmer	 2
Artisan	 3
Tradesman, businessman, services 4
Labourer	 5
Education	 6
Manufacturer	 7
Unemployed	 8
Retired	 9
Housewife	 10
Student	 11
Fisherman	 12
Others	 20
65	 Education:
None at all	 1
A few years in primary school 	 2
Completed primary school 	 3
Lower secondary school 	 4
Upper secondary school 	 5
Tertiary/Diploma	 6
Tertiary/Degree	 7
66	 Income:
Can you tell me which of the letters on this card represents the gross annual income from
all sources in your household/farm/business? (SHOW CARD 10)
Letter Annual Monthly
($) (0
( L ) <2,100 <175 01
( Q ) 2,100-4,199 176-349 02
( F ) 4,200-5,999 350-499 03
( G ) 6,000-8,999 500-749 04
( A ) 9,000-11,999 760-999 05
( H ) 12,000-17,999 1,000-1,499 06
(TI 18,000-23,999 1,500-1,999 07
( C ) 24,000-29,999 2,000-2,499 08
( D ) 30,000-35,999 2,500-2,999 09
( M ) 36,000-47,999 3,000-3,999 10
( X ) 48,000-69,999 4,000-4,999 11
( R ) 60,000-119,999 5,000-9,999 12
( B ) > 120,000 > 10,000 13
Refused Refused -9
67	 Family size/Total number of workers:
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APPENDIX B
MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY
Flood Hazard Research Centre
SOAL-SELIDIK ICEMUSNAIIAN, PERSEPSI DAN STRATEG1
PENGURANGAN ICESAN BANJIR
DI SEMENANJUNG MALAYSIA
Untuk Perumahan, Pertanian, Perikanan dan Penubuhan-penubuhan Komersil
dan Awam/Kerajaan
Nota-nota untuk Penemuduga
1	 Sebarang ayat yang digariskan mesti dibaca kepada responden
2	 Sebarang ayat di dalam kurungan hanya untuk maldumat penemuduga
sahaja
3 Semua jawapan berkod adalah untuk maklumat penemuduga sahaja.
Jangan baca jawapan tersebut kepada responden kecuali jika diminta
dalam soalan
4	 Selciranya sebarang soalan adalah tidak berkenaan, tulis 'TB 'di dalam
jawapan
5 Maklumat dalam muka surat 2 & 3 perlu diisikan oleh penemuduga
sebelum memulakan temuduga dengan responden (penemuduga boleh
merujuk kepada responden jika terdapat sebarang keraguan)
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Tandatangan Penemuduga:
Minit
UNTUK KEGUNAAN PEJABAT SAHAJA
Pantai:	 Pantai Timur	 1
Panatai Barat	 2
Wilayah:
Barat-laut	 1
Timur-laut	 2
Barat-daya	 3
Tenggara	 4
Tapak:
Pulau Pinang	 1
Kota Bharu	 2
Kuala Lumpur	 3
Pekan	 4
Bandar/Desa:	 Bandar	 1
Desa	 2
Jenis Banjir:	 Sungai	 1
Sungai & Pasang surut	 2
Pasang surut	 3
Alamat
No Soal-selidik:
Jenis Penubuhan:
Perumahan	 1
Pertanian	 2
Komersil	 3
Awam/Kerajaan 4
Perikanan	 5
No. Penemuduga: 	
Tarikh Temuduga: 	
	
Masa mula temuduga: 	
Masa tamat temuduga:
Tempoh temuduga: 	
CIRI-CIRI RUMAH/KEDAI/BANGUNAN
(a)	 Jenis:
Bungalow
	
1
Bangunan Terpisah	 2
Separuh-Terpisah	 3
Teres	 4
Pangsa	 5
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(b) Dinding luar:
Batu bata/konkrit 1
Batu bata(bawah)/papan(atas)
Papan 3
Lain 4
(Nyatakan
)
(c) Umur Bangunan:
> 100 tahun 1
81-100 tahun 2
61- 80 tahun 3
41- 60 tahun 4
21- 40 tahun 5
11- 20 tahun 6
<	 11	 tahun 7
(d) Lantai:
Terrazo/marble 1
Permaidani 2
Simen 3
Papn/parquet 4
Plastik/vinyl 5
Pasir 6
Buluh 7
Lain,
(Nyatakan
8
)
(e)(i) Tiang kaki bangunan:
Ada	 1 [KE S(e)ii)
Tiada	 2 [KE S(g) 1
(ii)	 Jika Ada, berapa tinggi?
1 kaki	 1
2 kaki	 2
3 kaki	 3
4 kaki	 4
5 kaki	 5
> 5 kaki	 6
(f)	 Tiang kaki bangunan dibuat dari apa?:
Konkrit/batu bata/simen	 1
Konkrit(bawah) & Papan(atas) 	 2
Papan	 3
Buluh	 4
Lain,	 5
(Nyatakan	 )
(g)(i)
	 Adakah bangunan ini mempunyai tingkat bawah tanah (basement)?:
Ya	 1 [KE S(g)ii)
Tidak
	 2 EKE Si	 )
(ii)	 Jika Ya, apakah kegunaan tingkat bawah tanah tersebut?
Tempat simpanan	 1	 Tempat tinggal 2
Tempat letak kenderaan	 3	 Tempat berniaga 4
Lain	 5
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2
(UNTUK DIBACA KEPADA RESPONDEN)
Tuan/puan, kami sedang menjalankan suatu kaji selidik untuk Universiti Sains Malaysia. Tujuan kaji
selidik ini adalah untuk mengkaji tanggapan penduduk Malaysia terhadap bahaya/bencana semula
jadi dan cara-cara penyesuaian mereka terhadap bahaya/becana tersebut. Kaji selidik ini adalah
dibiayai oleh Universiti Sains Malaysia, Jabatan Pant dan Taliair dan Middlesex University (UK). Kaji
selidik ini adalah SULIT. Kecuali kebenaran diberikan oleh responden, nama dan pendapat
responden tidak akan diberitahu kepada sesiapa pun. Dapatan-dapatan kajian hanya diterbit dalam
bentuk laporan yang tidak dapat dikenalpastikan.
II	 PERSEPSI
1	 Adakah anda memiliki milikan(bangunan)/tanah/perniagaan(kedai) ini?
Ya	 1
Tidak
	
2
2	 (a) Berapa tahun sudah anda tinggal/mengerja sawah/berniaga di kampung/pekan ini?
Tahun
(UNTUK PERTANIAN, PERIKANAN DAN PERNIAGAAN SAHAJA. LAIN PERGI KE S3)
(b) Sejak anda mula bekerja di sini, berapa tahun agaknya boleh dikatakan mendapat hasil
baik, buruk dan biasa (sederhana)?
Baik	 	 Tahun
Buruk
	
	 Tahun
Biasa (sederhana)	 Tahun
3	 (a) Apakah kelebihan-kelebihan tinggal/mengerja sawah/berniaga di kampung/pekan ini?
(CATAT SEPERTI YANG DIHURAIKAN. TANYA 'ADA APA LAGI' 3 KALI)
(b) Apakah kelebihan yang paling penting? 
	
(c) Apakah jumlah bilangan kelebihan? 	
4	 (a) Apakah kekurangan-kekurangan tinggal/mengerja sawah/berniaga di kampung/pekan
ini? (CATAT SEPERTI YANG DIHURAIKAN. TANYA 'ADA APA LAGI' 3 KALI)
(b) Apakah kekurangan yang paling teruk? 	
(c) Apakah jumlah bilangan kekurangan? 	
5	 Yang mana lebih banyak? Kelebihan atau kekurangan?
Kelebihan	 1
Sama	 2
Kekurangan	 3
6	 Senaraikan semua bahaya/bencana semula jadi yang dinyatakan dalam S4(a):
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7	 Adakah penduduk yang tinggal di kampung/pekan ini mempunyai masalah banjir
(mengalami banjir)?
Ya	 1
Tidak	 2
Tak tahu	 -9
8	 (a) Adakah anda menjadi ahli kepada mana-mana persatuan/organisasi yang terlibat
dengan penyelesaian masalah banjir?
Ya	 1 EKE S8(b)]
Tidak	 2 EKE S9 ]
(b) Jika Ya, apakah persatuan/organisasi tersebut? (MINTA ALAMAT & NO. TELEFON)
9	 Pada tempoh 10 tahun yang lepas, berapa kali telah milikan/bangunan ini dibanjiri? atau
Jika < 10 tahun tinggal di situ, 'Sejak anda tinggal di situ'?
Tidak dibanjiri 0 7 kali 7
Sekali 1 8 kali 8
2 kali 2 9 kali 9
3 kali 3 10 kali 10
4 kali 4 > 10 kali 11
5 kali 5 Tak tahu -9
6 kali 6
10	 Berdasarkan satu skala 0 (langsung tidak mungkin) sehingga 10 (tentu akan jadi), apakah
kemungkinan milikan/bangunan ini dibanjiri sekurang-kurangnya satu kali pada tempoh
masa berikut? (TUNJUK KAD 1, BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN DAN KEMUDIAN
MASIMX,411) SATV )WD VAITUK SEDAP TEMPOH MASA)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 -9
LTM	 TAJ TT
Pada beberapa bulan depan
Pada tahun depan
Pada tempoh masa 5 tahun
Pada tempoh masa 10 tahun
Pada tempoh masa 50 tahun
11	 Jika anda hidup 100 tahun, berapa kali anda fikir milikan/bangunan ini akan dibanjiri?
kali
12	 Pada tempoh 10 tahun yang lepas, berapa kali telah kampung/pekan ini dibanjiri? atau
Jika < 10 tahun tinggal di situ, 'Sejak anda tinggal di situ'?
Tidak dibanjiri 0 7 kali 7
Sekali 1 8 kali 8
2 kali 2 9 kali 9
3 kali 3 10 kali 10
4 kali 4 > 10 kali 11
5 kali 5 Tak tahu -9
6 kali 6 TB -8
13
	
	
Bolehkah anda ingat tahun-tahun di mana kampung/pekan ini dibanjiri? Sila beritahu
seberapa tahun yang anda boleh ingat:
Tahun	 (Mulakan	 dengan	 tahun	 terbaru)
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14	 Tahun apakah yang mempunyai banjir paling teruk di kampung/pekan ini?
15 Berdasarkan satu skala 0 (langsung tidak mungkin) sehingga 10 (tentu akan jadi), apakah
kemungkinan kampung/pekan ini dibanjiri sekurang-kurangnya satu kali pada tempoh
masa berikut?
(TUNJUK KAD 1, BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN DAN KEMUDIAN MASUKKAN SATU KOD
UNTUK SETIAP TEMPOH MASA)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 -9
LTM
	
TAJ IT
Pada beberapa bulan depan
Pada tahun depan
Pada tempoh masa 5 tahun
Pada tempoh masa 10 tahun
Pada tempoh masa 50 tahun
16	 Jika anda hidup 100 tahun, berapa kali anda fikir kampung pekan ml akan d banfi-i?
kali
17	 (a) Adakah tempat-tempat lain di MALAYSIA yang mengalami sed"k"t banj r di mana anda
boleh mendapat rezeki yang sama seperti di sini?
(BACA JAWAPAN KEPADA RESONDEN)
Tentu ada
Mungkin ada
Mungkin tak ada
Tentu tak ada
Tak tahu
(b) Jika Tentu ada, di mana?
Dalam mukim sama
Dalam daerah sama
Dalam negeri sama
Lain negeri di P. Barat
Lain negeri di P. Timur
1 [KE S17(b)]
2 EKE S17(b11
3 [KE S18 ]
4 [KE S18 ]
-9 EKE S18 ]
1
	
Malaysia Timur 6
2
	
Lain	
	 7
3
	
Tak Tahu	 -9
4
5
18	 (a) Dengan pengetahuan anda sekarang tentang masalah banj r cl . s ni, adakah anda mas h
terus tinggal bekerja berniaga di kampung pekan ini untuk masa yang lama?
Tentu ya	 1 [KE S18(b)]
Mungkin ya	 2 EKE S18(b)]
Mungkin tidak
	
3 EKE S18(c)]
Tentu tidak
	
4 EKE S18(c)1
Tak tahu	 -9[KE S19 ]
(b) Jika Tentu ya atau Mungkin ya, kenapa anda tidak p"ndah?
Tiada wang 1 Tanah pern agaan di s 6
Tiada tempat nak pergi 2 Bekerja berniaga ba k di s 7
Saudara & kawan di sini 3 Lain, nyatakan 8
Tak mahu tinggal tanah 4 Tak tahu -9
Mana pun sama sahaja
(c) Jika Mungkin tidak atau Tidak:
5
(i) Ke mana anda akan pindah?
Dalam mukim sama 1 Malaysia Timur
	 6
Dalam Daerah sama 2 Negeri Thai	 7
Dalam Negeri sama 3 Indonesia	 8
Lain negeri di P. Barat 4 Lain	 9
Lain negeri di P. Timur 5 Tak tahu	 -9
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(ii) Bila anda akan pindah?
Dalam masa 1 tahun 1 Dalam masa 6-10 tahun 4
Dalam masa 1-2 tahun 2 Dalam masa > 10 tahun 5
Dalam masa 3-5 tahun 3 Tak tahu/tak tentu -9
19	 (a) Setahu anda, bolehkah seorang tahu bahawa banjir akan datang?
Ya	 1 [KE S19(b)]
Tidak	 2 EKE S20 ]
Tak tahu	 -9[KE S20 ]
(b) Jika Ya, nyatakan bagaimana:
20 Berikut adakah beberapa pernyataan yang telah dikatakan tentang banjir di
kampung/pekan ini. Berdasarkan skala 1 (sangat setuju) hingga 5 (sangat tidak setuju),
sila tunjukkan adakah anda setuju atau tidak dengan setiap pernyataan.
(TUNJUKKAN KAD 2, MASUKKAN SATU KOD UNTUK SETIAP PERNYATAAN)
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
sangat	 setuju
	 neutral	 tidak	 sangat tidak
setuju	 (tiada komen)	 setuju	 setuju
(a) Banjir adalah hasil kegiatan Tuhan
(b) Banjir adalah basil alam semula jadi
(c) Banjir adalah hasil alam semula jadi (cuaca, iklim, din.)
(d) Banjir adalah hash l kegiatan manusia
(e) Banjir adalah basil interaksi alam semula jadi dan kegiatan manusia
(f) Banjir-banjir lepas di sini adalah kejadian luarbiasa yang tidak akan terjadi lagi
(g) Banjir adalah perkara biasa di sini. lanya selalu berlaku di sini
(h) Kejadian banjir di sini semakin meningkat/tambah
(i) Banjir boleh berlaku pada mana-mana satu tahun
(j) Banjir berlaku dalam pola tertentu, iaitu setiap beberapa tahun sekali
(k) Banjir adalah masalah besar untuk kami
(I) Kami tidak mempunyai banjir benar/serius/besar di sini
(m) Kami sudah lama hidup dalam keadaan banjir. Kami sudah biasa dengan banjir
(n) Banjir tidak akan terjadi lagi kerana Jabatan Pant dan Taliair dan jabatan-jabatan
kerajaan yang lain boleh mengawal banjir melalui pengurusan sungai dan pantai
(o) Pihak-pihak berkuasa belum lagi benar-benar memahami masalah banjir tempatan di
sini lagi
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III	 STRATEGI PENGURANGAN BANJIR
21	 (a) Bolehkah sesuatu dilakukan untuk mencegah banjir dari berlaku?
Ya	 1 EKE S22(a)i & KEMBALI KE S21(b)]
Tidak	 2 EKE S21(b)]
Tak tahu	 -9[KE S21(b)]
(b) Bolehkah sesuatu dilakukan untuk mengurangkan kesan banjir?
Ya	 1 EKE S22(a)ii]
Tidak	 2 EKE S231
Tak tahu	 -9(KE S231
22	 (a) Jika Ya untuk S21 (a) dan/atau S21 (b), apakah cara-cara itu? (BIARKAN RESPONDEN
MENGEMUKAKAN SEMUA STRATEGI SENDIRI. SOAL 'ADA APA LAGI?' 3 KALI)
(i) Cegah Banjir (ii) Kuranq kesan
Ya Tidak Ya Tidak
Sembahyang 1 2 1 2
Guna bomoh 1 2 1 2
Bina empangan dan kolamair 1 2 1 2
Dinding banjir, benteng, dan benteng 1 2 1 2
Mendalam & meluruskan atur sungai 1 2 1 2
Membina lencungan sungai, alur tambahan 1 2 1 2
Kolamair simpanan, empangan simpanan 1 2 1 2
Memperbaiki sistem saliran bandar 1 2 1 2
Pengurangan banjir(tanaman lindungan
di tadattaR kmtkik sick-ksleA aic bar* \
1 2 1 2
Pindahan/tindakan kecemasan 1 2 1 2
Peninggian tingkat bawah/lantai 1 2 1 2
Pelindungan rumah/bangunan dari air banjir 1 2 1 2
Kawalan guna tanah/rancangan pengezonan 1 2 1 2
Insuran banjir 1 2 1 2
RamaIan banjir & amaran banjir 1 2 1 2
Pembuatan hujan tiruan 1 2 1 2
Penanaman tanaman pelindung(untuk
mengurangkan hakisan tanah)
1 2 1 2
Keluarkan sampah apungan dari sungai 1 2 1 2
Sediakan bot/sampan 1 2 1 2
Pindahkan barangan isi rumah 1 2 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2 1 2
(b) Jumlah bilangan strategi untuk kawalan banjir:
(c) Jumlah bilangan strategi untuk mengurangkan kesan banjir:
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23
	
	 Adakah anda mengambil apa-apa langkah untuk mengurangkan banjir atau kesannya
terhadap keluarga, harta benda dan kandungannya, tanah atau tanaman pada masa lalu?
Ya	 1 EKE S24(a)]	 Tidak	 2 [KE S24(b)]
24	 (a) Pada masa banjir yang baru lepas, apa telah dibuat oleh anda? (BIARKAN RESPONDEN
MENGEMUKAKAN SEMUA STRATEGI SENDIRI. TANYA 'ADA APA LAGI' 3 KALI)
(b) Selain dari apa yang telah dibuat oleh anda untuk mengurangkan bahaya banjir,
terdapat juga beberapa strategi lain yang telah dibuat oleh orang lain. Sila nyatakan
adakah setiap strategi tersebut baik atau buruk. (TANYA RESPONDEN HANYA STRATEGI
YANG TIDAK DIKEMUKAKAN OLEHNYA DALAM BAHAGIAN(a))
(i) Adakah anda fikir strategi itu baik atau buruk?
(ii) Kenapa anda fikir strategi itu baik atau buruk?
Soalan (a)
	 Soalan (b)(i)	 Soalan (b)(ii) 
Ya = 1 ;Ta k = 2	 Baik = 1 ;TT =-9; Lihat kod
Buruk = 2	 di bawah
Tidak buat apa pun
Sembahyang
Guna bomoh
Bersedia untuk pindah
Pindah ahli keluarga ke tingkat atas
Pindah ahli keluarga ke tempat lain
Pindah binatang ternak/rumah ke tempat lain
Pindah kenderaan ke tempat lain
Pindah perabut
Pelindungan rumah/bangunan (tetap)
Pelindungan rumah/bangunan (tak tetap)
Pelindungan rumah/bangunan (kecemasan)
[contoh:Cegah air masuk rumah]
ksvran
Memberi amarari kepada (1Catl% laih di tapak
bank & di rc((rrair
Memberi amaran kepada orang lain
(jiran & saudara) di lain tempat
Membeli bekalan makanan
Memadamkan letrik
Mendengar laporan ramalan cuaca
Menelefon bomba, polis, pejabat daerah dan 
	
lain-lain
Meninggikan lantai rumah
Tukar pola tanaman/jenis tanaman
Sediakan bot/sampan
Ambil cuti
Pasangkan suis di tempat tinggi
Lain, nyatakan
	
(c) Jumlah bilangan strategi yang digunakan oleh responden:
(JANGAN TANYA. CUBA KIRA JUMLAH INI DALAM BAHAGIAN (a))
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25	 (a) Apabila banjir berlaku pada masa depan, adakah anda akan membuat sesuatu yang
beza dari apa yang biasa dibuat?
Ya	 1 EKE S25(b)1
Tidak	 2 EKE S26 ]
Tak tahu	 -9[KE S26 ]
(b) Jika Ya, apa yang akan dibuat? (BIARKAN RESPONDEN MEMBERI JAWAPAN
SENDIRI. KEMUDIAN, TANYA 'ADA APA LAGI' 3 KALI)
Ya Tak
Tiada buat apa pun 1 2
Sembahyang 1 2
Guna bomoh 1 2
Bersedia untuk pindah 1 2
Pindah ahli-ahli keluarga ke tingkat atas 1 2
Pindah ahli-ahli keluarga ke tempat lain 1 2
Pindah binatang ternak/rumah ke tempat lain 1 2
Pindah kenderaan ke tempat lain 1 2
Pindah perabut 1 2
Pelindungan rumah/bangunan (tetap) 1 2
Pelindungan rumah/bangunan (tak tetap) 1 2
Pelindungan rumah/bangunan (kecemasan sahaja)
(contoh:Cegah air masuk rumah/bangunan)
lnsuran banjir
1
1
2
2
Memberi amaran kepada orang lain di tapak
banjir & di rumah
1 2
Memberi amaran kepada orang lain (jiran & saudara)
di lain tempat
1 2
Membeli bekalan makanan 1 2
Memadamkan letrik 1 2
Mendengar laporan ramalan cuaca 1 2
Menelefon bomba, polis, pejabat daerah dan lain-lain 1 2
Meninggikan lantai rumah 1 2
Tukar pola tanaman/jenis tanaman 1 2
Sediakan bot/sampan 1 2
Ambil cuti 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2
lc) Jumlah bilangan strategi baru yang akan dibuat oleh responden: 	
(JANGAN TANYA RESPONDEN. CAMPURKAN JUMLAH BAHAGIAN (b))
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IV	 AMARAN BANJIR
26	 (a) Jika anda diberi amaran '2 jam' sebelum banjir lepas berlaku, adakah anda akan
membuat sesuatu yang lain dari apa yang telah dibuat?
Ya	 1 EKE S26(b)1
Tidak	 2 EKE S27 ]
Tak tahu	 -9 EKE S27 ]
(b) Jika Ya, apakah yang akan dibuat? (BIARKAN RESPONDEN MEMBERI JAWAPAN
SENDIRI. KEMUDIAN, TANYA 'ADA APA LAGI' 3 KALI)
Tak Ya
Tiada buat apa pun 1 2
Sembahyang 1 2
Guna bomoh 1 2
Bersedia untuk pindah 1 2
Pindah ahli-ah i keluarga ke tingkat atas 1 2
Pindah ahli-ah i keluarga ke tempat lain 1 2
Pindah binatang ternak/rumah ke tempat lain 1 2
Pindah kenderaan ke tempat lain 1 2
Pindah perabut 1 2
Pelindungan rumah/bangunan (tetap) 1 2
Pelindungan rumah/bangunan (tak tetap) 1 2
Pelindungan rumah/bangunan (kecemasan sahaja)
(contoh:Cegah air masuk rumah/bangunan)
1 2
Insuran banjir 1 2
Memberi amaran kepada orang lain di tapak
banjir & di rumah
1 2
Memberi amaran kepada orang lain (jiran & saudara)
di lain tempat
1 2
Membeli bekalan makanan 1 2
Memadamkan letrik 1 2
Mendengar laporan ramalan cuaca 1 2
Menelefon bomba, polis, pejabat daerah dan lain-lain 1 2
Meninggikan lantai rumah 1 2
Tukar pola tanaman/jenis tanaman 1 2
Sediakan bot/sampan 1 2
Ambil cuti 1 2
Anak-anak berhenti pergi ke sekolah 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2
(c) Jumlah bilangan strategi yang akan dibuat oleh responden: 	
(JANGAN TANYA RESPONDEN. CAMPURKAN JUMLAH BAHAGIAN (b))
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27 Dalam banjir yang baru berlaku, bolehkah anda memberi satu anggaran tentang berapa
banyak wang yang telah anda selamatkan akibat amaran banjir diterima.(JIKA TIDAK
TERIMA AMARAN RASMI: Berapakah wang yang boleh diselamatkan oleh anda sekiranya
amaran banjir diterima sebelum banjir berlaku?) (DAPATKAN SATU ANGGARAN)
($)
Tidak selamatkan apa-apa pun 0
< 1,000 1
1,000 - 1,999 2
2,000 - 2,999 3
3,000 - 3,999 4
4,000 - 4,999 5
5,000 - 5,999 6
6,000 - 10,000 7
> 10,000 8
Tak tahu -9
28 Adakah kampung/pekan ini mempunyai sistem amaran banjir rasmi? ('Rasmi' bermasuk
amaran yang diberi oleh Jabatan Pant dan Taliair, Perkhidmatan Kajicuaca Malaysia, Polis,
lain jabatan kerajaan, penjaga banjir, persatuan petani, ketua kampung dan pihak berkuasa
tempatan, dan media massa seperti radio, TV, redifusen din)
Ya 1
Tidak 2
Tak tahu -9
29	 (a) Tahukah anda yang mana satu organisasi/pihak berkuasa yang bertanggungjawab ke
atas ramalan banjir dan pengeluaran amaran banjir di kampung/pekan ini?
Ya	 1 IKE S29(b)1
Tidak	 2 [KE S30
(b) Jika Ya, siapakah organisasi/pihak berkuasa tersebut? (DAPATKAN NAMA)
(c) Tahukah mana untuk menghubungi organisasi/pihak berkuasa ini? (DAPATKAN
ALAMAT DAN NOMBOR TELEFON ORGANISASI/PIHAK BERKUASA TERSEBUT)
Ya	 1
Tidak
	
2
30	 (a) Tahukah anda yang mana satu organisasi/pihak berkuasa yang bertanggungjawab ke
atas penyebaran amaran banjir di kawasan (kampung/pekan) ini/di Negeri ini/di Malaysia?
Ya	 1 EKE S30(b)]
Tidak	 2 EKE S31 ]
lb) Jika Ya, siapakah organisasi/pihak berkuasa tersebut? (DAPATKAN NAMA)
(c) Tahukah mana untuk menghubungi organisasi/pihak berkuasa ini? (DAPATKAN
ALAMAT DAN NOMBOR TELEFON ORGANISASI/PIHAK BERKUASA TERSEBUT)
Ya	 1
Tidak
	
2
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, baniir telah berlaku disekitar
31	 Sejak tinggal di kawasan ini, pernahkah anda diberi amaran banjir oleh pihak-pihak
berkuasa berikut?
(TUNJUKKAN KAD 3, BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN DAN ISIKAN SATU KOD UNTUK
SETIAP ORGANISASI)
Ya Tidak IT
Polis 1 2 -9
Jabatan Pant dan Taliair 1 2 -9
Perkhidmatan Kajicuaca Malaysia 1 2 -9
Lain-lain jabatan kerajaan, nyatakan 1 2 -9
Penjaga banjir 1 2 -9
Pihak berkuasa tempatan/majlis perbandaran din 1 2 -9
Media (TV/Radio/Redifusion) 1 2 -9
Ketua kampung 1 2 -9
Wakil persatuan petani 1 2 -9
Lain-lain, nyatakan 1 1 2 -9
Lain-lain, nyatakan 2 1 2 -9
32	 (a) Berapa amaran banjir rasmi telah anda terima sejak anda mula tinggal di sini? 	
(b) Berapa amaran tersebut benar-benar diikuti oleh banjir? 	
(c) Berapa amaran tersebut tidak diikuti oleh banjir? 	
Id) Berapa kali telah anda dibanjiri tetapi tidak diberi amaran sejak anda mulai tinggal di
sini?
33	 (a) Sejauhmanakah anda bergantung kepada sistem amaran banjir rasmi?
1 [KE S34 ]
2 [KE S34 ]
3 [KE S34
4 [KE S33(b)]
100 % bergantung kepadanya
Banyak bergantung kepadanya
Hanya sedikit bergantung kepadanya
Langsung tidak bergantung kepadanya
(b) Jika jawapan ialah 4, kenapa?
Saya tidak percaya sistem tersebut 	 1
Amaran selalu diberi terlalu lewat	 2
Saya hanya bergantung kepada pengalaman/tafsiran sendiri	 3
Lain, nyatakan 	  4
BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN: Pada bulan	 tahun
Sim a i
	 di kawasan ini dan sekitarn 
34	 Pada masa itu, adakah milikan/bangunan anda dibanjiri?
Ya	 1
Tidak
	
2
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35	 Pada masa itu, adakah kampung/pekan ini dibanjiri?
Ya	 1
Tidak
	
2
Tak tahu	 -9
36	 Pada masa itu, bagaimanakah anda mula sedar bahawa banjir akan berlaku?
(SILA ISI SATU KOD SAHAJA. JANGAN BACA JAWAPAN KEPADA RESPONDEN)
Air memasuki milikan/bangunan	 1
Ikut pengalaman sendiri 	 2
Pesanan dari jiran	 3
Pesanan dari saudara-mara	 4
Amaran dari Jabatan Pant dan Taliair	 5
Amaran dari Perkhidmatan Kajicuaca Malaysia 	 6
Amaran dari polis	 7
Amaran dari lain jabatan kerajaan, nyatakan 	  8
Amaran dari penjaga banjir	 9
Amaran dari ketua kampung	 10
Amaran dari wakil persatuan petani	 11
Amaran dari pihak berkuasa tempatan	 12
Amaran dari media massa (TV/Radio/Redifusion)	 13
Bila rumah jiran dibanjiri	 14
Bila hujan lebat turun beberapa jam	 15
Amaran diberi oleh jiran/jawatankuasa menjaga banjir 	 16
Lain, nyatakan 	 	 20
37	 (a) Semasa banjir ini, adakah anda diberi amaran secara rasmi?
Ya	 1 EKE S37(b)]
Tidak	 2 EKE S44 ]
(b) Jika Ya, s apakah yang mula-mula memberi amaran kepada anda?
Polis	 1
Jabatan Pant dan Taliair	 2
Perkhidmatan Kajicuaca Malaysia	 3
Lain-lain jabatan kerajaan, nyatakan	 	 4
Penjaga banjir	 5
Pihak berkuasa tempatan/majlis perbandaran din 	 6
Media (TV/Radio/Redifusion) 	 7
Ketua kampung	 8
Wakil persatuan petani 	 9
Lain-lain, nyatakan	 	 10
Semboyan	 11
Jabatan Penerangan	 12
(c) Adakah anda menghubungi mereka atau mereka yang menghubungi anda?
Saya yang menghubungi mereka 	 1
Mereka yang menghubungi saya	 2
(d) Bilakah anda diberi amaran? ATAU Bilakah anda memberitahu mereka?
> 20 jam sebelum banjir berlaku 	 1
11 - 20 jam sebelum banjir berlaku 	 2
6 - 10 jam sebelum banjir berlaku 	 3
0.02 - 5 jam sebelum banjir berlaku	 4
0 jam sebelum banjir berlaku	 5
0.02 - 5 jam selepas banjir berlaku	 6
6 - 10 jam selepas banjir berlaku	 7
> 10 jam selepas banjir berlaku
	
8
Tak tahu	 -9
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38	 Bolehkah anda ingat bagaimana anda diberi amaran?
(TUNJUKKAN KAD 4. BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN DAN ISIKAN SATU KOD SAHAJA)
Melalui telef on 1
Dengan "speaker" berbunyi besar 2
Dengan papan notis/amaran 3
Mereka datang sendiri ke rumah saya 4
Mereka menghubungi saya secara persendirian di tempat lain 5
Semboyan polis 6
RadioiTV 7
Lain, nyatakan 10
Tak ingat -9
39	 Selepas amaran pertama, adakah anda diberikan sebarang amaran kemudian?(Iaitu
amaran kedua, ketiga dan lain-lain)
Ya	 1 EKE S40]
Tidak
	 2 EKE S42]
Tak tahu	 -9[KE S42]
40 Jika Ya untuk S39, apakah amaran-amaran kemudian yang diterima anda? Sila jawap Ya
atau Tidak untuk setiap punca amaran berikut, dan juga nyatakan adakah anda yang
menghubungi mereka atau mereka yang menghubungi anda (TUNJUKKAN KAD 5 DAN
ISIKAN SATU KOD UNTUK SETIAP JENIS AMARAN)
Terima Amaran Sava hubung Mereka
Ya Tidak
mereka hubung
saya
Pesanan dari jiran 1 2 1 2
Pesanan dari saudara-mara 1 2 1 2
Amaran dari Jabatan Pant dan Taliair 1 2 1 2
Amaran dari Perkhid. Kajicuaca Malaysia 1 2 1 2
Amaran dan polls 1 2 1 2
Amaran dari lain jabatan kerajaan, nyatakan 1 2 1 2
Amaran dari penjaga banjir 1 2 1 2
Amaran dari ketua kampung 1 2 1 2
Amaran dari wakil persatuan petani 1 2 1 2
Amaran dari pihak berkuasa tempatan 1 2 1 2
Amaran dari media massa 1 2 1 2
(TV/Radio/Redifusion)
Amaran dari Jabatan Penerangan 1 2 1 '2
Amaran dari semboyan 1 2 1 2
Amaran dari wakil rakyak 1 2 1 2
Amaran dari pihak lain 1 1 2 1 2
Amaran dari pihak lain 2 1 2 1 2
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41	 Bolehkah anda ingat bagaimana anda diberi amaran oleh setiap organisasi berikut?
(TUNJUKKAN KAD 6. BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN DAN ISIKAN SATU KOD UNTUK
SETIAP ORGANISASI)
Jabatan Pant dan Taliair
Perkhidmatan Kajicuaca Malaysia
Polis
Lain Jabatan Kerajaan
Penjaga banjir
Persatuan petani
Ketua kampung
Pihak Berkuasa Tempatan/Pejabat Daerah
Cara Amaran:
Melalui telefon 1 Mereka hubung say di tempat lain 5
Dengan "speaker" berbunyi besar 2 Semboyan polis 6
Dengan papan notis/amaran 3 Radio/TV 7
Mereka datang sendiri ke rumah 4 Lain, nyatak 8
Tak ingat -9
42 Di dalam sebarang amaran rasmi oleh Jabatan Pant dan Taliair, Perkhidmatan Kajicuaca
Malaysia, Polis, lain jabatan kerajaan, penjaga banjir, persatuan petani, ketua kampung
dan pihak berkuasa tempatan, adakah anda diberitahu tentang:
(a) Berapa lama sebelum banjir akan berlaku?
Ya 1
Tidak 2
Tak tahu -9
(b) Berapa dalam air banjir di setengah tempat?
Ya 1
Tidak 2
Tak tahu -9
(c) Apa yang anda mesti lakukan jika milikan anda dibanjiri?
Ya 1
Tidak 2
Tak tahu -9
(d) Apakah nasihat/arahan yang diberikan oleh pihak-pihak tersebut?
(TULIS JAWAPAN SECARA DESKRIPSI)
43	 (a) Adakah anda puas hati dengan operasi sistem amaran banjir pada masa banjir yang
baru berlaku pada 	 (bulan) 	 (tahun)? (BACA JAWAPAN KEPADA
RESPONDEN DAN ISIKAN SATU KOD SAHAJA)
Sangat puas hati 1
Puas hati 2
Tidak begitu puas hati 3
Langsung tidak puas hati 4
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(b) Kenapa? (TULIS JAWAPAN SECARA DESKRIPSI)
(BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN): UNTUK MEMBOLEHKAN PIHAK BERKUASA MENINGKATKAN
PRESTASI SISTEM AMARAN BANJIR, SILA BERI PENDAPAT ANDA TENTANG APA YANG DIFIKIR
SEBAGAI SATU SISTEM AMARAN BANJIR YANG SEMPURNA. 
44	 (a) Mula-mulanya, bagaimanakah anda ingin diberi amaran tentang banjir?
(TUNJUKKAN KAD 7, BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN DAN ISIKAN SATU KOD SAHAJA)
Diberitahu secara persendirian oleh polis, Jabatan Pant dan Taliair, 	 1
Perkhidmatan Kajicuaca Malaysia, lain jabatan kerajaan dan penjaga banjir
Diberitahu melalui tellefon oleh polls, Jabatan Pant dan Taliair, 	 2
Perkhidmatan Kajicuaca Malaysia, lain jabatan kerajaan dan penjaga banjir
"Siren" polls
	
3
"Speaker" berbunyi besar di sekitar kawasan banjir 	 4
Semboyan amaran yang dipasangkan di tapak strategi 	 5
Amaran melalui radio 	 6
Amaran melalui TV	 7
Notis amaran diletak dalam papan notis	 8
Diberi nombor telefon pihak-pihak berkuasa untuk orang menghubungi 	 9
mereka semasa banjir
Amaran persendirian disampaikan oleh ketua kampung	 10
Lain, nyatakan	 11
(b) Selepas amaran pertama telah diberi, bagaimanakah anda mahu amaran disampaikan
seterusnya? (iaitu amaran kedua, ketiga dal lain-lain) (TUNJUKKAN KAD 7, BACA
KEPADA RESPONDEN DAN ISIKAN SATU KOD UNTUK SETIAP KATEGORI AMARAN)
Ya Tak
Diberitahu secara persendirian oleh polls, Jabatan Pant dan Taliair, 1 2
Perkhidmatan Kajicuaca Malaysia, lain jabatan kerajaan dan penjaga banjir
Diberitahu melalui telefon oleh polls, Jabatan Pant dan Taliair, 	 1 2
Perkhidmatan Kajicuaca Malaysia, lain jabatan kerajaan dan penjaga banjir
Semboyan polls 1 2
"Speaker" berbunyi besar di sekitar kawasan banjir 1 2
Semboyan amaran yang dipasangkan di tapak strategi 1 2
Amaran melalui radio 1 2
Amaran melalui TV 1 2
Notis amaran diletak dalam papan notis 1 2
Diberi nombor telefon pihak-pihak berkuasa untuk orang menghubungi
mereka semasa banjir
1 2
Amaran persendirian disampaikan oleh ketua kampung 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2
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45 Pada umumnya, semakin lama masa amaran sebelum banjir maka semakin kurang tepat
sesuatu amaran. Memandangkan itu, berapa awal anda ingin menerima amaran sebelum
banjir berlaku?
(TUNJUKKAN KAD 8, BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN DAN ISIKAN SATU KOD SAHAJA)
> 12 jam sebelum banjir dijangka berlaku 1
Beberapa jam sebelum banjir dijangka berlaku 2
Bila kemungkinan banjir sangat tinggi, iaitu 2 jam sebelum ia dijangka berlaku 3
Bila kawasan hulu sungai sudah dibanjiri dan banjir sudah pasti berlaku
di sini dalam masa 1/2 hingga 1 jam
4
Lain, nyatakan 5
Tak tahu -9
46 Adakah isi rumah/perniagaan anda perlukan sesuatu sistem amaran banjir rasmi? Atau
Adakah anda sanggup bergantung kepada pengalaman sendiri untuk menentukan
kemungkinan banjir?
Saya perlukan satu sistem amaran banjir rasmi 1
Saya sanggup bergantung kepada din i sendiri 2
Tertakluk kepada keadaan tertentu 3
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V	 KEMUSNAHAN
Sekarang, cuba anda inqat kembali tentanq bank yang paling teruk dan bank yang baru berlaky
kebelakarman ini seiak anda tinqqal di banqunan ini
47	 (a) Berapa tingginya air banjir (dari permukaan jalan) bila ianya mula masuk
rumah/bangunan anda?
(b) Berapa tingginya	 air banjir	 (dari permukaan jalan) bila ianya mula
merosakkan/memusnahkan milikan bangunan anda?
(c) Berapa tinggi air banjir ( dari permukaan jalan) bila ianya mula mengancam kehidupan
keluarga/perniagaan anda?
Kod untuk S47 (a), (b) & (c) 
1 kaki	 1
2 kaki	 2
3 kaki	 3
4 kaki	 4
5 kaki	 5
6 kaki	 6
7 kaki	 7
8 kaki	 8
9 kaki	 9
10 kaki	 10
> 10 kaki	 11
Tak tahu	 -9
BANJIR PALING TERUK TAHUN
48	 (a) Semasa banjir paling teruk tahun	 , adakah anda tinggal di alamat ini?
Ya	 1 EKE S48(b)]
Tidak	 2 EKE S54 ]
(b) Adakah milikan/bangunan anda dibanjiri semasa banjir paling teruk tahun	 ?
Ya	 1 EKE S48(b)i]
Tidak	 2 EKE S54
Jika Ya, (i) Berapa tinggi air banjir?
(GUNA KOD SAMA SEPERTI S47)
(ii) Berapa lamakah rumah bangunan anda dibanjiri?
< 1 jam 1 3 - 4 hari 7
1 - 2 jam 2 5 - 7 hari 8
3 - 5 jam 3 8 - 10 hari 9
6- 12 jam 4 11 -30 hari 10
13 - 24 jam 5 > 1 bulan 11
1 - 2 hari 6 Tak tahu -9
49	 Adakah banjir paling teruk tahun	 menyebabkan sebarang kemusnahan terhadap
bangunan ini Atau terhadap kandungannya benda-benda dalamnya?
Ya	 1 EKE S50(a)1
Tidak	 2 EKE S50(i)]
50	 Jika Ya, adakah sebarang kemusnahan/kerosakan terjadi kepada:
Ya Tidak	 Kos($)
(a) Banqunan: Lantai 1 2
Dinding 1 2
Kaki Tiang 1 2
Tangga 1 2
Tingkat bawah tanah (Basement) 1 2
Taman bunga/halaman 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap bangunan: ($)
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(b) Kandungan Banqunan: Ya Tidak Kos(S)
Permaidani 1 2
Perabot 1 2
Alat letrik 1 2
Hawa dingin 1 2
Makanan 1 2
Binatang jinak rumah 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan kandungan bangunan: (5)
(c) Kenderaan: Ya Tidak	 Kos($)
Traktor 1 2
Lori 1 2
Van 1 2
Kereta 1 2
Motorsikal 1 2
Basikal 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap kenderaan: (8)
(d) Binatang ternak & tanaman: Ya Tidak Kos(S)
Tanaman 1 2
Lembu 1 2
Kambing 1 2
Ayam & itik 1 2
Babi(Jangan tanya orang islam) 1 2
Ikan 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap binatang ternak & tanaman: (5) 	
(e) Manusia:(BERSOPAN BILA TANYA SOALAN INI) Ya	 Tidak	 Kos(S)
Terbunuh	 1	 2
Sakit	 	 1	 2
Bimbang & tekanan	 1	 2
Hilang/tak dapat kerja	 1	 2
Tak dapat pergi ke sekolah	 1	 2
Lain, nyatakan 	 	 1	 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap manusia: ($) 	
Ya	 Tidak	 Kos(S)
(f) Benda-benda ingatan: 
Gambar foto	 1	 2
Benda lama/"antique"	 1	 2
Barangan emas/intan din	 1	 2
Gambar lukisan	 1	 2
Lain, nyatakan	 	 1	 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap benda-benda ingatan: (8)
(g) Lain-lain kemusnahan: 	 Ya	 Tidak	 Kos($)
Pakaian	 1	 2
Kasut	 1	 2
Mesin	 1	 2
Barangan perniagaan	 1	 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap benda-benda lain: ($)
(h) Jumlah kos semua kemusnahan akibat ban hr paling teruk tahun	 : = $ 	
(JANGAN TANYA RESPONDEN. PENEMUDUGA BOLEH KIRAKAN ANGKA INI SENDIRI)
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(i) Berapa lama kah diperlukan untuk membersihkan seluruh rumah/banqunan selepas banjir
paling teruk tahun 
< 1 jam	 1
1 - 2 jam	 2
3 - 5 jam	 3
6 - 12 jam	 4
13 - 24 jam	 5
1 - 2 hari	 6
3 - 4 hari	 7
5 - 7 hari	 8
8 - 10 hari	 9
> 10 hari	 10
Beberapa minggu 11
Beberapa bulan	 12
Beberapa tahun 13
Tak tahu	 -9
BANJIR BARU BERLAKU TAHUN
51	 (a) Semasa banjir baru berlaku tahun 	 , adakah anda tinggal di alamat ini?
Ya	 1 EKE S51(b)]
Tidak	 2 EKE S54 ]
(b) Adakah milikan/bangunan anda dibanjiri semasa banjir baru berlaku tahun 	 ?
Ya	 1 EKE S51(B)i]
Tidak	 2 EKE S54 ]
Jika Ya, (i) Berapa tinggi air banjir?
1 kaki	 1
2 kaki	 2
3 kaki	 3
4 kaki	 4
5 kaki	 5
6 kaki	 6
7 kaki	 7
8 kaki	 8
9 kaki	 9
10 kaki	 10
> 10 kaki	 11
Tidak tahu	 -9
(ii) Berapa lamakah rumah/bangunan anda dibanjiri?
< 1 jam	 1
1 - 2 jam	 2
3 - 5 jam	 3
6 - 12 jam	 4
13 - 24 jam	 5
1 - 2 hari	 6
3 - 4 hari	 7
5 - 7 hari	 8
8 - 10 hari	 9
> 10 hari	 10
Tidak tahu	 -9
52	 Adakah banjir baruberlaku tahun 	 menyebabkan sebarang kemusnahan terhadap
bangunan ini atau terhadap kandungannya/benda-benda dalamnya?
Ya	 1 EKE S53(a)]
Tidak	 2 EKE S53(i) ]
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53 Jika Ya, adakah sebarang kemusnahan/kerosakan terjadi kepada:
(a) Banqunan: Ya Tidak	 Kos($)
Lantai 1 2
Dinding 1 2
Kaki hang 1 2
Tangga 1 2
Tingkat bawah tanah (Basement) 1 2
Taman bunga/halaman 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap bangunan: ($)
(b) Kandunqan Banqunan: Ya Tidak Kos($)
Permaidani 1 2
Perabot 1 2
Alat letrik 1 2
Hawa dingin 1 2
Makanan 1 2
Binatang jinak rumah 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap kandungan bangunan: ($)
(c) Kenderaan: Ya Tidak	 Kos()
Traktor 1 2
Lori 1 2
Van 1 2
Kereta 1 2
Motorsikal 1 2
Basikal 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap kenderaan: ($)
(d) Binatanq temak & tanarnam Ya Tidak Kos($)
Tanaman 1 2
Lembu 1 2
Kambing 1 2
Ayam & itik 1 2
Babi(Jangan tanya orang islam) 1 2
!kw) 1 2
Lain, nyatakan 1 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap binatang ternak & tanaman: ($) 	
(e) Manusia:(BERSOPAN BILA TANYA SOALAN INI) Ya	 Tidak	 Kos()
Terbunuh	 1	 2
Sakit	 	 1	 2
Bimbang & tekanan	 1	 2
Hilang/tak dapat kerja	 1	 2
Tak dapat pergi ke sekolah	 1	 2
Lain, nyatakan 	 	 1	 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap manusia: (8)
(f) Benda-benda inqatan:	 Ya	 Tidak	 Kos( $)
Gambar foto	 1	 2
Benda lama/"antique"	 1	 2
Barangan emas/intan din	 1	 2
Gambar lukisan	 1	 2
Lain, nyatakan	 	 1	 2
Jumlah kos kemusnahan terhadap benda-benda ingatan: (8)
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(9) Lain-lain kemusnahan:	 Ya	 Tidak	 Kos($)
Pakaian	 1	 2
Kasut	 1	 2
NI esin	 1	 2
Barangan pern agaan	 1	 2
Jum ah kos kemusnahan terhadap benda-benda lain: (8)
(h) Jum ah kos semua kemusnahan akbat bank baru berlaku tahun 	 : = $	
(JANGAN TANYA RESPONDEN. PENEMUDUGA BOLEN KIRAKAN ANGKA INI SENDIRI)
Berapa lamakah d perlukan untuk members hkan seluruh rumahíbangunan selepas banjir
baru berlaku tahun
< 1 jam
	 1
1 - 2 jam	 2
3 - 5 jam	 3
6-12  jam	 4
13 - 24 jam	 5
1 - 2 har	 6
3 - 4 har	 7
5 - 7 har	 8
8 - 10 hari	 9
> 10 hari 10
Beberapa minggu 11
Beberapa bulan 12
Beberap tahun	 13
Tak tahu	 -9
54	 S la nyatakan ketepatan set ap anggaran kemusnahan bagi setiap banjir yang diberikan:
(a) Bani r pa I nq teruk: 
Sangat tepat
	
1
Tepat
	
2
Sederhana tepat	 3
Tdak beg tu tepat	 4
Sangat 'Mak tepat	 5
(b) Banfr baru berlaku: 
Sangat tepat	 1
Tepat
	
2
Sederhana tepat	 3
Tidak begitu tepat	 4
Sangat tidak tepat	 5
55 Sekarang, berdasarkan skala 0 (Tada kesan) hingga 10 (Kesan paling serius), cuba
member" darjah "kesedusan" kesan-kesan setiap banjir berikut terhadap kehidupan dalam
isi rumah anda secara keseluruhan (TUNJUKKAN KAD 9, BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN
DAN ISIKAN DARJAH KESERIUSAN UNTUK SETIAP BANJIR)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Tiada	 Paling
Kesan
	 Serius
(a) Banjir paling teruk tahun
(b) Banir baru berlaku tahun
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56 Berdasarkan kepada skala 0 (Tiada kesan) hinqqa 10 (Kesan paling serius), cuba tentukan
darjah "keseriusan" setiap kesan yang disebabkan oleh banjir terhadap kehidupan keluarga
anda sejak tinggal di sini(TUNJUKKAN KAD 9, BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN DAN ISIKAN
DARJAH KESERIUSAN UNTUK SETIAP KESAN)
0 1	 2 3 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
Tiada	 Paling
Kesan	 Serius
Kesan terhadap kesihatan ahli-ahli keluarga/pekerja
Terpaksa tinggalkan rumah/bangunan
Kemusnahan kepada benda-benda yang boleh digantikan (perabot, alat letrik din)
Bimbang dan tekanan tentang 1)anjir pada masa depan
Hilang atau musnah benda-benda yang tidak boleh digantikan (gambar din)
Semua kesulitan & kesusahan akibat cuba memulihkan rumah kepada keadaan asal
Kemusnahan kepada bangunan
Kesan banjir terhadap taman/halaman rumah & bangunan luar
Bau busuk air banjir
Kesulitan yang timbul akibat pembanjiran jaringan hubungan (jalanraya, jalan keretapi din)
Kesan terhadap perniagaan/tanaman
57	 (UNTUK PENUBUHAN PERTANIAN DAN PERNIAGAAN SAHAJA. LAIN PERGI S58)
Adakah anda dapat sebarang kerugian dalam hash l tanaman/perniagaan yang tidak dapat
digantikan pada tempoh selepas banjir:
(a)(i) Banjir paling teruk tahun
Ya	 1 EKE S57(a)ii]
Tidak	 2 EKE S57(b)i ]
Tak tahu	 -9 EKE S57(b)i I
(ii) Jika Ya, berapakah % kerugian itu dari hasil/perniagaan biasa?
1
	
-10 1 71 - 80 8
11 - 20 2 81 - 90 9
21 - 30 3 91 - 100 10
31 - 40 4 >100 11
41 - 50 5 Tak tahu -9
51 - 60 6
61 - 70 7
(b)(i) Banjir baru berlaku tahun
Ya	 1 EKE S57(b)ii]
Tidak	 2 EKE S58	 ]
Tak tahu	 -9[KE S58	 ]
(ii) Jika Ya, berapakah % kerugian itu dari hasil/perniagaan biasa?
1	 -10 1 71 - 80 8
11 - 20 2 81 - 90 9
21 - 30 3 91 - 100 10
31 - 40 4 >100 11
41 - 50 5 Tak tahu -9
51 - 60 6
61 - 70 7
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58	 (a) Adakah apa-apa kesan banjir jangka panjang terhadap milikan/tanah/perniagaan anda
dan kandungannya sejak anda tinggal di sini?
Ya	 1 EKE S58(b)]
Tidak	 2 EKE S59 ]
Tak tahu	 -9[KE S59 ]
(b) Jika Ya, nyatakan:
VI	 MAKLUMAT PERIBADI
Soalan-soalan berikut adalah standard di dalam semua kaji selidik dan cuma digunakan untuk
pengelasan kami. Jawapan-jawapan anda adalah SULIT. 
59 Taraf responden:
Ketua rumah 1
Isteri 2
Anak lelaki 3
Anak perempuan 4
Pengurus syarikat 5
Pekerja syarikat 6
Lain 7
60 Jantina:
Lelaki 1
Perempuan 2
61 Umur:
< 21 tahun 1
21 - 30 tahun 2
31 - 40 tahun 3
41 - 50 tahun 4
51 - 60 tahun 5
> 60 tahun 6
62
Melayu 1
Cina 2
India 3
Lain 4
63 Agar_naj.
Islam 1
Christian 2
Buddhist 3
Hindu 4
Taoist 5
Lain 6
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64	 Peker aan:
Profesional 1
Petani 2
Artisan/buruh mahir 3
Peniaga/perkhidmatan 4
Buruh kasar 5
Pendidikan 6
Pekilang 7
Penganggur 8
Persara 9
Suni Rumah tangga 10
Pelajar 11
Nelayan 12
Lainlain 20
65	 Pendidikan:
Tiada/buta huruf 1
Beberapa tahun sekolah rendah 2
Habis sekolah rendah 3
Sekolah menegah rendah 4
Sekolah menengah tinggi 5
Maktab/diploma 6
Universiti 7
66	 Berdasarkan Kad ini, huruf manakah yang mengandungi pendapatan tahunan kasar anda?
(TUNJUKKAN KAD 10)
BULANANHURUF TAHUNAN
($) (S)
( L )
	
<2100 <175 1
( Q )	 2,100-4,199 175-349 2
( F )	 4,200-5,999 350-499 3
( G )	 6,000-8,999 500-749 4
A )	 9,000-11,999 750-999 5
( H )	 12,000-17,999 1,000-1,499 6
( T )	 18,000-23,999 1,500-1,999 7
( C )	 24,000-29,999 2,000-2,499 8
( D )	 30,000-35,999 2,500-2,999 9
( M )	 36,000-47,999 3,000-3,999 10
( X )	 48,000-59,999 4,000-4,999 11
)	 60,000-119,999 5,000-9,999 12
( B )	 > 120,000 > 10,000 13
Tidak mahu beritahu -9
Tidak berkenaan -8
67	 Saiz Keluarga/Jumlah Pekerja:
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APPENDIX C
MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY
Flood Hazard Research Centre
FLOOD DAMAGE QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY FOR PENINSULAR
MALAYSIA
For Commercial/Business Establishments
Notes for Interviewer
1	 Any statement that is underlined should be read out to respondent
2	 Any statement in parentheses is for interviewer's information only
3	 All coded answers are for interviewer information only. They should
not be read out to respondents unless SPECIFIED so in the question.
4	 If any question is not applicable, write in 'NA'
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Signature:
Minutes
Interviewer Number:
	
Interview date: 	
Time interview started:
	
Time interview ended:
	
Duration of interview:
(TO BE READ OUT TO RESPONDENT)
We are carrying out a survey for the Universiti Sains Malaysia. The aim of the
survey is to find out the damage caused by floods on businesses in various parts
of Peninsular Malaysia. The survey is also partly supported by the Drainage and
Irrigation Department and the Flood Hazard Research Centre at Middlesex
University (UK). The survey is completely confidential. Unless permission is given
by participants, their names and views will not be revealed to anyone. The
results will be published in statistical and unidentifiable form only.
FLOOD DAMAGE
1	 Respondent's Identity Number.
2	 Respondent's Address 	
When was the last flood here?
When was the worst flood here?
Type of business
	
Study Area 	
(a) At what height above the ground would the flood water start coming into
your property/building?	
(b)At what height above the ground would the flood water become damaging
to your property/building? 	
(c)At what height above the ground would the flood water become damaging
to your family/business?
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Codes for 07(a). (b) & (c)
1 feet 1
2 feet 2
3 feet 3
4 feet 4
5 feet 5
6 feet 6
7 feet 7
8 feet 8
9 feet 9
10 feet 10
> 10 feet 11
Don't Know -9
8	 (a) Were you living/in business at this address at the time of the most recent
flood in	 ?
Yes	 1
No	 2
(b) Were you flooded at the time of the most
Yes	 1
No	 2
If answer is Yes, (i) What was the depth of
recent flood in	 ?
the flood waters?
1 feet 1
2 feet 2
3 feet 3
4 feet 4
5 feet 5
6 feet 6
7 feet 7
8 feet 8
9 feet 9
10 feet 10
> 10 feet 11
Don't Know -9
(ii) How long did the flood last?
< 1 hour 1
1 - 2 hours 2
3 - 5 hours 3
6 - 12 hours 4
13 - 24 hours 5
1 - 2 days 6
3 - 4 days 7
5 - 7 days 8
8 - 10 days 9
> 10 days 10
Don't Know -9
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9	 Did the most recent flood in 	 cause any damage, however minor, to
this property or its contents?
Yes	 1
No 2
10	 If Yes, was there any damage, however minor, to your:
Yes No	 Cost ($)
(a) Building.; Floor 1 2
2Wall 1
Stilts 1 2
Stairways 1 2
Basement 1 2
Garden 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to building: ($)
(b)	 Contents: Yes No	 Cost ($)
Carpet 1 2
Furniture 1 2
Electrical appliances 1 2
Air conditioning 1 2
Foodstuffs 1 2
Pets 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to contents: ($)
(c) Vehicles: Yes No	 Cost ($)
Tractor 1 2
Lorry/truck 1 2
Van 1 2
Car 1 2
Motorbike 1 2
Bicycle 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to vehicles: ($)
(d) Livestock & crops: Yes No Cost ($)
Crops 1 2
Cattle 1 2
Goats 1 2
Poultry 1 2
Pigs 1 2
Fish 1 2
Others, specify_ 1 2
Total cost of damages to livestock & crops: ($)
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(e) Humans:	 (PLEASE BE TACTFUL WHEN YOU ASK THIS
Yes
	 No	 Cost ($)
QUESTION)
Killed 1 2
Taken ill 1 2
Anxiety, stress, worry 1 2
Loss of work 1 2
Loss of schooling 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to humans: ($)
(0 Memorabilia: Yes No	 Cost ($)
Photographs 1 2
Antiques 1 2
Jewellery 1 2
Paintings 1 2
Others, specify 1 2
Total cost of damages to memorabilia: ($)
(g) Any other damages?: specify 	 Cost ($)
	
	 Cost ($)
	
	 Cost ($)
	
	 Cost ($)
	
Total cost of all other damages: ($)
(h) Total cost of all damages in most recent flood in 	 (year)
= ($)
(DO NOT ASK. INTERVIEWER SHOULD SUM UP ALL DAMAGES TO
ARRIVE AT THE FIGURE FOR TOTAL DAMAGES)
11	 If the height of flood waters is 3 feet (1 metre), how many times would your
damage (estimate) be compared to the most recent flood?
12	 If the height of flood waters is 6 feet (2 metres), how many times would your
damage (estimate) be compared to the most recent flood?
APPENDIX C:57
APPENDIX D
Dear Sir,
re: Questionnaire survey on Flood Management in Peninsular Malaysia with special
reference to Flood Forecasting and Warning Systems
This is to inform you that I am a staff member of Universiti Sains Malaysia and I am currently
pursuing a PhD in Middlesex University (UK). The topic of my research is 'An assessment of
policies and strategies of flood hazard management in Peninsular Malaysia, with special emphasis
on flood forecasting and warning systems'. I am conducting the above survey as part of my
fieldwork programme. Attached with this letter is a set of questionnaires. I hope you will find
time to complete the questionnaires and send them to me in the self-addressed and stamped
envelope.
Thank you for your kind co-operation.
Yours sincerely,
Chan Ngai Weng
School of Humanities
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Minden, 11800 USM Penang
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MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY
FLOOD HAZARD RESEARCH CENTRE
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY ON GENERAL FLOOD MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND
STRATEGIES IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON
CURRENT FLOOD FORECASTING AND WARNING SYSTEMS
For government officers, academics, private practitioners, consultants, environmental
groups, and other parties involved with flood management in Peninsular Malaysia
Notes for respondents: 
1	 Any statement in parentheses is either instruction or for information only.
2	 If any question is not applicable, write in 'NA'.
3	 The respondent is not obligated to answer any question which he/she does not wish to
answer. In such a case, write in 'NC'.
4	 The respondent should try to answer all questions whenever possible.
This questionnaire is not numbered and respondents are not required to state their names or
positions. Results of this survey are completely confidential and will only be published in
statistical and unidentifiable form. Please feel free to express your views. Thank you.
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SECTION I: GENERAL
1	 In what capacity are you associated with flood management?
Government officer
Academic
Environmental Group
Consultant
Others
2	 How much of your time
1
2
3
4
5 Please specify	
(in your work/research) is involved with flood hazard
management (all aspects)?
1	 - 10% 1 51 - 60% 6 None 00
11 - 20% 2 61 - 70% 7 Don't know 88
21 - 30% 3 71 - 80% 8 NA 99
31 - 40% 4 81 -90% 9
41 - 50% 5 91 - 100% 10
3 On a scale of 1 (least serious) to 10 (most serious), how would you rate the seriousness
of the flood hazard in each of the following States (overall in the State of course) in
Peninsular Malaysia ?
(Please circle one answer for each state in the rating scale)
State Rating
Perlis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
Kedah 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
Pulau Pinang 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
Perak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
Selangor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
Federal Territory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
Negeri Sembilan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
Melaka 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
Johor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
Pahang 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
Kelantan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
Terengganu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
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4	 On a scale of 1 (least adequate) to 10 (most adequate), how would you rate the Malaysian
Government's spending on flood mitigation in the whole country?
(Please circle one answer only)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
5	 (a) Do you think the spending on flood mitigation has been evenly/fairly distributed
throughout the entire country (i.e. each State getting its fair share of flood mitigation)?
(Please circle one answer only)
Very evenly distributed 1
Fairly evenly distributed 2
Fairly unevenly distributed 3
Very unevenly distributed 4
No idea 8
(b) Why is that so? (Please give a short account)
6	 On a scale of 1 (least adequate) to 10 (most adequate), how would you rate the overall
flood management strategy of the Malaysian Government?
(Please circle one answer only)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
7 Here are some statements that have been made about the flood problem in Peninsular
Malaysia. Can you please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each
statement based on the scale below?
(Please give one code for each statement in the appropriate box provided)
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
strongly	 agree	 neither agree	 disagree	 strongly
agree	 nor disagree	 disagree
(a) Malaysian flood management policies and strategies are too dependent ( )
on structural/engineering approach.
(b) There is a need to incorporate a multi-disciplinary approach to flood ( )
hazard management in Peninsular Malaysia.
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(c) The likelihood of flooding in many parts of the country is decreasing
because the DID and other government agencies can now control
flooding through river and coastal management (and other ways).
(d) The likelihood of flooding in many parts of the country is decreasing
because of changes in nature (weather and climate, etc.).
(e) The likelihood of flooding in many parts of the country is increasing ( )
and becoming worse because of uncontrolled and haphazard development.
(f) The likelihood of flooding in many parts of the country is increasing ( )
and becoming worse because of changes in weather and climate.
(g) Not enough studies have been done in the country to really fully
understand and tackle the flood problem effectively.
(h) The Drainage and Irrigation Department is adequate enough to tackle
the flood problem in Peninsular Malaysia. There is no necessity for
incorporating other agencies/departments into managing the problem.
(i) Pressure groups such as environmental groups should leave the
government agencies to do their work. Making noise will not solve
the flood problems.
SECTION II: FLOOD FORECASTING AND WARNING
(For Government officers whose departments are involved with flood forecasting and
warning systems. Others please go to Question 10)
8	 In your opinion, is your department's annual budget for 'Flood forecasting and warning'
adequate ?
(Please give one answer for each year in the box provided)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	 8 9	 10 No idea NA
least	 most
adequate
	
adequate
(a) 1991	 ( )
(b) 1992
	 ( )
(c) 1993 (Projected)	 ( )
9(a) What is the extent of the areal coverage of flood forecasting and warning systems in the
region under your department's control? (If not possible to ascertain, please give an
estimate)
(Please circle one code only)
1 - 10% 1 51 - 60% 6 None 00
11 - 20% 2 61 - 70% 7 No idea 88
21 - 30% 3 71 - 80% 8 NA 99
31 - 40% 4 81 - 90% 9
41 - 50% 5 91 - 100% 10
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(b) Is the extent of the coverage in (a) sufficient?
Yes	 1
	
No idea	 8
No	 2
	
NA
	
9
(c)	 If no for (b), what percentage of coverage do you think would be sufficient?
(Please circle one code only)
1 - 10% 1 51 - 60% 6 None 00
11 - 20% 2 61 - 70% 7 No idea 88
21 - 30% 3 71 - 80% 8 NA 99
31 - 40% 4 81 - 90% 9
41 - 50% 5 91 - 100% 10
10(a) Do you think the present flood forecasting and warning system in your region (For
government officers) /Peninsular Malaysia (For non-government officers) is the best
current system available?
Yes	 1	 No idea	 8
No	 2	 NA
	
9
(b)	 If no, which then is the best available system for your region/ Peninsular Malaysia?
(Please elaborate)
11(a) Do you think the current flood forecasting and warning system in your region/Peninsular
Malaysia in general needs to be improved?
Yes	 1
No	 2
(b) Why do you think so? (Please elaborate)
(c) If yes, how can it be improved? (Indicate number of ways)
1 	
2
	3	
	
4	
	
5	
	
6	
	
7 	
	
8 	
	
9 	
10
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10
4
5
6
7
8
9
(Those not involved with flood forecasting & warning systems, Please go to Question 12 (c))
12(a) In the current flood forecasting and warning system in your region, how much of the
actual forecasting and warning work is taken over by automation (telemetry, computer
modelling, faxing etc.) ?
(Please circle one code only)
1	 - 10% 1 51 - 60% 6 None 00
11 - 20% 2 61 - 70% 7 No idea 88
21 - 30% 3 71 - 80% 8 NA 99
31 - 40% 4 81 - 90% 9
41 - 50% 5 91 - 100% 10
(b)
	
In your opinion, are the flood duty officers suitably qualified to handle the current flood
forecasting and warning system in your region?
Yes	 1	 No idea	 8
No	 2	 NA
	
9
(c)	 What are the most important qualities/qualifications of a capable flood duty officer? (List
the most important quality/qualification first)
1
2
3
(d) Given the future advancement in mechanisation such as computerisation and other
technologies in flood forecasting and warning, how much of the flood forecasting and
warning work do you envisage will eventually be taken over by mechanisation?
(Please circle one code only)
1	 - 10% 1 51 - 60% 6 None 00
11 - 20% 2 61 - 70% 7 No idea 88
21 - 30% 3 71 - 80% 8 NA 99
31 - 40% 4 81 - 90% 9
41 - 50% 5 91 - 100% 10
(e) Given a the most up-to-date flood forecasting and warning system (fully mechanised), is
it possible that a clerical worker (without academic qualifications and knowledge of the
local catchment and rivers) might be able to be trained to man a flood forecasting and
warning centre effectively?
Yes	 1
Possibly	 2
No	 3
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13 Given the existing system in operation in your region, how important do you rate the
flood duty officer's experience (of floods, rivers, catchment, and other local conditions)
in flood forecasting ? On a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being most important), circle the
importance:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 No idea
14(a) In your opinion, what is the target 'lead time' (time between a flood warning and the
commencement of flooding) for issuing flood warnings in your region/Peninsular
Malaysia?
	 hours (Urban catchment)
	 hours (Rural catchment)
	 hours (Mixed: 50% urban & 50% rural)
	 hours (Overall in your region/Peninsular Malaysia)
(For government officers only)
(b) What is the average lead time your forecasting system can give (Give the actual average
lead time based on past floods).
	hours (Urban catchment)
	hours (Rural catchment)
	hours (Mixed: 50% urban & 50% rural)
	hours (Overall in your region/Peninsular Malaysia)
(c) Given the current forecasting system in your region, what is the maximum lead time
achievable?
	 hours (Urban catchment)
	 hours (Rural catchment)
	 hours (Mixed: 50% urban & 50% rural)
	 hours (Overall in your region/Peninsular Malaysia)
(For all respondents)
(d) Given the current state of forecasting technology in Malaysia, what is the maximum lead
time achievable?
	 hours (Urban catchment)
	 hours (Rural catchment)
	 hours (Mixed: 50% urban & 50% rural)
	 hours (Overall in your region/Peninsular Malaysia)
(e) In order to increase the lead time of your forecasting and warning system, what are the
necessary improvements?
1
2	
3 	
4	
5 	
6	
7	
8 	
9 	
10
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(For government officers only)
15(a) What percentage of the current flood forecasting work in your region & what percentage
of your region is using rain gauged point rainfall?
% of work (Please estimate)
% of region (Please estimate)
(For all respondents)
(b) At a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being the highest), how would you rate the
performance/reliability of rain gauge measured point rainfall in flood forecasting? (Circle
one answer only)
1 2 3 4567  8 9 10 No idea
(For government officers only)
16(a) What percentage of the current flood forecasting work in your region & what percentage
of your region is using gauged river levels?
% of work (Please estimate)
% of region (Please estimate)
(For all respondents)
(b) At a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being the highest), how would you rate the
performance/reliability of using upstream river levels in flood forecasting for downstream
areas?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
(For government officers only)
17(a) What percentage of the current flood forecasting work in your region & what percentage
of your region is using radar forecasted rainfall?
% of work (Please estimate)
% of region (Please estimate)
(For all respondents)
(b) At a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being the highest), how would you rate the
performance/reliability of radar based forecast rainfall in flood forecasting?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
(For government officers only)
18(a) What percentage of the current flood forecasting work in your region and what percentage
of your region is using satellite forecasted rainfall?
% of work (Please estimate)
% of region (Please estimate)
(For all respondents)
(b) At a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being the highest), how would you rate the
performance/reliability of forecast rainfall based on satellite imagery in flood forecasting?
1 2 3 45 67 8 9 10 No idea
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(b)
(c)
(For all respondents)
19(a) Accuracy: Based on your own experience/opinion, please rank the accuracy of each of
the following input in flood forecasting in your region (1 = most accurate, 2 = above
average, 3 = average, 4 = below average, 5 = least accurate, 8 = No idea).
Satellite forecasted rainfall (	 )
Radar forecasted rainfall (	 )
Rain gauged point rainfall (	 )
Gauged river levels/flow (	 )
Reliability(in terms of availability of data, non-failure of instrumentation, etc): Based
on your own experience/opinion, please rank the reliability of each of the following input
in flood forecasting in your region (1 = most reliable, 2 = above average, 3 = average,
4 = below average, 5 = least reliable, 8 = No idea).
Satellite forecasted rainfall (	 )
Radar forecasted rainfall (	 )
Rain gauged point rainfall (	 )
Gauged river levels/flow (	 )
Timeliness(in terms of the speed at which a forecast can be made): Based on your own
experience/opinion, please rank the timeliness of each of the following input in flood
forecasting in your region (1 = fastest, 2 = above average, 3 = average, 4 = below
average, 5 = slowest, 8 = No idea).
Satellite forecasted rainfall (	 )
Radar forecasted rainfall (	 )
Rain gauged point rainfall (	 )
Gauged river levels/flow (	 )
(d) Coverage(in terms of the areal extent that can be covered): Based on your own
experience/opinion, please rank the coverage of each of the following input in flood
forecasting in your region (1 = largest coverage, 2 = above average, 3 = average, 4 =
below average, 5 = smallest coverage, 8 = No idea).
Satellite forecasted rainfall (	 )
Radar forecasted rainfall (	 )
Rain gauged point rainfall (	 )
Gauged river levels/flow (	 )
20(a) On a scale of 1 (very backward) to 10 (most advanced), how would you rate the current
state of flood forecasting technology in Peninsular Malaysia?
(Please circle one answer only)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
(b) On a scale of 1 (very undeveloped) to 10 (most developed), how would you rate the state
of flood warning systems in Peninsular Malaysia?
(Please circle one answer only)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No idea
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21	 How do you rate the current international standing of Malaysian flood forecasting
technology:
(a) in the ASEAN region?: 
The best/most advanced 	 1
One of the best/most advanced	 2
Above average	 3
Average	 4
Below average	 5
Poor	 6
Very poor	 7
No idea
	
8
(b) in the world?: 
The best/most advanced	 1
One of the best/most advanced 	 2
Above average	 3
Average
	
4
Below average	 5
Poor	 6
Very poor	 7
No idea	 8
22	 How do you rate the current international standing of Malaysian flood warning
technology:
(a) in the ASEAN region?: 
The best/most advanced	 1
One of the best/most advanced	 2
Above average	 3
Average	 4
Below average	 5
Poor	 6
Very poor	 7
No idea
	
8
(b) in the world?: 
The best/most advanced	 1
One of the best/most advanced 	 2
Above average	 3
Average	 4
Below average
	
5
Poor	 6
Very poor	 7
No idea	 8
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22(a) What developments would you like to see in Malaysian flood forecasting and warning
systems in the future?
1 	
	
2 	
	
3 	
	
4	
	
5	
	
6	
7	
8 	
9 	
10
(b) What actual developments do you think is likely to happen in Malaysian flood forecasting
and warning systems in the future?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for giving so much of your time in answering the
questions.
Chan Ngai Weng
School of Humanities
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Minden, 11800 USM Penang
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APPENDIX E
	
THE STUDY REGION AND STUDY AREAS: NATURAL AND
HUMAN USE SYSTEMS RELATING TO FLOOD HAZARDS
E.1	 Introduction
In Peninsular Malaysia, the flood hazard is caused by a combination of human and natural
factors. Early settlements prospered on the banks of major rivers in the peninsula. As they
grew, floodplains became more developed and densely populated resulting in floods becoming
more and more of a serious hazard. Both the natural/physical use system (monsoon winds,
heavy seasonal rainfall, low-lying topography, river characteristics, drainage etc.) and human
use system (agriculture, housing, commerce, deforestation, floodplain encroachment etc.)
interact in the creation and perpetuation of flood hazards in Peninsular Malaysia.
This appendix discusses the natural and human use characteristics of the study region of
Peninsular Malaysia and the four selected study areas (Kuala Lumpur, Pulau Pinang, Pekan
and Kelantan) not previously examined in the main text, in relation to the creation and
perpetuation of the flood hazard.
E.2 The study region of Peninsular Malaysia
Peninsular Malaysia is geographically located at the southernmost part of the Asian mainland.
The peninsula lies just north of the Equator between latitudes 10 20'N and 6° 40'N, and
longitudes 99° 35'E and 104° 20'E. It is bounded on the north by Thailand, on the west by
the Straits of Malacca, on the east by the South China Sea and on the south by Singapore.
Its longest extent from north to south is about 800 km and its widest extent from east to west
is about 320 km. The peninsula covers an area of 131,794 km2 , over half and one-quarter of
which are highlands above 152 m and 305 m respectively.
The peninsula experiences a hot, wet humid equatorial climate regime. Temperatures are high
all year round with the exception of the highland areas. In the lowland areas, the mean annual
temperature seldom dip below 25°C. The most distinguishing feature of its temperature is the
small variation in the annual temperature range, usually between 1°C to 2°C. Because of this
uniform temperature all year round, the seasons in Peninsular Malaysia are distinguished not
by temperature but by rainfall. Basically (although there are small variations between
regions), the year is divided into four seasons: (1) the Northeast Monsoon Season (November
-March); (2) the Southwest Monsoon Season (May - September); (3) the First Inter-monsoon
Season (April/May); and (4) the Second Inter-monsoon Season (October). However, the
timing of these four seasons varies slightly between the northern and southern parts of the
peninsula.
E.2.1 Winds
Peninsular Malaysia is located in an area in Southeast Asia which is under the influence of
about eight or nine main airstreams which originate from places such as Siberia, North India,
Tibet, the North Pacific, Australia, the South Indian Ocean and the South Pacific (0oi 1979
p33). The combined effects of these airstreams have given rise to the region's two dominant
surface wind systems, viz, the north-easterlies and the south-westerlies or better known in the
country as the Northeast and Southwest Monsoons (Figure E.1). These two predominant wind
systems significantly affect the both the physical and human geography of the peninsula. On
the positive side, these winds bring forth heavy rains which are needed for seasonal wet
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Figure E.1: Surface wind systems over Peninsular Malaysia
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rice cultivation, water for domestic water supply, and other forms of human use. On the
negative side, the winds destroy crops and traditional houses, cause rough seas which stop
fishing activities, and worst of all bring heavy rains that often result in hazardous floods. In
the East Coast of the peninsula, the Northeast Monsoon winds are responsible for floods
which occur every year in one state or another. In many cases, extreme conditions created
by the winds have deposited rainfall exceeding 600 mm within a 24 hour period.
Furthermore, with the prevailing easterly winds, there is also the likelihood of flood
producing rains spilling over the central mountain ranges of the peninsula, thereby flooding
many parts of the West Coast as well. This was the case when an a tropical depression was
superimposed on the Northeast Monsoon winds (considered an extreme meteorological
condition) during the nation-wide 1971 flood.
During the Northeast Monsoon Season, heavy rain spells that last for a few days to a week
are often associated with the outbreak of cold surges originating in the continental parts of
the Asian mainland (Gan 1963, Cheang 1987). Lim (1979) also found that a heavy rain spell
of several days in January 1975 which occurred in the northern parts of the East Coast was
due to the activation of a quasi-stationary near-equatorial trough by the converging
northeasterlies. This sort of monsoon surge is synonymous with a cold surge. In another
study, Chia and Chang (1971) found that a two-day heavy rain spell in December 1969 over
the southern part of the East Coast was due to a cold surge coming from a 'polar outbreak'.
Another study by Yap et al (1982) indicated that 4-5 day rain spells are due to the interaction
of cold surges and westward moving monsoon disturbances. Such cold surges sweep over the
South China Sea and picks up moisture before depositing them along the East Coast. Cold
surges usually occur at intervals of several days to about 20 days and are most frequent
between November and February. The Malaysian Meteorological Service (MMS) uses cold
surges as a warning sign of impending heavy rains. According to Cheang (1987), the MMS
employs what he calls a 'cold surge and monsoon trough' theory to forecast heavy rains. This
forecast will then be relayed to the DID which in turn runs its flood forecasting models on
the Kelantan and Pahang river basins. As such, the issuance of a heavy rain forecast is the
first point through which the flood warning system in Peninsular Malaysia begins.
Based on the above studies on cold surges and monsoon trough, Sooryanarayana (1988) has
summarised that there are three situations which bring about heavy rain spells in the East
Coast. First, a monsoon trough disturbance moving from the western Pacific towards the
peninsula along the northern near-equatorial trough with a speed of 5-10° longitude per day
will bring moderate rains (Figure E.2). Second, a cold surge acting alone can initiate a quasi-
stationary disturbance, also bringing with it moderate rainfall. Third, when both a monsoon
disturbance and a cold surge develop simultaneously, convective activity is intensified and
this may lead to the development of a tropical depression. This depression may stay in the
region for several days if its intensification stage is quasi-stationary. It is this third situation
that brings about prolonged heavy rainfall which ultimately leads to floods.
The other predominant wind of the region, the Southwest Monsoon, on the other hand, does
not normally cause widespread floods because the peninsula is sheltered by the Indonesian
island of Sumatra. However, heavy rains do occur in many parts of the West Coast during
the period of the southwest monsoon which may lead to localised floods. Also, during this
same period, small intense and short-lived squalls called `sumatras' move across the Melaka
and Johor coasts, on the southern parts of the West Coast. These localised winds bring heavy
torrential rains but fortunately they are rather localised and do not normally cause large scale
floods. However, in many instances, especially in the more developed urban areas, flash
floods usually accompany these squalls. Other than the sumatras, there are also strong land
and sea breezes which affect the coastal parts of the peninsula. However, these winds do not
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(A)Monsoon trough disturbances moving towards Peninsular Malaysia: cloudy with moderate rainfall
(B)Cold surge acting alone, initiating disturbance: cold winds with moderate rainfall
(C)Presence of both monsoon trough disturbance and cold surge: very heavy rainfall, floods
Figure E.2: Monsoon trough disturbances and cold surges moving from the western
Pacific towards Peninsular Malaysia along the northern near-equatorial trough bringing
heavy rains and floods (after Sooryanarayana 1988)
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bring about large scale floods. During the two transition periods, long periods of calm
conditions exist and there is no dominant wind (Chan 1990a p47). Such conditions encourage
the build-up of convectional rain and thunderstorms which frequently give rise to the
occurrence of flash floods in the West Coast.
E.2.2 Rainfall and seasonality
The seasons in the peninsula are differentiated by the amount of rainfall received or
alternatively by the degree of wetness. In general, the timings of wet and dry seasons vary,
depending on Dale's (1974) rainfall regions (Figure E.3). In the Eastern Region, there is one
maximum and one minimum rainfall period. The maximum coincides with the rainy season
from November to March while the minimum corresponds with the dry season from April
to August. During the rainy season floods occur almost every year in one place or another
in the East Coast. In some extreme years, the spill-over effects of the Northeast Monsoon
rains spread across the central mountain ranges over on to the West Coast, giving rise to
widespread floods as well. As a result of the connection between monsoon rains and floods,
flooding is often said to be 'predictable' in the East Coast. What is unpredictabie, however,
is when exactly floods will occur during those five months of the Northeast Monsoon Season.
In the Western Region, there are two maximum and two minimum rainfall periods. The two
maxima occur in April and October-November while the two minima occur in February and
July. The two maxima coincide with the period of the two short inter-monsoon seasons, two
transitional periods where calm conditions prevail for most of the time and there is no distinct
or predominant winds. It is during the two maxima that most flooding occur. Unlike the East
Coast region, flooding in the West Coast region is not widespread but on a small localised
scale. Most flooding are also flash floods caused by convection rain-storms or thunderstorms
and/or a combination of such storms and monsoon rain-storms. However, the temporal aspect
of flooding in the West Coast region is not as predictable as that in the East Coast region.
Although flash floods mostly occur just before the commencement of the Northeast Monsoon
Season or during either of the two inter-monsoon periods, they are known to occur any time
of the year. In recent years, flash floods have been occurring rather more frequently and
there has been no clear identifiable pattern (Friends of Penang Hill 1991 p'70; DID 1992).
In the Northwestern Region of the peninsula, the timing of the wet and dry seasons are
similar to that of the Western Region. The only difference is that there is a more pronounced
dry season from December to February. In the Southwestern Region, the monthly rainfall
throughout the year is very evenly distributed and there is no distinct maximum or minimum.
Finally, the small Port Dickson-Muar Region experiences a maximum during the Southwest
Monsoon and a minimum during the Northwest Monsoon. Owing to the fact that all three
regions are sheltered and do not directly come under the influence of either monsoons,
flooding is seldom on a large scale as that experienced in the East Coast. The floods that
frequently occur are usually that of flash floods and there is no predictable time period when
it is most likely to occur. Because of this, all three regions and the West Coast region may
be considered as one region, that of the West Coast.
The mean annual rainfall is highly variable from place to place, but ranges from about 1,500
mm to more than 3,500 mm (see Figure 2.1). In general, rainfall decreases from the East
Coast to the West Coast (Chia 1975). In the East Coast regions where floods are the most
serious and frequent, the annual rainfall in any year can be as high as 5,000 mm. The bulk
of this rainfall is deposited during the Northeast Monsoon Season. The West Coast region,
however, is shadowed by the Indonesian island of Sumatra from the Southwest Monsoon
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Figure E.3: Rainfall regions in Peninsular Malaysia (After Dale 1974)
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Winds and by the Titiwangsa Range of the peninsula from the Northeast Monsoon Winds.
As such, most of the rains in the West Coast fall during the two short inter-monsoon seasons
in April and October where torrential convectional rains occur. The difference in the mean
seasonal rainfall is more distinct between different regions in the peninsula. For instance,
while most areas in the East Coast region receive more than 2,000 mm of rain during the
Northeast Monsoon Season, areas on the West Coast receive less than 1,000 mm of rain
during the same period (Chan 1990b p41). During the Southwest Monsoon Season, however,
the variation in rainfall totals between the two coasts are less pronounced, with both regions
receiving between 1,000 mm to 1,500 mm of rain.
In Peninsular Malaysia, rain falls all year round and no single month is ever completely dry.
In the East Coast region, the wettest months are November and December with an average
rainfall over 350 mm. The corresponding driest months are June, July and August with an
average rainfall of less than 250 mm for most parts of the region. In the West Coast region,
the wettest months coincide with the two inter-monsoon periods in April-May and October-
November where at least 300 mm of rain can be expected at most places. The driest months
on the West Coast are variable but usually occur in June, July and August. During these
months an average rainfall of less than 150 mm can be expected. The extreme north of the
Northwest Region, however, experiences a distinct dry season from the months of December
to March (Chan 1981a). During these months the average rainfall is less than 100 mm.
However, because of its short duration, average monthly rainfall is highly variable and should
at best be used only as a rough guide (Chan 1985).
Rainfall intensities in the peninsula are generally high, especially during convectional
rainstorms which are of short duration. The intensity of a particular rainfall is important as
it determines the rate of splash erosion and the rate of surface runoff (which in turn
determines land surface erosion and flooding). In general, average rainfall intensities are
around 150 mm per hour. Wycherley (1967) found that the rainfall intensity during an
unstable rainstorm in Kuala Lumpur was around 203 mm per hour. With such high rainfall
intensities and the subsequent high runoff rates, the occurrence of flash floods are therefore
a common phenomenon in the West Coast. In the East Coast, however, rainfall intensities
are much lower, about 2.5 mm per hour (0oi 1979 p71). However, the lower intensities are
more than balanced by the much longer duration of the rainfall which often lasts for four or
five days continuously. As a result, floods are not flashy but tend to be of the large scale and
long duration type, often lasting several days to a few weeks.
E.2.3 Topography
(a)	 The mountain ranges
Peninsular Malaysia is generally considered hilly with more than one-third of its total land
area above 152 m. Most of its mountain ranges are located in the northern parts of its interior
and strike northerly with a somewhat NNE trend. There are a total of eight mountain ranges
(Figure E.4). The peninsula is dissected by a central mountain range called the Titiwangsa
Range. This is the main range and backbone of the peninsula. It runs from Thailand in the
north to as far as Negeri Sembilan in the south. It is mostly made up of granite and its
highest point is Gunung (Mount) Kerbau (2,183 m). This central mountain range effectively
separates the East Coast of the peninsula from the West Coast. Towards the east and west
of the Titiwangsa Range are various smaller and lower mountain ranges running almost
parallel to it. One in particular, the Gunung Tahan Range, has the highest point in the
peninsula, the Gunung Tahan (2,188 m).
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(b) The foothills
Between the East and West coasts and the interior mountain ranges are gently rolling country
known as the 'foothill regions'. The elevations of these regions are usually between 76 m and
152 m. On the West Coast, the foothill region is much broader than that of the East Coast.
Owing to their good drainage, the foothill regions are suitable for rubber, oil palm and other
plantation crops. Many settlements and most of the infrastructure of the peninsula are located
on the foothill regions.
(c) The coastal plains
From the foothills to the coasts are flat coastal plains. The coastal plains on the West Coast
are generally wider than those in the East Coast. For instance, in the state of Perak, the
coastal plain is about 60 km wide. The narrower coastal plains in the East Coast are between
20 to 40 km wide. In the state of Kelantan, there is a fan-shaped delta at the estuary of the
Kelantan River. The Pahang River Delta, however, is of the cuspate type. A common
geomorphological feature along the East Coast is the `permatang' or beach ridges which are
former shorelines running parallel to the current shoreline. Nearest the shore, a series of
permatangs rise about 2 m above the surrounding land and are considered prime land for
building houses. Two other series of higher permatangs occur further inland. In general, the
average heights of coastal plains in the peninsula are not more than a few metres in most
places. Most of these coastal plains coincide with the floodplain regions of the peninsula.
E.2.4 Drainage
Rivers have an important place in the history of Peninsular Malaysia. Historically, rivers have
been the life and blood of early Malay civilisation, British colonial rule and modern day
Malaysia. In the past, rivers were the only source of communications between the Malay
hinterland and the outside world. Furthermore, rivers provided water for both irrigation of
crops and domestic water supply, a rich source of food, fertile soils, and in many areas a rich
mineral deposit called tin. As a result, most of the major settlements in the peninsula are
located near to the rivers. Although modern day use of rivers have been reduced, they are
still very important as natural drainage ways, for harnessing hydro-electric power, recreation,
fishing, and unfortunately as a convenient means of waste disposal. However, indiscriminate
use of rivers and a combination of rapid deforestation, agriculture and uncontrolled urban
development of floodplains have disrupted the natural regime of rivers and resulted in the
deterioration of rivers as a natural means of drainage. Frequently, this has resulted in an
increase in the frequency and magnitude of flooding as well as a corresponding increase in
flood losses.
The heavy all year round rainfall in the Malaysian peninsula has given rise to a dense
network of rivers and streams, though there is no single large river dominating the drainage
pattern. The rivers in Peninsular Malaysia are rather small by world standards. The largest,
the Pahang River, with a catchment area of 29,300 km2 is only about 430 km long. The other
major rivers are the Perak (14,000 km2), the Kelantan (13,100 km2), the Muar (6,595 km2),
the Terengganu (4,650 km2) and the Kelang (1,425 km2). There are more than 100 river
systems in Peninsular Malaysia (Figure E.5). The Titiwangsa Range is the main divide which
determines whether a river flows eastward into the South China Sea or westwards into the
Straits of Malacca. Due to the nature of its topography, the river courses in the peninsula are
relatively short. The gradients of the rivers in the upper courses are steep, some drop about
1,200 m in less than 24 km before they emerge on to the coastal floodplains. In the lower
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stretches and the floodplains, the river gradients are gentle and flat, giving rise to widespread
meandering patterns. Although the year-round precipitation ensures perennial streamflow and
no river course is ever completely dry at any one time of the year, the torrential and localised
nature of the rainfall causes rapid fluctuations in the river discharge giving rise to the
occurrence of floods. During flooding, flood flows in the upper river stretches are usually
transient but increase greatly in duration and intensity in the lower stretches, particularly in
the floodplains. As the densities of population, public amenities, infrastructure and property
are greatest in cities, towns and other settlement types in the floodplain regions, they are high
exposure areas and have the highest flood loss potentials (see Figure 2.5).
In the East Coast, the rivers are more frequently flooded than their counterparts in the West
Coast, due mainly to the effects of the Northeast Monsoon. Quaternary changes in sea level
and progressive sedimentation have also given rise to most rivers taking on a profile with a
typically vertical profile in the upper stretches to a flattened appearance in the middle to
lower stretches (Figure E.6). This is because when the river beds were raised, the rivers'
erosive and transportation capacities were reduced but its rate of deposition correspondingly
increased. As a result, this has given rise to the formation of extensive floodplains with the
typical fluvial formations such as meanders, ox-bow lakes, natural levees and swamps. In the
estuaries the rivers empty their loads into the sea and cause progressive sedimentation along
the coasts. In the West Coast which is sheltered, fluvial deposition has given rise to large
tracts of tidal and freshwater swamps which further impede drainage. Many rivers flowing
westwards often disappear into such swamps before they re-emerge and flow into the sea. In
the East Coast, there are few such swamps (due to the exposed coast-line to the South China
Sea) but floodplains are built around the estuarine areas and all along the major rivers. On
both coasts, the rapid physical development and occupation of such floodplains have increased
human vulnerability and damage potentials of flooding in such plains.
E.2.5 Deforestation
Peninsular Malaysia is a land naturally well endowed with its dense equatorial rainforest
which until today is still a commercially important natural resource. The economy of the
peninsula is still very much dependent on its forestry products. In 1990, total commercial tree
felling in the peninsula amounted to 11 million cubic metres, with sawn timber alone
contributing a total value of $2,520.9 million (Government of Malaysia 1991a p93). In the
past, uncontrolled logging has given rise to a rate of deforestation which has threatened not
only the ecology of the rainforest but more significantly increased runoff and erosion (on the
regional scale) and contributed to warming of the atmosphere (on the global scale) (World
Rainforest Movement 1991). Due to extensive exploitation of the peninsula's forests either
through logging, agriculture and other land use, less than 70.0 per cent of its total land area
is now under forest.
Forest cover is a natural form of flood prevention. In Peninsular Malaysia, deforestation is
a controversial issue (Shiva et al 1991; Kenyalang 1992; Sahabat Alam Malaysia 1992;
Utusan Konsumer 1992; Malayan Nature Society 1992). The dense evergreen equatorial
forest of the peninsula protects the top soil from splash erosion and overland flow through
its thick, multi-layered structure, undergrowth and litter layer. Natural forest also absorbs
part of the rain water during and after a rain event, leaving only a portion of the rain water
into the streams. Finally, interception of the rainfall by the forest canopy, tree trunks,
branches, undergrowth and leave litter increases the lag time by which the rain water reaches
the streams. All the above factors have significant implications for flood occurrences. For
instance, forest conversion and logging of commercial trees have been shown to have
disastrous consequences on soils and the hydrological regimes (Daniel and Kulasingam 1974;
APPENDIX E:80
DISTANCE FROM RIVER MOUTH
100m%
Headwater 424 m
Headwater 820 mHeadwater 950 m
Headwater 1903 m
Heed water
1132 m
er
0
Km	 100	 150 200 250 300	 350 400 450 500 Km
z
tz.
Figure E.6: Profiles of major rivers in Peninsular Malaysia (After Lim 1988)
APPENDIX E:81
Kamaruzaman 1990; Friends of Penang Hill 1991; Hamirdin 1992). Research has also
revealed that significant water yield increases occur after deforestation (Abdul Rahim 1988,
1990; Abdul Rahim and Harding 1992). For example, Abdul Rahim (1990) showed that
logging in the peninsula has substantially increased water yield between 55.0 per cent to 70.0
per cent (unsupervised logging) and between 28.0 per cent to 44.0 per cent (supervised
logging with conservation measures). The DID (1986, 1989) has also shown that clear-cutting
of dipterocarp forest resulted in a water yield increase of 822 mm (470.0 per cent), 793 mm
and 476 mm in the first, second and third years respectively. Zulkifli and Abdul Rahim
(1991) found that there is a water yield increase of between 3 mm to 5 mm for every
percentage of forest cover cleared. Toebes and Goh (1975 p10) showed that logging activities
caused significant changes in flood peaks, flood volumes and flood frequencies.
The government is aware of the importance of its forests both as an economic resource as
well as an ecological safeguard against environmental degradation. It is now pursuing a policy
of 'sustainable development of natural resources'. In its Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995), the
growth rate for sawn logs is estimated at -6.7 per cent. This negative growth rate is in line
with its efforts in protecting and regenerating its forest 8 well as in protecting the
environment and control floods. However, despite this policy of sustained yield and
conservation, poor enforcement of its policies (resulting in illegal logging) may yet see the
trend of uncontrolled deforestation continue in the future (Hani Ahmad 1991).
E.3 The Kuala Lumpur study area
E.3.1 Historical background
Kuala Lumpur is the federal capital of Malaysia. It is the largest city and the single most
urbanised area in the whole country. Despite its current premier position, it is still a relatively
young city. It was only founded in 1857 by a tin prospecting expedition and developed
rapidly into a strategic commercial and administration centre. The name Kuala Lumpur
literally means 'muddy river confluence' (`Kuala' meaning confluence and 'Lumpur' meaning
mud). Soon, the precious mineral had drawn in thousands of miners who settled in and
around Kuala Lumpur. Kuala Lumpur was more than a mining town. It was also a trade
centre and was the point of access between the sea and the hinterland. From 1868, a Chinese
miner single-handedly ruled Kuala Lumpur until 1880 when the then British resident moved
the state capital of Selangor from Kelang to Kuala Lumpur. In 1890, a town council called
the Sanitary Board was formed in Kuala Lumpur and in 1896, when the Federated Malay
States were formed, Kuala Lumpur became the federal capital. It continued its rapid
development into the Twentieth Century when Malaya pushed for independence. In 1972,
Kuala Lumpur became a city and in 1974, it became a federal territory, separate from the
state of Selangor' (Figure E.7).
E.3.2 Population
From a meagre population of a few hundred miners when it was first founded in 1857, Kuala
Lumpur's population has grown rapidly over the years. During the 1991 census, its
population was estimated at 1,145,075 (Department of Statistics Malaysia 1992 p125). With
After losing Kuala Lumpur to the Federal Government, the state of Selangor moved its
capital to Shah Alam.
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ever increasing development and urbanisation, the federal capital's population is expected to
increase further in the near future. Although the government has given an estimated figure
of 2.4 per cent (average annual growth rate) over the Sixth Malaysia Plan period
(Government of Malaysia 1991a p28), Kuala Lumpur's rate of population increase is expected
to be much higher than the national average 2 . According to the Kelang Valley Perspective
Plan, the population of the Kelang Valley (of which Kuala Lumpur occupies the middle and
part of the lower sections) is estimated to reach 4,760,000 by the year 2000 (JICA 1989 p1).
The population in Kuala Lumpur is projected to reach 2.2 million by the year 2000 (Kuala
Lumpur City Hall 1984). This will mainly be due to rural-urban migration, better health care
in the city and the government's current policy of encouraging population growth towards
achieving a 70 million target for the whole country by the year 2095.
E.3.3 Land use
Kuala Lumpur's land use pattern has changed so fast that in the 137 years since its founding,
the area still under natural vegetation is now almost negligible (Figure E.8). The majority of
the land use is now made up of urbanised settlements and associated non-agricultural areas.
The heart of the city is almost devoid of vegetation, except for a few isolated small areas.
In a recent study on green space in the federal capital, Teh (1989 p58) found that only 2.2
per cent of the total area is still under primary forest while another 7.4 per cent is under
secondary forest. Agriculture land (mostly rubber and oil palm plantations) which used to
make up most of the fringe areas surrounding the heart of the city is now fast disappearing.
These areas are being replaced by housing estates.
Although the government is now paying attention to preserving and protecting the natural
environment, the need for economic progress and development will ensure dial- rapid
urbanisation proceed at least at its present rate in the federal capital. Land is getting scarce
in the Capital and housing developers are already opening up the few remaining hills with
forested vegetation (Plates E.1 and E.2). The future land use is therefore going to be even
more urbanised than the current land use. All these would mean converting more areas with
vegetation (either natural or human-made) into areas with artificial surfaces such as concrete,
cement, tar and others.
E.3.4 Rainfall
Rain falls all year round in Kuala Lumpur and the mean annual and monthly rainfalls are
about 2,640 mm and 220 min respectively. The annual rainfall regime has two distinct peaks,
one from October to December and the other from April to May. The wettest months are the
two inter-monsoon periods of October (mean rainfall of 350 mm) and April (mean rainfall
of 330 mm), and the beginning of the North-east Monsoon Season (the month of December
has a mean rainfall of 330 mm) (Figure E.9). During the inter-monsoon months, convectional
rain storms result in heavy torrential rains, usually occurring in the late afternoons. The
mornings are usually dry while the afternoons until shortly before mid-night are wet. This
is due mostly to convectional rain which falls during the inter-monsoon periods. Despite their
normally short duration, these storms are very intense and frequently bring about flash floods.
Monsoon rains occurring during the onset of the Northeast Monsoon Season can also cause
2 In the 1980s, the annual average population increase in Kuala Lumpur was about 5.0
percent. In the mid-1990s, it is expected to be not less than 4.0 percent.
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Plate E.1: Clearing the remaining few forested areas in Kuala Lumpur for development:
Top - View from the top of Bukit Desa across the Kelang Valley; Bottom - Levelling a
forested hill for housing development in Damansara, Kuala Lumpur
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Plate E.2: Top - Landslides caused by deforestation; Bottom - Exposed slopes are highly
susceptible to landslides in a wet equatorial climate
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flash floods as well as widespread floods of longer duration. Such rains are more hazardous
because they can occur at anytime and are longer in duration. If the occurrence takes place
during the night, the subsequent flooding may incur more damage as people are not aware
of it and therefore not able to take evasive action. In the past, floods generally did not occur
during the remaining months of the year. However, due to rapid development during the last
20 years or so, the situation has changed, and flooding now occurs frequently outside the
peak rainfall periods. The most alarming feature of flooding in the federal capital is that
severe floods now occur with the same rainfall (amount) that did not cause any flooding
previously (Ferng 1988 pl). According to Sham (1979), higher concentrations of hygroscopic
air pollutants (from combustion, automobiles and industries) in the city's atmosphere may
have given rise to an increase in the total rainfall amount.
E.3.5 Topography
Kuala Lumpur is located in the middle and upper sections of the Kelang River Basin which
extends from the Titiwangsa Range in the east to the Straits of Malacca in the west. It is
surrounded by hills in almost every direction except towards the west and south-west. Most
of the area in and around the city is below 75 m but a substantial part of it, especially in and
around its CBD, is located on the Kelang River floodplain. Towards its north, one has to
negotiate the hills on the road to the northern parts of the peninsula. These hills are generally
more than 150 m high but many peaks reach above 1,000 m. Within the federal capital, the
land is flat but rising gradually away from the river, and in the 1971 flood (a 1 in 100 year
event), the inundated zone was rarely more than 275 to 365 m wide (United States
Department of the Interior 1981 p11). Further south of the city, about 8 km away, the Kelang
Valley broadens to a width of 24 km or more. Here, the terrain is entirely flat with elevations
of no more than 15 m and only isolated hills below 150 m are found (Figure E.10).
E.3.6 Drainage
Kuala Lumpur owed much of its early development the Kelang River system, which provided
the tin-rich alluvium, communications and transport, domestic water supply and served as a
natural conduit for drainage and garbage disposal. Today, however, the Kelang River system
is no longer used as a means of transportation' or water supply (the water is too polluted),
but is still of vital importance to Kuala Lumpur as it is the main drainage conduit. Owing to
the nature of its surrounding topography, the majority of the rivers in the Kelang Valley
converge in and around Kuala Lumpur. The Kuala Lumpur area is drained by the Kelang
River (120 km long) and its two main tributaries, the Gombak (27 km long) and Batu (24 km
long) Rivers. All three rivers originate from the foothills of the Titiwangsa Range. Other
tributaries are the Keroh, Kerayong, Jinjang, Bunus and Kuyuh Rivers. The entire drainage
area is about 464 km2 at the Market Street Bridge in Kuala Lumpur4 (Pang 1987 pB6.2). The
Kelang River (which drains an area of 1,200 km 2) forms the backbone of Kuala Lumpur's
drainage system (Figure E.11). Its general direction of flow is from north-east to south-west.
The majority of the other tributaries, however, follow a predominantly north to south
direction. In general, the rivers are short and swift flowing in the north of the city. However,
when the rivers reach the low-lying city centre, the flow is generally sluggish and slow.
3 The Kelang River is too shallow but there have been proposals to turn the section of
the river from Kelang to Kuala Lumpur into a commuter waterway (to ease the traffic
problem faced by commuters between the two cities).
4 The entire catchment area of the Kelang River Basin is about 1,425 km2.
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In the catchment areas, about 80.0 per cent is forested but this percentage is fast decreasing.
E.3.7 The flood hazard
Rapid growth in terms of physical and economic development, and population pressures in
recent decades in and around the federal capital have increased the frequency of flash floods,
resulting in various problems and unprecedented damages. According to the Malay Mail
(April 7, 1982), 'It takes just half an hour of heavy rain to create havoc, traffic jams, stalled
vehicles, erosion and damage to housing estates in the federal capital...'. When flash floods
occur, communications are cut, industrial activity temporarily stopped, schooling and work
disturbed, people are evacuated, crops are destroyed, livestock drowned and human lives are
lost. Furthermore, flooding is a danger to public health for sewage, animal carcases and
garbage are pollutants in flood areas (1-luan et al 1982 p1). In the past, the city has been
subject to flooding at irregular intervals. Since independence, major floods occurred in 1957,
1971, 1973, and 1993 but flash floods are a recent phenomenon (see Table 2.1). More
recently, however, it has been shown that rapid development within the city has increased
both the frequency and magnitude of flood flows (Yaziz and Sulaiman 1985). Floods have
also been attributed to rapid socio-economic development when human land use such as
housing, industrial, commercial, communications and others replaced the natural vegetation
(United States Department of Interior 1981). Much of the natural land surface has gradually
been converted to artificial impervious materials such as concrete, tar, cement and others.
Such changes have changed the hydrological regime of river systems resulting in increased
surface runoff and shortened lag time between rainfall and peak flow. The water retention
capacity of the land surface has also been drastically reduced. Furthermore, siltation raised
river beds, reducing the rivers' capacity as natural means of drainage. In many areas, the
river level may actually be higher than the surrounding floodplain (over-flowing being
avoided by a natural levee on both banks). All these lead not only to an increase in the
frequency of flooding but also more significantly, to an increase in the flood magnitude.
Together with inadequate urban artificial drainage, many parts of Kuala Lumpur has become
very flood-prone (Ferng 1988 pl).
When heavy rains occur, either during the two inter-monsoon periods or just as the Northeast
Monsoon is about to begin, severe flooding can occur. A good example is the 1971 flood in
which a depression-type storm passed over the Kelang Valley and inundated approximately
445 ha of land in the city. During this flood, the total flood damage was estimated at more
than $58.6 million (1993 prices). It was also estimated that some 177,000 people living in
low-lying areas were affected (Pang 1987 pB6.3). Millions of ringgits have been spent by the
government to control flooding in the capital. In the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) the
government spent $68.8 million (1993 prices) on flood mitigation and another $14.0 million
(1993 prices) on drainage improvement in the federal capital. In the current Sixth Malaysia
Plan (1991-1995), the government has allocated $496.7 million (1993 prices) for flood
mitigation in the federal capital, underlining the seriousness of its flood problems.
Despite the huge amount of money spent and the completion of many flood alleviation
schemes, flooding continues to occur and do not seem to have diminished. Although the CBD
has not been hit by a big flood since the 1971 event (as river dredging is a continuous process
in the heart of the city), many low-lying parts in the city such as Brickfields, Kampung Baru,
Kampung Dato Keramat, Old Kelang Road, Pantai Dalam, and Sungai Besi Road experience
flash floods frequently. Due to the shortage of land within the city, further encroachment of
flood-prone areas is expected. This in turn may lead to further increases in flood damage.
Each year, more and more people from all over the country flock to the federal capital to
seek their fortune. This puts a strenuous demand for housing and other social amenities. As
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a result, more and more housing schemes are developed. More roads are built, more
industries are set up and more buildings are erected. All these add on to further deplete
whatever remaining green space there is in the city.
People get a false sense of security when flood alleviation schemes are politicised in flood-
prone areas. A good example is the Kuala Lumpur Flood Mitigation Project which was
initiated after the disastrous 1971 flood which severely disrupted life in the city. The project
was much politicised as a solution to the city's flood woes. It was begun in 1976 with an
estimated cost of $465 million (1993 prices) (Pang 1987). Up to the end of the 6th Malaysia
Plan in 1995, a total of $295.4 million is expected to be spent under this project. This project
has convinced residents in the city that floods are now well under control, and given the
notion that people tend to forget extreme past events and are more pre-occupied with day-to-
day demands, they turn a blind-eye to the threat of floods and continue to inhabit hazardous
flood-prone areas (which usually offer cheap housing). As a result, the scene resembles that
of a 'vicious circle' (Figure E.12). This is known as the 'levee effect' whereby flood
protection schemes are erroneously perceived to render part of a floodplain safe for
development (Smith 1992 pp231-2). And as long as there are freak thunderstorms, there will
be floods. When politicians claim that Kuala Lumpur has not been flooded since the 1971
floods, they are really only referring to the CBD of the city. Many low-lying areas are still
flooded many times a year. Flood defence in the CBD are essentially based on the 1971 event
(a 1 in 100 year event) and as Kuala Lumpur moves forward into the 21st Century, this level
of defence may be breached. Even if an event of the 1971 magnitude were to occur in the
1990s, it has been estimated that flood damages would increase many folds because of new
developments and increased values of properties, contents and infrastructure.
E.3.8 Future development trend
Being the premier region in the country, the federal capital is expected to develop at a much
faster pace than other regions. There are plans to merge the four urban centres of Kuala
Lumpur, Petaling Jaya, Shah Alam and Kelang into a continuous conurbation stretching the
entire length of the Kelang River Valley by the year 2020. As such, the direction of
expansion from Kuala Lumpur is expected to be moving towards the west and southwest (see
Figure 2.6). In the Kelang Valley Perspective Plan, the estimated rate of increase of
urbanised area from 1985 to 2005 in and around Kuala Lumpur is about 32.3 per cent.
Consequently, the percentage of forest, agriculture and mining land will correspondingly
decrease. This will have serious implications as more and more of the hitherto unused and
undeveloped flood-prone sites in and around the city will be occupied either by individuals
(housing), private corporations (businesses) and public agencies (government buildings and
other structures). Its population is expected to reach 2.2 million by the year 2000. Together
with rapid social and economic development accompanied by modernisation and further
commercialisation of the city area, the incidence of flooding, which is already a major
problem (Pang 1987 pB6.2), is expected to increase in the future.
E.4 The Pulau Pinang study area
The state of Pulau Pinang5 comprises the island of Pulau Pinang (previously Penang) and the
mainland portion of Seberang Prai (previously Province Wellesley). The total area in Pulau
5 The study area chosen for this research is the island of Pulau Pinang. To avoid
confusion and for all practical purposes, the name Pulau Pinang' will be used to refer only
to the island, unless stated otherwise.
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Pinang is about 295.3 km2 . The island is located between latitudes 5°7'N and 5°35'N and
longitudes 100°9'E and 100°32'E.
E.4.1 Historical background
Pulau Pinang was the earliest trading post to be colonised by the British in Malaya. In 1786
Francis Light, an ex-Royal British Navy captain, established a supplies station on the island
as a midway stopping point for the East India Company merchant ships sailing between India
and China. Owing to its strategic position, the island post soon began attracting other
merchant ships and traders such as Indians, Chinese, Javanese and other European traders.
In 1826, Pulau Pinang became part of the British Straits Settlements which also comprised
Melaka (previously Malacca) and Singapore. Of the three, Singapore's more favourable
location and deep port made it the premier port. Nevertheless, Penang continued to thrive on
its trade of betel nuts, camphor, rattan, bird's nest and opium. Later, when the tin rush in
Perak and other Malay states began, Pulau Pinang served as a port to export the metal. The
introduction of rubber into the Malay states also helped Pulau Pinang's trade. Indians who
came from South India to work in the rubber estates usually made Pulau Pinang their first
port of call. Rubber was also exported via Penang. In all, the port of Pulau Pinang became
the northern outlet for the north Malayan states of Kedah, Perak and Penang itself. By the
turn of the 19th Century, Pulau Pinang's population was a mixture of Chinese, Malays,
Indians, Ceylonese, Punjabis and Europeans. When Malaya achieved its independence in
1957, Pulau Pinang continued to progress and served as the northern 'growth pole' of the
peninsula (Lim 1978).
Since the 1970s, the Pulau Pinang state government has embarked on a two-pronged
development programme of industrial development and tourism. The current state government
has grand plans to transform the island economy into an industrial power by the turn of the
century and into a post-industrial society by 2020. To the foreigner, such plans may seem
over-ambitious and out of proportion. Yet, Pulau Pinang's growth in recent years is nothing
short of phenomenal. Its semiconductor factories (located in the Free Trade Zone - a rapidly
expanding industrial region) and other electronic industries have made Pulau Pinang the
'silicon valley of Southeast Asia'. Thanks to Pulau Pinang, Malaysia is the world's largest
computer chip exporter and is only behind the United States and Japan in terms of chip
production. Multi-national computer giants such as Intel, Advanced Micro Devices, Hewlett-
Packard, Robert Bosch, Hitachi, Toshiba and Motorola already have huge plants in Penang
and are still competing to out-do each other in terms of both qualitative and quantitative
production of chips.
Pulau Pinang is renowned in the world, especially amongst the English speaking, as 'the pearl
of the orient'. To the foreign tourist, Pulau Pinang offers everyone almost everything. From
the budget traveller to the 5-star hotel guest, from rickshaws to limousines, from the sunny
beaches to the hill-top resorts, from hawker food to elaborate banquets, from Chinese opera
to discotheques, and from typical Malay kampung huts to skyscrapers. All the above
attractions are many times enriched by the cultural uniqueness and colour of each ethnic
group from the multi-racial communities. Tourism is a big business in Pulau Pinang. In 1992,
the number of tourist arrivals to the island was about 2.15 million (80.0 per cent being
foreign arrivals). The state government has plans to further develop the tourism business.
There are plans to develop the Penang Hill area into a tourist resort, programmes to clean
up the beaches and the city, efforts to maintain historical buildings, and plans for a bigger
international airport.
Currently, Pulau Pinang is growing at a very fast rate. Since 1988, its gross domestic product
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(GDP) has been expanding at more than 10.0 per cent per annum, much higher than the
corresponding national figure of 8.5 per cent per annum. In 1991, its GDP grew at the rate
of 11.0 per cent per annum. From 1992 onwards, the government has estimated an annual
growth rate of 7.0 per cent to 8.0 per cent until the end of the century. By the turn of the
century, it is also estimated that the current per-capita GDP of $4,000 would be doubled (the
corresponding GDP for Malaysia is $2,800). The Pulau Pinang state government has firmly
set its aim of turning the state into an industrial power in ten years within the 'Northern
Growth Triangle' linking it with the other three north Malaysian states of Perlis, Kedah and
Perak (Asiaweek 27.11.92 p60). With the formation of this growth triangle, Pulau Pinang
hopes to become the centre of trade and commerce for northern Peninsular Malaysia as well
as for the Indonesian island of Sumatra and Southern Thailand. The government's long term
plan is to see that Pulau Pinang recaptures the position as the region's leader in entrepot and
trade (which it lost to Singapore). Despite Singapore's overall superior infrastructure,
financial system and expertise, many feel that Pulau Pinang has a good chance of catching
up as operating costs are much lower than Singapore's. Certainly, the Pulau Pinang leaders
have no doubts that it will.
E.4.2 Population
Pulau Pinang has one of the highest population densities in Malaysia. Until 1947, its urban
centre of Georgetown was the largest town in the peninsula. In 1921, it had a population of
123,000 compared to only 80,000 for Kuala Lumpur. By 1957, Kuala Lumpur had overtaken
it as the largest town. In 1991, the state of Penang had a population of 1.1 million and
although it is the smallest state in the country, it is ranked eighth out of thirteen states in
terms of population. The most distinct feature of its population is that it is the only state in
Malaysia where the Chinese (52.8 per cent) have a clear majority over the Malays (34.6 per
cent) and the Indians (11.5 per cent).
Historically, the sheltered east coast of the island (which is adjacent to mainland Peninsular
Malaysia) is much more heavily populated than the isolated west coast (which is used mostly
for agriculture). Georgetown, located on the northeastern portion of the island is the most
densely populated while the west coast and central highlands are the least densely populated
(Figure E.13). Owing to the rapid expansion of its industries and tourism, the population of
Pulau Pinang is expected to rise sharply in the near future.
E.4.3 Land use
Unlike the evolution of Kuala Lumpur's landscape which has been largely due to tin mining
and commercialisation, Pulau Pinang's present landscape has been largely the result of its
port, tourism and industries. Of the total area of 295.3 km 2, only about less than 30.0 per
cent remains forested (25.0 per cent under natural forest and 5.0 per cent under secondary
forest). The forested area is located in the northwestern and northern parts of the island
where the land elevation is above 300 m. The total area under natural forest cover has
gradually diminished and replaced by crops or secondary forest (Figure E.14). Due to
population and development pressures, even this remaining natural forest refuge is being
threatened. The new town of Air ham is currently expanding into the forested foothills and
there are now proposals to develop about 364 ha of the Penang Hill area into a tourist
attraction (Friends of Penang Hill 1991). The forested area is the main water catchment area
in Pulau Pinang. Besides the highland forest, mangrove and nipah forests are found on a thin
stretch along the west coast.
By far, the area under agriculture is the largest, accounting for about 40.7 per cent of the
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Figure E.13: Population density by mukim in Pulau Pinang
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Figure E.14: Land use in Pulau Pinang in 1987 based on land use classification of
satellite imagery (Source: Remote sensing unit of Universiti Sains Malaysia)
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total land area (Figure E.15) (JICA 1991 pC-1). Of this, about 32.4 per cent is under rubber,
18.6 per cent under orchards, 15.8 per cent under coconut, 9.4 per cent under padi and the
remaining area under mixed horticulture, vegetable and nutmegs. Most of the agriculture land
is located towards the central foothills, the southern and western parts of the island. In
particular, the relatively undeveloped western part of the island is occupied with padi fields,
rubber and coconut plantations and orchards. Pig farming and rearing of other livestock such
as chicken, ducks and goats are also found in the agricultural areas.
Together with the federal capital, Pulau Pinang (particularly Georgetown) is one of the most
intensively developed areas in the peninsula. The built up areas, with its locus around
Georgetown expands in three directions, northwards to the tourist belt of Tanjung Bunga and
Batu Feringghi (where all the major hotels are located), southwards along the entire east coast
towards the Free Trade Zone (where all the industries and the new town of Bayan Baru are
located) and Bayan Lepas (where the airport is located), and finally westwards to the new
town of Air Itam and into the Paya Terubong valley. In all, the current total built-up area
takes up 22.2 per cent of the total land area in the island.
The future land use of Pulau Pinang is expected to change to accommodate the state
government's desire to make it the Northern Regional Growth Centre. Under the Draft
Structure Plan of the Pulau Pinang Municipal Council, the total built up area is to increase
to about 48.0 per cent by the year 2010. The main increase would be in terms of housing,
industries, commercial and tourism. Current agricultural land (mostly rubber and coconut
plantations and orchards) is under severe pressure for conversion into housing or commercial
land. The majority of the expansion of the built-up area is expected to be from Georgetown
southwards until the southeastern coast where many of the proposed new towns are located
(Figure E.16). In this area, much of the built-up area will be for industrial and commercial
development. Industrial development is also featured on the northern coast (for tourism) while
the inland valleys are for housing. Hill-tops are not spared either and are targeted for
recreation and tourism. Based on the Draft Structure Plan, the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA 1991 pC-6) has concluded that the current urban area of 39.0 per
cent in the Pinang River catchment (which encompass Georgetown) will increase to about
46.0 per cent by the year 2010. Their study of land use change within catchment areas of the
major rivers in Pulau Pinang has also indicated that the percentage built-up area in the eastern
coastal belt, which is now between 12.0 per cent to 46.0 per cent (depending on specific
area) will increase to between 44.0 per cent and 93.0 per cent by 2010. Along the northern
coastal belt, the current urban area of between 7.0 per cent to 14.0 per cent will reach 30.0
per cent to 70.0 per cent by 2010. Even the southern coastal belt which is relatively
undeveloped will experience a rapid urban growth rate (with many proposed new towns)
owing to the proximity of the airport and the expansion of the Free Trade Zone.
E.4.4 Rainfall
Pulau Pinang is a tropical island with an equatorial climatic regime which is, in general, not
very different from that experienced by other parts of Peninsular Malaysia. However, its
northern location, maritime nature and exposure to the Southwest Monsoon all affect its
rainfall regime. The seasons in the island are defined by variations in rainfall. Generally,
average annual rainfall is between 2,000 mm to 3,000 mm (Chan 1991c). In general, the
highland areas in the centre and western parts of the island receive the highest rainfall
averaging between 2,600 mm to 3,000 mm annually. The west coast receives the highest
annual rainfall because it is exposed to the Southwest Monsoon winds from May to
September. During these months the rainfall received is between 900 mm to 1,300 mm. The
average monthly rainfall is between 250 mm to 500 mm but unlike the other areas in the
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Figure E.15: Categories of land use and their proportions in Pulau Pinang
APPENDIX E:100
Figure E.16: Proposed future expansion of Pulau Pinang (Source: Remote sensing unit
of Universiti Sains Malaysia)
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peninsula, Pulau Pinang experiences a distinct dry season from the beginning of December
to the end of March. There are, however, two distinct rainfall peaks during the two inter-
monsoon periods of April/May and October. Short torrential convectional storms of 3 to 5
hours duration (usually localised and confined to one or two catchments) during these two
short periods can give rise to flash floods. Such storms usually cause severe damage to small
streams. Rainfall intensities during such storms are generally high, as seen by the average
probable rainfall in the Pinang River basin (Table E.1).
Table E.1: Average probable rainfall intensities in the Pinang River Basin
Return Period (Year) 2 5 10 20 30 50 100
Average Probable
Rainfall (mm/day)
	 124 178 213 247 266 291 423
(Source: JICA 1991 pG-8)
Depression-type monsoon storms of longer duration (2 to 3 days) are more widespread over
the whole island and can cause severe damage to large catchments. Such storms usually occur
just before the onset of the Northeast Monsoon (usually in September and October when the
highest rainfall peak is experienced).
E.4.5 Topography
The topography of Pulau Pinang can be broadly divided into two main geomorphic units, the
lowland coastal plains and the interior hills (Figure E.17). The hills are mainly confined to
the central and northern parts of the island. The terrain in the hills is usually rugged and is
steep, with slopes more than 30.0 per cent. The most well known is Penang Hill which is
made up of a complex of peaks and spurs. In general, the elevation ranges from 300 m to
800 m.
The lowlands occupy the coastal regions on the island. Its east and west coasts are made up
of floodplains with elevations usually not exceeding a few metres. In the Pinang River basin,
many areas near the river estuary are just one metre above sea level. There are even small
depression areas where the elevation is below sea level. On its west coast, the low elevation
has given rise to large tracts of swamps. Swamps are scarce on its east coast mainly because
many of them have been reclaimed for human land use. It is on these lowland plains that
flooding occur frequently. Overall, the lowlands occupy about 40.0 per cent of the total land
area on the island.
E.4.6 Drainage
The rivers in Pulau Pinang are generally short (not more than a few kilometres long) and
swift flowing, due to the small size of the island and the short distance between the hills
(catchment) and the sea. In the lowland areas, however, the low elevation and flat terrain
have caused the rivers to flow slowly. Erosion and sediment run-off (caused by development
and other human related activities such as mining, housing, quarrying and agriculture) in
many of the upper stretches have significantly increased siltation of river beds and
consequently reduced the capacities of rivers in down stream areas as drainage outlets. Many
rivers in Pulau Pinang are heavily affected by siltation. The more notable of these rivers
being the Pinang, Batik Pulau, Fettes and Keluang. In the Pinang River, the siltation depth
is under 80 cm and the quantity of silt is estimated at about 10,000 m 3
 of which 80.0 per cent
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Figure E.17: Topography of Pulau Pinang
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is deposited in the estuary (JICA 1990 p2-5). Because of this, the lower stretches of the
Pinang River are very flood-prone.
There are altogether 31 main river systems in Pulau Pinang (see Figure 2.11). The largest
of these is the Pinang River system with a catchment area of approximately 50 km2 . The
upper stretches of the Pinang River system is made up of several tributaries such as the Air
Terjun River, Air Puteh River, Air Itam River and Tat's Stream. All these tributaries have
their headwaters in the Penang Hill area and are therefore swift flowing. Two other
tributaries of the Pinang River are the Jelutong and Dondang Rivers. The Pinang River
eventually flows eastward and discharges into the South Channel. The importance of the
Pinang River system is not so much in its rank as the largest river system but in that it flows
through densely populated and built-up Georgetown. Currently, 94.5 per cent of its catchment
consists of built-up areas. And because of this, the occurrence of floods in the Pinang River
basin can result in heavy damages. In recent years, flooding has occurred in the older parts
of Georgetown along the Pinang River and along its tributaries such as the Air Itam,
Dondang and Jelutong Rivers.
Owing to the fact that Pulau Pinang is a relatively small island with centrally located
highlands, the rivers follow a radial drainage pattern and flow outwards from the centre of
the island in all directions. On its east coast, almost all rivers discharge into the South
Channel but on its west coast the rivers discharge into the Straits of Malacca. Other than the
Pinang River system, the other important river systems on its east coast are the Keluang and
Gelugor River systems. Both drain into the South Channel. All river systems, other than the
Pinang River system, have catchment areas less than 25 km2 . Other major river systems on
its west coast are the Pinang (West), Nipah, Burong, Kongsi and Pulau Betong River
systems. Some parts of these rivers are flood-prone but because the built-up area is small
(average built-up area is only about 12.0 per cent) and most of the land is agricultural, the
potential damage is not serious. In general, drainage on the west coast is poor because of the
existence of large tracts of mangrove swamps.
E.4.7 The flood hazard
Floods in Pulau Pinang are predominantly 'flashy' in nature. The island is sheltered from the
Northeast Monsoon and partly from the Southwest Monsoon. As such, unlike the East Coast
states, the threat from seasonal monsoon flooding in the island is small. Before independence
in 1957, floods were rather uncommon in Pulau Pinang. Most of the island, with the
exception of Georgetown, was then covered with lush green forest. Even the 1926 flood,
supposedly the worst flood to affect Peninsular Malaysia, did not affect Pulau Pinang.
However, rapid development in industry, housing and commerce since the 1960s has resulted
in forested areas being cleared for human use. Since the beginning of the 1970s floods have
become increasingly frequent (Table E.2).
In Pulau Pinang, floods are caused by depression-type monsoon storms, thunderstorms and
high tides. Depression-type monsoon storms are of a few days duration and are generally of
low intensity but because they are widespread in extent, they cause severe damage to large
catchments (JICA 1990 p2). Such storms usually occur during the Southwest Monsoon Season
or just before the onset of the Northeast Monsoon Season. In 1980 heavy and continuous
rainfall gave rise to widespread floods which inundated Georgetown to a depth of 1.0 m for
two days. On the other hand, convectional thunderstorms which normally occur in the
afternoons, are of much shorter duration of between two to five hours. The rainfall intensities
are, however, very high. A 50 mm depth of rain falling within a 15-minute spell is not
uncommon during these thunderstorms. Because of this, the rainfall intensities experienced
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Table E.2: Flood history of Pulau Pinang
Year
1971
1972
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Magnitude Damage No. of evacuees Lives lost Return period
(1993 prices)
Severe* NA NA 0 1:100
Minor Slight 0 0 NA
Minor NA 0 0 NA
Minor Slight 0 0 NA
Severe $993,500 NA 0 NA
Minor NA NA 0 NA
Minor Slight 0 0 NA
Minor NA 0 0 NA
Minor NA 0 0 NA
Minor $1.2m 41 1 NA
Minor $17,200 21 0 NA
Minor $23,500 100s(est) 0 NA
Moderate $93,000 0 0 NA
Severe $1.3m NA 0 1:12
Minor Slight 0 0 NA
Moderate $175,800 NA 0 NA
Severe $124,800 NA 0 1:30
Minor NA NA 0 NA
Minor Slight 0 0 NA
*	 The definition of severe, moderate and minor is given by the DID and depends on the
extent, duration and amount of damage caused by each flood.
NA	 Not available.
est	 Estimated.
m	 million.
(Source: Drainage and Irrigation Department Malaysia; various newspapers).
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during thunderstorms are considered potentially high in terms of erosivity. According to
Jackson (1977), a rainfall intensity of 25 mm/hour is considered erosive. Thunderstorms have
been responsible for the occurrence of landslides and flash floods in Pulau Pinang, the former
in the hilly areas while the latter in the lowlands. In June 1991, one such storm caused
widespread flooding in almost the whole of Georgetown and many other low-lying parts of
the island (New Straits Times 10.6.91). High tides also cause flooding in estuarine and low-
lying areas. In particular, spring tides which occur twice a month also flood some parts of
Georgetown. However, tidal flooding by itself is not serious as the depth is seldom more than
0.5 m. Usually, only the roads are flooded. Most buildings in the vicinity of tidal flooding
have been flood proofed (either by stilts, raised floors or higher door thresholds). It is the
simultaneous occurrence of depression-type monsoon storms, thunderstorms and spring tides
that increase flood peaks. Any combination can give rise to severe and widespread flooding.
Flood-prone areas in Pulau Pinang are shown in Figure 2.11.
E.4.8 Future development trends
Pulau Pinang is currently about 20.0 per cent richer than Malaysia as a whole, and the gap
is likely to grow (The Economist 22.5.93 p73). With its desire to become the centre of
development in the northern region of the peninsula, Pulau Pinang is set to develop at an
even faster rate than its present. Although the island has been a traditional strong-hold for
trade, commerce and tourism, it has now added industries to its economy. Besides expanding
the current Free Trade Zone, the state government has recently embarked on a rural
industrialization programme. This will not only enhance growth but will also convert rural
into urban areas. The aim of this programme is to transform the rural areas into planned
urban settlements by introducing modern urban facilities (housing, commercial space, social
amenities and recreational facilities) to the rural areas, increase employment opportunities in
the rural areas and curb rural-urban migration. New townships such as Bayan Baru will
become the nucleus of future development in these areas.
In terms of commercial development, Georgetown will remain as the centre but houses and
old buildings located in the fringe areas around the city will be converted into modern shop-
houses and offices. While most of the buildings in the inner city area are of mixed use (as
housing quarters on the upper floors and as shop-houses on the ground floor), there is a
tendency for conversion into solely commercial usage because of the increasing demand
and high rentals. Such conversions will no doubt increase flood damage potentials in and
around the city. In terms of residential development, there is an increased demand within the
environs of Georgetown. This has given rise to the redevelopment of underdeveloped
properties in the city as well as an increased rate of development of new housing schemes.
New housing schemes are predominantly located in the new townships of Air ham, Bayan
Baru, Paya Terubong, Gelugor, Sungai Nibong, Sungai Ara, Batu Uban and Tanjung
Tokong. Agricultural development in the future will still be predominantly in the west coast
plains. It will involve the provision of better infrastructure in agriculture areas. However,
much agricultural land is expected to give way to housing, commercial and industrial land
use. In the field of tourism the state government has plans to further develop the northern
coastal belt around Tanjung Bungah, batu Feringghi and Teluk Bahang. Future development
plans include more hotels, infrastructure facilities, residential resorts, tourism facilities and
other touristy attractions. The city of Georgetown is also to be developed in specific areas
for encouraging tourism.
With the current and future trend of development, more and more areas on the island will be
built-up leading to a corresponding decrease in the area under forest, secondary vegetation
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or plantation crops. This will have many significant effects on the environment, not least
those associated with flooding. The increase in built-up areas and decrease in vegetation
cover, if not properly compensated by flood management measures, can only lead to an
increase in flood frequencies and magnitudes. And as flood damage potential increases
following the increase in commercialisation and investments, the current flood problems in
many of the river catchments are expected to be exacerbated. Population growth and rural-
urban migration from nearby states to seek employment in Pulau Pinang's industrial parks
is likely to force many to occupy hazardous floodplains, thereby aggravating encroachment
and increasing exposure and vulnerabilities. In the state government's anxiousness to make
the state the 'Growth Centre in the north', care and caution must be taken seriously (in terms
of flood management consideration) in all its development programmes. In this context, the
concept of sustainability must be applied.
E.5 The Pekan study area
The Pekan study area encompasses Pekan District in the state of Pahang (the largest state in
Peninsular Malaysia) and is located at the estuary of the Pahang River, the largest river in
Peninsular Malaysia. The district has a total area of 3,846 km2
 of which a significant portion
is flood-prone. The flood-prone mukims are Pekan 6 (the town), Penyor, L,epar, Pulau Manis,
Temai, Ganchong, Pahang Tua, Langgar and Pulau Rusa. The most severely affected is
Pekan as it is located on the bank of the Pahang River and is nearest to its estuary on very
low-lying land (see Figure 2.14).
E.5.1 Historical background
Literally translated, Pekan means town. The town itself is not just an ordinary town, even
though in terms of physical size and population it is small in comparison to the other towns
in Pahang. Rather, Pekan is a royal town, the seat of the Pahang Sultan. Historically, it is
an important early place, having been established as a fishing and agricultural settlement. In
the early days, it also served as the entry point of all trade between Pahang and the outside
world. Yet, despite those advantages and its relatively earlier beginnings, its growth has been
severely restricted and hampered by frequent floods (almost yearly). Economic, commercial
and housing activities in the town have not progressed as rapidly as in some other towns such
as Kuantan, Bentong and Raub.
The majority of other mukims in the district are agriculture based. The most important crops
are padi, coconut, rubber and mixed horticulture (bananas, fruit trees, tapioca, sweet
potatoes, ground nuts, sugar cane, maize, vegetables and spices). More recently, in the last
two decades, oil palm has been introduced to replace old rubber trees because of its better
price on the international market. But owing to the frequent flooding, agricultural expansion
has been restricted to some extent. Large foreign and local corporations which own large
tracts of rubber and oil palm plantations in the West Coast are generally reluctant to invest
in the district of Pekan. As a result, until today, most crops are planted by smallholders on
a rather small scale. In recent years, significant migration of rural youth to the large urban
centres (either in the West Coast or in the East Coast) has retarded agricultural development.
In fact, it is increasingly difficult to convince the younger generation to take up a job in
agriculture. Farming is unrewarding (in terms of remuneration), hazardous and full of other
'Hereafter when Pekan is referred to, it is taken to mean the mukim of Pekan (which is
basically the town of Pekan) unless otherwise stated.
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uncertainties in comparison to a wage earning job in the city (Shahnon Ahmad 1972).
Besides agriculture, fishing is also an important source of livelihood, especially in the coastal
and riverine mukims such as Pahang Tua, Langgar, Pekan and Lepar (Plate E.3). However,
due to the rough seas during the Northeast Monsoon Season, fishing activities have to be
temporarily stopped during those few months of the monsoon, usually between November to
March. As such, the fishing industry in the East Coast has never developed as fast as that in
the West Coast. Frequent flooding of roads has also delayed and in many cases destroyed
fishing products due to be transported to markets.
E.5.2 Population
In 1970, the town of Pekan only had a population of 4,700 as compared to Kuantan (43,400),
Bentong (22,700), Raub (18,400), Mentekab (11,300), Kuala Lipis (9,300) and Temerloh
(6,000). In 1980, its population was 18,904 and by 1991, the figure had increased to 21,768
(Department of Statistics Malaysia 1992 p71). In 1991, Pekan town's population was a
quarter of the total population of Pekan District which had a population of 85,120 in 1991.
The majority of the population in Pekan District are Malays, who make up about three-
quarters of the total population. Outside the mukim of Pekan, the proportion of Malays is
even higher, reaching more than four-fifths of the total population. In the rural areas of Pekan
District, the Malays are usually padi farmers, smallholders of rubber plots, land scheme
settlers, fishermen, labourers and agricultural workers. In the towns, they are usually
attracted to the government service while some set up small businesses such as restaurants,
coffee shops, sundry retail outlets, and others.
The Chinese are mostly businessmen and artisans. As such, they are mainly found in the
larger towns, such as Pekan. However, unlike the other large towns in Pahang such as
Kuantan, Mentekab, Temerluh and Raub where the Chinese form the majority of the
population, Pekan town only has a small percentage of Chinese. This is not surprising as
business opportunities in Pekan are not as good as in the other towns. Moreover, frequent
flood damage to properties, goods, business and health is not conducive to business. As a
result, the proportion of Chinese in Pekan is still small, making up less than a fifth. Other
ethnic groups such as the Indians and others make up the remainder of the population.
E.5.3 Land use
The land use of the lower Pahang river basin is shown in Figure E.18. Swamps, marshlands
and wetland forests occupy the major portion of the basin. On the fringe of the river banks
the land use is mostly agriculture, the majority of which is under rubber and wet padi. This
is followed by mixed horticulture. Compared to the Kuala Lumpur and Pulau Pinang study
areas, the percentage of built-up urban area in the Pekan study area is small. The only urban
area is found in Pekan town itself.
E.5.4 Rainfall
The mean annual rainfall in Pekan District is between 3,000 mm to 3,500 mm. The area
experiences only one maximum and one minimum period of rainfall. The maximum occurs
during the Northeast Monsoon but the minimum varies from April to August (Chan 1989).
More than two-thirds of the annual rainfall is deposited during the Northeast Monsoon
Season, a quarter during the Southwest Monsoon Season and the remainder during the Inter-
Monsoon Seasons. During the Northeast Monsoon Season, a mean rainfall of between 1,500
mm to 2,500 mm can be expected. Despite its low intensities, between 2.5 mm/hour to 5.0
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Plate E.3: Top - A fishing village in Pekan town by the bank of the Pahang River.
Bottom -Traditional wooden houses (with stilts) built on the banks of the Pahang River
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Figure E.18: Land use in Pekan District
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mm/hour, rainfall during the northeast monsoon can be highly hazardous because of its
duration. Usually, depression type monsoon storms last anything between four days to a
week. Such a long duration in rainfall will cause the catchments to be saturated and rivers
to overflow their banks. As Pekan is situated at the estuary of the river, the combined volume
of river discharge reaching it after a rain spell of five days or more is enormous. Due to
siltation of the estuary, the occurrence of high tides, and other reasons, the probability of
flood occurrence in the area during the Northeast Monsoon Season is very high.
E.5.5 Topography
The mukim of Pekan is situated just on the southern bank of the Pahang River. The town
itself, however, is entirely in the floodplain of the Pahang River. Therefore, the land on
which Pekan is built is very low and flat. In most parts of the town, the land elevation varies
between 1 and 5 m above mean sea level. Along the coastal areas of Pekan are a series of
beach ridges ('permatangs') running almost parallel to the shore. These beach ridges (mainly
of sand) are said to have been formed by tectonic movements and eustatic changes to the sea
level (Ooi 1979 p25-26). In between the beach ridges are swales or depressions. It is the
swales that are seasonally flooded because of their low elevations. In many places, the swales
are covered by mangrove swamps. And near the estuary of the Pahang River, along the tidal
reaches, are mud flats. Because of this, drainage is extremely poor in such places and
flooding occurs frequently. In the lowest areas in the town, towards its north and beside the
river, flooding occurs at least once in two years. In the two major floods in 1971, Pekan was
flooded for two to three weeks, to depths of up to 1.5 m. In the outskirts of the town, lower
lying areas such as the mukims of Ganchong and Pahang Tua were inundated to depths of
more than 3 m.
E.5.6 Drainage
The Pahang River is the main river that flows through the mukim of Pekan. It has its origins
in the central mountain ranges of the peninsula. The Pahang River has to flow a long way
from its source to Pekan on its estuary. Its main tributaries which contribute significantly to
flood flows are the Tembiling River, the Semantan River, the Lipis River, the Teriang River
and the Tanum River (see Figure 2.14). In the highlands of the interior, the Pahang River
flows from a north to south direction. On reaching Temerloh, the river takes a sharp turn to
the east and flows into the South China Sea off the town of Pekan. On the Pekan floodplain
the Pahang River is in its old age as evidence such as meanders, ox-bow lakes, braided
streams, islands, swamps and levees are abundant.
E.5.7 The flood hazard
Owing to its exposure to the Northeast Monsoon winds, its proximity to the Pahang River
and its low-lying elevations, the Pekan floodplain is subject to seasonal flooding of various
magnitude almost every year. Pekan floodplain occupants living in flood-prone locations for
a long time are, in many ways, well adjusted to the seasonal floods. To them, flooding during
the monsoon season is almost a certainty. It is just a matter of how high the flood waters will
be and the how long the duration of the flood. It might seem illogical for the floodplain
occupants to remain in such hazardous areas. Most Malay families are very attached to their
land and are very reluctant to relocate. Furthermore, close family ties and friends in the same
kampung where one grew up are also responsible for their reluctance to shift elsewhere.
Consequently, people living in the Pekan floodplain have developed various coping strategies.
Usually, floodplain inhabitants can cope reasonably well with the normal seasonal floods in
which the flood waters do not exceed stilt height and the duration of which do not last more
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than a few days. However, major severe and large scale floods with flood waters exceeding
stilt height (often reaching roof level) and the duration of which exceeds a week render most
people helpless. Most people have to evacuate during major floods.
Historically, many such large and severe floods have occurred which seriously crippled the
social and economic aspects of settlements on the floodplain. The largest documented floods
occurred in 1886, 1926, 1931, 1967, December 1970 to January 1971, December 1971,
1979, 1983, 1987 and 1988. The 1926 flood was the largest flood ever recorded. However,
damages during this flood was not particularly high by today's standards because of the
relatively undeveloped nature of the lower Pahang River basin at that time (which was mostly
swampland) (Plate E.4). The 1970 flood which stretched into January 1971, is considered the
second largest flood ever experienced in the Pekan area (see Plate 6.3). During this flood,
damages were severe as much development had occurred since the 1926 flood. For the entire
Pahang River Basin, tangible losses were estimated at around $38 million. Furthermore, 24
people drowned and 153,000 people were temporarily relocated. The December 1971 flood
was also severe, causing flood losses at an estimated $16 million, 10 deaths and 43,000
evacuees. During the 1972 flood, the damage was $6 million and 7,000 people were
evacuated. The concurrent occurrence of the January and December floods in 1971 (both of
which lasted for two to three weeks) made both the government and floodplain inhabitants
realise that severe large scale floods were not really isolated extreme events that occur once
in a long time. Because of significant damages and loss of life, these floods demonstrated that
the risk of such flooding was more serious than was previously perceived. People became
more aware of the flood hazard and the government took positive steps to provide more
comprehensive flood reduction measures to ensure that a recurrence of the 1971 event in the
future would not result in such high losses.
Other than the severe floods discussed above, floods of various other magnitudes have also
occurred in Pekan District during the years 1954, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963,
1964, 1965, 1966, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1991 and 1992. In general,
these are the regular seasonal floods where flooding is localised and damages are not
significant. However, that is not to mean that these floods are without their effects. On the
contrary, such floods also occasionally entail temporary evacuation of floodplain occupants
in the worst hit areas. Furthermore, these floods also damage crops such as padi, maize,
tapioca, vegetables and other short-term cash crops.
On the whole, despite the frequent occurrences of normal seasonal floods as well as the
severe ones, the Pekan area does not suffer economic damages on the same scale as that
suffered by the large urban centres on the West Coast states. There may be several reasons
for this. First, the number of commercial properties is low. Second, population density is
also low. Third, most private properties are built on stilts or 'flood proofed' in some way.
Fourth, people are well adapted to the normal floods and because they expect them to happen
during certain times of the year (during the monsoon season), they are well prepared for
them. Fifth, the Northeast Monsoon Season is generally considered as an off-season in the
Pekan area. By this, it is meant that business, trade, agriculture, fishing, transportation and
other economic activities are at their lowest. However, as Pekan town expands, population
increases, and more agriculture and commercial activities develop, potential flood damages
is expected to rise in the future.
Although urban flood damages in the Pekan area may not approach a fraction of that suffered
by the federal capital of Kuala Lumpur during the same flood in 1971, rural damages in the
former area are severe. Generally, floodplain inhabitants comprise the poorest sections of
Malaysian society. The majority of these people are either farming on marginal lands or
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Plate E.4: The 1926 flood in Pekan town
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fishing under subsistence conditions. The 1971 floods destroyed the entire main-season padi
crop, which provides the main income of peasant farmers, as well as other cash crops. For
the entire Pahang river basin, the total crop losses for the two 1971 floods (January and
December) and the 1972 flood were $9.0 million, $5.1 million and $1.65 million respectively
(Australian Engineering Consultants 1974b p51). Besides crop losses, damages to housing and
property were also substantial. Overall, there were also intangible losses such as loss of life,
dislocation, stress, health effects on the old and weak, isolation, interruption to routine
activities and others.
E.5.8 Future development trends
Future developments in Pekan District are not expected to be as rapid as that targeted in other
areas in the country. The town is expected to further expand towards the south, east and west
but the rate of development will only be moderate. Agriculture will continue to be the main
focus of development as there are currently few other commercial opportunities in the area.
The swamps towards the south will inhibit developments as will the swamps north of the
Pahang River. As such, agriculture expansion will take place in and around existing
agricultural areas along both banks of the Pahang River. According to official sources in the
Pekan District Office, future expansion north of the Pahang River will be northwards towards
Kuantan town. In the south of the river, the expansion will be towards existing agriculture
areas. Further inland, towards the extreme west of Pekan District, existing lowland forest is
expected to be cleared for more agricultural land schemes. In this context, the most likely
crop to be planted will be oil palm. This crop is expected to take on more importance as
many of the old rubber trees will be felled to give way for the new crop. In some areas,
reclamation of swamp lands will further increase the area under agriculture. However, the
land use change is not expected to be large and there is currently no reason to believe that
such changes will alter the existing hydrological regime significantly. Nevertheless, such
increases in developments will naturally expose more crops, properties, infrastructure and
people to the flood hazard. In this context, future flood damage potential is expected to rise.
E.6 The Kelantan study area
Kelantan, literally translated, means 'Land of lightning'. This probably has its origins from
the frequent occurrences of lightning during rainstorms, which occur throughout the Northeast
Monsoon Season. It is located on the northeastern corner of Peninsular Malaysia and is
bordered by Thailand in the north. The state of Kelantan is unique in that there are three
levels of administrative units compared to two levels in the other states in Peninsular
Malaysia. Kelantan is divided into ten jajahans of which only two, Jeli and Gua Musang are
relatively flood free (Figure E.19). All the other jajahans are flooded to some degree. The
worst affected jajahan is Kota Bharu which is located on the Kelantan River estuary where
the land is almost entirely on the floodplain. Each jajahan is subdivided into smaller
administrative units called districts.
The study area comprises the three sample sites in and around the three towns of Kota Bharu,
Kuala Krai and Pasir Mas. Kota Bharu 7 is located on the estuary of the Kelantan River, Pasir
Mas slightly further inland on the banks of the same river and Kuala Krai at the confluence
of the Kelantan and Lebir Rivers. All three sample sites are flood-prone to certain degrees
and are located within the Kelantan River Basin which discharges into the South China Sea.
7 Hereafter, the term Kota Bharu shall refer to the town of Kota Bharu unless specified
otherwise.
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E.6.1 Historical background
Historically, Kelantan is unique because of early Siamese influence. In fact, even today a
significant percentage of its people are of Siamese origin. Before the westerners arrived,
Kelantan was one of the more prominent and powerful Malay states under Siamese rule and
influence. As a result, Siamese culture can be identified in many Kelantanese customs.
Kelantanese are steeped in tradition and consider their state a veritable seat of Malay culture.
The influence of Islam is particularly strong in Kelantan.
Early British colonial influence did not spread to Kelantan because it did not have rich tin
deposits and its terrain and climate were unsuitable for rubber planting. Frequent flooding
also hampered development as infrastructures such as roads and other communication lines
were constantly damaged. Few early immigrants such as the Chinese and Indians settled in
Kelantan and the state was left very much to the hands of local Malay rulers. Because of this,
economic development was slow and Kelantan's economy mostly depended on traditional
agriculture (padi), fishing and local handicraft. As a result, it lagged far behind other states
in terms of economic development and until today remains one of the poorest states in
Peninsular Malaysia (Faaland et al 1990 pp122-3).
E.6.2 Population
Although Kelantan is one of the poorest states, it is the most densely populated state on the
East Coast. In the 1991 census, Kelantan had a population of 1.18 million. It was ranked
seventh (out of 13 states) in the whole of Malaysia. Of the 10 jajahans in Kelantan, Kota
Bhani is the most densely populated with 366,849 people. This is more than twice the
number of the second ranked jajahan in Kelantan. More significantly, the Kelantan delta
where Kota Bharu is situated, is the most densely populated with more than 600 people per
km2 . Because of this, annual monsoon floods bring extensive economic losses and human
sufferings to occupants in the delta area.
Kelantan is a predominantly Malay state. Malays comprise more than 90.0 per cent of the
total population. In fact, in the rural areas where traditional padi planting, fishing and other
agriculture activities prevail, the population is almost entirely Malay. Non-Malays in Kelantan
are usually confined to the major towns. For instance, the percentage of non-Malays is about
32.0 per cent in Kota Bharu (29.0 per cent Chinese; 2.0 per cent Indians; and 1.0 per cent
others).
E.6.3 Land use
Because Kelantan is agriculture based, the predominant land use is agriculture. Padi planting
dominates much of the riverine and coastal low lands, especially around the Kelantan Delta.
Due to the high frequency of flooding, wet padi is the most suitable crop. In fact, many padi
varieties are of the flood resistant type. All along the coastline are fishing villages. Such
villages also act as centres of the Kelantanese cottage industry where a variety of traditional
handicrafts are produced. The cottage industry becomes important during the Northeast
Monsoon Season when fishing activities cease.
Further inland on the hill slopes where drainage is better, rubber and oil palm become more
dominant. Other crops such as coconut, vegetables, pineapple, tea, coffee, cocoa, pepper,
sugar cane, banana and local fruits are also cultivated on higher grounds. Most of these crops
are planted by smallholders although the Kelantan government has initiated many land
schemes involving plantation agriculture. Because of the effects of the monsoons and the high
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incidence of floods, plantation agriculture in Kelantan has never developed in the same
breadth as it has in the West Coast.
Towards the interior lies the forest reserves and high land forests. In this area, logging is still
important and contributes significantly to the state's revenue. Shifting cultivation is also
carried out by aboriginal people. More recently, the completion of the east-west highway has
changed the land use in the interior.
Other than Kota Bharu town, urban expansion and economic development has not affected
floods in other parts of Kelantan. Urban expansion and economic development in Kota Bharu
is not expected to have the same effect on exacerbating the flood hazard as in Kuala Lumpur
or Georgetown but further encroachment of floodplain, especially in and around the Kelantan
Delta is expected to increase flood damage potential in the future.
E.6.4 Rainfall
The Kelantan study area is situated on the East Coast and is therefore subject to the influence
of the Northeast Monsoon winds. However, being located further north in the peninsula, the
winds reach the state of Kelantan earlier, usually in mid-October. Likewise, the winds die
off earlier, around the end of February. Because of this timing, the DID of Kelantan has
designated the period from 15th October to 15th January as the 'flood season' in the state.
The beginning of the Northeast Monsoon Season is usually marked by the arrival of strong
easterly winds and the occurrence of intermittent rains over a week or two. In the case of the
former, the occurrence of typhoon magnitude winds (between 65 to 100 knots) is not
uncommon (Sunday Times 3.12.72). Winds of such magnitudes have destroyed crops,
houses, uprooted trees and damaged roads, telecommunications and other structures. In the
case of the latter, experience tells the Kelantanese that such intermittent rains when followed
by subsequent continuous rains are a sure sign that floods will follow soon. As a result, even
while the floods have yet to occur, the people living in flood-prone areas would make
contingency plans to face the impending floods. Fishermen will stop going out to sea as their
small boats and light engines cannot cope with the rough seas caused by the monsoon winds.
In fact, as soon as the winds commence, fishing activities cease. Most fishermen would then
beach their boats or anchor them far inland along the irrigation canals or tributaries of the
Kelantan River to avoid being damaged.
The average annual rainfall of the Kelantan River Basin varies from 2,800 mm on its
northernmost coast to about more than 3,600 mm in the foothill region in the centre of the
basin. The bulk of this rain (more than 60.0 per cent) falls during the Northeast Monsoon
Season. As is common on the East Coast, rainfall intensities during the Northeast Monsoon
Season are usually low, about 2.5 mm/hour (60 mm/day) but rain spells last for a few days
to more than a week. For instance, it has been estimated that a rain spell of 8 days duration
with a 1,200 mm volume of rain will have a return period of 15 years. A similar rain spell
with a 500 mm volume of rain will occur every two years (Government of Malaysia Undated
pD2). The occurrence of an 8-day rain spell with 1,200 mm of rain will give rise to flooding
in many parts of Kelantan. Most seasonal floods during the Northeast Monsoon are caused
by such rain spells. During the Southwest Monsoon Season, however, flooding seldom
occurs. When it does, it is usually localised and of short duration. However, flash floods
occur frequently in Kota Bharu and other towns as a result of inadequate urban/artificial
drainage.
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E.6.5 Topography
Kelantan may be divided into three topographical regions: (1) the mountains in the interior;
(2) the coastal and floodplains; and (3) the rolling country in between the two. In the
mountainous interior, covering the jajahans of Jeli and Gua Musang, the land is made up of
steep slopes and mountain peaks, averaging between 1,000 m and 1,500 m (Figure E.20).
It is from this region that the majority of the rivers in Kelantan have their origins. In the
coastal and floodplains, the land elevation is low, seldom more than 15 m above sea level.
The jajahans within this region are Kota Bharu, Tumpat, Bachok, Pasir Puteh and Pasir Mas.
Most areas hugging the Kelantan River and those near its estuary are seldom more than a
metre or two above mean sea level. In fact, the existence of many permatangs in parallel
formation have given rise to swales, many of which are below sea level. It is in the coastal
and floodplains that floods are most frequent and serious. Kota Bharu town, which is located
near the estuary of the Kelantan River has very low elevations and is very vulnerable to
seasonal floods (due to the Kelantan River overflowing its banks) as well as flash floods (due
to poor urban drainage). The rolling country is found in the central parts of Kelantan,
comprising the jajahans of Machang, Tanah Merah and Kuala Krai. Generally, the land
elevation in this region varies from about 15 m to 1,000 m. The region is made up of narrow
floodplains, dissected river valleys and isolated hills. This region is also subject to flooding,
especially in the narrow floodplains. For instance, Kuala Krai town is located at the
confluence of the Galas and Lebir Rivers (both tributaries of the Kelantan River) and is
therefore very easily flooded during the Northeast Monsoon Season.
E.6.6 Drainage
The natural drainage pattern in Kelantan is dominated by one major river system, that of the
Kelantan River. The rivers in the interior mountains form the origins of the Kelantan River
system. They include the Nenggiri, the Galas, the Lebir and the Pergau Rivers. The Nenggiri
and Pergau essentially flow eastward to join the Lebir and Kelantan Rivers which flow in a
predominantly northwards direction. Most other tributaries of the Kelantan River flow either
eastward or westwards towards the main river. Because the coastal plains are seldom more
than 15 m above sea level, land drainage is generally inadequate and rivers tend to be
sluggish and meandering. These combine to promote widespread flooding whenever heavy
rain falls, especially during the Northeast Monsoon Season. During this season, flood
frequency is also further increased by a temporary rise of the sea level by some 30 - 40 cm,
due to water stowage in the South China Sea (Tilmans 1991 p89).
Owing to this interrelated drainage network, it has helped flood warning operations
somewhat. The Kelantan River flood warning system is based on a flood routing network of
rivers comprising the Nenggiri, Pergau, Galas, L,ebir and Kelantan rivers. For instance, flood
levels at Kuala Krai will depend on river levels at gauging stations on the upper stretches of
all four of these rivers. As such, experience and correlation techniques have shown that when
certain levels are reached upstream at various gauging stations along these rivers, the
likelihood of Kuala Krai being flooded will be high. Similarly, flood levels at Kuala Krai are
used to estimate or predict flood levels at Kota Bharu. Experience indicates that flood waters
of the Kelantan River at Kuala Krai take about 12 to 15 hours to reach Kota Bharu. Flood
warning boards are set up at strategic points by the side of the Kelantan River to indicate the
river level at Kuala Krai and its corresponding level at the place of the board. Corresponding
'alert', 'warning' and 'danger' levels between the two points are shown on the board (see
Plate 5.3). Floodplain occupants are expected to be aware of changes in the river level at
Kuala Krai to decide whether or not to evacuate. Because nearly all rivers in the state drain
into the Kelantan River at some stage or another, the discharge of the Kelantan River at its
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lower stretches is overloaded, often causing extensive flooding.
Another major problem with the Kelantan River system is the high rate of siltation at its
lower stretches, particularly the estuary. The problem has become so acute that it is now a
problem even for fishing boats to negotiate the narrow river mouth to go out to sea. Because
of this, the capacity of the river to discharge its water into the sea is very much reduced. In
fact, this has been as much a cause of frequent flooding as has the Northeast Monsoon. The
opening of new agricultural land schemes in the central and interior parts of the state,
logging, as well as the growth of new towns and the building of the East-West Highway and
other roads have also compounded the problem of flooding.
E.6.7 The flood hazard
The Kelantan River is the focal point of Kelantanese life. It has been for centuries and still
is. There is no doubt that the Kelantan River has brought many benefits to the people in
terms of transportation, fishing, hydro-electric power, water supply, irrigation, drainage and
so on. Unfortunately, the river is also the bane of the Kelantanese as it brings about seasonal
floods which until today, are as serious a threat as ever. In the East Coast of Peninsular
Malaysia, Kelantan is probably the state which is most severely affected by flood hazards.
This is because, unlike Pahang and Johor where a greater portion of the flood-prone areas
are swampland or jungle (Terengganu seems to have overcome flooding somewhat with the
completion of the Kenyir dam), the flood hazard in Kelantan affects most of its major towns
and the main agricultural areas. Kelantanese are also highly exposed to flood hazards because
a significant proportion live on floodplains. The state has the highest percentage of poor and
hard-core poor households (The Star 24.8.94 p11), making it one of the most vulnerable
states to flood hazards.
According to Takenada (1988 pl), annual floods of the Kelantan River bring not only
extensive economic losses and human sufferings, but also negative psychological effects on
farmers who are reluctant to adopt modern agriculture technology and potential industrialists
who avoid the Kelantan floodplain. Almost each year, many parts of the state are flooded,
the damage being worse in Kota Bharu because of its dense population and compactly built-up
urban areas. To say that the flood hazard is a major problem faced by the people of Kelantan
would be an understatement. During the flood season, almost everything that is done or is
being done has the flood hazard or its possible effects in mind. Even though the Northeast
Monsoon inevitably causes floods in Kelantan almost every year, Kelantanese living in low-
lying areas become apprehensive whenever rains occur continuously for a couple of days or
more during the season. In fact, many people go about making preparations to face the
impending floods irrespective of whether they will occur or not. A survey by a local
newspaper showed that many floodplain occupants start to pack and store away important
documents and expensive household contents to prevent flood damage. Residents of Kampung
Hujung Tanjung near Kota Bharu built a bund made of coconut tree trunks and sand bags in
anticipation of flood waters threatening their houses (New Straits Times 21.11.89).
In the past, flood losses in Kelantan have been significant. Three of the worse floods hit
Kelantan in 1967, 1973 and 1988. In the 1967 flood (a 1 in 50-year event), there were 39
deaths and official figures quoted damages at $44.6 million (1993 prices). The entire coastal
region north of Kuala Krai, totalling 300,000 ha or 20.0 per cent of the total area of
Kelantan, was flooded (see Figure 2.13). Almost half of the entire population of the state of
Kelantan were evacuated. In the 1988 flood, 19 people lost their lives and damages totalled
$33.8 million (1993 prices) (Table E.3).
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Table E.3: Historical floods in Kelantan
Year
1926
1931
1949
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1986
1987
1988
1990
1991
1992
1993
Magnitude Damage Number of Lives lost
(1993 prices) Evacuees
Severe Extensive NA NA
Severe NA NA 0
Minor NA NA 0
Minor NA NA 0
Minor NA NA 0
Minor Negligible NA 0
Minor Negligible 0 0
Minor Slight 0 0
Minor Negligible 0 0
Severe $4.5m NA Several
Minor Slight 0 0
Severe NA NA 0
Minor Negligible 0 0
Minor Negligible 0 0
Minor Negligible 0 0
Moderate Negligible 0 0
Severe $196,000 21,667 3
Severe $14.8m 18,323 4
Moderate $619,500 1,806 3
Severe $7.0m 12,296 3
Moderate $1.1m NA 0
Minor Negligible NA 0
Minor Negligible 0 0
Severe NA 200 3
Severe $6.7m NA 0
Severe $2.5m 4,890 0
Severe $12.7m 0 0
Moderate $3.7m 7,177 9
Severe NA 7,968 0
Moderate $4.8m 402 4
Severe $33.8m 36,789 19
Moderate NA 514 4
Minor $1.5m 572 2
Minor NA NA 4
Severe NA** 15,854 16
*	 The definition of severe, moderate and minor is given by the DID and depends on the
extent, duration and amount of damage caused by each flood.
**	 A total of 113,000 school children missed school for several days as 200 schools were
closed.
NA	 Not available.
est	 Estimated.
m	 million.
(Source: Drainage and Irrigation Department Malaysia; various newspapers).
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E.6.8 Future development trends
With its tropical sunny climate, crystal clear seas, golden sandy beaches and enchanting
cultural uniqueness, Kelantan is a popular tourist destination (both local and foreign) in
Peninsular Malaysia. Indeed, climate also has a strong influence on almost every other aspect
of Kelantanese life ranging from the timing of the padi cycle, padi yield, other agricultural
crops, fishing activities, commercial activities and of course, response to the flood hazard.
Even the number of marriages are influenced by the seasons (in terms of good or bad yields
as well as traditional beliefs relating to the weather and climate). The close affinity between
climate and life in Kelantan was shown by Monteiro (1962). More than anything else,
unfavourable climate during the Northeast Monsoon Season (and human occupation of
floodplains) has produced a flood hazard that has profound effects on almost every facet of
Kelantanese life. Every end of the year around the months of October and November,
Kelantanese from all walks of life (especially the state government) brace themselves for yet
another season of monsoon assault. During this season, it would be normal for the Kelantan
River to overflow its banks in low-lying areas such as Pasir Mas, Kuala Krai and Kota Bharu
and a real bonus if nobody drowned.
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APPENDIX F
	 SURVEY METHODS AND SAMPLING
F.1 Survey methods
A wide range of survey methods are available to hazard researchers and other social scientists
in investigating social phenomena. In this thesis, the selection of appropriate research
methods depends on the time frame as well as the scope and resources available in this
research.
F.1.1 The quantitative structured questionnaire
The quantitative structured questionnaire survey is a widely used method in the social
sciences. It is a universally recognised method and is scientifically based. In the hazards
research literature, it is the predominant investigative tool of the dominant hazards paradigm
where individuals/households are surveyed and the results aggregated. Its usefulness and
accuracy is based on sound sampling techniques and on the asking of unbiased questions.
Detailed discussion of this method can be found elsewhere (Marsh 1982).
In this research, careful attention was given at various stages of the survey. For instance, the
form, content, wording, order and context in which questions were asked in each
questionnaire were carefully planned. They were revised accordingly after the pilot survey.
Interviewers were carefully chosen and trained. Their performance and credibility were
monitored closely. During the main survey, interviewer bias and human error when
administering the questionnaire were minimized by close supervision and counter-checking.
Random checks were constantly carried out on both interviewers and respondents. The author
also carried out a significant portion of the interviewing himself (see Section F.3 below).
F.1.2 The self completion/mailed questionnaire
In contrast, the self completion or mailed questionnaire is an impersonal survey method.
Because of the nature of the questionnaire, the response rate can be poor. Furthermore, if a
respondent is unclear over a question, there is no avenue for clarifying the ambiguity. This
may lead to unclear answers. Because there is no direct contact, only simple and direct
questions can be asked. There is no opportunity for probing beyond the given answer, which
may result in a shallow account. Because of its limitations, such self completion
questionnaires have only been used to a limited extent in Britain (Bateman et al 1991 p42).
Nevertheless, self completion questionnaires are cheaper and quicker to administer than either
personal or telephone surveys. They are also capable of reaching even the most remote or
otherwise inaccessible parts of a survey region. Furthermore, documents such as maps,
diagrams and pictures can also be mailed out to the respondents if necessary. Given a
conscientious respondent, the greater anonymity may result in the eliciting of a more truthful
response.
In this research, the self completion questionnaire was sent to officers of flood hazard
organisations and other selected respondents outside of the four study areas. Respondents
within the four study areas were interviewed by the author with the same set of
questionnaires.
F.1.3 The telephone interview
The telephone interview method has gradually become a very practical and popular form of
survey since the 1980s. This is especially so in the developed world where more than 90.0
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per cent of households have telephones. Technological improvements in telephone
communications have also made telephone interviewing more convenient and easier. It is now
possible to draw a random sample of telephone numbers by a process called random-digit-
dialling (RDD) (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). Telephone interviews also have
the advantage of being capable of reaching a survey population which is geographically
dispersed. Furthermore, when such interviews are assisted by a computerised format such as
the computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI), the effects and errors of inexperienced
interviewers may be greatly reduced. However, the most obvious advantages are that of
speed, cost and the semi-personal nature of the interview. However, the disadvantage with
this survey method is that only a limited amount of information can be conveyed over the
telephone at any one time. As such, they are generally not suitable for surveys in which the
respondent has to read or identify certain maps, pictures or show cards. Furthermore, there
is a greater chance for the respondent to turn down or terminate an interview when not in the
presence of the interviewer. Interviewers also cannot describe the respondent's characteristics
and environment in detail.
In this research, telephone interviews were conducted by the author with relevant government
officers, academics, consultants (whose work is related to the flood hazard). This method of
survey was only resorted to when personal interviews could not be arranged or when the
respondents were not located within the four study areas.
F.1.4 In-depth interviews
In-depth interviews are a variation of the structured questionnaire. This method can either be
conducted by means of a structured questionnaire (with in-depth accounts within the
questionnaire) or by a non-structured questionnaire (whereby only key questions are asked
and respondents are encouraged to give detailed accounts of events and phenomena). This
method has the advantage of being able to obtain detailed accounts of the events or
phenomena under study. However, quantification is often difficult as no two accounts of
events or phenomena can be easily quantified. The method may be used as a back-up or
supplementary for the structured questionnaire interview.
On the whole, personal interviews using the structured questionnaire appear to be the most
appropriate research methodology for the section on individual household survey in this
study. The method is quantitatively based and detailed accounts of flood events can be
obtained by supplementary in-depth qualitative interviews on selected households.
Furthermore, interviewers can motivate respondents to participate, research their preferences,
ensure that all questions and other information are understood, and develop a close rapport
with respondents (which will enhance the respondent's confidence in the interviewer and
thereby provide free flowing answers). Similarly, both the remaining two surveys on flood
damage to business establishments and the survey on government officers and other experts
are best tackled by the quantitative questionnaire approach. On the other hand, the evaluation
of flood hazard institutions is best tackled by the qualitative research methodology.
F.2	 Selection of case study areas
In this thesis, four case study areas, each representing a geographically different flood hazard
zone in Peninsular Malaysia were selected. The selection of the study areas is essentially
based on the criteria below:
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(a)	 Geographical location on the East or West Coast of the peninsula
Historically, and for a variety of reasons, vast differences exist between the East and West
coasts of Peninsular Malaysia (Figure F.1). In the East Coast, most of the floods experienced
are predominantly caused by heavy orographic rainfall (which can persist for up to a week)
brought by the monsoon winds, particularly the Northeast Monsoon winds (November to
March). As such, flooding in the East Coast is seasonal in nature and relatively predictable.
On the other hand, the West Coast is located in a rain-shadow area, being sheltered by the
peninsula's Main Range from the Northeast Monsoon winds and the Indonesian island of
Sumatra from the Southwest Monsoon winds. However, this does not imply that floods are
any less frequent than those in the East Coast. Flooding in the West Coast can occur all year
round as rain falls throughout the year (there is no distinct dry season) and is predominantly
caused by torrential convectional rainfall'. Nevertheless, the significance of the influence of
the monsoon winds in the West Coast should not be totally discarded. During certain years
where the rainfall is extremely high (as in a 1 in 100 year event), there is an 'overspill' effect
where heavy monsoon rainfall is brought into the West Coast causing floods. A good example
is the major flood in Kuala Lumpur (located on the West Coast) in 1971 (Pang 1987). As a
result, there are wide differences in flood causes and their subsequent predictability between
the East and West Coasts. Consequently, the warning lead time 2 and responses are likely to
be different.
Flood magnitudes over space and time are also likely to be different between the East and
West Coasts. While the floods in the former are usually extensive and last longer, those in
the latter are flashy and of short duration. East Coast floods also commonly cause deaths
because of the greater magnitude of flood peaks and river flows whereas West Coast floods
seldom account for deaths. Despite that, the amount of economic loss from floods is likely
to be higher in the West Coast because of the higher densities of built-up properties and
infrastructure.
The West Coast and East Coast are also different in terms of social, economic and political
development. East Coast states are predominantly populated by Malays and are the seat of
Malay culture. Much of economic livelihood in the East Coast is based on peasant padi
farming, fishing and other agriculturally based occupations. While the former had prospered
during British colonial rule (Kennedy 1967) and subsequently after independence (Ooi 1979;
Government of Malaysia 1991a), the latter has been largely neglected and today lagged far
behind the former. As such, the East Coast is underdeveloped and has traditionally been the
poorer half of the peninsula. These differences are envisaged to have significant influences
on vulnerability to flood hazards and government flood management between the two coasts.
(b)	 Flood type
Although most of the flood prone areas in Peninsular Malaysia are affected by river floods,
there are many places, particularly those areas located near to estuaries and the coast, that
are affected by tidal flooding. Besides the differences in flood characteristics, the effects of
tidal floods are more damaging mainly because of the salinity of the flood waters. However,
'While heavy convectional rainfall can occur all year round in the West Coast, it occurs most
frequently during the two short inter-monsoon periods of April and October (though the exact
timing of these two transitional periods varies from place to place) (Dale 1974).
2 'Lead time' is defined as the time between a flood warning and the occurrence of the flood
(Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton 1977).
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because of its 'predictability', people may have been well adapted to tidal floods. A third type
of floods is a combination of both river and tidal floods. People living in riverine areas near
the coast experience flooding when heavy rains coincide with high tides.
Floods can be seasonal as in 'monsoon floods' or perennial as in 'flash floods'. The former
occurs mainly in the East Coast and can last for a duration of a few days to more than a
month. The latter usually occurs in the heavily developed urban areas on the West Coast and
usually lasts not longer than a day. However, the onset for flash floods is sudden and usually
no warning can be given. On the other hand, seasonal monsoon floods are expected and
people (at least those in the East Coast) are apparently well adapted to them. Because of the
different types of floods, a comparison of how government and people respond to them is
necessary to give a more complete picture of the flood hazard in the peninsula. All flood
types may be classified as 'normal' or 'major' according to the severity (see Chapter 2).
(c) Urban and rural areas
In general, vast differences exist between urban and rural areas in Peninsular Malaysia.
Malaysia is a rapidly developing country with an economy that grew at an annual rate of 6.7
per cent over the 5th Malaysia Plan Period (1986-1990) and an expected annual growth rate
of around 7.5 per cent over the 6th Malaysia Plan Period (1991-1995) (Government of
Malaysia 1991a). In 1990, 35.6 per cent of households lived in urban areas in Peninsular
Malaysia. As a result of expected rapid development in rural areas as well as rural-urban
migration, this figure is projected to reach 49.8 per cent by 1995 (Government of Malaysia
1991a). Besides the obvious benefits in the development of rural areas and the uplifting of
rural standards of living, one of the adverse effects of rapid urbanisation is the increased
frequencies of flooding (particularly of flash floods) as a result of the increased rate of
runoff. Another difference between the two areas is that of the income level and therefore,
the ability to adopt strategies towards flood hazard mitigation. Urban areas are also better
protected in terms of more flood protection schemes in view of the damage potential. On the 	 1
other hand, rural riverine areas, particularly padi farming areas that need water for irrigation
of crops, are at a higher risk to flooding than urban areas which are usually located on higher
ground within the floodplain. Finally, there are also differences such as occupational
characteristics, educational level, infrastructure, amenities and others between the urban and
rural areas, all of which will have a bearing on perception and adoption of flood mitigation
strategies and policies.
(d) Areas with and without formal flood warning and evacuation systems
Another criterion in which the selection of study areas in this study has taken into account
is the presence or absence of formal FWESs 3 . As one of the objectives of this study is to use
the flood warning and evacuation segment to examine links between contexts, it is important
that both areas with and without the benefits of such systems are selected. Individual
perception and flood hazard management are likely to differ between people living in areas
with formal FWESs and those without. The extent to which people rely on formal FWESs
is likely to influence their perception and decisions to adopt mitigation strategies.
(e) Ethnicity
In Peninsular Malaysia, to merely say that ethnicity is an important aspect of Malaysian
3 These are official flood warning and evacuation systems.
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society would be an under-statement. In fact, a harmonious and tolerant inter-relationship
between the various ethnic groups is vital in promoting social development and fostering
national unity. It was precisely due to a breakdown in this relationship that resulted in the
racial riots of May 1969. In general, all three major ethnic groups come from a varied
background of rich ethnic tradition and customs. While the Chinese have traditionally settled
in the major cities and towns', the Malays have traditionally been padi farmers contented
with their rural way of life (Sendut 1961) and the Indians have always located in the vast
expanse of rubber estates in the peninsula (Ooi 1979). Because of cultural and economic
differences, it is likely that the different ethnic groups may have developed different strategies
in flood hazard mitigation. For example, Malay houses with traditional architectural design
built on stilts are well adapted to floods. The Chinese and Indians may have also developed
their own flood proofing strategies.
Based on the above criteria, four case study areas, two each in the East and West coasts of
the peninsula were chosen (see Figure 2.5). Within these four basic areas are sample sites,
some of which are urban while some are rural. Furthermore, some of the samples sites are
affected by river floods, some by tidal floods and others affected by a combination of both
types of floods. The two East Coast areas are predominantly affected annually by seasonal
monsoon floods while the two West Coast areas are mainly affected by flash floods. Some
sample sites are equipped with formal FWESs while some are not. Flood magnitude and
frequency also vary between different sample sites in each study area. Finally, some sample
sites are dominated by Malays, some by Chinese and some by Indians. The characteristics
of the four case study areas are described below.
F.2.1 The Pulau Pinang Study Area
Pulau Pinang is an island located in the northwestern part of Peninsular Malaysia (on the
West Coast). This study area is divided into three samples, an urban sample in the city of
Georgetown (70 interviews) and two rural samples in Bayan Lepas (44 interviews) and Sungai
Pinang (58 interviews) (see Figure 2.11). The urban sample is predominantly occupied by
Chinese with Malay and Indian minorities. It is mainly affected by river flooding with some
tidal flooding occurring near the Pinang River estuary. An automatic warning siren is in
operation and is located at the Pinang River bank in the vicinity of Jalan Perak. On the other
hand, the rural sample is predominantly occupied by the Malays. There is no formal FWES
at this site and it is only affected by river flooding.
F.2.2 The Kuala Lumpur Study Area
Kuala Lumpur is the federal capital of Malaysia. It is situated on the West Coast of the
peninsula. It is the largest city in the country and is the single most highly urbanised area in
Malaysia. The area is highly susceptible to flash floods caused by torrential convectional or
monsoon rains. With the exception of the 1971 flood, so far the flood magnitudes in Kuala
Lumpur tend to be small and the duration limited to not more than a day. However, flood
frequencies are high, especially in low-lying riverine areas. Within this study area are
samples drawn from the Dato Keramat-Kampung Baru site (37 interviews), the Pantai Dalam
4 The Chinese initially came to Peninsular Malaysia from South China (notably Kwangtung
Province) towards the end of the 19th century to work in the tin mines. Subsequently, business
opportunities in the towns and drop in tin prices (also due to exhaustion of the tin reserves),
caused them to migrate to nearby towns. Today, the major cities and towns in Peninsular
Malaysia are predominantly occupied by the Chinese.
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site (28 interviews), the Brickfields site (21 interviews) and the Old Kelang Road site (28
interviews) (see Figure 2.12). The first two sites are predominantly occupied by Malays, the
second site by Indians and Chinese, and the last site is a predominantly Chinese area. A
formal FWES is in operation in the Dato Keramat site. This is an automatic solar powered
siren located on the bank of the Kelang River. The other sample sites have no formal
FWES s.
There are also other reasons for selecting this area. Secondary data and an insight into the
management of floods were readily available. Floods in Kuala Lumpur are well documented
and the author spent time on attachment to the DID which permitted access to its ongoing
flood mitigation projects and support for this research. The author also spent time at the
MMS which is responsible for forecasting heavy rains.
F.2.3 The Kelantan Study Area
Politically, the Kelantan Study Area is unique as Kelantan is the only state in Peninsular
Malaysia which is currently governed by an opposition party, viz. the Pan Islamic Party
(PAS). The town of Kota Bharu is the capital of the state and is located at the northernmost
part of the East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia. It is dissected by the Kelantan River which
periodically overflows its banks and floods many parts of the town. Seasonal monsoon floods
are a norm and flood magnitudes are high. Severe floods inundating almost the entire district
are not uncommon. The area is mostly affected by riverine floods and a combination of
riverine-tidal floods. In comparison with the other states in Peninsular Malaysia, Kelantan is
one of the poorer states in the country. Kota Bharu town is littered with slums and squatter
areas. The area is affected by riverine and tidal floods well as a combination of both. Because
of the seasonal nature of the floods, various formal FWESs are in operation in this study
area. The Ministry of Information employs the media (mostly radio and television) to convey
warnings to the people. At the level of the village, local DID officials, the police and ketua
kampungs play important roles in the formal FWESs. In the selection of sample sites within
the Kelantan Study Area, four sample sites were chosen: Kota Bharu town (urban, 61
interviews), Kuala Krai (rural and urban, 31 interviews), Pasir Mas (rural, 63 interviews) and
Kemubu (rural, 37 interviews) (see Figure 2.13). All areas are dominated by Malay
occupants. Within each sample site, households experiencing different flood frequencies were
surveyed so as to obtain a cross-section of samples.
F.2.4 The Pekan Study Area
The Pekan Study Area is located on the estuary of the Pahang River, the largest river in
Peninsular Malaysia. The area is located within the East Coast state of Pahang. It is divided
into four sample sites, Pekan town (51 interviews), Pulau Pekan Baru (22 interviews), rural
Pekan (37 interviews) and Ganchong-Pahang Tua (30 interviews) (see Figure 2.14). All areas
are affected by a combination of river and tidal floods. Pekan town comprises a mixture of
Malays and Chinese but rural Pekan is a predominantly Malay area. Both areas have formal
FWESs in operation (radio and television announcements). The Pekan Study Area is chosen
mainly because it is one of the most hazardous flood risk areas in the peninsula. Flood
magnitudes are high and the area floods almost every year. Despite that, not much has been
documented about flooding in the area.
F.3 Sampling
Within the constraints of resources and time in this research, a target of 600 households was
decided upon. This gives a breakdown of about 150 households in each of the four sample
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areas, a sufficient number for common statistical tests to be carried out. The sampling
structure is designed to be as representative of the national flood-prone population as possible
(see below for a detail discussion).
F.3.1 Pilot surveys
The pilot surveys for individual households, business damage and government officers and
other professionals were carried out during the month of October 1992 (while the author was
still under attachment at the DID and the MMS). The author spent a few days each at the
four study areas and carried out sample pilot surveys and visited the state DIDs and other
state level flood hazard organisations. During the pilot surveys at each study area, cadastral
and street maps were obtained for the purpose of sampling for the main survey. Potential
sampling sites were visited, sketches' made and notes taken. Based on the pilot survey, the
original questionnaires for all three surveys were subsequently modified (they were shortened
and some questions either dropped or rephrased). The training of interviewers was carried
out during the first week of November 1993 6. The main surveys were carried out from the
second week of November 1992 to the first week of February 1993. Data processing and
entry was carried out from March 1993 to August 1993. Data analysis commenced from
August 1993.
F.3.2 Sampling selection of case study areas
In the structured questionnaire survey, probability sampling of all households within the
floodplains of Peninsular Malaysia would appear to be the ideal approach. However, this was
not possible for a number of reasons. Firstly, although flood risk areas are identified through
past flooding (see Figure 2.5), the total number of flood risk properties or the total number
of people living in flood risk areas is unknown.
As such, it is not possible to construct a sampling frame which consists of the total number
of households living in flood risk areas in the peninsula'. Thus, without a proper sampling
frame, it is not possible to adopt a sampling design based on a strictly quantitative probability
sampling design' (though this would have been the ideal sampling design). Thirdly, even if
the population of the flood risk households was known, the limited time frame and limited
resources available in this individual research project would not have made it feasible to attain
a sample size that is statistically representative of the entire flood risk population of the
peninsula. Fourthly, the peninsula covers an area of about 18.4 million hectares of which
many areas (some of which are flood risk areas) are inaccessible.
5 Sketch maps often had to be made in some of the remote villages because cadastral
maps were not up-to-date and squatter settlements not shown (see Figure 2.18).
6 Several other training sessions had to be held for new recruits as some interviewers
from the first batch were either dropped (due to incompetence) or resigned.
7 To identify the exact flood risk population in Peninsular Malaysia would entail mapping all
flood risk areas and superimposing them on existing population data. This, in itself, is a major
exercise beyond the scope of this dissertation.
8 A probability sampling design is one in which the total population that is being surveyed is
a known entity. In this kind of design, one can specify for each sampling unit of the population
the probability that it will be included in the sample. In other words, each unit has the same
probability of being included in the sample.
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In view of the above limitations, using a probability sampling design was clearly not possible.
Nevertheless, in order to maintain some form of scientific conformity, sample areas were not
selected haphazardly. The non-probability sampling design was used. In non-probability
sampling, there is no way of determining the sampling frame. As such, there is also no way
of specifying the probability of each unit's inclusion in the sample, just as there is no
assurance that every unit will have some chance of being selected. Although accurate
estimates of the population can only be made from probability sampling, social scientists do
employ non-probability samples. The major reasons for this practice are convenience and
economy, which, under certain circumstances (e.g. exploratory research), may outweigh the
advantages of using probability sampling. Non-probability sampling is also used when a
sampling population cannot be precisely defined and when a listing of the sampling population
is unavailable (Frankfort-Naclunias and Naclunias 1992 p175). In as much as probability
sampling is not feasible, the usage of non-probability sampling must be made as scientifically
sound as possible in order that selected sample areas do give a fairly accurate estimate of the
population characteristics. In this research, quotas and percentages which reflect regional
divisions between East and West Coasts, rural and urban populace, flood type, and areas with
and without formal warning systems were used. The proportion of households of different
ethnic origins were also selected to reflect the national composition.
F.3.3 Individual household survey
In studying how individuals (households) perceive and plan strategies towards flood hazard
mitigation, the quantitative research methodology employing a structured questionnaire was
used. To supplement this approach, some households (about 10.0 per cent of total households
selected) were chosen at random for in-depth interviews in order to get a more detailed
account of their flood experiences. This is based on the qualitative research methodology
where accounts of past flood experiences are recorded. This serves to give a more detailed
insight into the flood hazard which is not captured by the quantitative survey.
Within each study area, sample sites were chosen based on qualitative non-probability
sampling. However, the selection of individual households within each sample site was
strictly based on probability sampling. Standard procedures for sampling households were
adhered to (Kish 1965; Moser and Kalton 1971). Although sampling frames are also available
in the form of electoral register, postcode address file, lists of telephone subscribers and
fanner registers, they were found to be problematic and unsuitable. In the present study, up-
to-date cadastral maps showing property lots in the flood risk areas (produced from records
of previous floods by the DID), street maps and sketches obtained during the pilot survey (in
the case of squatter houses and other properties not identified on cadastral or street maps)
were used to select the households. As such, each household within a sample site has an
equal chance of being selected.
The sampling frame for each case study area is represented by the total of all flood risk
properties within each specific sample site respectively. In the case of certain study areas
containing squatter dwellings where property lots do not exist, a current street map or a
sketch map drawn during the pilot survey to the area was used as the sampling frame. In
most cases, a combination of two or more data sources were consulted to form a sampling
frame. After the sampling frame has been identified for each study area, the selection of
individual households for interviewing was based on simple random sampling. This was done
by numbering all the property lots in all sample sites in a study area and drawing the required
number of samples from a random number table. In each study area, a target sample of 5.0
per cent of flood risk properties was taken. However, refusals and damaged questionnaires
have reduced the sample size slightly but is not envisaged to have a significant effect. A total
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of 618 households were interviewed from the four study areas (Table F.1).
During the structured questionnaire interview, interviewers were told to record accounts of
flood experiences as some individuals had more unique flood experiences and were more
responsive than others. This was necessary because the structured questionnaire survey did
not allow for such qualitative recordings of in-depth accounts of human experience. In-depth
interviews were also carried out (mostly done by the author) with selected households. The
qualitative approach was used in such interviews.
F.3.4 Survey of government officers, academics, consultants and other professionals
This is a perception survey on how the experts on various aspects of flood hazard
management perceive existing flood hazard management strategies and policies in Peninsular
Malaysia. As the number of government officers, academics, consultants and workers of
voluntary organisations whose work is related to the flood hazard is not large, an attempt was
made to interview all of them based on a list of names obtained by the author. Respondents
based in the four study areas were interviewed by the author but those working in other states
were sent a copy of the questionnaire and requested to fill it in by themselves. The author
also carried out qualitative interviews with individual respondents and had group discussions
with employees of some organisations. Telephone interviews were carried out only when
respondents were not available for direct interview. A total of 21 respondents were
interviewed and a total of 28 self-completed questionnaires were returned. The total of 49
respondents represented 59.8 per cent of the 82 potential respondents on the author's list.
While the in-depth interviews with key planning flood officers at the headquarters of the
various federal agencies will provide an insight of the overall Malaysian policies of flood
hazard management employed by the federal government on the national level, in-depth
interviews with officers at the various state agencies will uncover disagreement with those
policies. Furthermore, policies employed by the local district government, municipalities and
village committees may also differ. Strictly speaking, federal policies should be adhered to
by lower level authorities at all times but variations do occur. This may be due to variations
in various aspects of the flood hazard itself, or it may be due to political, social, economic
and other regional differences. Thus, respondents selected for this survey represents a cross-
section of government officials at all administrative levels as well as independent experts such
as private consultants, academics and workers of voluntary organisations such as the Red
Crescent, the St. John's Ambulance Brigade, Belia (a youth organisation), and others.
F.3.5 Business damage survey
Although reports on flood losses by business establishments have been regularly reported in
the press, there have been few studies on such losses. The only notable exceptions are the
flood damage estimation reports by JICA (1982; 1991) and an unpublished study by Smith
(1985). In the present study, an attempt was made to discover the scale of flood losses
experienced by businesses located in flood-prone areas. This is a supplementary quantitative
survey on flood damages to business establishments carried out in each of the four study
areas. The questionnaire is a brief two page record of different types of losses suffered by
businesses as a result of flooding. It is a brief record of actual flood damage to property,
goods, business and other related losses due to floods. Non-probability sampling was used
in this survey as every fifth business along pre-selected roads was sampled. The first sample
was usually located in the heart of the business district of each of the four study areas. Only
the urban areas in each study area were surveyed. The four sample sites chosen for this
survey were Georgetown (Pulau Pinang Study Area), Kota Bharu Town (Kelantan Study
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Table F.1:	 Number of households interviewed in selected study areas in Peninsular
Malaysia
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Residential 121( 70.4) 72( 37.5) 90( 79.0) 53( 37.8) 336( 54.4)
Farming 18( 10.4) 79( 41.2) 0(	 0.0) 48( 34.3) 145( 23.5)
Commercial 32( 18.6) 30( 15.6) 24( 21.0) 10(	 7.2) 96( 15.5)
Fishing 1(	 0.6) 11(	 5.7) 0(	 0.0) 29( 20.7) 41(	 6.6)
Total 172(100.0) 192(100.0) 114(100.0) 140(100.0) 618(100.0)
Figures in parentheses are percentages
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Area), Kuala Lumpur City (Kuala Lumpur Study Area) and Pekan Town (Pekan Study Area).
In this survey, a total of 273 businesses were interviewed (Pulau Pinang = 52 businesses;
Kota Bhani = 76 businesses; Kuala Lumpur = 55 businesses; Pekan = 90 businesses).
F.3.6 Evaluation of flood hazard institutions
In many countries, especially in the developed countries in the west, the role of flood hazard
institutions (see Chapter 5) is vital in flood hazard management. In the United Kingdom, for
instance, researchers have found that flood hazard institutions and not individuals are more
influential in flood hazard management (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986). Likewise, flood hazard
institutions are also envisaged to play an important role in flood hazard management in
Peninsular Malaysia. As such, the evaluation of the adequacies of flood hazard institutions
warrant a separate investigation from that of the individual response (as represented by the
household survey).
In the evaluation of flood hazard institutions and flood hazard organisations, a qualitative
research methodology using the cultural insider (i.e. the author) was adopted. Flood hazard
institutions in Peninsular Malaysia are assessed based on a pre-determined 'ideal' set of
criteria. In-depth interviews with high ranking government officials of flood hazard
organisations regarding the objectives, statutory duties, functions and policies and other
aspects of flood hazard management were also carried out. The 'criteria approach' method
of evaluation used by some British geographers in researching flood hazard institutions in the
United Kingdom (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986) was adopted. In this method, a list of four
criteria deemed to be representative of the ideal flood hazard organisation was selected.
Malaysian flood hazard organisations were assessed based on this list of criteria.
F.3.7 Collection of secondary data
The collection of secondary data is an important input in this study. Secondary data such as
flood reports, annual expenditure on flood mitigation, rainfall and streamflow records,
departmental annual reports (those of flood hazard organisations), theses, newspaper reports
on floods, historical archives on floods, and other relevant material related to the flood hazard
were obtained from the relevant authorities and used as background material in the write-up
of this thesis.
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APPENDIX G
	
CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGIES IN HAZARDS
RESEARCH
This appendix defines the key concepts and terminologies used in this thesis.
G.1 Hazards and disasters
The term 'natural hazards research' has been commonly and widely used, particularly
amongst geographers during the infancy of such researches. However, it has the connotation
that hazards are 'entirely' of natural origins, which is a common misconception (Jones 1991
p28). Thus Burton and Kates (1964) have defined 'natural hazards' as
'those elements of the physical environment harmful to man and caused by
forces extraneous to him'.
When hazards research first came to prominence in the 1940s, natural hazards were viewed
as 'acts of God'. For instance, 'droughts' were seen as 'acts of God' although the losses
arising from them were viewed as 'acts of man' (White 1935). This perspective seems to
imply that humans do not have any part to play in the creation of such hazards. Gradually,
however, results from researches in hazards, particularly in the flood hazard, indicated that
humans do play an important role in the creation of such hazards mainly through the choice
of 'location' (Burton et al 1978). It is only when humans choose to locate properties and live
in areas affected by extreme natural processes that hazards exist. For instance, flooding in
an uninhabited swamp is not considered a hazard (unless it gives rise to substantial ecological
or other environmental effects). Thus, Blaikie et al (1994) assert that `...there is no risk if
hazard and vulnerability do not coincide' (see definitions in Section G.2). Generally, it is
often difficult to distinguish a hazard that is attributed to nature from one that is attributed
to humans. In fact, the same hazard in one area may be more directly attributable to nature
but can be largely created in another area by humans. For instance, seasonal flooding during
the monsoon months along riverine mangrove forests in the East Coast of Peninsular
Malaysia is considered a natural cause but the occurrence of flash floods in urban areas is
considered a human cause (due to rapid development, inadequate drainage, poor planning and
others). Yet, it is not uncommon to see the prefix 'natural' being conveniently attached to
hazards (disasters or catastrophes) in the current literature, particularly in the media and
political publications. This is because the very use of the term 'natural' implies that the
hazard associated with it has a natural origin and this thereby exonerates humans from any
blame. This, it has been suggested, is an ideologically-based argument in favour of consensus
and denies conflicts in the community arising from socially constructed inequalities of power
and control (Burgess 1978).
In natural hazards research terminology (particularly that emanating from the Chicago School
of Hazards Study), a natural hazard carries with it an inherent element of human
1 The term 'natural hazards research' is used throughout this thesis to mean that sub-
branch of geography initially uncovered by Gilbert F White in the 1940s and subsequently
developed into the so-called 'Chicago School of Hazard Studies'. The term is also used
synonymously with 'hazards research' although some geographers have preferred the term
'environmental hazards research' (Parker 1991a p4).
2 Some researchers are convinced that hazards and disasters are not natural but largely
created by human activities (Cannon 1993).
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involvement. It includes all those elements in the geographic environment that potentially
affect humans, their structures, or their activities adversely (Department of Regional
Development and Environment 1990 p7). In the tradition of hazards research, a natural
hazard is viewed as the outcome of an interaction between the natural physical system and
the human-made system. Thus, Kates (1971) has defined a natural hazard 3 as:
'....an interaction of man and nature, governed by the coexistent state of
adjustment of the human use system and the state of nature in the natural
events system.'
In terms of the flood hazard, Kates's (1971) 'General System Model' clearly underlines this
distinction and realistically links together the human and the physical world (see Figure 3.1).
In this man-nature interaction, the physical world is represented by the 'Natural Events
System' which produces the flood and the various characteristics which describe it. These
include flood magnitude, frequency, duration and temporal spacing. On the other hand, the
human world is represented by the 'Human Use System' which involves human occupance
of the floodplain that encompasses human-made activities such as housing, agriculture,
recreation and other damageable material wealth that turn the physical flood into a flood
hazard.
Burton et al (1978) view natural hazards as occurring within an ecological framework. The
resultant interaction between the natural events system and the human use system does not
necessarily produce a hazard. In many cases, a flood may be productive and be considered
as a resource. For instance, flood waters deposit rich alluvial soils on the floodplains of many
river basins making them fertile farm lands. Based on this model, the authors suggest that
hazards exist at the interface between the natural and human use systems and that human
response to such hazards may modify both the systems. This model thereby distinguishes
between natural events and their interpretation as natural hazards (or resources).
Nevertheless, the authors persist with the use of the term natural hazards which, by itself is
imprecise.
Despite similar explanations and clarifications in the literature on natural hazards research
(Kates 1971; White 1974; Burton et al 1978), the term natural hazards has been criticised as
being misleading, inappropriate and erroneous as it suggests that the flood event is solely the
result of natural phenomena (Ball 1975; Fordham 1992). Yet, others have contended that
natural hazards and natural disasters are in no way 'natural' as they can not be dissociated
from human society, particularly those which are marginalized and impoverished by years
of colonialism and are therefore most vulnerable to them (Wisner et al 1976; Susman et al
1983; Winchester 1992). As human society becomes more affluent and sophisticated, people
are not satisfied with the explanation that floods are naturally occurring events. In the quest
for a more practical explanation, they look for someone to blame and floods have recently
been looked upon as a result of the mismanagement of the state or the misapplication of
technology (Penning-Rowsell et al 1986). In the light of the above discussion, floods may be
seen at best as 'quasi-natural hazards'. Taken to its extreme, floods have even been regarded
as 'acts of man rather than acts of God' (Smith 1979 p7). The term natural becomes even less
appropriate when applied to disasters - the sometimes catastrophic outcome of hazards
(Fordham 1992 p12). In poorly developed Third World countries where the capacity and
'Kates (1971 p444) has acknowledged that the notion of natural hazard as a joint probability
of states of natural events and human adjustments was initially developed together with Russell
and Arey (Russell et al 1970).
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technology to cope with disasters are wanting, the occurrence of such events is usually
associated with vulnerability, dependence and marginalization all of which arise because of
socio-economic rather than natural factors (Davis 1978; Susman et al 1983; Winchester
1992). Blaikie et al (1994) assert that the social, economic and political processes of human
society are the 'root' causes of hazards and disasters.
More recently, the term 'environmental hazard' has been also introduced in hazards research.
According to Parker (1991a), environmental hazards are defined as
`...those hazards that result from the interaction of the environment and
human society and are processes and events which are harmful and damaging
to society.'
The term does not carry any implication of bias towards either the natural or human
dimensions and it has the added advantage of being able to accommodate both, but some
ambiguity is caused as some entirely human-made hazards such as pollution and fire has been
included in this classification. Environmental hazards may also be viewed as 'costs' to society
as they inflict death, destruction, damage and disruption as a result of the intricate
interrelationship between nature and society (Jones 1991 p27). Smith (1992 p14) has noted
that the term also implies a spectrum of hazard types ranging from largely natural to largely
man-made, from intense to diffuse and from involuntary to voluntary. Yet, he has also noted
that it is essentially because of its wide applications that has led to impossibly wide
definitions. For example, Kates (1978) has defined environmental hazards as
`...the threat potential posed to man or nature by events originating in, or
transmitted by the natural or built environment.'
As a result, this definition can almost include anything from long-term environmental
deterioration to all forms of social hazards which have diverse and different origins. The
usefulness of such a definition is therefore rather limited. In his quest for a more focused and
manageable definition, he has restricted environmental hazards to 'events which directly
threaten human life by means of acute physical or chemical trauma'. However, by so doing
he has excluded environmental hazards affecting natural ecosystems. Because of the
intertwined nature of the natural ecosystem and human society, any damage to the former will
also indirectly affect the latter. For example, oil spills which severely damage marine
ecosystems also deprive coastal fishing communities of a source of livelihood. The occurrence
of an oil spill such as that of the Exxon Valdez may be termed an 'environmental disaster'.
In order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding when referring to researches in the field
of hazards, the term 'natural' has often been dropped. Thus, some researchers such as
Fordham (1992) have merely used the term 'hazards research' instead of the more
conventional 'natural hazards research'. Without the problematic pre-fix 'natural', the term
would theoretically encompass all types of hazards, whether naturally created, human-made
or a combination of both. Broadly defined, it is taken to encompass that field of research
which is concerned with 'the totality of factors which generate, sustain, exacerbate, or
mitigate those characteristics of natural and man-made environments that threaten human
safety, emotional security, and material well-being' (Mitchell 1984). It is the term 'hazards
research' which is therefore adopted throughout this thesis. However, when referring to
research pertaining to the behavioural paradigm (see Chapter 3), the term 'natural hazard'
which is a central theme (viewed in an ecological framework) employed by those working
within this paradigm is retained.
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G.2 Floods
The term 'flood' has been variously defined by researchers from different fields. As the study
of floods falls in a common research frontier where many disciplines have made relevant
contributions, it is thus not surprising to find just as many definitions of floods in the
literature. Basically, the definition of a flood is dependent on the objective in which it is
coined. Some of the common definitions of floods are as follows:
(1) ...a relatively high flow which overtaxes the natural channel provided for the
runoff (Chow 1956).
(2) ...any relatively high flow that overtops the natural or artificial banks in any
reach of a stream (Chow 1964).
(3) ...any high streamflow which overtops natural or artificial banks of a stream
(Ward 1978).
(4) ...a body of water which rises to overflow land which is not normally
submerged (Ward 1978).
(5) ...water on land not usually submerged (Handmer 1991).
In many parts of the world floodplain dwellers distinguish between 'normal high flows' or
'normal high waters' and 'floods'. This is the case in many parts of Peninsular Malaysia,
particularly in its East Coast, where seasonal monsoon rains cause the rivers to overflow each
year. The problem of defining a flood becomes more problematic here as many traditional
Malay houses are built on stilts and flooding to 1 metre above ground may be considered as
a form of seasonal high water and not as a 'flood'. Such seasonal flooding, the flood mark
of which is below stilt height of the houses and the duration of which is short, is considered
normal and floodplain occupants are quite used to them (see Chapter 2). Water levels above
stilt height and the duration of which is a week or more is considered a flood. However,
many houses with stilts also have a back portion which has no stilts. This section of the house
is usually either the kitchen, a spare room or a store room. Occupants of houses with such
a design will naturally consider that a flood has occurred when the back portion is flooded
even though the main living room and bedrooms are not. Moreover, flooding of any height,
irrespective of whether any part of the house is flooded or not will result in temporary
dislocation in terms of accessibility, loss of work and income, disruption to schooling, loss
of business, loss of crops and livestock and other damages. In the case of the West Coast,
normal seasonal inundation of the type occurring yearly in the East Coast would be
considered floods. This is because the majority of houses in the West Coast, mostly of the
modern type, do not have stilts. In order to provide a workable definition which can be
applied in all areas in the peninsula, a flood in this thesis is defined broadly as
'...any substantially large body of water inundating a previously unsubmerged
spatial entity over a definite period of time causing some form of disruption
or damage.'
Because floods are a physical phenomenon, all the above definitions (except the last)
epitomise the physical perspective on floods. Yet, floods have more often than not been
wrongly misconstrued by the public and the press as being synonymous with hazards or
disasters. This is very true indeed in Peninsular Malaysia where flood events are notoriously
played up by the press even though many flood events may not have affected humans in any
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significant way. Floods will always be present in areas where physical conditions such as
monsoons, low-lying topography and an abundance of water resources favour their creation.
However, excess water, even that which inundates places not normally submerged, cannot
be considered as hazardous unless it has harmful effects on humans and society. This is
because, a flood which occurs in an unpopulated area is strictly by itself a physical event that
can only be classified as a 'natural phenomenon'. A flood or any high water in itself is
certainly not a threat to humans if the affected area is not occupied by humans or used to
conduct human activities. Swamps have always been flooded but such flooding (whether
perennial or seasonal) have never been or ever will be considered as a hazard. While one
flood may be considered as an 'extreme event' displaying a relatively high variance from
the mean (White 1974 p4), another flood of lesser magnitude may be considered as 'normal'
in a particular locality. For example, an intense rainstorm in a semi-desert environment which
causes a 'flash-flood' 5
 is considered an extreme event. However, a similar occurrence in the
wet equatorial tropics would be considered quite normal (though it may still be considered
by some affected businesses as a hazard). Nevertheless, the occurrence of a flood in the
physical world would not automatically qualify it as a 'natural' hazard. It is human occupance
of floodplains that has made a normally harmless flood into a 'hazardous flood'. Thus,
according to Parker (1991a p4), whilst floods are transmitted through the physical
environment (for example, through river systems or tidal surges), it is the action of society
that exacerbates the phenomenon. In more ways than one, human societies have been made
more fragile and vulnerable to the flood hazard by inadvertent and haphazard floodplain
encroachment.
Finally, while hazards research has been mostly dominated by geographers, disaster research
has been dominated by sociologists. Similarly, hydrologists, engineers, anthropologists, and
others have also made relevant contributions to such researches. As such, there may be as
many different definitions to the above terms as there are different disciplines involved in
such studies. To complicate the matter further is the peculiarity of the English language which
creates confusion when different terms are used interchangeably to mean the same thing. For
instance, to the average person the terms hazard and disaster may be synonymous and used
interchangeably. Furthermore, both the terms disaster and catastrophe are often used
interchangeably as well. However, in the context of scientific enquiry, it is required that such
terms be clearly defined. Different terminologies have been applied to floods of different
magnitudes or levels of severity. This include floods being described as a 'risk', 'threat',
'hazards', 'crisis', 'emergency', 'disaster' and 'catastrophe' (not necessarily in a hierarchy).
Although many of the above terms have been used extensively in a variety of contexts by
geographers, sociologists and economists, it is rather unfortunate that neither consistency nor
agreement are found in their usage. For instance, the term 'disaster' has been a source of
much debate (Britton 1986; Green 1989). Suffice to say that these terms are inherently
problematic when it comes to definition because they differ not only quantitatively but also
4 An 'extreme event' is considered as a naturally occurring physical phenomenon which (for
the sake of differentiating between a natural hazard) is isolated from human society and therefore
does not affect humans and society (Burton et al 1981 p288). However, an extreme event may
be a hazard if it has damaging effects on the natural environment. This is because of the close
relationship between society and the environment and any effect on the latter would affect the
former in the long-term.
5 A flash-flood is defined as a flood event characterised by rapid response to runoff. It is
usually of short-duration lasting not more than a few hours. In Peninsular Malaysia, it is most
frequently associated with violent convectional storms of short duration (often lasting minutes
instead of hours) which are typical of the humid equatorial climatic regime.
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qualitatively as well. Furthermore, one definition may be acceptable to the geographer but
may at the same time prove totally unacceptable to a sociologist. Indeed, it would be almost
impossible to find one definition for the term disaster that fits every researcher's requirements
(not to mention the common person's definition as well). While it might prove useful to
conduct a literature review of the definitions of hazards research terminologies, it is not
within the scope of this research. Nevertheless, in the context of this research, the definitions
for each terminology used are carefully considered and subsequently distinguished from one
another in order to avoid any misunderstanding and confusion over their usage.
In relation to the flood hazard, the following definitions have been adopted:
(1) Flood risk - The term risk by itself denotes a measure of probability of the occurrence
of a hazard. It can also mean the quantified, conditional probabilities that the
consequences of a hazard will be harmful (Harris et al 1978 p379). A flood may be
considered as a risk if it poses potentially negative effects on human beings and their
activities. Risk is absent when there are hazards but no vulnerability, or when there
is a vulnerable population but no hazard event (Blaikie et al 1994 p21). The term is
used synonymously with 'Flood Threat'.
(2) Flood exposure - The term exposure is a measure of the human population and/or
land use at risk from floods. It is similar to the 'unsafe conditions' which are the
specific forms in which vulnerability of a population is expressed in time and space
in conjunction with a hazard (Blaikie et al 1994 p25).
(3) Flood vulnerability - Vulnerability may be defined as 'the characteristics of a person,
household, group, community or state in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope
with, resist and recover from the impact of hazards and disasters' (Blaikie et al 1994
p9). It is the likelihood that a person (and the others) will fail to mobilise sufficient
resources to meet the challenge posed by the hazard (Green 1992 p178).
(4) Flood hazard - The key distinction between a 'flood' and a 'flood hazard' is that the
former is an event in which flood water inundates an otherwise dry land area,
whereas the latter is ever-present in floodplains, i.e. it is not event-based and is
continuous. Individuals which make up fioodplain communities are therefore
constantly threatened by the flood hazard. The term hazard by itself may be regarded
as a pre-disaster situation in which some risk of flood disasters exists in a locality.
The Royal Society (1983 p22) defines a hazard as 'a situation that in particular
circumstances could lead to harm'. A flood may be viewed as a hazard only if it
occurs in a populated area and thereby has the potential to inflict damages on
property, harmful effects on health and the loss of human life. As such, a natural
phenomenon such as a flood which occurs in a populated area is considered a
'hazardous event'''.
(5) Flood disaster - The main difference between a flood hazard and a flood disaster is
that the former is a perceived natural event which threatens life and property whereas
the latter is the realisation of the hazard (Whittow 1980 p19). A flood will be
considered as a disaster when whole human communities are seriously maimed or
crippled (at least temporarily) as a result of an unacceptably large number of fatalities
and/or property damage which exceed local coping capacity. Although this definition
6 See Department of Regional Development and Environment (1990 p7).
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is adopted by some researchers who need to quantify disasters (Hewitt and Sheehan
1969), the number of fatalities is not a necessary pre-condition for a disaster. A
disaster is still deemed to have occurred when 'the overall damage to an entire
community is so severe that most or all public and private facilities no longer provide
essential social or economic services (even though no one may be killed)' (Torry
1979b p3'70). Keller et al (1990) defines a disaster as 'an event which afflicts a
community the consequences of which are beyond the immediate financial, material
or emotional resources of that community'. In a disastrous flood, the effects is such
that emergency managers may themselves become victims and outside assistance is
required to deal with it. A disastrous flood will lead, at least temporarily, to massive
disruption of function for community and individual (Raphael 1986 p5). Furthermore,
recovery (comprising the psychological and physical recovery of victims, the
replacement of physical resources and the social relations required to use them) is
unlikely without external aid (Blaikie et al 1994 p21).
(6) Flood catastrophe - Taking it to the extreme, a flood will be considered as a
catastrophe when almost entire human societies (people and property) are wiped out
leaving only few survivors and buildings and infrastructure in ruins. Compared to a
flood disaster, a flood catastrophe is of greater magnitude and severity, and the time
frame needed for recovery is much longer.
(7) Flood emergency - An emergency refers to a sudden or unexpected situation or event
which disrupts society and which requires immediate action and response. An
emergency is a threat to the normal flow of life in society and implies the existence
of hazards. An emergency situation may progress into an accident or disaster if it is
not put under control. A flood emergency is a general term used collectively to refer
to a 'flood crisis', a 'flood disaster' or a 'flood catastrophe' (Handmer and Parker
1992). It refers to a flood event in which the medical, welfare, police and other
personnel are severely overtaxed.
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APPENDIX H
	
SOME UNIQUE QUALITATIVE ACCOUNTS OF MALAYSIAN
FLOOD EXPERIENCES
This appendix examines individual cases of flood experiences based on in-depth qualitative
interviews with flood victims. Although some cases appear to be quite extraordinary, they
are not uncommon amongst floodplain occupants living in the flood zones. In fact, many such
experiences may not be perceived by the flood victims as being extraordinary or even unique.
To them, these experiences are part and parcel of everyday life on floodplains. They are risks
that floodplain inhabitants have to take as the majority are fully aware of the hazardousness
of the areas they are living in. It is not uncommon to find that many older inhabitants have
so many unfortunate experiences that it may be difficult to single out the worst experience.
Often, it is a case of too many experiences that render floodplain occupants finding it difficult
to single out the worst flood ever experienced by them. Nevertheless, the following accounts
serve to illuminate the range of flood experiences of the floodplain occupants in the
peninsula.
Case 1:	 Makcik (Aunty) Mabee, an urban squatter from Georgetown, Pulau
Pinang (Interview date -10 November 1992)
Makcik Mabee is a West Coast urban squatter occupying a small piece of land on the bank
of the Air Itam River in Georgetown, Pulau Pinang. She is 60 years old and lives with her
retired husband, 5 children and 7 grand children in a house on that small piece of land (Plate
11.1). Of the 14 occupants in her house, only her two sons and three daughters are working.
Of her 7 grand children, 3 are in school. Malccik Mabee was born in the same house and has
always lived there all her life. Structural forces of poverty and landlessness have forced
Makcik Mabee's late father to build the house during the 1920s when the area was largely
forested and undeveloped. The land on which the house was built was subsequently bought
by a Malaysian Chinese, thereby making Makcik Mabee and her family squatters. The
Chinese has since tried to develop the land but has been unsuccessful because of its proneness
to floods. To recover his investment, the Chinese is charging rent on those squatter families
occupying his land. And he has forbidden any renovation, repairs or additions of structure
of any kind to their squatter houses. Makcik Mabee's house is made entirely of wood but has
since been renovated or rebuilt several times because of damages caused by flooding. Today,
the ground floor section is reinforced by a 0.5 metre high brick foundation which supports
the back section. In the front section, four 0.75 metre high wooden stilts prop up the floor.
Because of this type of structure, a flood depth of 0.6 metres would flood the back portion
(kitchen) of the house but only a flood depth of more than 0.75 metres will flood the front
section (living and dining rooms). The bedrooms are located slightly higher in a form of split
level about another 0.5 metres above the dining and living rooms. Thus, only a flood depth
of more than 1 metre will flood the bedrooms. With the height of the beds another 0.5 metres
high, only a flood depth of more than 1.5 metres will flood the beds as well.
However, flood depth is not the only danger that affects the house and family of Makcik
Mabee. When a flood occurs the velocity of the river current is very strong and this poses
a very dangerous hazard to the structure of the house. In two separate incidents, the front
portion of Makcik Mabee's house had collapsed during flooding because of the erosive force
of the river current. In view of this, a separate storage barn with a built-in chicken coop was
constructed just in front of the house to reduce the velocity of the river current during
flooding. This barn is a flood loss reduction measure and has served to protect the family
house from the direct force of the river current. Nowadays, Makcik Mabee and her family
only has to repair damages that occur to the barn instead of that which would occur to her
house. Nevertheless, during times of large and severe floods such as the flood in June 1991
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Plate 11.1: (a) Makcik Mabee during one of the many floods that affect her house. (b)
One of Makcik Mabee's daughters cooking in a flooded kitchen. (c) Makcik Mabee's son
Rus' returning home from work in a sampan. (d) Makcik Mabee's family enjoying a
swim during a 1990 flood. (e) Makcik Mabee and her daughters and granddaughters
during a flood in 1990. Flood depth was about 1.5 metres. (0 Makcik Mabee's wooden
house which has been repaired beyond recognition over the years
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(a 1 in 30 year event), even the barn cannot protect the house from being threatened by the
current. During this flood, the awning and porch of the house had collapsed.
When she was a child Makcik Mabee had briefly recalled the occurrence of floods every once
in a while (she estimated that flooding then occurred once every few years) but it was always
fun then because the flood waters were rather shallow and did not cause a lot of problems.
She remembers with a tinge of nostalgia of how she would play in the flood waters with her
father and other children in the same locality. In the last decade, particularly in the last few
years, she recalled that flooding had become much worse (in terms of magnitude and
frequency). She attributes this to rapid housing and town development, especially in the Air
ham town area on the upstream stretches of the river. Today, flooding (flooding is taken to
mean the river overflowing its banks and subsequently flooding the adjacent floodplain even
though the flood waters may not enter the house) occurs at least 7 times a year. In fact, every
time when heavy rains occur continuously for more than an hour and they coincide with high
tides, the river will overflow its banks. However, not every flooding of this kind will result
in the flood waters entering her house. Nevertheless the stress and worry caused by such
flooding is immense. According to Makcik Mabee, continuous heavy rains during the night
almost always cause her to lose sleep because she instinctively wakes up to check on the river
levels for fear of serious flooding of the type in June 1991.
Makcik Mabee's plight and those of others living in the vicinity of her neighbourhood is often
covered in the newspapers. Come every heavy rain spell Makcik Mabee and her family fear
they may be swept away by the flood waters. According to Malccik Mabee,
`...I do not fear so much for myself. But I am very worried for my
grandchildren. They are very small. My youngest grandson is only two
months old... .1 remember the flood last year. The water rose more than 5 feet
(1.7 metres). I had to get a rescue boat to take my grandchildren to the relief
centre. When we came back after the water had receded, I found our
furniture, clothes and household items were all destroyed'. (New Straits
Times 6.11.86).
Makcik Mabee had contemplated flood proofing the house by building upwards, viz, raising
the lower floor levels and the bedroom levels. However, when she approached the land owner
she was told in no uncertain terms that nothing is to be done to the present property. This
was because the owner had intentions of selling the land. Incidentally, the owner today is the
descendant of the original owner. According to Makcik Mabee, the original owner was a
close friend of her father and had never given them her family any trouble. He was very
understanding and gave them a free hand to do what they liked with their house. However,
the present owner had other ideas. Due to the increase in land prices in the past few years,
because of limited land for housing on Pulau Pinang, the owner had wanted to sell the land
on which Makcik Mabee's house is built. Many prospective buyers had been to her house to
see the piece of land but on each occasion had decided against buying because of the high
risk of floods. Still, the owner is hopeful and is adamant about selling. Because of this,
Makcik Mabee and her family cannot flood proof their house even though they want to.
The family's main strategies on flood hazard reduction includes: (1) keeping electrical
appliances on shelves fixed high on the walls; (2) flood watching by Makcik Mabee and her
husband during the rainy season (they take turns to sleep during the day and to stay awake
when it rains at night); (3) all children sleep in the upper floors; (4) electrical mains are
switched off during floods; (5) motorbikes and bicycles are parked on higher ground; (5)
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telephone the police as soon as waters from the Air Itam River flood overflows its banks; (6)
warn relatives and friends nearby. Curiously enough, listening to the nearby automatic solar-
powered siren (set up by the DID) is not one of the family's strategy. They do not trust it and
think that it is a 'joke' as it goes off many times before an actual flood occurs.
During the floods of June 1991' in which the height of the flood waters almost reached 3
metres and lasted 24 hours, Makcik Mabee suffered unprecedented losses. Repairs to the
structure of the house alone cost $650. Another $700 was spent on replacing or refurbishing
the damaged contents of her house. This includes carpets, furniture, crockery, cooking
utensils (floated away in the flood waters), foodstuffs (mainly rice and salted fish), and
electrical appliances which included a washing machine, an electric kettle, two table fans, an
iron and a hair dryer. In terms of vehicles, her family had to spend $1,000 to overhaul and
repair her husband's car, another $400 was also spent to repair her son's motorbike.
However, her greatest loss was the drowning of a total of 30 heads of goats during the flood.
With each head fetching $300 in the market, she had lost $9,000, almost her entire fortune.
Loss of work to the whole family amounted to about $500 while medical expenses incurred
as a result of sickness caused by the floods (either directly as a result of over exposure to the
cold and wet flood waters or indirectly as a result of stress) amounted to $100. Obviously,
the effect of stress and worry cannot be gauged in terms of ringgits. Finally, some losses
were suffered in terms of damage to memorabilia such as photographs, old collector items
and inherited antiques. All in, Makcik Mabee lost a total of $12,650 which was a lot of
money considering her husband's pension was only $400 per month and her entire family
income was less than $2,000 per month. This is a moderate household income by Malaysian
standards but it should be viewed in the perspective that there are three families in this
household and fourteen mouths to feed.
During the most recent flood (0.75 metres high and lasted 4 hours) which occurred in
October 1992 (a few weeks before this interview), Makcik Mabee only suffered minor losses
amounting to $200. The bulk of this loss was due to the loss of livestock such as chicken and
repairs to the lower floor of her house.
Makcik Mabee's family wants to move but is unable to do so because it would be difficult
if not impossible to find a cheaper place where the whole family can live. There is talk about
relocating her family and other squatter families by the authorities to nearby government flats
but so far nothing has materialised. The problem is compounded by the fact that the
authorities are only willing to allocate one flat to the family even though Makcik Mabee's
family is an extended one with three separate families (two of her children are married with
children of their own but are forced to continue to live with Makcik Mabee because of high
rents elsewhere). Structural contextual forces, therefore, are largely responsible for keeping
the Mabee family and the majority of squatters on hazardous urban floodplains.
Case 2:	 Zaini Abdullah, a clerk from Air Itam, Pulau Pinang (Interview date - 8
November 1992)
Zaini works as a clerk in Georgetown but lives with his 60 year old mother in Kampung
Happy Valley on the outskirts of Air Itam town. It is located in a depression bordered by the
Sungai Dondang which is a tributary of the Sungai Pinang. The residents in Zaini's kampung
No photographs were taken by makcik Mabee's family during the June 1991 flood
because the flood was too severe. The height of the flood waters reached roof level and
everybody had to be evacuated.
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blame intensive large scale housing developments and agriculture on the slopes of previously
forested hills around Paya Terubong as the main causes of the increased flood threat (see
Plate 5.1). While the environmental effects of forest clearing, especially on hill slopes, are
varied, the incidence of floods have been especially well documented (Friends of Penang Hill
1991). Before the new town of Bandar Baru Air ham was developed, the flood frequency at
Zaini's house was about once in a few years. After the construction of the housing estate and
infrastructure began in the 1980s, the frequency and magnitude of flooding had increased
substantially. Now, every time it rains heavily for more than a few hours, flooding occurs.
In 1992, Zaini claimed that floods of varying magnitudes had occurred four times. Although
a religious man, Zaini firmly believes that floods in his kampung are not an 'Act of God'.
Rather, he blames the housing developments on the hill slopes of the Paya Terubong Hills
as the sole cause of his flood woes.
During the widespread June 1991 flood, the flood waters in his house reached a height of 2.5
metres. As a result of the nearby bushes and forest being flooded, there was the additional
danger of snakes, especially Malaysian cobras, taking shelter in his house. Zaini recalled that
he found four such reptiles in the kitchen and the chicken coop. For safety (from floods and
snakes), both he and his mother had to evacuate to a relative's house elsewhere in Pulau
Pinang for two days. He considers the June 1991 flood to be the worst ever experienced.
During this flood, his total loss was $1,300. This included damage to household items,
poultry and personal belongings. Although Zaini seems quite calm about floods (even though
he bears a grudge against the housing developers), his mother is quite hysterical about it. She
claimed that floods in the past few years have caused a lot of stress and worry. She is
affected psychologically as she cannot sleep properly whenever it rains. Furthermore, during
times of flood she invariably falls sick because of over-stress. Zaini has considered moving
elsewhere but financial considerations and his obligation to his mother have prevented him
from doing so. His mother does not want to move as all her relatives and friends are in the
kampung. She does not like living in a flat in the city and insists that she would want to die
in the kampung and be buried beside her late husband in the cemetery nearby.
Case 3:	 Mohd Isa Wadi, a flood survivor from Kemubu, Kelantan (Interview date
- 17 November 1992)
Mohd Isa Wadi is now 8 years old (Plate H.2 Top). He goes to school in Kemubu and is in
a government primary school. He is a normal and healthy child just like all the other
kampung boys in Kampung Arun Naka in the Kemubu Irrigation Scheme area. However, had
fate not been on his side, he could have easily been one of the unlucky victims of the
disastrous flood which devastated most of Kelantan in 1988. More precisely, had it not been
for the timely intervention of his neighbour Pakcik (uncle) Hassan Harun, Mohd Isa Wadi
would have been washed away and drowned in the flood waters. During the 1988 flood
Kampung Arun Naka was under between 1 to 2 metres of water. The road in front of Mohd
Isa's house is the highest ground and was only submerged under a foot or so of water. He
was only 4 years old then. Apparently, he was trying to get to his friend's house across the
narrow road which separated their house. It was raining heavily and Mohd Isa was carrying
an umbrella. Being a small boy he only stood at about slightly under three feet. As such, half
his body was submerged as he walked along the road. At about the same time, possibly
around 4.00 pm Pakcik Hassan Harun was having his regular afternoon smoke of Indonesian
'keretek' cigarette on the stairs of his kampung house (Plate 1-1.2 Bottom). He saw Mohd Isa
struggling along the road and was not at all alarmed as all the other kampung boys knew the
road well and knew exactly what they were doing. As he turned to request a cup of tea from
his wife he took his eyes off the little lad. In that split moment of time Mohd Isa had stepped
into the huge drain that lined both sides of the road. As Pakcik Hassan turned around, Mohd
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Plate 11.2: Top: Mohd Isa Wadi with his catch of crabs from the padi fields. Bottom:
Pakcik Ilassan's house after a normal convection storm in the afternoon
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Isa had disappeared. Only the umbrella was visible. Soon, even the umbrella was being
dragged below by the strong flood waters. The strong current was due to the presence of an
underground monsoon pipe that lay under the road. Water from Pakcik Hassan's side of the
road was flowing through the monsoon drain over to Mohd Isa's house. Then, the umbrella
disappeared! Pakcik Hassan jumped up immediately followed by screams from his wife who
also saw part of the incident.
The old man (Pakcik Hassan was 53 then) dived into the muddy flood waters and took a deep
breath before he went down groping for the boy. Hassan was born and bred in the same
kampung and had grown up learning how to swim in the nearby Kelantan River. He was a
good swimmer and diver during his younger days. Apparently, he could stay under water for
almost 3 minutes at any one time. He had learned to hold his breath under water because of
his fishing days. Whenever his line was stuck in the water he had to dive into the water to
try to retrieve it. During those days fishing hooks were expensive and he had a few favourite
ones which he did not want to lose. But those were the days. He had not swum nor dived for
a long time now. But this was an emergency. When there was no sign of Mohd Isa in the
area around the drain, Hassan knew instinctively that the boy must have been dragged by the
underwater current into the monsoon drain under the road. Taking another deep breath he
went under for the third time but this time he went straight for the monsoon drain. He could
not see anything in the muddy waters but he was used to this type of diving as the Kelantan
River water was just as muddy when he dived for his hooks. Then he had to hold his line and
follow it down to the bottom of the river to free his hook. Now, all he had to do was just
grope around and he found the opening and went straight into the drain. There was still no
sign of the boy. When he was half way through, he was pricked by something sharp. It was
the umbrella! Then he found the boy! He got hold of the boy's head and pushed the boy until
he was out of the pipe on the other side of the road. Finally Hassan got himself out. He was
still holding the boy's head. Instinctively he dragged himself and the boy on to the shallow
part on the road. Then he held the boy's legs with one hand and massaged the boy's throat
and stomach with his other hand. Water came squirting out of the boy's nose and mouth.
Then there was a cough. Then more coughs and then the cry. Mohd Isa was saved. Hassan
took him back to the boy's parents who were oblivious of the entire incident. The boy's
father was apparently in the padi fields and his mother was busy cooking. Mohd Isa was not
even sent to hospital for a check-up. It is not uncommon for such accidents to happen to
children who play in the muddy flood waters during the flood season. He had a narrow
escape. So what? He is alive now and crying like any normal boy. There was no need to go
to the hospital! Besides, they may have to row his father's sampan (small wooden canoe)
about 5 miles to the district hospital which may have been flooded during that time as well.
Such is the attitude of kampung folks. His father also earn a meagre income barely enough
to support the family. According to Mohd Isa's mother, the household income fluctuates
between $200 to $400 per month, depending on the season. There is no way the family can
afford to move elsewhere. The official agricultural authorities also do not encourage farmers
to move as there is currently a severe shortage of farm labour as youngsters are being
attracted to the cities. During floods, the family depend on the authorities for help and
subsidies.
Case 4:	 Siew Kim Choon, a shop-owner from Kuala Krai, Kelantan (Interview
date - 19 November 1992)
Siew Kim Choon is a politically active member of the Chinese community in Kuala Krai. He
owns a sundry shop in Kuala Krai town selling household provisions. According to him,
floods are a common hazard in Kuala Krai (Plate H.3). During his 30 odd years living in
Kuala Krai he had experienced many floods. He cannot recall which flood was the worse but
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Plate H.3: Slew with his family after evacuating his old mother to a nearby village which
was not flooded. Note the ladder going into one of the upstairs windows. The ground
floor is almost completely flooded and the main door cannot be used
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some accounts of his grievances are outlined here. As chairman of the Hakim' Association,
it was his responsibility to see to it that flood victims of Halcka and other Chinese origins get
their fair share of government aid during times of floods. In the 1983 flood, Siew recalled
that the first time he realised that a flood was coming was when he saw the red balloon'
raised over the police headquarters in Kuala Krai town. The raising of the red balloon was
shortly followed by the Kelantan River overtopping the 'Bradley Steps' 4 , now renamed
`Tangga Krai' (Plate H.4). The first to be flooded was the police headquarters as it was
located just beside the river. The flood waters rose swiftly. Within half a day, the whole of
Kuala Krai town was flooded. Siew's shop house was flooded to a depth of 1.5 metres. He
managed to shift most of his goods upstairs. With that kind of flood depth, his own losses
were minimal. To minimize losses, Siew stores all the expensive provisions and goods on the
upper shelves in his shop. He orders only the bare minimum of stock during the Northeast
Monsoon months. Finally, he gets his boat ready which is capable of moving people as well
as goods. Thus, losses are kept to a minimum during times of floods.
Siew's main task during the floods was to liaise with the government officials over the
amount of food, clothing and other rations to be given to the Chinese community (who were
mostly Hakkas). He recalled having to row his sampan a few miles to get all the allocated
provisions such as sardines, rice and clothes from the government. He argued that there is
too much official bureaucracy even during times of floods. He is of the opinion that the
government should make it easier for flood victims to obtain relief and that such aid should
not be politically motivated. Had it not been for his initiative, then the Hakka people would
certainly not have received the food aid from the government. This would have created a
grave situation as the floods lasted more than a week. He had expected the government to
come to the victims and give them the provisions, just as they have done so in the various
kampungs on the outskirts of Kuala Krai town. Perhaps this overlooking of Kuala Krai town
by the authorities was a deliberate one as other kampungs in low-lying areas were worse hit
than the town. Kuala Krai town was just one isolated case in which the government may have
overlooked, considering the thousands of communities threatened by the floods then. Yet,
Siew is critical of the authorities and his opinion of the government in terms of flood relief
is very low. He is also sceptical about the effectiveness of formal FWESs. He has no plans
for relocation even though he has the means to. He believes he is well attuned to floods and
can cope reasonably well. He thinks that flooding is an acceptable risk that is not too 'risky'.
He continues to live in Kuala Krai town largely because of his business and his association
with the Haklca Association, but he believes in relying more on himself than others during
times of floods. Perhaps, all occupants in flood-prone areas should adopt his attitude of self-
reliance but certainly not his attitude towards official flood relief operations.
2 In Malaysia, the Chinese community consists of three major clans, viz. the Cantonese,
Hokkien and Haklca.
' Balloons of different colours were used to warn people living in the vicinity of Kuala
Krai town of impending floods. A green balloon was raised over the police headquarters high
in the air for everyone to see when the river level at a certain upstream location had reached
the alert mark. Similarly, a yellow and red balloon was raised when the river level had
reached the warning and danger marks respectively.
4 The Bradley Steps, the brainchild of an English expatriate, were constructed during the
colonial era. They are a flood monitoring device based on a series of steps from the highest
point on the bank of the Kelantan River to the river level at Kuala Krai. The rise and fall of
the river level is measured by a number of calibrated poles along the steps.
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Plate H.4: The Bradley Steps in Kuala Krai town. Note the measurements on poles from
the top of the steps to the bottom where the Kelantan River lies. As the river level rises,
the measurements can be read on the poles. The steps are used as a form of flood
warning not only to residents of Kuala Krai and its vicinity but more importantly for
the capital town of Kota Bharu located downstream
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Case 5:	 Kak (Sister) Atikah, a fisherwoman from Pulau Pekan Baru, Pahang
(Interview date - 22 November 1992)
Political pressures were originally responsible for Kak Atikah's arrival in Malaysia. She is
a Cambodian refugee who came to Malaysia together with other Cambodian refugees when
war broke out in her country in the 1970's. Most of these refugees settled on small islands
off the Pahang River near Pekan in 1975. Initially they were denied entry but they built
wooden huts on stilts and stayed on. Almost all of them made their living by fishing.
Gradually, as the years went by they became accepted by their Malaysian neighbours across
the river bank. Many of their children who were born after their arrival have been granted
Malaysian citizenship. Today, most of the Cambodians have been given some form of civil
rights whereby they can continue to stay. Some have been given red identity cards. This
means that they can stay permanently but they are not citizens of Malaysia. Yet, some lucky
ones have been given outright blue identity cards which entitles them to apply for citizenship.
Kok Atikah's eight children (Plate H.5) are all Malaysian citizens but it has been tough
bringing them up on her own. Her husband went to look for a better job in the town of
Kuantan, and never returned.
Kok Atikah depends on fishing and harvesting plant products from mangrove and fresh water
swamp forests for a livelihood. Her combined monthly income is less than $200, well below
the poverty line. During the Northeast Monsoon months, fishing activities cease because of
the dangerous conditions and Kak Atikah is forced to work as a part-time labourer in every
odd job she can find. Friends invariably try to help her but they are also in the same
situation. Poverty and other structural constraints prevent Kak Atikah and the other
Cambodians to move elsewhere. And because they are 'illegal aliens', their plight is of low
salience on official agendas.
Due to their poor economic condition, Kak Atikah and most of the Cambodians are still living
in the river mouth area off the river bank. These areas are most vulnerable to seasonal floods
during the monsoon season. Almost every year they are forced to evacuate to higher grounds
because of the flood hazard. There are 24 houses in Pulau Pekan Baru and many more on
other adjacent islands. The Cambodians only occupy houses on Pulau Pekan Baru. Houses
on other islands mainly belong to Chinese and Malay nationals. The houses are built on stilts
and are linked to each other by wooden pathways. As the houses are in the path of the
Pahang River, the current is swift and strong when the river is in spate. During times of high
flow and flood flow, many houses on the fringes have been either partly or completely
destroyed. To counter this problem, the Cambodians have reinforced the structure by linking
their houses together with planks. For instance, Kak Atikah's house is linked to four of her
neighbours' houses by wooden planks which also double up as pathways or bridges as the
ground is always below the water level of the river. However, the wood used is of poor
quality and a lot of the wooden pathways were rotting. In fact, the residents admitted that
they constantly have to replace broken and rotted planks. Furthermore, the constant erosional
force of the river current also contributes to the destruction of the building structure.
According to the residents, almost all houses in Pulau Pekan Baru have had some parts
destroyed or washed away during one of the many floods.
Besides the above flood loss reduction measure, many other strategies have evolved. These
include: (1) teaching the children to swim as soon as they are able to walk. Despite growing
up in a water environment, there have been cases where children have been swept away by
swift currents during severe floods; (2) using their fishing boats as means of evacuation; (3)
evacuate as soon as the order is given by the authorities (some evacuate even before the
official order); and (4) move out temporarily to live with relatives and friends during
APPENDIX H:152
Plate H.5: Kak Atikah and her eight children. Note the rotting stilts and stairs. The
houses in her kampung are all built on stilts. Wooden planks link and bind the houses
together. The planks also serve as walk-ways. More importantly they serve to strengthen
the house structure against the force of the flood waters
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the flood season.
Pulau Pekan Baru has since been supplied with electricity but there is no piped water. For
drinking and cooking, the Cambodians draw groundwater from beneath the river bed by
means of an electric pump. For bathing and washing purposes, they use the river water.
Sewage is directly discharged into the river. The Cambodians have built their houses on land
belonging to a Malaysian. For each house, they have to pay about $96 a year as rent.
Considering the fact that their average monthly household income is $348 (below the poverty
line), the rent is a substantial amount. Due to the proposed construction of a flood
embankment along the river bank adjacent to Pekan, the government has decided to relocate
some of the people whose houses are in the way. Work on the project is scheduled to
commence in 1993. Many of these people have been given a piece of land near Paloh Inai
(5th mile) to build their new houses. Each household has to pay about $850 to secure that
piece of land. Even so, there are still many Cambodians who, like Kak Atikah, are living
'from hand to mouth'. Therefore, they are constrained by structural contextual forces and
cannot afford to move. The Cambodians are also reluctant to move because moving will mean
an end to their livelihood. They will have to give up fishing, the only job they know, and
take up new jobs. For many of the older generation such as Kak Atikah, learning a new trade
may be difficult. Many are afraid of relocation. So unless the authorities provide some form
of concessions such as loans, and guarantee these people some jobs they can handle, it is
unlikely that the inhabitants of Pulau Pekan Barn will ever 'evolve' on to dry land.
Case 6:	 Ismail Bin Midun, a moderately well-off East Coast padi farmer from
Kampung Keladi, Pekan, Pahang (Interview date - 27 November 1992)
Ismail bin Midun is 53. Like most of his neighbours, Ismail is a padi farmer but he is more
fortunate in that he has inherited 10 relongs (5.3 hectares) of padi land from his father. Being
from a more well-off family, Ismail attained secondary education and is considered very well
educated in his kampung. Besides working on his 10 relongs of padi land, he serves as a part-
time teacher in a religious school. His income is, therefore, higher than most of his
neighbours. His monthly income from farming is highly variable because of the nature of
farming and the many hazards affecting his crops. It varies between $300 to about $500 per
month. As a part-time teacher his salary is at least assured, about $300 per month. Ismail has
a family of four children. Because of his 'double-income' he is considered one of the better-
off farmers in Kampung Keladi. He has some savings which helps him recover from floods
and other hazards. Unlike his poorer neighbours his situation is not as heavily controlled by
structural forces such as poverty, illiteracy and low occupational mobility. He has the option
and means of moving elsewhere. Yet, Ismail is strongly affected by other structural forces,
largely of the socio-cultural kind. Although his children have long since migrated to live in
the cities (and have tried incessantly to persuade him to leave), Ismail's attachment to his
inherited land, his love for his kampung (at the time of the interview Ismail is the ketua
kampung), his close ties with his relatives and friends and his religious pursuits have strongly
affected his decision to stay. And despite his relative well-being, he is often badly hit when
major floods occur. For example, in the 1971 flood he lost his entire crop, and his car (an
old Morris Minor), was damaged beyond repair. His property was also severely damaged
requiring repairs running into thousands of ringgits. But he has always been able to recover
sufficiently to resume farming because of his extra income from teaching and his savings.
Ismail was born and bred in Kampung Keladi, a small kampung about 2 km from Pekan
town. Kampung Keladi is famous not because of its farming nor its closeness to the royal
town of Pekan. Rather, it is famous because it was the birth place of Malaysia's second
Prime Minister, the late Tun Abdul Razalc. Today, the house in which the late Tun was born
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has been reconstructed and is used as a show piece of the Pekan Museum (Plate H.6).
Tourists from all over the country visit Kampung Keladi throughout the year except during
the monsoon months of between late November to the end of March. During these months
Kampung Keladi is subjected to serious flooding almost every year. What varies is not
whether the floods will come or not but rather how bad the flood will be.
The inhabitants of Kampung Keladi are very attuned to the normal seasonal floods when the
Pahang River spills its waters on to the adjacent floodplain. People have built houses on stilts
that are high enough to stop the flood waters from entering their premises during normal
floods. Yet, during extreme major floods, even the stilts cannot keep out the flood waters.
For example, during the 1971 flood when it rained continuously for 5 days and 5 nights, the
waters rose 2 metres within 11 hours and another 1.5 metres in the next day. Ismail recalled
that his house was flooded up to roof level and he had to evacuate his family to a relief centre
15 kilometres away. During this flood, even the best adapted inhabitants of Kampung Keladi
had to be relocated. Thus, although rural people are well attuned to normal floods, they are
highly vulnerable to major floods. This is especially so in the case of the poor, aged, very
young and handicapped. Studies have shown that rural-urban migration have resulted in mass
exodus of rural youth into cities, leaving behind the aged and the very young (Muhammad
Razha 1978; Rajmah A Samad 1978; Chan 1991a). This is largely due to 'push' factors such
as land fragmentation, landlessness, low productivity in farming, higher educational
attainment amongst the young and 'pull' factors such as the attraction of city life, education,
employment and business opportunities. Thus, the aged, very young, handicapped, and
unwell are the ones left behind and they are the most vulnerable to flood hazards. According
to Ismail, thousands of people were stranded for several weeks in make-shift relief centres
during the 1971 flood, most of them children and the aged. There was widespread cholera
due to the shortage of drinking water and the medical authorities could not cope with the
number of people affected.
According to Ismail, the flood waters in 1971 started coming in at around 6.00 pm and it rose
to 2 metres around 5.00 am the next morning. Ismail jumped out of his bed and rowed his
sampan to the village head's house to inform him. Together they went to inform the DO
(District Officer) at his house. By the time the DO rounded his men who came with two
empty trucks it was already about 11.00 am. Fortunately the roads to Kampung Keladi were
still passable. The trucks negotiated some of the shallower stretches of flooded roads and
managed to evacuate about 100 kampung folks to the Sekolah Tengku Ampuan Fatimah, a
school located on relatively higher ground in Pekan. By 6.00 pm the next day, all the roads
going to Kampung Keladi were impassable. According to Ismail's estimation, the flood waters
rose to a height of between 3.5 to 4 metres. He recalled that only 0.5 metres of the telephone
pole by the side of a road was visible. Many of his poorer neighbours' houses with low stilts
were completely submerged. The flood waters stayed in Kampung Keladi for almost a month
although many of the kampung folks went home to stay after the flood waters had subsided
to about 2 metres. This was about two weeks after their evacuation.
After this flood, the government was convinced that Kampung Keladi was much too unsafe
for its residents and that all its residents should be permanently relocated elsewhere. A place
called Kampung Dato Shah Bandar was earmarked for the relocation. Each family was given
a house on a piece of land measuring a quarter of an acre. Each family had to pay the
government $2,817 for the house and land. Eventually, a total of 20 families were relocated.
Another 10 families from Kampung Keladi were offered places in a FELDA land
development scheme near Bentong. Now, only 16 families are left in Kampung Keladi.
Ismail's is one of them. Most of these families were the original inhabitants of Kampung
Keladi before the 1971 flood. Many have left their new houses in Kampung Dato Shah
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Plate H.6: Ismail Bin Midun indicating the flood depth during the 1971 flood in the
house in which the late Tun Razak (1\'Ialaysia's second Prime Minister) was born
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Bandar to their grown-up children and they themselves have returned to their beloved
kampung of birth. Ismail is one such person. Besides padi farming, he plants vegetables, fruit
trees and has a smallholding of rubber inherite4 from his father. Because of the high
incidence of floods, losses are high but he is not bothered. His way of life is simple and his
needs are limited. Furthermore, he can always fall back on his income as a part-time teacher.
When Ismail was posed the question as to whether he thought another big flood like the 1971
flood would come again, his answer was a definite 'Yes'. Yet, he has no qualms about
staying on. For him, as is for most muslims, fate lies in the hands of Allah (God).
Case 7:	 Maliveloo, a barber from Kampung Haji Abdullah Hukum, Kuala
Lumpur (Interview date - 17 January 1993)
Maliveloo is a barber running his business in his own house. He is 50 years old and has been
living in Kampung haji Abdullah Hukum for 24 years. His kampung is located on the west
bank of the Kelang River and is very flood-prone. According to him, it floods at least two
to three times a year (Plate H.7 Top). Flooding is due to a combination of inadequate
artificial drainage and rubbish dumping into the Kelang River. Like most of his neighbours,
Maliveloo has flood proofed his house (Plate H.7 Bottom). Because of this, Maliveloo's
perception of a flood is somewhat different. Unless water enters his house, Maliveloo will
not consider it as a flood. In 1992, there were two occasions in which flash floods have
occurred in his kampung but on both occasions, water did not enter his house because of the
high concrete thresholds across all his doors. As a result, Maliveloo did not consider the two
events as floods. According to him, his business has not been affected by the floods.
Although the residents in his kampung have been warned by policemen during flooding, they
are highly sceptical about the formal flood warning system. They report that the warning
always come too late. In many instances, officials of the Kuala Lumpur City Hall were the
first to warn the people and not the police. Maliveloo is of the opinion that flooding in the
past was worse than the present. He is aware that the Drainage and Irrigation Department is
dredging the Kelang River all year round and that big floods have since been under control.
He believes that a flood of the 1971 magnitude will not occur again.
Case 8:	 Anbalagan, a motorcar mechanic from Kampung Haji Abdullah Hukum,
Kuala Lumpur (Interview date - 1 February 1993)
Anbalagan is an automobile mechanic who lives in a house which he also uses as a garage.
This is, of course, strictly illegal as his house is of residential status and not to be used for
commercial/business purposes. He is a small time operator in an obscure kampung and has
so far been able to avoid being charged for wrongful use of the premises. At most times he
has four to ten cars parked in his garage, all under repair. During the major flood in 1971,
Anbalagan was still in secondary school. He remembers how many of the houses in his
kampung were destroyed. Most of the houses then did not have stilts but after that flood,
many of the residents decided to rebuild their houses on stilts. Anbalagan's house was rebuilt
by his father. It has stilts about 1.75 metres high but his garage is an extension built at
ground level. During the last big flood in 1978 Anbalagan's losses were great. Equipment
in his garage was damage and his estimated cost was $2,600. Fortunately, he managed to
drive away all but one of his clients' cars to higher ground. Otherwise, his loss would have
been greater. As it was, he only had to repair the damaged car and it cost him about $2,500.
Ile is unwilling to move elsewhere because the present premise is rent free (being his own
house) and he has built up a sizeable clientele in the kampung and its nearby neighbourhood.
It is also very accessible to the federal capital of Kuala Lumpur. However, he has ambitions
to buy a house in a posh neighbourhood once he has earned enough money. Even so, he is
not likely to relocated his business elsewhere, unless being ordered by the authorities or if
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Plate H.7: Top: Flooded houses in Kampung Haji Abdullah Hukum (Kuala Lumpur)
during a 1981 flash flood. Bottom: The front section of Maliveloo's house. Note the high
threshold in the front door and the concrete wall which is built all around the bottom
section of the house. This is a common form of flood proofing as it prevents flood waters
(up to 0.5 metres) from coming into the house
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a severe flood makes him bankrupt. In terms of flood management, he is of the opinion that
the government is successful in controlling the flood hazard through river dredging and
improvement of drainage networks.
Case 9:
	 Abdullah, a squatter from Kampung Bumiputera, Kuala Lumpur
(Interview date - 3 February 1993)
Like most of the inhabitants of Kampung Bumiputera, Abdullah is a squatter. He was born
in a small kampung in Tanjong Karang, Perak. He is of peasant heritage as his parents are
both padi farmers. But like most of his peers (the younger generation), padi farming did not
appeal to him. A farmer's life was tough and the remuneration hardly lucrative. There were
simply too many hazards associated with padi farming and through his childhood experiences
Abdullah remembers vividly how his family always lived in poverty. He was determined to
get out of it even though generations of his family had been farmers. After he failed his
Lower Certificate of Education Examinations (Form Three), he packed his bags and went to
stay with his uncle in Kampung Bumiputera, hoping to learn a trade and make his fortune in
the federal capital. He had hoped that he would soon make enough money to move out to a
rented place of his own and thereafter to buy his own house. This remains a distant dream
as with his poor education, Abdullah could not find gainful employment. All he could find
were odd jobs in construction sites, hawking, and selling cheap goods at night markets. As
a result, he has never made enough to move out of his uncle's house. Abdullah is not the
only nephew staying with his uncle. There are two other distant cousins from remote
kampungs in Terengganu also trying their luck in the federal capital. All three of them share
a room. Nevertheless, Abdullah and his two cousins refuse to admit defeat and return home
to a sedentary peasant life as this would spell shame and disgrace. Instead, they stay back and
join the thousands of unemployed rural youngsters in the federal capital hanging on to the
dream that one day they will strike it rich.
Kampung Bumiputera is full of Abdullahs and they keep coming from the rural areas. This
wave of rural-urban migration became especially pronounced during the past five years or
so as Malaysia enjoyed an economic boom. As the squatter population swell the number of
squatter huts also increase. Elsewhere, in the federal capital, many new squatter settlements
grow unnoticed. Squatter huts are often erected at a rate faster than the speed at which the
authorities can tear them down. The lack of low cost housing and social, political and
economic considerations may also have prompted the authorities to close a blind eye. cm the
squatter problem. Other than erecting new huts, many of the existing squatter huts are also
extended or partitioned into more rooms. Kampung Bumiputra is only one of hundreds of
squatter settlements in the federal capital and other major cities in the peninsula. They are
prime targets for squatters as the land on which their huts are built are the most flood-prone
land which are deliberately avoided by developers. Hence, squatter settlements like Kampung
Bumiputra are intricately linked to flood hazards and have become a major social problem
for the authorities. Because of their origins and riverine location, these settlements are high
risk flood zones. Increasingly dense populations in squatter settlements, the weak house
structures of 'makeshift' wooden huts and the high incidence of poverty have increased the
squatters' vulnerability to flood hazards.
Kampung Bumiputra has been described by one respondent as 'highly flood-prone' as floods
occur as frequently as it rains. It is subject to frequent flash floods because of its low
elevation and its proximity to the Kelang River. A solar powered automatic siren belonging
to the DID is located near the bridge linking Kampung Bumiputera and Kampung Datuk
Keramat (Plate 11.8). But according to Abdullah, the siren breaks down rather frequently and
no warning is given during times of flood. Another problem is that there have been too many
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Plate H.8: Location of solar powered automatic flood warning siren on the bank of the
Kelang River in Kampung Datuk Keramat
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false alarms. Apparently, the alarm is set at three levels, viz, alert, warning and danger. It
is only when the river level has exceeded the danger level that flooding occurs. Usually, the
alarm goes off at the alert level. It becomes increasingly louder and the tones more rapid as
it reaches the warning and danger levels. But in many instances, the river level falls back to
normal after only exceeding the alert level. As such, no flooding occurs. Because of this,
many residents are not too worried whenever the siren goes off. In fact, most people are so
used to it going off that they are oblivious of it and carry on their usual business as if nothing
has happened. Moreover, the sound of the siren is similar to that of a factory siren nearby.
The factory siren goes off many times a day signalling the beginning and end of a shift.
During the 1988 floods the siren sounded but not many people paid any attention to it. When
the second pitch went off Abdullah had the sense to drive his old car to higher ground. As
a result, his damage was minimal when the flood came. There were two flash floods in 1988
but the damage was minimal. Minor flash floods now occur about twice a year but the
residents in Kampung Bumiputera are so used to it that it is not a big problem. The floods
also do not stay long, usually lasting a day or less. Abdullah's dream is not diminished by
the atrocious living conditions he has to endure. He sees some of his friends making it and
feels that his turn will come. As he hangs on to his dream, scores of other Abdullahs have
arrived and are still arriving, or are making plans to arrive. They make competition for jobs
ever more keen. More and more become trapped on urban floodplains just as those who stay
behind in rural kampungs are trapped on rural ones.
Case 10:	 Wan Hassan, a poor East Coast padi farmer from Kampung Ganchong,
Pekan District, Pahang (Interview date - 27 November 1992)
Wan Hassan is aged 46, married and has six children aged between four and twenty. The
eldest daughter is married and lives with her husband in another kampung. Four are in
school. He and his wife Hasnah work on their small plot of inherited padi land of about 6
relongs (3.18 hectares). His two sons Badrul (aged 17) and Jamil (aged 15) also help out in
the farming after school. The small hectarage is hardly economical and he has to fish and
engage in part-time work elsewhere to supplement his income. State irrigation has allowed
him to crop twice a year but his income from padi farming is highly variable. During a good
season, his income totals $2,000 for the main season and $1,500 for the off-season. This
averages to less than $300 a month, well below the poverty line. His off-farm income is not
much. The catch from his fishing is for home consumption although on some good days he
may sell part of it. He tries to get whatever part-time job he can get in the kampung. This
include repairing houses, painting, plucking coconuts, and making sampans. The
supplementary income seldom exceeds $100 per month. Thus, his total monthly income is
about $400 which hovers just above the poverty line. Fortunately, education is provided free
by the state. Badrul and Jamil are also given free books. Wan Hassan's family can just about
survive during a good season. When the floods come, the family is severely affected. During
normal floods, crops are usually partly destroyed but severe floods often completely wipe out
a season's crop. For example, during the 1988 flood, his entire main season crop was
destroyed and he had to depend on government subsidies to help him recover.
The Hassan family is too poor and does not have the resources nor the know-how to move
elsewhere. The family is firmly bound to a farming existence in their kampung by exogenous
contextual forces such as poverty, low occupational and residential mobility and low
educational attainment. It was fine during his father's time when the family land was about
18 relongs (9.54 hectares). His father always had enough to provide for the family but the
land has to be divided between Wan Hassan and his two brothers who are also in the same
impoverished situation. The Hassan family has little choice but to carry on. Wan Hassan
himself dreads what would happen to his land when he dies. Each of his six children will get
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only a relong (0.53 hectares). He secretly hopes that all his children will receive a good
education and escape from the poverty they are in now. Structural forces have trapped the
family in Kampung Ganchong. The family's flood loss reduction strategies include: (1)
planting flood-resistant padi varieties; (2) removal of floating debris from the padi fields
during floods; (3) engaging in supplementary income activities; (4) use of sampan for
evacuation; (5) flood watching; (6) responding quickly to official warnings and evacuation;
and (7) depending on the government for flood aid and other subsidies.
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APPENDIX I
	 HISTORICAL FLOOD EVENTS IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
This appendix is based on an evaluation of the annual flood reports of the DID (both federal
and state), archived documents, newspaper reports, and various official unpublished articles
and reports. While the physical accounts of each flood is fairly accurate, the reported
damages are at best crude estimates. There are several reasons for this. According to officers
in charge of compiling the annual flood reports, there is no systematic survey on flood
damage after each flood. The flood damages are only roughly estimated. The estimates only
include damages to public utilities and crops. Damages to private sector industries, commerce
and business and private properties are seldom reported. In the case of the annual flood
reports of various states, direct damages might be overestimated to attract federal aid. This
is often a strategy employed by state governments (via personal communication with DID
officers). On the other hand, indirect damages will most certainly be underestimated because
they are too difficult to isolate and measure. Finally, estimates of deaths are likely to be
underestimated because there are thousands of remote flood-prone kampungs where death by
drowning is not reported. The number of evacuees is also most certainly underestimated as
only official figures at government relief centres are used. For every few families evacuated
to government relief centres there is likely to be one who has evacuated itself to a relative
or friend's house. The absorbing of disaster victims by the extended family and close friends
is a well documented local response to disasters (Davis 1977). Thus, despite every attempt
being made to project as accurate a picture as possible, the accuracy and reliability of the
flood damage figures should be treated with caution.
Although floods have occurred regularly in most parts of Peninsular Malaysia in the past,
there have been no written records until the 1930s onwards. Although the DID has identified
major (severe) floods from moderate and minor floods, no definition has been given for the
various categories. According to officials involved with the flood hazard, the differentiation
is mostly arbitrary and is based on a number of criteria such as flood magnitude, duration,
areal extent and the population affected. In the following account on the historical occurrence
of flood events, a major flood is defined as one which affects at least one state severely, the
geographical extent of which covers a greater part of the state, the population evacuated
substantially large and the duration lasts at least a week. More importantly, major floods
usually over-stretch the capacities of the emergency, relief and other operations. Moderate
floods refer to floods of a few days duration, of moderate intensity and extent (affecting one
or two districts) and with the population evacuated not exceedingly large. Emergency and
relief agencies usually have no problem coping with such floods. Minor floods are usually
of one or two days duration and only a few people are evacuated, if any. The affected areal
extent is localised, usually a few villages. Emergency and relief services are usually not
needed but may be put on stand-by. Finally, flash floods are of a few hours to one day
duration. The flooding is very localised and may affect only the low-lying areas in a town
or village. Flash floods are most frequent in the more developed and urbanised areas on the
West Coast states. A chronological order of various flood occurrences in all states in the
peninsula is given in Table 2.1.
1886 - Major flood
This is the earliest flood event where some patchy records are available. This flood occurred
in the East Coast, in which the worst hit was the state of Kelantan. It was known as 'The
storm forest flood' because it destroyed hundreds of square kilometres of lowland forest on
the floodplains of the Kelantan and Besut rivers. Records showed that the flood was
accompanied by gale force winds. Besides the damage to the forest, the flood also caused
extensive damages in the Kelantan plain.
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1925 - Minor flood
This flood mainly affected the West Coast. In Perak, flooding occurred along the Kinta
River. In Selangor, although severe flooding occurred in the Kelang River, the Selangor
River and the Bernam River, the extent of the flooding was mostly localised.
1926 - Major flood
According to the Drainage and Irrigation Department, this flood was considered 'the biggest
flood in living memory' in Peninsular Malaysia. The flood affected almost the entire length
and breadth of the peninsula, causing extensive damages to the natural environment. As a
result of this flood, severe erosion occurred, hill sides were scarred, river beds silted,
residual lakes created and lowland forests destroyed. Although records on damages to humans
and structures were not available, it is estimated that such damages were substantial. Most
of the East Coast states were affected by this flood. The worst hit were Pahang and
Terengganu, especially in the border region between the two states. The royal town of Pekan
suffered severe damages as houses were inundated up to roof level (see Plate E.4). In
Terengganu, the most severe flooding occurred in the town of Kemaman. There were
extensive damages to communications and property. The 5-day rainfall for Kemaman was
between 180 cm and 190 cm. Further north in Kelantan, severe flooding with extensive
damage also occurred. The capital town of Kota Bharu was under 1 to 1.5 metres of water.
Several West Coast states were also affected. In Kedah, severe flooding occurred in the
southern parts of the state. In Perak, severe flooding occurred along the Perak River and
great damage was caused. In Selangor, severe flooding occurred in the Kelang, Langat and
Selangor rivers.
1931 - Major flood
The states of Perak and Kelantan were worst hit in this flood, especially the border areas
between the two states. In Perak, the lower Perak River floodplain and the Kinta Valley were
the most severely affected. In Kelantan, there was substantial damage as a result of the
flooding. The state of Negri Sembilan on the West Coast was also affected, particularly along
the Linggi River.
1936 - Moderate flood
This flood mainly affected the two West Coast states of Perak and Selangor. In Perak,
flooding occurred along the Kinta and Batang Padang rivers. In Selangor, flooding occurred
along the Bernam River.
1947 - Major flood
This flood affected mainly the northern parts of the West Coast, including the states of Perak,
Kedah and Perlis. Severe flooding occurred in North Perak, particularly in Krian District.
In Kedah, the valleys of the Muda and Padang Terap rivers were flooded. Flooding also
occurred in Perlis. In the East Coast, only Terengganu was affected. The flooded areas were
along the lower parts of thee Besut River.
1948 - Minor flood
In Perak, flooding occurred in Krian. In Selangor, flooding occurred along the Kelang River.
1949 - Moderate flood
In Kedah, flooding occurred in the southern parts of the state. In Terengganu, flooding
occurred along the Besut and Terengganu rivers. In Kelantan, flooding occurred in the
Kelantan River.
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1950 - Minor flood
Only the state of Perak experienced some flooding. Minor floods occurred along the Bidor
River but no damage was reported.
1951 - Moderate flood
This flood mainly affected the West Coast states. In Kedah, floods occurred in the district
of Kulim. In Perak, the Perak River overflowed its banks. In Selangor, flooding occurred
along the Kelang and Langat Rivers and in Negri Sembilan, parts of the Linggi River were
flooded. In Johor, flooding occurred along the Muar and Segamat rivers. In Terengganu,
flooding occurred along the Besut River.
1952 - Minor flood
This flood only affected the West Coast states. In Pulau Pinang, flooding took place along
the Muda River. In Kedah, Kulim District was flooded. In Perak, the Kerian River
overflowed its banks. In Selangor, flooding occurred on the Langat River. In Melaka,
stretches of the Kesang River were flooded. In Johor, flooding occurred along the Muar and
Segamat rivers.
1953 - Minor flood
In Perak, three rivers were affected, viz. the Perak, the Bidor and the Batang Padang rivers.
In Selangor, minor flooding occurred along the Langat River.
1954 - Major flood
This flood affected both the East and West Coast extensively. In the West Coast, there was
some localised flooding for short duration in Kedah but no severe damage was reported. In
Pulau Pinang, the Kulim River inundated parts of Tengah District. In Perak, flooding also
occurred in the Bidor River catchment for three days but no damage was reported. In Negri
Sembilan, Tampin District was flooded for five days and 40 ha of padi were reported
damaged and another 20 ha totally destroyed. There was also substantial damage to structure
and canals. In Melaka, more than 100 ha of padi were destroyed and Melaka Town was
submerged under water for five days.
The southern state of Johor was severely affected. In its eastern coast, severe flooding
occurred for three to four days. In its central region, the floods lasted seven days and two
persons drowned. Damage to structures, communications and other property were severe but
no estimate was made. In the southern parts of the state, flooding lasted twelve days. Many
towns were flooded and damages were severe. In its west, flooding lasted between five to
seven days. Two soldiers taking part in rescue operations drowned and there was severe
damage to agriculture crops.
In the East Coast, only two states were affected. In Pahang, some local flooding which gave
rise to minor damages was reported. But in Terengganu, severe flooding occurred along a
32 km coastal belt, centring around Besut. The town of Besut was flooded for a week.
1955 - Minor flood
In the federal capital of Kuala Lumpur, low-lying areas were flooded for a short duration.
No damage was reported. The state of Melaka was also flooded for one day but no damage
was reported. In Perak, the Bidor, Behrang and Kinta rivers caused minor flooding.
1956 - Minor flood
Minor flooding in Perak and Selangor. In Negri Sembilan, the Tampin area was flooded for
two days but no damage was reported. In Johor, there was also minor flooding for three days
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but damage was minimal. In Terenggariu, flooding occurred but no serious damage was
reported.
1957 - Major flood
Minor flooding occurred in Perak. In the Kelang Valley, however, severe flooding forced the
evacuation of about 4,000 people. Tin mines were flooded and life was lost. Although the
total area flooded was relatively small, damages were estimated to be significant as flooding
took place in densely populated areas. In Terengganu, the floods lasted eleven days and
almost all roads in the state were flooded to a depth of between 1 to 3 metres. In Johor, 202
ha of padi were flooded in the Sri Menanti area between four to twenty days. Severe damage
to the crop was reported.
1958 - Minor flood
Minor flooding lasting three days occurred in the Krian, Batang Padang and Manik rivers in
Perak. There was also minor flooding in Selangor, Pahang and Kelantan. Slight damage was
reported in Kelantan.
1959 - Minor flood
Minor flooding occurred in Pulau Pinang and Perak. No damage was reported in either state.
Similarly, minor flooding of short duration also occurred in Selangor, Pahang, Terengganu,
Kelantan (mainly Pasir Puteh District), Negri Sembilan and Johor. Only the flooding in Johor
resulted in the destruction of 85 ha of padi and slight damage to another 65 ha of padi in the
Assam Bubok area.
1960 - Moderate flood
In Kedah, flooding damaged 24 ha of padi. Perlis was also flooded for four days but no
damage was reported. Pulau Pinang experienced minor flooding of short duration. No damage
was reported. In Perak, flooding lasting between two to six days resulted in slight crop
damage and loss of poultry. In Selangor, the floods lasted ten days with slight damage to
vegetable crops. In Negri Sembilan, minor flooding lasting between six to ten days was
reported but without damage. In Melaka, there was also minor flooding. The East Coast
states of Pahang, Terengganu and Kelantan all experienced only minor flooding. Only slight
damage was reported in these states.
1961 - Moderate flood
During this flood, most states were affected but the magnitude and extent of flooding were
not severe. Minor flooding occurred along the West Coast. In the state of Kedah, Perlis and
Johor only minor flooding was experienced. No damage was reported in all three states. In
Perak, the flooding resulted in slight damage to padi and kampung land. Most places in Perak
were flooded for a few days but some of the lowest lying areas were flooded for more than
twenty days. In Selangor, the flooding lasted between three to four days with slight damage
to crops and structures. In Negri Sembilan, flooding occurred in Linggi, Rembau and Pedas
districts resulting in damage to two bridges. In Melaka, the Melaka Valley was flooded
resulting in slight damage to 49 ha of padi crop. In the three East Coast states of Pahang,
Terengganu and Kelantan, only minor flooding occurred. No damage was reported.
1962 - Minor flood
In Kedah, flooding occurred in scattered areas damaging 2,400 ha of padi crop. In Perlis, the
capital town of Kangar was flooded but no damage was reported. In the other West Coast
states of Pulau Pinang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Johor, minor flooding resulted
in slight damages. Similarly, the East Coast states of Pahang, Terengganu and Kelantan also
experienced minor flooding with slight damage.
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1963 - Moderate flood
In Kedah, some 560 ha of padi crop was damaged to varying degrees by flooding which
lasted about ten days. There was minor flooding in Pulau Pinang with slight damage. In
Perak, minor flooding affected the Krian, Slim and lower Perak rivers resulting in slight
damage. In Selangor, minor flooding lasting between one to ten days occurred but no damage
was reported. However, flooding due to the breakage of a mining bund resulted in the death
of 14 persons and loss of property and livestock. There was also some minor flooding in
Negri Sembilan and Johor but no damage was reported. In the East Coast, only Kelantan
experienced minor flooding.
1964 - Minor flooding
Floods lasting 19 days affected 850 ha of padi. In Pulau Pinang, parts of Seberang Perai and
the major town of Georgetown was flooded. However, only slight damages were reported.
In Perak, Krian District was flooded for seven days and two children lost their lives. In
Dindings District, there was damage to 2,428 ha of crops and livestock. The other West
Coast states of Perlis, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Johor suffered minor flooding. In the
East Coast, only the state of Pahang experienced minor flooding without damage.
1965 - Major flood
This flood mainly affected the East Coast. Extensive flooding occurred in the Kelantan and
Besut river basins. Some 11,048 ha of padi were totally damaged and another 6718 ha
partially damaged. About 650 ha of other feed crops were also damaged. In addition, several
lives were lost. The damage to the Drainage and Irrigation Department's structures and
equipment was estimated at about $1.6 million'. In Terengganu, major flooding occurred in
the Besut and Terengganu river basins. About 5,342 ha of padi and another 89 ha of other
crops were damaged. Total damages to the DID's structures were estimated at $500,000. In
Pahang, flooding occurred in scattered areas resulting in closed roads and minor damage to
crops.
In the West Coast, the worst affected state was Perak. The royal town of Kuala Kangsar was
flooded. The Trans-Perak agricultural scheme was also flooded and damage to crops and
structures were reported. In Kedah, minor floods occurred throughout the state. The worst
affected area was the Muda River valley in which 243 ha of padi were damaged. In Pulau
Pinang, flooding in the Muda River damaged 98 ha of padi. Damages to rubber nursery and
livestock were also reported. The other West Coast states of Perlis, Selangor, Negri Sembilan
and Johor reported only minor flooding with slight damage.
1966 - Minor flood
All states were affected by minor flooding. With the exception of one death in Perlis, there
was little loss in terms of property, structures and crops.
1967 - Major flood
This was arguably the most severe flood experienced in the states of Kelantan, Terengganu
and Perak because great damages were caused. In the lower stretches of the Perak River,
flooding lasted about 20 days. In the Kelantan River basin, flooding was severe and lasted
for a week and damages were estimated at well over $78 million (approximately $208 million
at 1993 prices) and 320,000 people were evacuated. The total number of affected people was
estimated as 430,000. In the Kemasin-Semerak River basin (Kelantan), total damage was
estimated at $18 million (approximately $48 million at 1993 prices). Of this total, damage to
Damage figures are given at prices during that particular year, unless specified.
APPENDIX 1:167
rural industries amounted to $8.5 million, damage to properties and structures amounted to
$7.9 million and indirect damages amounted to $1.6 million. The total number of evacuees
from the Kemasin-Semerak Basin was 75,000 people. For the whole of Kelantan, a total of
39 people lost their lives in the floods. In the Terengganu River basin, severe and widespread
flooding lasted for 10 days. In Pahang, moderate to severe flooding occurred on three
occasions. In the southern state of Johor, severe flooding occurred on two occasions and
minor flooding on one occasion. Elsewhere, the flooding was from minor to moderate. All
states were flooded to some degree during this flood.
1968 - Minor flood
Minor flooding occurred in Selangor and Negri Sembilan on the West Coast. In the East
Coast, minor flooding also occurred Terengganu and Kelantan.
1969 - Minor flood
During this flood, only the southern state of Johor was severely flooded. Damages were not
estimated. Perak, Terengganu and Kelantan experienced minor flooding but the rest of the
peninsula was flood-free.
1970 - Major flood
This flood mostly affected the East Coast states. In Pahang, flooding of catastrophic
proportions, second only to the 1926 flood, hit many parts of the state. The floods came in
December and extended into January 1971. In Terengganu, there was moderate flooding but
Kelantan experienced only minor flooding. In the West Coast, localised and minor flooding
affected Kedah, Perak and Selangor. The other states were flood-free.
1971 - Major flood
Although the 1971 flood is not comparable to the 1926 flood, its effects were severe. Almost
all parts of the peninsula suffered damage to some degree. The worst hit was the federal
capital of Kuala Lumpur and the state of Pahang. Losses and damages suffered were on an
unprecedented scale.
In Pahang, there were two major floods in 1971, viz. the January 1971 flood (an extension
of the December 1970 flood) and the December 1971 flood. In the January 1971 flood, the
total flood damage was estimated at $29.6 million. Of this total, damage to rural industries
accounted for $6.3 million, damage to structures and properties amounted to $15.6 million
and indirect damages accounted for $7.8 million (JICA 1982 p-94). In the December 1971
flood, the total damage was estimated at $13.5 million of which damages to rural industries
accounted for $4.0 million, damage to structures and properties accounted for $5.3 million
and indirect damages accounted for $4.2 million. During the January and December 1971
floods, the number of flood victims evacuated were 153,000 and 43,000 respectively. The
royal town of Pekan was again severely affected as not only private properties were destroyed
but also public buildings and amenities (Plate 1.1).
During the January 1971 flood in Kuantan (Pahang), total flood damage was estimated at $3
million. Of this total, damages to rural industries accounted for $0.6 million, damages to
structures and properties accounted for 1.8 million and indirect damages accounted for $0.6
million.
During the January 1971 flood in Kuala Lumpur, total flood damage in the federal capital
was estimated at $34.2 million, of which the entire amount was for damages to structures and
properties.
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Plate 1.1: The 1971 flood in Pekan: Top - The office of His Royal Highness The Sultan
Of Pahang in deep waters; Bottom - The Police Headquarters in Pekan town
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1972 - Moderate flood
This flood mainly affected the East Coast states. In Pahang, total estimated flood damage
amounted to $5.5 million. Of this total, damage to rural industries accounted for 1.6 million,
damage to structures and properties accounted for $2.0 million and indirect damages
accounted for 1.9 million. The number of evacuees totalled 6,900 people. In Terengganu,
widespread flooding occurred in low-lying areas along all the major rivers. The estimated
damages to irrigation structures alone totalled $163,000. In Kelantan, major flooding cause
an estimated total damage of $78,000. The total number of people evacuated was 21,667.
There were three deaths due to drowning. In the West Coast, minor to moderate flooding
occurred. In Kedah, there was minor flooding in the northern parts, accounting for damages
to 1,214 ha of padi. In its southern parts, flash floods also occurred. In Pulau Pinang, minor
flooding occurred along the Muda River resulting in the evacuation of 1,177 people. There
was no estimate of any damage. In Perak, moderate flooding occurred from Kuala Kangsar
to Kampung Gajah, resulting in an estimated damage amounting to $289,400. 102 people
were evacuated. In Selangor, minor flooding caused a total damage of $6,000 and the
evacuation of 547 people. There was no flooding elsewhere in the West Coast.
1973 - Moderate flood
Again, moderate to severe floods hit the East Coast states but only minor floods occurred in
the West Coast states. In Kelantan, this flood was estimated to be the biggest since the 1967
flood. The estimated damage was about $6.5 million (Jabatan Pengairan dan Saliran Kelantan
1991 p2). 18,323 people were evacuated and four persons drowned. There was also
widespread flooding in Terengganu resulting in an estimated $110,000 damage to irrigation
structures and a total of 13,213 people evacuated. In Pahang, the banks of the lower Pahang
and Kuantan rivers were topped and estimated damages amounted to $206,000. 2,652 people
were evacuated and 1 person died. In the West Coast, minor flooding occurred in Kedah,
Perlis, Perak, Selangor, and the federal capital. 3,338 people were evacuated in Kedah while
another 6,325 people were evacuated in Perak. In the latter, there was an estimated damage
of $90,000. Flash floods also occurred in the southern parts of the peninsula in the states of
Negri Sembilan and Johor.
1974 - Minor flood
During this flood, the worst hit state was Kelantan. Moderate to severe flooding occurred
along the Kelantan, Semerak, Kemasin and Golok rivers resulting in an estimated damage to
irrigation works amounting to $320,000. 1,806 people were evacuated and 3 persons lost
their lives. In Terengganu, flooding occurred along the coastal areas of the main rivers
resulting in an estimated damage to irrigation works totalling $134,300. In the West Coast,
only minor flooding occurred in the states of Kedah, Perak and Negri Sembilan. In Perak,
the estimated damage was $27,500. Flash floods also occurred in the Pulau Pinang, the
federal capital and Kajang in Selangor.
1975 - Moderate flood
Again, Kelantan was badly affected. In January, floods caused a total of 11,025 people to be
evacuated and three persons lost their lives. The worst affected areas were the coastal parts
of Kota Bharu town. In December, flooding again occurred along the Kelantan, Semerak,
Kemasin and Golok rivers. Estimated damage to drainage and irrigation works and crops
were $300,000 and $3.5 million respectively. 1,271 people were evacuated. In Terengganu,
estimated flood damage to irrigation works was $80,000. In Pahang, flash floods in Kuantan,
Temerloh and Pekan and minor floods elsewhere caused an estimated damage to irrigation
works amounting to $86,000. 1,627 people were evacuated. In Perak, flooding in Trans-
Perak damaged 1,700 ha of crops. Elsewhere, minor flooding occurred in Kedah, Pulau
Pinang, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Johor.
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1976 - Minor flood
Moderate floods in the Golok, Semerak, Kemasin and Kelantan river basins caused estimated
damages to irrigation works and crops amounting to $200,000 and $400,000 respectively. In
Pulau Pinang, flooding in Georgetown, Bayan Baru, Butterworth, Seberang Jaya and Perai
resulted in damages to crops (estimated at $275,000), industries and houses (estimated at
$275,000). Police rescue boats had to be employed to move residents in parts of Jalan Perak
(Georgetown) which were deeply inundated, although in many parts of the city the flooding
became a carnival (Plate 1.2). In Terengganu, minor flooding in some coastal areas damaged
irrigation works estimated at $55,000. In Kedah, minor flooding occurred in Padang Terap
and Kubang Pasu. In Johor, minor flooding also occurred in the Batu Pahat, Johor, Sedili,
Segamat, Tenglu Besar and Tenglu Kecil river basins. Flash floods also occurred in Selangor
in Ulu Langat (May) and in the federal capital in Kassipillai and Segambut (October). No
damage was reported.
1977 - Minor flood
Only minor and flash floods were observed. In Kedah, flooding in Padang Terap, Kubang
Pasu, Pendang and Baling damaged 32 ha of padi. In Pulau Pinang, there was some minor
flooding in riverine areas in Georgetown, Bayan Barn, Butterworth, Seberang Jaya and the
Prai metropolitan area. No damage was reported. In Selangor, flash floods occurred in Ulu
Langat, Kuala Langat, Sepang, Ulu Selangor, Petaling and Gombak. There were no report
on damages. In Terengganu, minor flooding also caused an estimated damage to irrigation
works at $55,000. In Pahang, there was also minor in Bentong. In Kelantan, the Kemasin and
Banggu river basins were affected by minor floods. Damages were estimated as negligible.
In Johor, several villages along the Batu Pahat, Bekok, Sembrong, Endau, Segamat and
Permandi rivers were flooded.
1978 - Minor flood
Johor was the worst hit. Severe flooding in South Johor gave rise to an estimated damage of
$652,000. 6,090 people were evacuated and the death toll was 5. In Terengganu, severe
flooding also resulted in losses amounting to $138,000. In Kelantan, minor flooding occurred
along the Kelantan, Golok, Semerak and Kemasin rivers. Do damages were estimated.
Similarly, minor flooding occurred in the eastern part of Pahang. In the federal capital, flash
floods in December in Kampung Baru, Kampung Kasipillai, Kampung Siam Tiong Nam
forced the evacuation of 1,000 residents. In Selangor, flash floods occurred in January and
again in December. In Kedah, minor floods caused damage to 20 ha of padi. In Pulau
Pinang, minor flooding also occurred in Georgetown, Pulau Betong and Butterworth. No
damages were reported.
1979 - Minor flood
Severe flooding again occurred in Johor. Areas flooded were Rantau Panjang, Kota Tinggi,
Segamat, Buloh Kasap and Bukit Kepong. A total of 10,059 people were evacuated and the
resulting damages were estimated at $293,201. In Terengganu, flooding in Kuala Terengganu,
Dungun, Kemaman and Besut forced 4,262 people to be evacuated. In Pahang, severe
flooding also took place in Kampung Sungai Lembing and minor flooding in Jerantut,
Temerloh, Kuala Lipis, Sungai Lembing and Pekan. Elsewhere, no floods were reported.
1980 - Minor flood
During this year, only the two states of Kelantan and Johor were flooded. In the former,
flooding in the Kemasin, Semerak and Golok riverine areas damaged 24 ha of padi and
forced 30 families to be evacuated. There were three deaths. In the latter, flooding occurred
in the upper catchment of the Muar River, the Muphur River and in the town of Kota Tinggi.
There were no evacuees and no reported damages.
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Plate 1.2: The 1976 flood in Georgetown, Pulau Pinang: Top - A Police rescue team
moving residents in deeply affected areas along Jalan Perak to relief centres by boat;
Bottom - Children having a carnival in parts of the city flooded to a shallow depth
(From the Star archives)
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1981 - Minor flood
Again, only the two states of Kelantan and Johor were flooded. In the former, flooding
occurred in the Golok, Semerak, Kemasin and Kelantan river basins. Flood damages were
estimated at $4.946 million of which damage to padi accounted for $4.39 million, damage
to cash crops accounted for $0.32 million and damage to tree crops accounted for $0236
million. In the latter, serious flooding in the Endau and Kecil areas and localised flooding in
Kota Tinggi and Johor Bahru and Simpang Renggam areas caused flood damages amounting
to $84,000. 2,599 people were evacuated.
1982 - Minor flood
Floods only occurred in the East Coast. In Kelantan, the Golok, Kelantan and Kemasin rivers
topped their banks and the resultant floods caused an estimated total damage of $1.98 million_
Of this total, damage to crops was estimated at $265,000 and damages to public utilities at
$1.235 million. A total of 4,890 people were evacuated. In Terenannu, the riverine areas
of the Besut, Teren oaanu, Kemaman, Nerus and Dungun rivers were flooded. Damages were
estimated at $1.66 million. There were 5,371 evacuees and the death toll was six. In Pahang,
only minor flooding occurred in Temerloh, Kuantan and Jerantut. 30 people were evacuated.
1983 - Moderate flood
This flood mainly affected the East Coast states. In Kelantan. serious flooding with two peak
occurred in the Kelantan, Kemasin, Semerak and Golok rivers. Areas affected include Kuala
Krai (see Plate 11.3), Tanah Merah, Nfacang, Pasir Puteh. Pasir Mas, Bacok, Tumpat. and
Kota Bharu. Damages to crops were estimated at $3.50 million and damages to public
facilities estimated at $6.45 million. Other damages were estimated at $0.347 million. In
Teren uaanu, serious flooding occurred in Besut, Kuala Terengganu, 1-lulu tereneraanu,
Nfarang, Dungun,and Kemaman. Damages were estimated at $3.266 million. 21,356 people
were evacuated and there were three deaths. In Pahang, flooding took place in Kuantaua,
Temerloh, Pekan, Maran and Jerantut. A total of 9T7 people were evacuated and there were
two deaths. In Johor, minor flooding occurred in Johor Bahru, Kota Tin ggi, Seeamat and
Nfersing. A total of 1,593 people were evacuated. In the West Coast, flooding occurred along
the Perlis River causing damages estimated at $27,000 and the evacuation of 45 people.
1984 - Moderate flood
During this year, minor to moderate floods occurred throughout the peninsula. On the West
Coast, minor flooding in Kedah forced the evacuation of five families. In Pulau Pinang, flash
floods forced the evacuation of 41 families and the death of one person. An estimated flood
damage of $983,000 was also caused. In Perak, minor flooding forced the relocation of 52
families. Minor flooding in Selangor also caused damages amounting to $10,000. In Negri
Sembilan, flooding in the Jelai, Kenaboi and Gemenchih valley caused an estimated damage
of $143,000. In Melaka, severe floods occurred along the Melaka and Kesang rivers. A total
of 2,358 people were evacuated. Damages were estimated at $523,673 of which damage to
agriculture amounted to $190,362, damage to commercial establishments accounted for
$90,370, damage to public facilities accounted for $213,478 and damage to domestic
properties accounted for $29,463. In Johor, minor flooding occurred in Kota Tina cri, Johor
Bahru and Segamat for three days. A total of 143 people were evacuated but no damage was
estimated. In the federal capital, flash floods occurred twice but no damage was estimated.
In Pahang, minor floods occurred in Kuantan, Temerloh, Pekan and Kuala Lipis. No
damages were reported. In Kelantan, flooding in the four major rivers caused 7,177 people
to be evacuated and the death of nine people. The total flood damage was estimated at $3.116
million.
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1985 - Minor flood
This year, the East Coast was not affected at all. In the West Coast, flash floods and minor
floods were frequently observed. In Kedah, flash floods in Kuala Muda, Pendang, Gurun,
Baling, Sik and Kulim caused the evacuation of 3,641 people. One person died. In Pulau
Pinang, minor flooding occurred along the Kulim, Perai, Pertain, Rawa, Kilang Ubi, Rambai
and Kubang Ulu rivers. Damages were estimated at $14,500. There were 21 evacuees. In
Georgetown, flash floods caused damages to commercial and industrial properties and created
massive traffic jams and disruption to life (Plate 1.3). In Selangor, there were several
occurrences of minor flooding and flash flooding resulting in damages estimated at $37,000.
Minor flooding also took place in Negri Sembilan and Melaka but no damage was reported.
However, 68 people were evacuated in Melaka. In Johor, flooding along the Kesang, Paloh,
Juaseh, Johor and Batu Pahat rivers forced the evacuation of 468 people but no damage was
reported. In the federal capital, flash floods along the Gombak, Batu and Kelang rivers also
forced the evacuation of 5,591 people.
1986 - Moderate flood
In the East Coast, moderate to severe floods occurred. In Kelantan, severe floods along the
four major rivers forced the authorities to evacuate 7,968 people. In Terengganu, severe
floods described as the 'biggest' since the 1967 flood caused damages totalling $3.26 million.
All major rivers in the state overflowed their banks. There were eight deaths. In Pahang,
however, only minor flooding occurred and no damage was reported. In the West Coast,
flooding was mainly of the minor and flash flood types. In Kedah, flash floods damaged
crops totalling an estimated $262,000. 177 evacuees and another 34 families from two sites
were evacuated. Five people also lost their lives. In Perlis, minor flooding occurred.
Damages to crops were estimated at 70 ha and damages to facilities estimated at $80,000. In
Pulau Pinang, flash floods caused an estimated damage amounting to $20,000. In Perak,
minor flooding in Larut and Matang resulted in damages to public facilities estimated at
$25,000. In Selangor, only minor flooding occurred. In Johor, severe flooding occurred in
Segamat, Kluang, Muar and batu Pahat. Total damage was estimated at $592,400.
1987 - Moderate flood
In general, severe flooding in the East Coast and flash flooding in the West Coast. In
Kelantan, flooding due to monsoon rains lasted for about two weeks. Damages were
estimated at $4.1 million. A total of 401 people were evacuated and there were four deaths.
In Terengganu, there was long duration flooding in all the major rivers lasting for more than
ten days. Damage to the DID's projects was estimated at $1.044 million. 1,748 people were
evacuated and there were four deaths. In Pahang, monsoon rains also caused floods in the
Kuantan and Pahang river basins resulting in 2,328 evacuees and four deaths. Damages to
public facilities and agriculture were estimated at $79,000 and $348,000 respectively.
In Johor, severe flooding occurred in January and December. In the former, damages were
estimated at $470,000 and total number of evacuees was 9,625. There was one death. In the
latter, flood damages totalled $10,000 and a total of 832 people was evacuated. In Kedah,
minor floods along the Pendang River lasted for three days. No damage was reported. In
Perlis, floods occurred in the Tasoh and Padang Terap river basins resulting in damage to
36 ha of padi and 111 metres of irrigation canals. In Pulau Pinang, flash floods occurred in
Pulau Betong, Genting, Permatang Damar Laut and Georgetown. Floods were also reported
along the Muda and Prai rivers. Damages were estimated at $83,000. In Perak, flash floods
were reported in the vicinity of Ipoh town (especially along the Pan i and Pinji rivers), and
also along the Kampar, Bidor, Sungkai, Bikam, Slim, Berof, Cheroh and Kelawar rivers. In
Krian District, damage was estimated at $5,000. Flash floods in Central Perak also caused
damage to oil palm plantations estimated at 61 ha or $750,000. In Selangor, minor flash
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Plate 1.3: The 1985 flood in Georgetown: Top - A Police warning and rescue team
escorting school children back to their homes; Bottom - Workers in a motorbike repair
shop taking an extended break (From Pulau Pinang DID archives)
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floods also occurred and crop damage was estimated at $7,000. A total of 70 people were
also evacuated. Finally, in the federal capital, there were many occurrences of flash floods
along the Kelang River but no damage was reported.
1988 - Major flood
Many parts of the peninsula were flooded but the worst affected areas were the East Coast
states. In Kelantan, sever flooding in the Kelantan River Basin caused the deaths of 19
persons. A total of 36,789 people were evacuated and total damage was estimated at $29.83
million (Plate 1.4). In Terengganu, there were two floods, one in November and the other
in December. The total number of people evacuated was 15,608. There were six deaths and
damage was estimated at $10.05 million. In Pahang, severe flooding occurred in the Districts
of Lipis, Temerloh, Pekan and Kuantan. The total number of people evacuated was 23,269.
There were six deaths and damages were estimated at $5.84 million.
Severe floods also affected many of the West Coast states. In Kedah, severe flooding
occurred along the Muda, Ketil, Padang Terap, Baru, Temin and Anak Bukit rivers resulting
in the evacuation of 20,849 people and four deaths. The estimated damage was $10.5 million.
In Perlis, severe flooding affected the Perlis River Basin. 519 people were evacuated and one
person died. The flood damage was estimated at $2.14 million. In Negri Sembilan, several
kampungs along the Serting and Gemenceh rivers were flooded. They are Kampung Sri
Rompin, Kampung Peti, Felda Jelai 4, Kampung Ladang and Kampung Londah. A total of
276 evacuees were temporarily relocated. Flood damage was estimated at $1.15 million. In
Melaka, minor flooding occurred along the Melaka River causing 86 people to be evacuated.
No damage was reported. In Johor, the Districts of Segamat and Kota Tinggi were flooded.
A total of 412 people were evacuated and there was one incident of death. The flood damage
was estimated at $1.09 million. In the federal capital, flash floods occurred six times during
the year. A total of 3,000 people were evacuated. There was no report on damages.
1989 - Minor flood
With the exception of Pulau Pinang and Johor, flooding in the peninsula in 1989 can be
described as minor. In Pulau Pinang, severe floods with depths of between 0.5 to 1.1 metres
of one to two days duration occurred in the Muda, Jarak, Dua, Lahar Tiang, Lokan and
Lahar Endin rivers. A total of 109 people were evacuated and damage to agriculture was
estimated at $66,780. Flash floods also occurred in Georgetown along the Pinang River. In
Johor, floods of three to six days duration occurred along the Muar, Endau, Johor and Batu
Pahat rivers. Flood depths generally varied between 0.5 to 1.0 metre but some of the lowest
lying areas have flood depths of 2 metres. The total number of flood victims evacuated was
1,525 people. About 65.0 per cent of those evacuated were from the Kota Tinggi area.
Several stretches of trunk roads were inundated between three to six days at depths between
0.3 to 1.2 metres. Total flood damage was estimated at $561,000 of which damage to
agriculture and public facilities were estimated at $411,000 and $150,000 respectively.
Another 340 ha of agricultural land were damaged.
Other than the above two states, Perlis, Perak and the federal capital were also flooded but
the flooding was minor. In Perlis, there were three flood events. Areas flooded were Arau,
Ulu Pauh, Kampung Padang Telela, Katong, Kampung Paloh, Kaki Bukit and Tasoh. A total
of 870 ha of padi fields were inundated but no damage was estimated. In Perak, minor floods
occurred in several villages in Kinta and Batang Padang Districts. Most areas were flooded
to depths of between 1.0 to 2.0 metres for a duration of four to seven days. There was no
estimate of damage. In the federal capital, flash floods occurred twice along the Kelang and
Bunus rivers. Areas flooded were Kampung Pantai Dalam, Kampung Limau, Kampung Pasir
Baru, Kampung Pasir Lama and Kampung Sentosa. Flood depths varied between 0.25 to 1
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Plate 1.4: The 1988 flood in Kota Bharu, Kelantan: Top - An aerial view of the Kota
Bharu stadium and the General Hospital (with buildings built in a semi-circle); Bottom -
An aerial view from another part of the town around Jalan Pengkalan Chepa (From
Kelantan DID archives)
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metre and the floods lasted for about two hours. No damage was estimated.
1990 - Minor flood
In general, despite seven states reporting flood occurrences, the floods in 1990 were minor.
In Perlis, areas inundated were Balai Baru, Beseri, Padang Melangit, Kampung Repoh,
Kampung Bakau, Abi Kubang Badak and Bintong. No damage was reported. In Kedah,
moderate floods forced the evacuation of some 2,055 people from the districts of Sik, Baling,
Kulim and Kuala Muda. There were damages to crops, land and private properties but no
estimate was made. Floods also occurred in the island of Langkawi. In Gurun town, flash
floods inundated 12 villages and 20 families were evacuated. In Pulau Pinang, floods
occurred along the Muda, Jarak, Dua, Lahar Tiang, Lokan and Lahar Endin rivers. A total
of 1,759 inhabitants were relocated temporarily. Damages to crops was estimated at
$160,000. In Perak, minor and flash floods inundated nine villages along the Perak River
near Park town. About 10,000 people were stranded when the wooden bridge linking their
villages to Pant town was washed away by the flood waters. In Krian District, 51 people
were evacuated. No damage was reported. In Johor, flooding along the Segamat, Johor and
Batu Pahat rivers resulted in 1,280 people being evacuated. In Terengganu, minor floods
along the Dungun, Besut and Kemaman rivers forced the evacuation of 1,300 people. Finally,
in Kelantan, two flood events took place in Kuala Krai District and Kota Bharu District. In
the former, flood depths of between 0.19 to 2 metres were reported in Kampung Tualang,
Kampung Guchil, Manik Urai Lama and Masek. A total of 517 people were evacuated. In
the latter, several villages along the Kelantan River were flooded but no damage was
reported. Four persons lost their lives in the floods in Kelantan.
1991 - Moderate flood
The most seriously affected state was Johor. Flooding along the Muar, Johor, Segamat and
Batu Pahat rivers resulted in the evacuation of 3,000 people. Unfortunately, no estimates of
the damages were made. In the three East Coast states of Terengganu, Pahang and Kelantan,
the floods were not severe. In each state, the number of evacuees was less than 1,000. In
Kelantan, there were two deaths due to drowning. Total estimated flood damage was $1.4
million (Jabatan Pengairan dan Saliran Kelantan 1991 p8). In Pulau Pinang, especially
Georgetown, flash floods caused havoc in terms of traffic jams, damage to properties,
commercial and industrial losses and damage to public facilities. The flood event of June was
a 1 in 33 year event. The flooded extent of the Pinang and Air Itam river basins were 20 km2
and 16 km2
 respectively. Flood depths were between 0.70 to 2.75 metres. The duration of
flooding was one day (see Plate H.1). A total of 42 people were evacuated and the estimated
damage to public facilities was $680,012. Damages to commercial and industrial plants were
deemed to be substantial but no estimate was made. Damage to crops and other public
facilities was estimated at $562,048. Flash floods also occurred in Selangor and the federal
capital but estimates on damages were not available.
1992 - Minor flood
Although this flood is classified as minor, there were a total of 12 deaths. Of this total, four
were in Kelantan. In Johor, flooding in January forced the evacuation of 1,252 people in
Segamat and Batu Pahat districts. Another flood occurred in Kota Tinggi, Mersing and
Kluang districts in November. During this second flood, a total of 900 people were
evacuated. In anticipation of more flooding, 500 sacks of rice worth $41,335 and 21,264 tins
of sardines worth $35,000 were sent to the forward bases (The Star 12.11.92 & 13.11.93).
In Perlis, floods hit several low-lying areas in Arau and 60 people were evacuated. In Pulau
Pinang, many parts of Bukit Mertajam were flooded to about 1 metre of water. More then
1,000 residents in Taman Sri Rambai fled their homes. 50,000 residents were affected by the
flood. Household damages worth $180,000 were reported (The Star 30.10.92). In Melaka,
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a total of 335 people were evacuated when flash floods hit Alor Gajah District. The floods,
described as the worst since 1971, also destroyed large areas of padi fields, maize and banana
plantations. In the federal capital, 500 residents in Puchong were evacuated when a flash
flood hit the area. Damage to properties was estimated at $150,000 (The Star 2.1.92). In
another flash flood, about 1,000 residents of Kampung Segambut experienced losses estimated
at $1 million (Berita Harian 8.1.92).
1993 - Major flood
In its annual flood report, the DID emphasised that floods in 1993 are not confined to the
East Coast are widespread on the West Coast as well. The flood season in 1993 began at the
end of October and terminated at the end of December. Flood peaks were observed in many
states from 24th December to 29th December. The DID flood report confirms that the 1993
flood was similar in magnitude to the 1988 flood, and therefore it can be classified as a major
flood. States which were badly affected were Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang and Johor. The
federal capital also experienced severe flash flooding on many occasions. A total of 22 deaths
were reported, of which 16 were from Kelantan and three from Pahang. The number of
evacuees totalled 23,355 and damage to properties, public utilities, roads, bridges and crops
were estimated roughly at millions of ringgits (unfortunately the DID could not give an exact
figure).
In Kedah, the flooding was minor but serious enough to cause the evacuation of 291 people.
Damage was minimal. In Negri Sembilan, 122 people were evacuated but flooding was
generally not severe. In Melaka, 40 people were evacuated and school children missed a day
of school because many roads were flooded. In Pulau Pinang, flood depths of between 0.6
to 2.0 metres were recorded. The 1993 rainfall on 21 November was a 1 in 30 year event.
The Pinang River basin was flooded to an extent of 20.0 km2 and the Air Itam River basin
flooded to about 16.0 km 2 . Damage to crops totalled $5,500 but generally the flooding was
not severe. In Kelantan, the flooding was severe as the flood level was almost as high as the
1988 major flood. A total of 113,000 school children missed school for several days as 200
schools were either flooded of the roads leading to them were impassable. There was a total
of 16 deaths and 15,854 evacuees. In Pahang, there were 2,644 evacuees as many towns and
villages were inundated for several days to a week. The worst hit was Pekan with 1,398
evacuees and the closure of 16 schools. In Johor, a total of 132 people were evacuated but
flooding was localised. Three villages (Kampung Puting, Kampung Lubuk and Kampung
Roban) were cut off for ten days. In Kuala Lumpur, there were a total of four flash floods
during the year. The flood on 7 June was the 4th largest flood since 1951. A total of 4,272
people were evacuated to relief centres. The floods caused massive traffic jams in the federal
capital and inconvenience but no estimate of damage was made.
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INFLUENTIAL FACTORS IN PREVIOUS HAZARDS
RESEARCH FINDINGS
FACTORS
	
INFLUENTIAL
	
NOT INFLUENTIAL
GENDER
LENGTH OF
RESIDENCE
TENURE
Men more likely to determine
family response to flood
hazard (James 1974).
Males take a more optimistic view
of the likelihood and nature of
flooding but more aware of flood
risk (Fordham 1992). Males felt
more positively that flood relief
schemes could enhance the environ-
ment and not spoil the view
(Fordham 1992). Women are more
vulnerable to hazards and disasters
due to limited access to resources
(Blaikie et al 1994).
Longer residence, more aware
(Waterstone 1978). People living
in new houses for shorter periods
of time are more likely to adopt
insurance against earthquake
(Palm and Hodgson 1993). Those in
residence longest generally show a
lower level of flood hazard
perception (Fordham 1992).
Home owners more likely to
mitigate (Waterstone 1978).
Urban home owners more sensitive
to hazard characteristics; rural
= opposite (Burton et al 1978).
Tenants were prepared to live with
a larger range of risks than property
owners (Fordham 1992).
Respondents who make adjustments
are mostly house owners while
tenants are not bothered to do
anything at all (Jamaluddin and
Ismail 1983). Land owners have
better access to resources and
can adapt better to hazards and
disasters (Blaikie et al 1994).
The landless are forced to occupy
'hazardous' land and are more
vulnerable (Davis 1978).
Gender not related to
awareness of flood risk
Kates 1971; Mileti et al
1975).
Gender not related to flood
hazard perception (Parker
1976).
Length of residence not
related to expectation of future
flooding (Kates 1962).
Tenure not related to flood
hazard perception (Parker
1976). Tenure has no sign-
ificant effect on hazard
evaluation, expectation of
future hazard occurrence,
or attitude toward tward
damage prevention (Baker
and Patton 1974). Tenure has
no significant association
with number of adjustments
(Harding and Parker 1974).
Tenure has no significant
relationship with flood
awareness, perception of flood
frequency, causes of floods,
risk of future floods, awareness
of flood alleviation schemes,
advantages and disadvantages,
APPENDIX J:180
FACTORS	 INFLUENTIAL
	
NOT INFLUENTIAL
and willingness to move (Leigh
and Low 1983).
EDUCATION	 The more educated tend to have a Education not significant in
positive attitude towards hurricane future flood expectation (Kates
damage prevention (Baker and 	 1962). Literacy has no
Patton 1974).	 significant effect on ha7ard
Those with more years of school	 evaluation or expectation of
completed tended to insure against hazard recurrence (Baker and
earthquake occurrences	 Patton 1974). Education not
(Palm and Hodgson 1993). Hazard influential in respondents'
awareness increases with higher	 perception of storm hazards
education but college graduates	 Islam 1974). There is no
are less prepared than those with 	 significant relationship
some college education (Turner et	 between education level and
al 1979). Perceived changes of flood flood awareness, perception of
frequency is significantly	 flood frequency, flood causes,
influenced by education level 	 awareness of flood alleviation
(Leigh and Low 1983). 	 pi ogrammts, advaiNw,ts .and
The higher the education level,	 disadvantages of living in the
the higher the degree of flood 	 area, and willingness to move
hazard perception (Fordham 1992). (Leigh and Low 1983).
AGE
	
Age associated with perception of
	
Age has no significant effect
importance of flood and knowledge on expectation of future
of local flood problem: younger 	 hazard occurrence and attitude
respondents more aware (Handmer toward damage prevention
1979). Age associated with hazard (Baker and Patton 1974).
awareness: younger respondents
more aware (Waterstone 1978).
Older respondents (55+) have a low
level of flood hazard perception but
more aware of past floods. Young
respondents (18-34) display a
high level of uncertainty and
tendency to disagree but middle-
aged respondents (35-54) showed
the highest flood hazard perception
(Fordham 1992). Aged respondents
tend to deny the existence of
hazard (Baker and Patton 1974).
The very young and the aged are
more vulnerable to disasters
(Blaikie et al 1994). Young farmers
more versatile in adopting more
drought reduction strategies than
old farmers (Chan 1981a).
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Organizational membership
support did not give a
clearly interpretable
pattern (Fordham 1992).
There is no significant
relationship between ethnic
group and perception of flood
frequency, causes of floods,
risk of future floods, their
estimation of advantages and
disadvantages and willingness
to move (Leigh and Low
1983).
Socio-economic indicators
not associated with attitudes
to future flooding (Burton
1961). Income has no
significant association
with number of adjustments
(Harding and Parker 1974).
There are few significant
relationships between hazard
perception and expectation and
socio-economic variables
(Parker and Harding 1979).
FACTORS	 INFLUENTIAL	 NOT INFLUENTIAL
FAMILY/
HOUSEHOLD
STRUCTURE
GROUP
MEMBERSHIP
ETHNICITY
Single family structure more
likely to take action; but homes
with school age children are less
aware of earthquake hazard than
those without children (Turner et
al 1979). Families with children
under 16 less aware of a flood
problem (Parker 1976).
Those with children take a more
cautious view of the flood hazard
and households with older members
have a low flood hazard perception
(Fordham 1992).
Group membership has a positive
association with attitude to
structural solutions (James 1974).
Different ethnic groups showed
significant differences in their
degree of prior awareness of the
flood hazard and awareness of types
of flood alleviation programmes
(Leigh and Low 1983). Specific
ethnic groups are often prejudiced
and are denied access to resources
and information and are, therefore,
more vulnerable to disasters
(Blaikie et al 1994).
SOCIO-
ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
Socio-economic class associated
with greater knowledge of flood
protection structures (Roder 1961).
Lower income groups believe
flooding to be less likely than
higher income groups (Fordham
1992). Importance of hazard to
income or locational interest
influences hazard perception and
estimation (White 1974). Wealthier
peasants more likely to experiment
with more adjustments (Burton et al
1993). Low income families are less
likely to adopt strategies since the
risk of unforeseen disaster weighs
lightly against everyday needs (Davis
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FACTORS	 INFLUENTIAL	 NOT INFLUENTIAL
1981). The poor have less access to
resources and are more vulnerable
to disasters (Varley 1994; Blaikie
et al 1994).
	
DISTANCE FROM Nearer the river, more aware of
	
Adoption of earthquake
	
RIVER/LOCATION flood hazard (Waterstone 1978). 	 and windstorm insurance
Those living closest to river have does not vary by geographic
lower flood hazard perception than location (Palm and Hodgson
those living further away (Fordham 1993).
1992). Those nearest river tend to
show less support for flood relief
schemes (Fordham 1992). Farmers from
dry areas more perceptive of recent
moisture conditions than those from
wet areas (Chan 1981a).
HAZARD
PERCEPTION
Respondents who are more aware of
the hazard are more likely to make
adjustments (White 1973, 1974; Burton
et al 1978, 1993). Perception of
adjustment availability and perceived
linkages with other people influences
adjustment choice (White 1974).
PAST
EXPERIENCE
HAZARD
AWARENESS
Past experience influences the
choice of adjustment (White 1973,
1974; Burton et al 1978, 1993).
Past experience influences hazard
awareness and level of adjustment,
measured in terms of the
number of adjustments (Harding
and Parker 1974). Expectation of
future minor flooding is highly
related to experience of past
flooding (Jamaluddin and Ismail
1983).
More awareness leads to less
support for flood relief schemes
There is no direct link
between awareness of past
experience and the decision
to settle and maintain
settlement in a hazard zone
(Islam 1974).
Expectation of future major
flooding is not significantly
related to past flooding
experience (Jamaluddin and
Ismail 1983). The number of
flooding experiences does not
affect adoption of adjustment
(Jamaluddin and Ismail
1983).
Past experience bore no rel-
ationship to perceived
seriousness of flood hazard
(Chua 1972).
There is no clear
correspondence between
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FACTORS	 INFLUENTIAL	 NOT INFLUENTIAL
(Fordham 1992). 	 perception of cyclone hazard
and adoption of specific
adjustments (Islam 1974).
HAZARD
RECENCY
HAZARD
FREQUENCY
Recency of hazard experience
accounts for variations in hazard
perception (Kates 1962).
Hazard recency is associated with
flood hazard awareness (Harding
and Parker 1974).
Frequency of hazard personal
experience determines hazard
perception and estimation, with
intermediate frequency generating
greatest variation in hazard inter-
pretation and expectation (White
1974). Flood frequency is associated
with flood hazard awareness
(Kates 1962; Harding and Parker 1974).
HAZARD
MAGNITUDE/
SEVERITY
PERSONALITY
TRAITS
Respondents' evaluation of
hurricane hazard and expectation
of hazard recurrence vary strongly
with sites having different
magnitudes of risk (Baker and
Patton 1974). Severity of hazard
experience accounts for variations
in hazard perception (Kates 1962).
Influences hazard perception and
estimation (White 1974). Exert
strong influence on certain choices
of adjustments in the face of severe
intensive events (Burton et al
1993).
Difference in hazard
magnitude has no sign-
ificant influence on
awareness of hazard,
respondents from all
hazard zones show a
similar level of high un-
awareness of the flood hazard.
There was also no association
in future expectation of floods
between sites having different
flood magnitudes (Harding
and Parker 1974).
No statistically significant
associations are found between
personality traits and hazard
perception and expectation
(Parker and Harding 1979).
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APPENDIX K SURVEY OF FLOOD LOSSES INCURRED BY RESIDENTIAL,
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN
VARIOUS PARTS OF PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
K.1 Introduction
There is now a considerable volume of literature on flood damage assessment (White 1945;
Parker and Penning-Rowsell 1972; Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton, 1977; Smith et al 1979;
Parker and Penning-Rowsell 1984; Parker et al 1987). Flood damage in terms of losses are
direct or indirect, and both categories include tangible and intangible losses. While the
assessment of tangible losses is fairly straight forward, the evaluation of intangible losses can
be problematic. Despite this, there have been attempts to quantify intangible flood damages
so that they can be included in cost-benefit analysis (Green et al 1983a, 1988).
In Peninsular Malaysia, floods can cause a range of damages to residential and commercial
properties located on rural and urban floodplains. While the damages in rural areas are
usually confined to residential properties (with farm properties usually doubling up as
residential premises) resulting in the loss of livestock and crops, and damage to building
structure and contents, urban flood damage involves both damage to residential and
commercial properties. And because of the high density of residential and commercial
properties, infrastructure and public utilities in urban areas, urban flood damage is expected
to be much higher than in the rural areas. Flood damage records have been and are still being
collected by government departments and agencies on an ad hoc basis, i.e. whenever a flood
occurs. As such, damage statistics are incomplete, irregular, and only covers government
owned properties and utilities, the only exception being crop damage. Based on these records
the estimated flood damage in Malaysia is of moderate extent compared with other
neighbouring countries but this could largely be due to the underestimation of damages (JICA
1982 pP-6). Three examples of estimated flood damages during various flood events in
several states are given in Table K.11.
There have been few attempts to determine the extent of flood damages to different types of
privately owned properties in the peninsula, the exceptions being Smith (1985) and JICA
(1991). Even so, both these above studies have focused on identifying potential flood damage
rather than actual flood damage. In the current research, two separate surveys on flood
damage were carried out. One was the main survey of 618 households which encompasses
a section on 'actual' flood damages. The other was a survey of actual flood damages of 273
businesses. The latter was a preliminary survey of flood damage to private commercial
properties. As it serves only as a supplementary survey to the main household survey (its
results complement the findings of flood damage to residential properties surveyed in the
main household survey), it is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of commercial
'Figures given in this table should be treated with caution as they are crudely estimated.
For example, damage to roads and vehicles are not included. Intangibles (see Section K.3.2)
are also not included. The main criticism of this table is that it focuses only on those flood
losses which can be measured in Ringgits. Other reasons for the crude estimates are
previously examined in Appendix I.
2 Actual flood damage includes all damages suffered during a particular flood event. This
is opposed to potential flood damage which is calculated based on flood depth, building
characteristics and other theoretical assumptions (Smith 1985).
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Table K.1: Estimated flood damages in past major floods in Peninsula Malaysia
Type of damage Pahang-1971
Damage
1. Rural industries:
a. Crops 10,000,000
b. Livestock 240,000
c. Forests 20,000
d. Fisheries 45,000
Sub-total 10,305,000
2. Structures & Properties: 
a. Utilities &
Facilities	 5,470,000
b. Public buildings 2,425,000
c. Housing	 12,450,000
d. Industrial
Facilities	 570,000
Sub-total	 20,915,000
3. Indirect damages: 
a. Activities
Interrupted	 10,130,000
b. Rescue & Relief 1,800,000
Sub-total	 11,930,000
Total Damage
	 43,150,000
Kelantan-1967 Kuala Lumpur-1971
% Damage Damage
23.2
0.6
0.05
0.1
24,850,000
6,390,000
-
31.5
8.1
23.9 31,240,000 39.6
12.7 9,287,000 11.8 17,492,000 51.0
5.6 1,368,000 1.7 Incl. in 2a
28.9 16,340,000 20.7 13,712,000 40.0
1.3 3,063,000 8.9
48.5 26,995,000 34.2 34,267,000 100.0
23.5 12,305,000 15.6 10% incl. in 2
4.2 8,350,000 10.6
27.6 20,655,000 26.2
100.0 78,890,000 100.0 34,267,000 100.0
(Price level)
	 (1974)	 (1976)	 (1977)
(Source: JICA 1982)
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properties in the peninsula. Both surveys are aimed at answering Research Question 1
(Chapter 1), i.e. to determine how important the flood hazard is in Peninsular Malaysia.
The surveys covered flood damage suffered by residential households, commercial properties
and businesses, and industries during the most recent flood. As a comparison, flood damage
suffered during the worst flood was also covered in the household survey. It was not carried
out in the commercial survey as many businesses are relatively new and the owners are
unwilling to be drawn into lengthy interviews.
K.2 Types of flood damage
In the flood damage assessment literature, damages or losses have been categorised as direct
or indirect. Such damages are further categorised as tangible or intangible (White 1945;
Parker and Penning-Rowsell 1972; Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton 1977; Higgins and
Robinson 1982; Parker and Penning-Rowsell 1984; Parker et al 1987). A typology of flood
damage is given in Figure K.1.
K.2.1 Tangible flood damage
Tangible flood damage refers to those effects of flooding which can be assigned monetary
values. They can be direct as in the case of damage to building structures or indirect as in
the case of the loss suffered as a result of drop in business volume.
(a) Direct damage
Direct flood damage results from the contact of flood water and its contents (sediment, oil
etc.) with buildings and their contents, vehicles, livestock and crops, humans, memorabilia,
etc.. For residential properties, the pressure and contact of flood water may give rise to
adverse effects on building structure (walls, floors, stilts etc.), damage to garden and house
contents such as furniture, electrical appliances, household utensils, carpets, wiring system
and sockets, etc. In the case of commercial properties, additional effects may include damage
to shop fittings, goods, raw material, machinery, etc. The costs of clean-up after a flood may
also be included as direct damage.
(b) Indirect damage
Indirect damages usually occur at the time of, or in a period after, a flood. In Peninsular
Malaysia, as flood events can last for several weeks, such damages may be substantial. Also,
the post-flood period can extend for several weeks or months. In the case of residential
properties, indirect damages include alternative accommodation, costs of transportation (of
family members and household contents), loss of income through disruption to work, costs
of treatment to illness resulting from floods (especially children and the elderly being exposed
to the cold waters), loss of schooling and subsequent costs of extra lessons to catch up with
the syllabus, etc. In the case of commercial properties, such damages may include loss of
production, reduced output due to inability of worker to commute to working premise,
transportation of goods and raw materials to alternative location, loss of trade due to
temporary closure of business outlets, loss of business orders, increase in costs of
transportation caused by disruption to usual traffic, the devaluation of the property value in
the market, etc.
K.2.2 Intangible flood damage
Intangible flood damage refers to those effects of flooding to which it is not currently possible
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Measurement
Tangible Intangible
Form of
Damage
Direct Damage to
buildings and
contents
Stress and
loss of life
Indirect Loss of production
and work
Inconvenience
of flood
Figure K.1
	 A typology of Flood Damage (After Parker et al 1987 p2)
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to assign acceptable monetary values (Pearce 1976). The only common property shared by
'intangibles' is that they cannot be evaluated for one reason or another (Parker et at 1987
p10). As with tangible damages, it is possible to have both direct and indirect intangible
damages. The damage of historical buildings by flooding is a direct effect but it would be
difficult to evaluate the loss in monetary terms. This is then an intangible direct loss. On the
other hand, the inconvenience caused by a flood is difficult to measure in monetary terms.
This is then termed an intangible indirect loss.
According to findings by Green et al (1988), the non-monetary (intangible) impacts of
flooding are far more important to the households affected than the value of the damages
done. Physical damage to building and their contents is the most visible but not always the
most serious effect of flooding (Green et al 1983b p6). Among the notable intangible damages
are disruption to the household's life caused by a flood, the stress of the flood event itself;
subsequent health damage; loss of memorabilia or of other irreplaceable and non-monetary
goods; and possible evacuation. Furthermore, stress and worry about the risk and
consequences of future flooding may also damage a person's health.
K.3 Reported household flood damage
In the household survey, 539 households (87.2 per cent) were flooded during the most recent
flood in their area. The majority experienced their most recent flood between 1988 and 1992.
Of those flooded, 234 households (43.4 per cent) reported that they suffered some losses as
a result of their most recent flood experience. For comparison, households were also
surveyed on the most severe flood experienced by them. This ranged from 1926 to 1992, the
most common being the 1991, 1988, and 1971 floods in that order. During the most severe
flood, 593 households (96.0 per cent) were flooded and of these, 485 households (81.8 per
cent) suffered some form of damage.
Damage estimates for the most recent flood are reasonably accurate with 83.8 per cent of
affected respondents reporting so (Table K.2). However, figures for the most severe flood
must be treated with caution because about 36.7 per cent reported experiencing their most
severe flood before 1982 (more than 10 years ago). Furthermore, 35.4 per cent of
respondents have also openly admitted that they vaguely remember the damage and that their
damage estimates may be inaccurate.
K.3.1 Reported tangible flood damage
(a)	 Reported direct damage
In Peninsular Malaysia tangible direct damages appear to be the most significant affecting
households. This appears to contradict Green et al's (1988) findings which suggest that
intangible impacts are far more important to households in the United Kingdom (UK). This
may be explained by a combination of exposure to flood hazards, cultural differences and the
level of affluence between the two societies. It is most certainly true that floods in the UK
are not as severe as those in Malaysia. Malaysians are also more experienced and attuned to
floods than their UK counterparts. They are hardened by years of flood experience, some of
which are so severe that entire villages (houses) are washed away (e.g. the 1926 flood, see
Appendix I and Winstedt 1927). Thus, seasonal floods are a way of life to Malaysians, as
common as the cold wet UK winter. Malaysians are, therefore, less likely to consider stress,
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Table K.2	 Accuracy of damage figures during the most severe and most recent
floods
Level of accuracy Most severe flood
Frequency	 Percentage
Most recent flood
Frequency	 Percentage
Very accurate 11 2.3 17 7.3
Accurate 103 21.2 97 41.5
Moderately accurate 199 41.0 82 35.0
Inaccurate 148 30.5 33 14.1
Very inaccurate 24 4.9 5 2.1
Total 485 100.0 234 100.0
e
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worry3 , the loss of memorabilia and other intangibles as highly significant as their UK
counterparts would'. Malaysian floodplain occupants are also largely poor (see Chapters 6
and 7) and can ill afford to lose their entire crop, spend on expensive house repairs and
replacement of house contents caused by flood damage. When food and shelter is the main
priority in life (which is often lived on a day by day basis), then it is almost certain that
tangible flood loss will be the main concern. Thus, in Peninsular Malaysia, damage to
building contents appeared to be the greatest damage for both the most recent and worst
floods (Figure K.2). This is followed by damage to livestock and crops and building structure
respectively. Although flood damages for different categories of damages are relatively low
for both floods, ranging from $39 to $459, total damages are quite substantial. Bearing in
mind that 46.9 per cent of households in the current survey have monthly incomes below
$500, the total damage estimates of $1,393 (most recent flood) and $1,837 (worst flood)
becomes significant. Furthermore, it should be put in perspective that the damage figures for
the worst flood are estimated at prices many years ago depending on the year of occurrence
(37.2 per cent of respondents indicated that they suffered their worst flood more than 10
years ago).
Table K.3 gives the breakdown of different types of damages to building contents for the
most recent and the worst flood. In both cases household appliances appear to contribute the
most amount of damage, amounting to 40.5 per cent and 34.8 per cent respectively'. This
is followed by damage to furniture which accounted for 29.6 per cent and 34.0 per cent
respectively. In terms of different types of properties, residential households appear to suffer
the bulk of the damage, accounting for 63.6 per cent and 63.1 per cent of total damage to
contents respectively. However, the average damage for commercial households was highest,
amounting to $1,416 and $1,311 respectively.
In terms of damage to building structure, the most affected structures are the floors, walls
and stilts (Table K.4). The majority of households suffered only minor damage of less than
$500 for both floods. The average dainage suffered by each flooded household was small,
being only $180 and $373 respectively. Commercial households suffered the highest average
damage for both floods while damage to fishing households was the smallest. This is mainly
due to the fact that the majority of fishing households build their properties on stilts and
regularly replace worn-out or rotting stilts. Another reason could be the fact that the
fishermen do not consider the replacement of stilts as a kind of flood damage but rather as
3 Nevertheless, stress and worry are still important effects felt by many Malaysians living
in the more hazardous flood zones, especially the aged and the young (see Section K.3.2).
4 Perhaps a hypothetical comparison would highlight the difference in importance given
to intangibles between the two societies. A lady in the UK loses her beloved dog which
drowned during a flood and another woman (farmer) in Malaysia loses her water buffalo. It
is likely that the former will be highly stressed as no other dog would be considered as able
replacement to the one she lost. Thus, the intangible loss is much more important than the
actual cost of the dog. In the case of the latter, her source of livelihood is lost. She is
therefore only concerned about the tangible loss (cost of the buffalo) as she would not be able
to plough the land and farm in the next season. To her, any replacement buffalo would do.
Even a mechanical tractor, considered a windfall, would be a more than appropriate
substitute.
5 As the text discusses both the most recent and the worst flood simultaneously, the first
figure refers to the former while the second figure to the latter in all subsequent cases.
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Figure K.2: Types of reported flood damage experienced by households during the most
recent and most severe floods
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Table K.3	 Reported damage to building contents
(a)	 During most recent flood: N=234
Item
	 Amount of damage ($)
	
Total	 % of Total
DK	 1-	 501- 1,001- 2,001- 3,000- 5,001- affected Damage
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 10,000
Carpet 1 11 1 0 0 0 0 13 5.3
Furniture 3 52 12 3 0 0 0 69 29.6
Appliances 0 21 7 5 0 2 1 36 40.5
Air cond. 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 2.4
Foodstuffs 1 19 0 1 0 1 0 22 8.2
Pets 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 9 0.9
Others 0 6 1 3 0 1 0 11 13.1
DI( - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $52,550
Total damage incurred by farming households = $3,150
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $26,900
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $0
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $82,600
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $352
(b)	 During the most severe flood:
	 N=485
Content
	
Amount of damage ($)	 Total % of
DK	 1-	 501- 1,001- 2,001- 3,000- 5,001- 10,000+	 Total
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 10,000
Carpet 2 45 1 1 0 0 0 0 49 5.9
Furniture 5 169 32 5 1 0 0 0 212 34.0
Appliances 0 71 22 8 3 2 1 1 108 34.8
Air cond. 0 11 7 4 1 0 0 0 23 8.4
Foodstuffs 3 59 1 1 0 1 0 0 65 6.2
Pets 12 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0.2
Others 1 22 8 5 0 1 0 0 37 10.5
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $140,500
Total damage incurred by farming households = $15,100
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $65,550
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $1,550
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $222,700
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $459
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Table K.4: Reported damage to building structures
(a)	 During the most recent flood:
	
N=234
Structure	 Amount of damage ($)
	
Total number % of Total
DK	 1-	 501- 1,001- 2,001- affected	 Damage
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000
Floor 3 44 4 5 1 57 53.1
Wall 6 40 4 3 0 53 32.7
Stilts 0 10 0 0 0 10 5.0
Stairs 0 6 0 0 0 6 1.8
Basement 1 1 1 0 0 3 0.5
Garden 1 10 0 0 0 11 2.9
Other areas 0 7 0 0 0 7 4.0
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $30,400
Total damage incurred by farming households = $3,400
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $8,300
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $50
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $42,150
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $180
(b)	 During the most severe flood:	 N=485
Structure	 Amount of damage ($)
	
Total number % of Total
DK	 1-	 501- 1,001- 2,001- 3,001- affected	 Damage
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000 7,500
Floor 8 158 14 9 3 0 192 35.3
Wall 12 143 13 6 1 0 175 27.1
Piles 5 46 3 3 1 0 58 9.6
Stairs 3 32 1 1 1 0 38 5.6
Basement 2 5 0 0 0 0 7 0.4
Garden 4 23 1 0 0 0 28 1.7
Other areas 0 20 5 6 1 3 35 20.3
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $113,050
Total damage incurred by farming households .--- $27,250
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $36,800
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $3,950
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $181,050
Average damage incurred by each flooded household =$373
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more of a maintenance to the building.
Damage to vehicles for both the most recent and most severe floods are not high (Table K.5).
This is because most people would park their vehicles on higher ground or they may move
the vehicles just as the flood waters are about to rise. However, the main reason is that not
many floodplain households have expensive vehicles such as a car or a van. Most would have
motorbikes and bicycles, the repairs of which are relatively cheap.
Damage to livestock and crops can be very significant, especially amongst rural households.
Although the average damage for both floods is relatively small at $309 and $339
respectively, the average damage suffered by farming households during both floods is $366
and $778 respectively (Table K.6). This level of damage is highly significant when damage
totals are compared with monthly incomes. The average monthly incomes of farming
households in the current survey is $382. Damages to livestock and crops during the two
floods are about 95.8 per cent and 203.7 per cent of their average monthly income
respectively.
Flood damage to humans can either be tangible (such as loss of work) or intangible (such as
stress and illness6 caused by flooding). The average tangible flood loss to humans in the most
recent and most severe floods are not large, i.e. $78 and $142 respectively (per flooded
household). Table K.7 illustrates the types of flood loss to humans for both floods. Loss of
work is the main component of flood loss to humans, making up 83.4 per cent and 70.9 per
cent of the total flood loss to humans in the most recent and worst floods respectively.
Although illness caused by the effects of flooding is difficult to quantify, many respondents
have reported some loss due to medical expenses. However, total medical expenses reported
due to the two floods are not large. For those households with reported illness due to flooding
amongst household members, the average medical expense for the most recent and worst
floods are $110 and $103 respectively. Again, these amounts must be seen in relation to the
average incomes of the households concerned. Households with low incomes would have
difficulty finding the extra money for medical expenses during floods as they need the money
for other expenses in recovery and rehabilitation. Some households have also reported loss
of medical expenses as a result of stress and worry. This is translated into monetary loss
when medical help is sought. However, the expenses are small. Finally, a rather unique flood
loss to humans is that incurred by households with school children, especially those who are
taking government examinations. For both the most recent and worst floods, a small
percentage of households reported such loss. School children who have registered for
government examinations and who subsequently fail to attend their examination because of
floods, lose their examination fees. More significantly, however, is the fact that they will lose
one year of their academic career as they will have to do a re-sit the following year. The
effects of seasonal flooding on government examinations is so serious that a commission was
set up to identify flood seasons all over the country so that examination dates could be
arranged to avoid the most frequent flood dates. Subsequently, annual end of the year
examinations in November-December (usually the peak of the flood season in the East Coast)
has been re-scheduled for an earlier date in October (Sooryanarayana 1988).
Although damage to memorabilia reported by respondents for both the most recent and worst
6 Some illness would have occurred without flooding. Hence, the difficulty of isolating
flood-related illness from the rest. However, great caution was exercised when asking the
question related to illness and in depth probing was used. Respondents were asked about their
health history and whether or not they thought the illness was related to floods.
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Table K.5	 Reported damage to vehicles
(a)	 During most recent flood: N=234
Type of
vehicle DK 1-
500
Amount of damage ($)
501-	 1,001- 2,001-
1,000	 2,000	 3,000
3,000-
5,000
Total
5,001- affected
10,000
% of Total
Damage
Tractor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Lorry/truck 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Van 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 7.5
Car 0 9 3 0 1 0 2 15 73.1
Motorbike 0 25 2 0 0 0 0 27 17.8
Bicycle 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 1.5
Others 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.1
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $16,800
Total damage incurred by farming households = $1,350
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $13,250
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $0
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $31,400
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $134
(b)	 During the most severe flood:
	 N=485
Type of
vehicle DK 1-
500
Amount of damage ($)
501-	 1,001- 2,001-
1,000	 2,000	 3,000
3,000-
5,000
Total
5,001- affected
10,000
% of Total
Damage
Tractor 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 5 2.9
Lorry/truck 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 5.0
Van 0 3 1 3 0 0 0 7 9.4
Car 0 33 10 2 1 0 2 48 56.1
Motorbike 0 56 3 1 0 0 0 60 20.2
Bicycle 1 30 1 0 0 0 0 32 4.6
Others 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 1.8
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $39,450
Total damage incurred by farming households = $3,850
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $26,200
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $1,950
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $71,450
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $147
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Table K.6	 Reported damage to livestock and crops
(a)	 During most recent flood: N=234
Amount of damage ($)
	
Total % of Total
DK	 1-	 501- 1,001- 2,001- 3,000- 5,001- affected Damage
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 10,000
Crops 3 43 9 6 5 1 1 68 71.5
Cattle 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 5 4.6
Goats 1 6 2 0 0 0 1 10 16.5
Poultry 1 51 0 0 0 0 0 52 5.2
Pigs 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.1
Fish 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.7
Others 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 1.4
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $13,650
Total damage incurred by farming households = $53,050
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $3,100
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $2,500
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $72,300
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $309
(b)	 During the most severe flood:	 N=485
Amount of damage ($)	 Total % of Total
DK	 1-	 501- 1,001- 2,001- 3,000- 5,001- affected Damage
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 10,000
Crops 3 61 36 13 6 2 1 122 61.4
Cattle 0 4 4 7 1 1 1 18 19.0
Goats 0 17 3 2 0 0 0 22 5.6
Poultry 0 158 1 0 0 0 0 159 8.6
Pigs 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 4 1.2
Fish 0 15 1 0 0 0 0 16 3.2
Others 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 9 1.0
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $29,250
Total damage incurred by farming households = $112,850
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $2,200
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $20,300
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $164,600
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $339
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Table K.7	 Reported damage to humans
(a)	 During most recent flood:
	
N=234
Nature of Amount of damage ($) Total % of Total
damage DK 1- 501- 1,001- 2,001- 3,000- 5,001- affected Damage
500 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 10,000
Killed 0 0 0 1 0 0 0	 1 8.0
Illness 23 18 0 0 0 0 0	 41 5.9
Stress 76 2 0 0 0 0 0	 78 0.5
Loss of work 18 41 2 3 0 0 1	 65 83.4
Schooling 27 4 0 0 0 0 0	 31 2.2
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $4,300
Total damage incurred by farming households = $1,250
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $12,200
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $400
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $18,150
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $78
(b) During the most severe flood:
	 N=485
Amount of damage ($)
	
Total % of Total
DK	 1-	 501- 1,001- 2,001- 3,000- 5,001- affected Damage
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 15,000
Killed 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1.1
Illness 64 45 0 0 0 0 0 109 3.8
Stress 204 13 0 0 0 0 0 217 1.0
Loss of work 41 130 11 5 1 1 1 190 70.9
Schooling 94 25 0 0 0 0 0 119 4.6
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 18.6
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $16,295
Total damage incurred by farming households = $6,800
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $43,500
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $2,350
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $68,945
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $142
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floods is relatively low, being $39 and $37 for each flooded household respectively, there are
many others who could not give a value for their loss. Such `unquantifiable' loss is examined
under Section K.3.2. The most common memorabilia loss or damaged during floods are
photographs, antiques, jewellery, paintings and other family 'treasures' (Table K.8).
Table K.9 illustrates other damages suffered by households during the most recent and worst
floods. Goods appear to be the most common item to suffer damage. This is followed by
damage to machinery. Most households reporting such damages are business households.
However, the average damage reported was not large amounting to $160 and $330 for both
floods respectively.
Finally, in terms of tangible damage, the total cost of all flood damages suffered by
households is shown in Table K.10. The average total lost per flooded household is not large,
even by Malaysian standard, being $1,393 and $1,837 for the two floods respectively.
However, once again, the total flood loss must be seen in relation to the average incomes of
the households concerned. For example, out of 69.8 per cent of respondents with incomes
less than $350 who reported flood loss during the most recent flood (therefore considered
poor households) suffered losses of more than $500. Furthermore, 22.5 per cent of these
respondents suffered losses greater than $2,000. For the most severe flood, 40.7 per cent of
respondents reporting flood losses suffered losses greater than $500. For those in the
marginal income group earning monthly incomes between $350 and $499, 66.7 per cent of
those reporting flood losses suffered losses greater than $500 in the most recent flood. For
the most severe flood, there were 36.6 per cent of respondents who suffered this level of
loss. The percentages of respondents appear lower in the most severe flood because there are
fewer respondents who remember their actual flood loss. Furthermore, the most severe flood
may have been experienced a long time ago when the price level is not the same. For
example, a flood loss of $500 in 1980 would be equivalent to approximately $743 in 1993.
If the flood loss of $500 was in 1970, then the equivalent loss in 1993 would be
approximately $1,316. Thus, the flood loss for the most severe flood for respondents in
Kuala Lumpur (most of the households reported that the 1971 flood was the most severe)
becomes highly significant. However, it must be cautioned that the flood loss reported for
such a distant flood may not be very accurate and should be treated as an estimate.
In terms of the type of households, commercial households appear to suffer the greatest flood
loss. In the most recent flood, these households suffered an average loss of $1,023 as
compared to $435 and $383 for farming and residential households respectively. Fishing
households suffered the lowest loss of only $79 per household. This is due to the fact that
commercial households have damaged goods and machinery as compared to other households.
Furthermore, commercial households also suffer loss of production or trading during the
duration of the flood. During the most severe flood, commercial households suffered an
average loss of $3,099 per household as compared to $1,303 and $1,099 for farming and
residential households. Fishing households again suffered the lowest loss averaging $751 per
household. As a comparison, squatter households suffered an average flood loss of $1,346
and $1,319 per household for the most recent and worst flood respectively.
K.3.2 Reported intangible flood damage
'Intangibles' are those factors that are often left out of a benefit-cost analysis (Green and
Penning-Rowsell 1988 p101) simply because they are unquantifiable. There are many factors
which fall into this category. For instance, previous studies have shown that some of the
impacts of flooding, notably health damage, may be intangible over the short period but the
damaging effects can surface years after the flood (Emery 1987). Although techniques are
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Table K.8	 Reported damage to memorabilia
(a)	 During most recent flood: N=234
Amount of damage ($)
	
Total % of Total
DK	 1-	 501- 1,001- 2,001- 3,000- 5,001- affected Damage
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 10,000
Photographs 10 3 1 0 0 0 0 14 15.9
Antiques 0 5 1 1 1 0 0 8 74.2
Jewellery 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.0
Paintings 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 5 6.0
Others 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.9
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $8,800
Total damage incurred by farming households = $350
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $0
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $0
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $9,150
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $39
(b)	 During the most severe flood:
	 N=485
Amount of damage ($)	 Total % of Total
DK	 1-	 501- 1,001- 2,001- affected Damage
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000
Photographs 20 24 1 0 0 0 17.0
Antiques 1 18 2 0 1 22 45.5
Jewellery 0 6 0 0 0 0 10.1
Paintings 3 11 0 0 0 14 14.1
Others 3 8 1 0 0 12 13.3
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $15,900
Total damage incurred by farming households = $350
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $1,550
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $0
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $17,800
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $37
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Table K.9	 All other flood damages reported
(a) During most recent flood: N=234
Damaged	 Amount of damage ($)
	
Total % of Total
items	 DK	 1-	 501- 1,001- 2,001- 3,000- affected Damage
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000
Machinery	 0	 2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 6	 27.6
Goods	 0	 6	 3	 5	 4	 0	 18	 58.0
Others	 1	 41	 1	 0	 0	 0	 43	 14.4
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $2,200
Total damage incurred by farming households = $550
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $34,450
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $300
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $37,500
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $160
(b) During the most severe flood:	 N=485
Damaged
	 Amount of damage ($)	 Total % of Total
items	 DK	 1-	 501- 1,001- 2,001- 3,000- 5,001- affected Damage
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 15,000
Machinery
	 0	 12	 1	 3	 1	 1	 2	 20	 21.6
Goods
	
0	 12	 9	 7	 9	 2	 2	 41	 48.0
Others	 12	 155	 5	 4	 1	 2	 1	 180	 30.4
DK - Don't know or unable to give an estimate
Total damage incurred by residential households = $14,800
Total damage incurred by farming households = $22,700
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $121,750
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $700
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $159,950
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $330
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Table K.10 Total estimated and reported cost of all damages suffered by households
(a) During most recent flood:
Amount of damage ($)
	 Total
1-	 501-	 1,001- 2,001- 3,000- 5,001- 10,000+
	 affected
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 10,000
Frequency	 120	 32	 32	 18	 22	 7	 3	 234
Percentage	 51.3	 13.7	 13.7	 7.7	 9.4	 3.0	 1.3	 100.0
Total damage incurred by residential households = $139,797
Total damage incurred by farming households = $80,500
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $102,948
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $2,700
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $325,945
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $1,393
(b) During the most severe flood:
Amount of damage ($)
	
Total
1-	 501-	 1,001- 2,001- 3,000- 5,001- 10,000+
	 affected
500	 1,000 2,000 3,000 7,500 10,000
Frequency	 150	 98	 92	 57	 75	 5	 8	 485
Percentage
	 30.9	 20.2	 19.0	 11.8	 15.5	 1.0	 1.6	 100.0
Total damage incurred by residential households = $380,400
Total damage incurred by farming households = $185,496
Total damage incurred by commercial households = $290,598
Total damage incurred by fishing households = $34,287
Total damage incurred by all flooded households = $890,781
Average damage incurred by each flooded household = $1,837
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being developed to measure intangible damage, the very fact that no market prices can be
attached to them restricts the development of such techniques. Although intangible flood
damage is difficult to measure, their effects on households are identified to include:
(a) Reported damage to building structure over the long term
The discussion on direct damage to building structures in Section K.3.1 (a) refers only to
expenditure spent during the two floods. It does not include long term effects which are
difficult to estimate and are therefore treated here as an intangible damage. Although many
traditional Malaysian houses are built on stilts, this does not mean they are completely flood
proof. In fact, the majority of the stilts (41.2 per cent) are built of wood which will rot over
time. In such cases, houses may collapse and this is by no means uncommon (Plate K.1).
Walls, floors, stairs and other structures may also experience wear and tear over the long
term (Plate K.2, Plate K.3 and Plate K.4). Unfortunately, such wear and tear is not easily
measured or estimated. However, detailed interviews with house owners in flood-prone areas
indicate that such intangibles may be substantial.
(b) Reported fall in property values
Furthermore, properties in flood-prone areas loose their residential attractiveness and
experience sharp drops in property values. For instance, house owners in the Jalan P Ramli
area (Pulau Pinang) and the Kampung Baru, Dato Keramat and Tiong Nam areas (Kuala
Lumpur) have mentioned that the values of their houses have not increased vis-a-vis houses
in other residential estates nearby. Although the current research does not take into account
property values, indications (from discussion and interviews with house owners and estate
agents) are that such intangible losses can be substantial.
(c) Reported long term effects on vehicles
Undoubtedly, regular flooding of vehicles inevitably results in rusting of parts and damage
to the engine and the body-work. As such, it was not surprising to note that many cars,
motorbikes, bicycles and other modes of transportation in flood-prone areas bear the mark
of rusting (see Plate 7.2). Although no count was taken in this research, the number of such
vehicles is noted to be significant.
(d) Reported inconvenience caused by flooding
This is not normally mentioned as a flood loss or damage by respondents in this research.
Floodplain occupants in Peninsular Malaysia accept the consequences and risks of flooding
and do not consider flooding as an inconvenience that can be measurable in terms of
monetary loss. Such an item is difficult, if not impossible to measure in monetary terms.
Studies elsewhere have indicated that very large scale flooding will disrupt whole
communities, thus reducing the degree of social support available and subsequently causing
further disruption (Erikson 1976; Blocker and Rochford 1986; Green and Penning-Rowsell
1988).
(e) Reported stress of the flood event
Stress caused by the flood event is rated highly amongst respondents of two studies in the
United Kingdom. Based on a scale from 0 (no effect) to 10 (most severe effect), a maximum
severity of 10 was given by respondents in Swalecliff while a value of 6.5 was reported by
respondents in Southgate (Green and Penning-Rowsell 1988 p105). In the current research,
APPENDIX K:203

Plate K.2: Damage to walls of building as a result of repeated flooding. Top: An example
from Pulau Pinang. Bottom: An example from Kuala Lumpur.
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Plate K.3: Damage to the building floor as a result of repeated flooding. Top: An
example from Pulau Pinang. Bottom: An example from Pekan.
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Plate K.4: Damage to the other building structures as a result of repeated flooding. Top:
An example of damage to stairs from Pekan. Bottom: An example of damage to stilts
from Kelantan
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although stress accounts for only a small percentage of tangible flood damage in terms of
medical expenses (see Table K.7), the intangible effects can be severe and have long term
effects on a person. The percentage of respondents mentioning stress as a flood related
problem is significant. For the most recent flood, 12.6 per cent of all respondents reported
that stress was a problem. During the most severe flood, the figure is even higher at 35.1 per
cent of all respondents. In fact, of all the effects to humans reported by respondents, stress
is mentioned by the highest number of respondents.
Question 56 in the household survey examines the respondents' rating of various flood effects
on their households on a scale of 0 (no effect) to 10 (very serious effect). For the stress
variable, respondents gave a relative severity rating of 5.0 (Figure K.3). This is a very high
rating compared to the relative severities of other impacts. Only disruption to transport or
communications is ranked higher than stress. Furthermore, stress and worry about the risk
and consequences of future flooding may also damage a person's health, although this
relationship my be difficult to prove.
(f)	 Reported health damage
In Peninsular Malaysia, damages to health (other than stress and worry) do not appear to
feature highly on respondents' evaluation of flood impacts. The mean score of 2.4 suggests
that floodplain occupants have grown 'used to' floods and are well adapted to them. In fact,
232 respondents (37.5 per cent) rated flood effects on health as 0, i.e. no effect at all. Only
a small proportion of respondents, 12.2 per cent rated health effects with a score of 6 and
above. However, based on the chi-square test, it was found that there were significant
differences in rating between respondents from the East and West Coasts. There was a higher
proportion of respondents from the East Coast (76.5 per cent) rating health effects with a
severity of less than 4 than there were in the West Coast (61.9 per cent). On the other hand,
the corresponding figures for a severity ranking of 7 or more were 5.4 per cent and 13.7 per
cent respectively. This could be due to the fact that East Coast inhabitants have more flood
experiences and may perhaps be more adapted to disruption and other conditions arising from
flooding. A high proportion of East Coast respondents (78.0 per cent) perceive flooding to
be a normal part of their livelihood and because of that it is unlikely that they will consider
flooding to be harmful to their health. On the other hand, West Coast inhabitants are
generally less able to cope with disruption caused by floods as such events are not so
common. They are, therefore, more susceptible to suffer health effects resulting from floods.
There are also significant differences when rating health damage between the various ethnic
groups. Indians (31.9 per cent) seem to have the lowest proportion rating health effects as
0. This was followed by the Malays (36.2 per cent) and the Chinese (42.8 per cent). On the
other hand, the Malays (6.7 per cent) appear to have the lowest proportion rating health
effects 7 or more. This could be due to the fact that Malays form a greater proportion of East
Coast respondents (66.6 per cent) and thus are more experienced when it comes to floods.
On the other hand, health is very important to the Chinese. The Chinese would spend more
of their income on 'good' food than would the other ethnic groups. Because of this, the
Chinese are envisaged to assess health effects rather more seriously than the Malays or
Indians.
When households with a flood frequency of 1 in 5 or less are considered, 86.2 per cent of
Malays rated health effects as minor (a rating between 0 and 3) as compared to 69.2 per cent
and 62.1 per cent of Chinese and Indians. Conversely, only 3.4 per cent of Malay
respondents rated health effects as severe (a rating between 7 and 10) as compared to 7.7 per
cent and 10.3 per cent of Chinese and Indian respondents respectively. This is due to the fact
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that Malay households have lived with floods for a much longer time and are therefore more
experienced. They are therefore more adapted to floods and tend to have a more philosophical
attitude towards floods. Combined with their 'resigned' attitude towards life in general (see
Chapter 6), it is not surprising to find that Malays generally rate flood effects lower than the
other ethnic groups. The chi-square test value of .04 provided evidence of the existence of
significant differences amongst the ethnic groups in their rating of the health effects of floods.
When households with flood frequencies of 1 in 2 or more are considered, a lower percentage
of Malays (6.1 per cent) rated health effects as severe as compared to 11.0 per cent and 29.4
per cent of Chinese and Indian respondents respectively. This again indicates the low
importance paid to health effects by Malays. However, the high percentage of Indians with
a high rating of health effects is difficult to explain. It could be due to the tendency for
Indians to exaggerate the importance of the health effects but this is at best an intelligent
guess. Much more research into the sociological aspects of Indian culture and its influence
on Indian thinking and way of life needs to be done to ascertain the actual reasons.
Nevertheless, the chi-square test yielded a test value of .00 which indicates the presence of
significant differences in rating health effects amongst the ethnic groups living in highly
flood-prone areas.
Education, age and income level do not appear to have any associations with the rating of the
relative severity of health. The chi-square test revealed that there are no significant
differences amongst highly flood-prone households (with frequencies of at least 1 in 2) and
those which are less flood-prone (with frequencies of 1 in 10 or less).
(g)	 Reported loss of memorabilia or of other irreplaceable and non-monetary goods
Although the total tangible loss of memorabilia reported by respondents is not high, there are
many instances where the value of certain memorabilia can not be quantified. For example,
a rare family photograph taken a century ago which included many members who have since
passed away may be invaluable to the family concerned. It is extremely stressful for a family
to lose such memorabilia in a flood even though the actual photograph may cost next to
nothing in the market. Enduring gifts such as jewellery from loved ones may also be lost in
a flood. For example, Makcik Mabee (see Appendix H) has revealed to the author the time
she lost a pair of gold earrings given to her by her late mother. She was so stressed by it that
she wept for many days and continued to search for them after the flood. It was part of her
family heritage which she would pass on to one of her daughters but the earrings are lost
forever and can never be replaced. More significantly, they were also quite valuable with an
estimated value at about $400 (1993 prices). She confided that she had pawned them several
times (and recovered them later) after severe floods to help the family recover.
There are also countless incidents where flood victims have lost memorabilia which include
treasured cooking utensils, clothes, jewellery, paintings, antique furniture and others. In one
example, a Malay woman claimed that she could not replace one of her cooking pots which
had been passed down by her great grandmother. Apparently, this cooking pot made from
brass and silver is specially made for preparing a type of special Malay cake. It keeps the
heat even and almost always yielded good results for this woman. The author enquired why
she was so stressed when she could just go out and replace one, even with a microwave oven!
But, according to the woman, this type of cake can only be made with 'that' kind of cooking
pot. There are similar ones in the market but they do not make it like they used to, apparently
due to inferior cheap alloys used nowadays. It is hard to argue with the expert on Malay cake
in this matter.
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From such experiences, it can be concluded that despite the apparent low cost of damage to
memorabilia, some memorabilia are unquantifiable and irreplaceable. Damage to these
memorabilia or losing them can cause considerable stress to those who are attached to them.
There are also those who lose or damage antique furniture, paintings and other family
treasures as a result of floods. Such items are difficult to price.
(h)	 Evacuation
The majority of floodplain occupants in Peninsular Malaysia would have experienced
evacuation during their lifetime. Evacuation can be divided into temporary and permanent.
The former is very common in the peninsula, especially in the East Coast where evacuation
is a routine response to the seasonal monsoon floods. In the current study, respondents did
not rate the relative severity of evacuation highly. A mean score of 2.5 was given by all
respondents who gave evacuation a rating. This is due to the fact that many respondents
consider evacuation as a necessary safety routine during the flood season. As such, it is not
considered a severe effect of floods. In the East Coast, 73.8 per cent of respondents rated
evacuation as a minor effect of flooding as compared to 63.2 per cent of West Coast
respondents. The chi-square test value of .00 indicates the existence of significant differences
in rating the severity of evacuation between respondents from the two coasts. In terms of
sample areas, Kelantan had the highest percentage of respondents (77.6 per cent) giving
evacuation a minor rating and Kuala Lumpur had the lowest percentage (48.2 per cent). This
indicates that the majority of respondents from the former area do not consider evacuation
a severe flood effect. On the other hand, the majority of respondents in the latter area regard
evacuation as a severe effect. This is because respondents from Kelantan are used to being
evacuated whereas their counterparts from Kuala Lumpur are not.
Respondents from rural areas also rate the effect of evacuation low when compared to urban
respondents. For example, 73.7 per cent of rural respondents rated evacuation as a minor
effect as compared to 65.0 per cent of urban respondents. The chi-square test value of .00
confirms that there are significant differences in the ratings of urban and rural respondents.
Squatters also tend to rate evacuation low as they are also used to being evacuated. However,
there is no significant difference in rating the effect of evacuation amongst respondents from
different habitation types although farming households tend to rate evacuation lower than the
others.
K.4 Commercial flood damage
In Peninsular Malaysia, little is known about the extent of flood damage to private
commercial properties. There is a dearth of information and hitherto, to the best knowledge
of the author, actual flood damage from commercial properties has not been surveyed
although flood damage estimates have been made from time to time by the Drainage and
Irrigation Department, various other government departments and the newspapers. Even so,
such damages are concentrated on structural damage to infrastructure, public properties, and
crops. In a study of 80 commercial properties in Kuala Lumpur, Smith (1985) has estimated
the average potential flood damage to stock and equipment at $114,290 (1985 prices). This
is the expected amount at a flood depth of 2 metres but is expected to decrease with lower
depths of flooding.
Although the extent of actual flood damage on private commercial properties is largely
unknown, it is hypothesized to be substantial. This is because floods can damage the physical
structure of commercial properties and their contents (goods, machinery, raw materials etc.),
affect property value, reduce the volume of business, cause disruption to transportation, cut
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off electrical supplies (thereby stopping production), stop workers from commuting to
factories, and give rise to indirect losses. Also, flood damage includes transporting cost of
goods and raw materials to alternative location, loss of trade due to temporary closure of
business outlets, loss of business orders, increase in costs of transportation caused by
disruption to usual traffic, the devaluation of the property value in the market, etc.
Unfortunately, such losses are difficult to estimate unless a former detailed survey is carried
out for such properties. In the current research, these losses are not surveyed due to inherent
difficulty in estimation but is expected to be important, especially for businesses relying on
day to day transactions. A flood of 2 weeks duration may theoretically reduce the monthly
business volume by half, if not more (since customers may seek alternative outlets rather than
stick to a flood-prone business).
K.5 Industrial flood damage
In terms of industrial damages, only a few companies were identified as having recent flood
experience and only four gave information on flood damages during the 1991 flood in Pulau
Pinang. Table K.11 indicates that industrial properties can be severely affected by floods as
some of them suffered production losses ranging from 10 per cent to 95 per cent during the
1991 flood, ranging from $10,000 to $500,000 (1991 prices). A garment factory reported that
its production shifts were only running at 70.0 per cent capacity and this amounted to a loss
of $300,000. Furthermore, another it suffered another $200,000 due to damage to goods.
During a 1983 flood, an electronic factory suffered losses estimated at $300,000 (1983 prices)
(The Star 26.10.83). Raw materials and finished products such as electronic clocks, radios
and cassette players were damaged by the flood waters. Work at the factory was disrupted
as workers could not reach it due to the flood waters and the resultant traffic jams. Hundreds
of workers from other factories were also stranded and work at these factories was also
disrupted, resulting in loss of production (New Straits Times 25.10.83). Flood loss suffered
by factories is, therefore, a common risk endured by factories and industries in the Pulau
Pinang industrial zones. With rapid future expansion of the Free Trade Zone and industrial
Park in Pulau Pinang, many are targeted on floodplains, and flood hazards expected to
exacerbate, flood loss to factories and other industrial concerns is expected to rise in the
future.
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Table K.11:
	 Reported losses from some industrial properties during the 1991 flood in
Pulau Pinang (1991 prices)
Name of company % Reduction in full capacity Damage to contents Total Loss
(Estimated loss in $) (Estimated loss in $) (in $)
Eastern Garment 70 (200,000) (500,000)
MFG. Co. Sdn. Bhd. (300,000)
Robert Bosch(M) 95 (Nil) (10,000)
Sdn. Bhd. (10,000)
Hewlett Packard(M) 10 (NA) (NA)
Sdn. Bhd. (NA)
Sanyo Electric(Penang) 50 (Nil) (NA)
Sdn. Bhd. (NA)
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APPENDIX L ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN DEPENDENT AND
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES SIGNIFICANT AT, OR ABOVE,
THE 95 PER CENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL
[NS = Not significant	 0.n = Significance level	 - = Insufficient observations]
(a)
QUESTION DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE VARIABLE
COAST SITE
QUESTION DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE VARIABLE
COAST SITE
C0101 C0103 C0101 C0103
02(a) NEW 0.03 0.00 024(B)(1)b C0428 0.00 0.00
04(a) C0145 0.00 0.00 024(B)(i)d C0432 0.00 0.00
04(a) DISAD2 0.00 0.00 024(B)(1)e C0434 0.01 0.00
04(b) C0147 0.00 0.00 024(B)(1)( C0438 0.00 0.00
04(c) C0149 0.01 0.02 024(B)(i)g C0438 0.00 0.00
05 C0151 0.00 0.01 024(B)(1)h C0440 0.01 0.01
06 C0152 NS NS 024(B)j C0444 0.02 0.00
07 C0154 NS NS 024(B)(i)k C0448 0.00 0.00
010 C0161 0.02 0.00 024(13)01 C0448 0.00 0.01
010 C0163 0.00 0.00 024(B)(1)m C0450 0.01 0.05
010 C0165 0.01 0.00 024(B)(i)n C0452 0.00 0.00
010 C0167 0.01 000 024(B)(i)o C0454 0.00 0.00
010 C0169 0.01 000 024(13)(i)p C0456 0.00 0.00
011 C0171 0.01 001 024(B)(1)g C0458 NS 0.00
013 C0176 0.00 0.00 024(B)(1)r C0460 0.00 0.00
015 CO203 0.00 0.00 024(B)(1). C0462 0.00 0.00
015 CO205 0.00 0.00 024(B)(I)t C0464 0.00 0.00
015 CO207 NS NS 024(B)(0 C0466 0.00 0.00
015 CO209 0.02 0.00 024(B)(1)v C0468 0.00 0.00
015 CO211 0.04 000 024(6)(1)w C0470 0.00 0.00
016 CO213 NS 0.00 024(B)(I)x C0472 0.00 0.00
017(a) CO216 0.00 000 024(3)0015 CO503 0.00 0.00
017(b) CO218 0.00 0.00 024(B)(ii)c CO505 0.00 -
018(a) CO220 0.03 NS 024(B)(11)d CO507 0.00 NS
018(b) CO222 000 0.00 024(B)(11)* CO509 0.00 0.00
019(a) CO228 0.00 000 024(13)(ii)f CO511 0.00 0.00
019(b) CO230 0.00 000 024(13)(11)g CO513 0.00 0.00
020(a) CO232 0.00 0.00 024(B)(Ii)h CO515 0.00 0.00
020(b) CO233 NS NS 024(8)(11)1 CO517 0.00 0.02
020(c) CO234 NS 001 024(B)(ii)j CO519 0.00 0.00
020(d) CO235 0.00 0.00 024(B)(ii)k CO521 0.00 0.00
020(s) CO236 0.00 000 024(B)(11)1 CO523 0.00 0.01
020(f) CO237 NS 0.00 024(B)(ii)m CO525 0.00 0.00
020(g) CO238 NS 000 024(8)(1i)n CO527 0.00 0.00
020(h) CO239 0.00 000 024(B)(1i)o CO529 0.00 0.00
0200 CO240 0.00 000 024(B)(ii)p CO531 0.00 0.00
0200 CO241 0.00 000 024(13)(ipg CO533 0.00 0.00
020(k) CO242 001 000 024(8)(11)r CO535 0.00 0.00
0200 CO243 NS 000 024(B)(11), CO537 0.00 0.00
020(m) CO244 0.00 0.00 024(B)(101 CO539 0.00 0.00
020(n) CO245 0.04 0.00 024(B)(ii)u CO541 0.00 0.00
020(o) CO246 NS 000 024(13)(11)v CO543 0.00 0.00
021(a) CO301 0.00 0.00 024(8)(11)w CO545 0.00 NS
021(b) CO303
CO305
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
024(B)(ii)x -
022(a)I
CO547 0.00
022(a)I1 CO308 000 0.00
022(c)I CO309 0.01 NS
022(c)II CO310 NS NS
022(d)I CO311 0.00 0.00
022(d)II CO312 0.02 0.00
022(6)1 CO313 0.00 0.00
022(s)11 CO314 0.02 NS
02201 CO315 0.01 0.02
022(011 CO318 NS NS
022(9)1 CO317 0.00 0.00
022(9)11 CO318 0.05 NS
022(h)1 CO319 NS NS
022(h)11 CO320 0.05 NS
022011 CO324 NS NS
022(k)li . CO326 NS NS
022011 CO328 0.05 NS
022(0)11 CO334 NS NS
022(g)I CO337 NS NS
022(g)II CO338 NS NS
022(01 CO339 NS NS
022(r)11 CO340 NS NS
022(a)11 CO342 0.00 0.00
022(011 CO344 0.01 0.03
022(v) CO347 0.00 0.00
022(w) CO349 NS NS
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(al)
QUESTION DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE VARIABLE
COAST SITE URBAN/RURAL
C0101 C0103 C0t04
023 CO351 NS 0.00 NS
024(a) C0402 0.00 0.00 0.01
024(a) C0404 0.00 0.00 0.00
024(a) C0405 NS 0.00 NS
024(a) C0406 0.00 0.00 NS
024(a) C0407 0.00 0.00 0.00
024(a) C0408 NS 0.00 NS
024(a) C0409 0.00 0.00 NS
024(a) C0410 NS 0.00 0.02
Q24(a) C041 I -
024(a) C0412 0.05 0.0 NS
024(a) C0413
024(a) C0414 N5 N5 N5
024(a) C0415 NS 0.00 NS
024(a) C0416 0.00 0.00 0.00
024(a) C0417 NS 0.03 NS
024(a) C0418 0.00 0.00 0.01
024(a) C0419 NS NS NS
024(a) C0420 NS 0.00 0.00
024(a) C0421
024(a) C0422 0.043 0.06 o.oci
024(a) C0423 NS NS 0.02
024(a) C0424 NS NS 0.01
024(b) CO551 0.00 0.00 0.00
025(a) CO553 0.00 0.00 0.00
025(b) CO558 NS NS NS
025(b) CO559 NS NS jsIS
025(b) CO560 NS NS 0.03
025(b) CO561 0.01 0.02 0.02
025(b) CO562 0.04 0.03 NS
025(b) CO563 NS NS NS
025(b) CO564 NS NS NS
025(b) CO566 NS NS NS
025(b) CO568 NS NS NS
025(b) CO570 0.00 0.00 0.02
025(b) CO571 NS NS 0.02
025(b) CO574 0.03 NS NS
025(b) CO576 0.00 0.00 0.01
025(b) CO577 NS NS NS
025(c) CO579 NS NS NS
(b)
QUESTION DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
F1000
	
FLOOD	 FLOOD	 FLOOD
FREQ.	 RECENCY	 TYPE SEVEARY
C0150	 RECFLD	 60105	 C1275
OurirrioN DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
FLOOD
	
FLOOD	 rwoo	 FLOOD
P880.	 RECENCY	 TYPE SEVERITY
C0150	 RECFLD	 C0106	 C1275
02(a)
04(a)
0400
04(b)
NEW
60145
0I6022
C0147
000
000
NS
000
NS
000
NE
000
NS	 NS
000
	
NS
000
	
NS
000
	
NE
024(3)0)1)
024(8)04
024(3)00
024(8)(0(
60426
C0432
C0434
C04136
0.01
NS
NS
NS
0.00
NE
0.04
NS
0.00
NS
NS
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.03
NS
04(0 C0140 000 NE 000	 NS 024(3)0)10 C0438 0.00 0.00 0.00 NE
06 C0151 00) 001 NS	 NE 024(5)0)11 60440 NS NS NS -
06 CO 152 000 000 000	 - 024(3)) 60444 NS NS NS NS
07 C0154 NS NS NS	 NE 024(13)00 60446 NS NS NS NS
010 C0161 000 000 000	 NB 024 (13)(1)1 60440 NS NS NS NS
010 CO 163 000 000 000	 NS 024(13)(1)0 C0450 0.01 NE NS NS
010 C0166 000 000 NE	 NE 024(8)()n C0452 0.00 NS 0.01 NS
010 C0107 000 000 NE	 NE 024(13)(l0 60454 0.00 NS 0.03 NS
010 C0100 000 000 NS 024(3)(l)p 60456 NS NS NE NS
011 C0171 000 000 000	 NS 024(3)(l)q C0438 0.01 NS NS NS
013 C0176 000 000 001	 NS 024 ( 3)0), Calm 0.00 NE 0.00 NS
015 CO203 000 001 000	 NS 024(5)00 60462 0.00 NS NS NS
015 CO205 000 000 000	 NE 024(8)(01 60464 0.00 NS NS NS
Oil CO207 000 000 000	 NS 024 (8)0)0 C0466 0.00 0.03 NS 0.02
015 CO200 000 000 000	 NS 024(B)(l0 60468 NE NS 00) NS
018 CO211 000 003 000 024(31)(l)0 C0470 NS 0.03 0.00 NE
0 16 60213 000 000 000	 NE 024(8)0)0 60472 0.03 NS NS NS
017(a) CO216 000 006 000	 NS 024(3)010 CO503 NS NS 0.00 0.01
017(b) CO2 IS 000 000 000	 NS 024(8)00 60506 NS NS 0.01 NS
Ole(s) CO220 NS NS 000	 NS 024(3)010 60507 NS NS NS -
018(b) CO222 000 002 NS	 NS 4224(8)0)o. cows Ns 0.01 NS NS
O10(s) 60226 000 NS NS	 NS 024(31)01)1 60611 001 0.00 0.00 NS
010(b) 60230 000 000 NE	 NS 024(8)01)9 CO513 NS 0.03 0.01 NE
020(4 CO232 002 NS 000	 001 024(8)00 CO515 NS 0.03 NS NS
020(b) C0*33 NE NS NE	 NS ozNago C0617 NE NS NS NS
020(0) 60234 NS NS 003	 NS 024(3)(0) 60510 000 000 0.00 -
C(20(1 cam 003 NE NS	 NS 024(3)010 CO521 NS NS NS -
02001 CO236 000 004 003	 001 02401)001 CO523 NS NS NS -
0200) CO237 000 NS NS	 NS 024(5)00ra 60525 NS NS 000 NS
020(0 CO231 000 000 000	 NE 024(8)(110 60527 00) 0.00 0.00 NS
02004 CO230 000 000 000	 002 02403)(00 60520 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
0200) CO240 000 000 NE	 000 024(3)01)0 60531 0.01 0.00 001 -
0200 CO241 000 000 000	 NS 0s(8)0) a CM" 005 0.00 002 001
02000 CO242 000 NS NS	 NS 024(8)00i 60536 000 NS 000 NS
02001 CO243 000 NS 000	 NS 024(8). 60537 0.00 0.04 0.01 NS
020(0) 60244 000 000 000	 004 024(8)01)1 60530 NS 000 NS -
020(.) 6*248 000 000 002	 NS 024(8)010 00541 001 NS 000 -
wood 60246 NS 002 001	 003 021(8)0))o 60543 NS 0.00 000
02 1 (s) CO301 0 00 NS 000	 000 024(3)(10w C0645 NS NS 000
021(b) CO303 002 NS 004	 002 024(5)010 60547 NS NS NS
022(.)1 60306 NS NS 000	 -
02200 CO306 NE NS 003	 -
022(c)) 6e306 NS NS NE	 NS
On c)11 60310 001 NS NS	 003
Q22(41 60311 006 000 000	 NS
02200 CO312 003 NS 000	 NS
021t00 60013 NS NS 000	 NS
0201 CO314 003 NS 004	 NS
022()) CO315 NS NS 001	 NS
022(111 CO3 PI 002 NE 000	 NS
022(0)1 CO317 NS NS 002	 -
022l CO311 NS NE NS	 -
02201 CO310 NS NS 001	 001
=MI CO320 02 006 NS	 NS
1222($ CO324 NS 004 NS	 003
02200 603213 NS NS 002	 NS
022(11 CO3241 NS NE NS	 NS
022(o)11 CO534 NS NE NS	 NS
OZ2001 60337 000 NS NS	 NE
0220011 603311 000 NS NS	 001
0220)1 60130 NS 002 000	 NS
0220)11 60340 NE NS NS	 MI
022(.)5 60342 NE 001 000	 NS
022(011 60344 NE NS NS	 NS
022M CO347 NE NS 000	 NS
022(M 60340 NE NS NS	 NS
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OM
DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE VARIABLE
	
FLOOD	 FLOOD	 FLOOD FLOOD
	
FREQ.	 RECENCY	 TYPE SEVERITY
	
C0159	 RECFLD	 C0105	 C1275
	
CO351	 0.00	 0.01	 0.03	 NS
	
C0402	 NS	 0.02	 0.00	 NS
	
C0404	 0.00	 NS	 0.00	 NS
	
C0405	 NS	 NS	 0.00	 NS
	
C0408	 NS	 NS	 NS	 0.02
	
C0407
	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
C0408	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
C0409	 0.00	 NS	 0.00	 NS
	
C0410	 NS	 0.02	 0.01	 NS
C0411
	
C0412	 Ng	 0.6	 0.6	 Ng
C0413
	
C0414	 Ng	 Ng	 Ng	 Ng
	
C0415	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
C0418	 0.00	 NS	 0.00	 NS
	
C0417	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
C0418	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 7JS
	
C0419	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
C0420	 NS	 NS	 0.00	 0.02
C0421
	
C0422	 Ng	 Ng	 0.05	 Ng
	
C0423	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
C0424	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
CO551	 NS	 Ng	 0.00	 NS
	
CO553	 NS	 NS	 0.01	 NS
	
CO558	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
00559	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
CO560	 0.02	 NS	 0.01	 NS
	
CO561	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
00562	 NS	 Ng	 NS	 NS
	
CO563	 0.01	 NS	 0.03	 NS
	
CO564	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
CO566	 NS	 NS
	
CO568
	 NS	 NS	 Ng	 Ng
	
CO570	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
CO571	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
CO574	 0.00	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
CO576	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
CO577	 0.04	 NS	 NS	 NS
	
CO579	 NS	 NS	 NS	 NS
(c) OUES11ON DEPENDENTVARIABLE BUILDING
TYPE
INDEPENDENT
WALL	 BUILDING
TYPE	 AGE
VARIABLE
FLOOR WITH/OUT
TYPE	 STILTS	 HEIGHT
STILT STILT
TYPE
00121 00122 00123 C0124 C0125 C0126 00127
02(4 NEW NS 000 NS 000 0.00
000 0.00
0.05
0400 C0148 000 0.00 000 000 0.00
0.04
NS
oga) DISAD2 008 NS 000 000 0.00 NS 0.04
0404 00147 000 000 000 000 0.00
0.00
NS
0414 C0140 0.00 000
000 000 0.00 000
NS
05 00 151 NS 001 005 NS NS
001
0.02
06 00 182 000 000 000 000
0.00 000
07 CO 154 000 003 001 NS
NB 001 -
010 00 101 001 000 000 001
000 000 0.01
010 00 108 001 o oo 0 00 NS 000 000
NS
010 C0165 0 01 000 000 001 000
000 0.00
010 00 101 001 000 001 NS 002
000 0.01
010 00 100 000 000 NS NS
006 001 Ns
011 00171 000 000 005 000 0.00 000
NS
013 00 170 0 01 000 000 001 0.00
003 0.00
015 00203 NS 000 000 001 0.01
000 0.01
0 15 CO205 000 000 000 NS 004
000 0.01
015 00207 NS 000 000 000 000
000 0.01
015 00200 000 NS NS NS NS
000 -
CI 15 CO211 000 NS NS NS NS NS
-
010 00213 000 000 001 000 000
000 0.06
017(a) CO2111 000 NS NS 000 000 NS NS
017(b) 00216 006 000 002 000 NS NS NS
011(a) CO220 NS NS 002 NB NS 000
.
0.03
010(b) 00222 000 000 NS 003 000 NB NS
010(a) 00226 NS NS NB NS 000 NS 0.00
010(b) 00230 000 NS NS 002 N11 NS 0.03
02244 00232 000 000 000 000
000 NS N13
02005 CO233 NS NS NB
000 003 NB 0.00
020(a) 00234 000 000 004 001 NS NB NS
020(4 00236 001 000 000 000 000 NS 004
020(4 CO236 000 000 000 000 000 NS NS
0204 00237 000 000 000 003 005 NS
NB
020(4 002311 004 000 000 000 000 000 002
02005 CO230 000 000 NS 000
000 NS 001
0200 00240 000 000 002 000
000 NS 000
0200 00241 000 000 000 000 000
000 NS
wool 00242 006 000 NS 0 00 NS 001 NS
020(5 CO243 001 000 001 000 NS NS NS
020(na 00244 000 000 NS 000 000 000 000
02000 CO245 000 000 000 000 NS NS
NS
020(0) CO241 000 000 000 000 000 NS
000
02 1(4 CO301 000 000 NS 000 000 NS NS
0221(b) CO303 NS NS 002 000 000 NS NS
022.)l 00305 001 000 NS 000 000 NS 001
022(011 00306 NS 000 NS 006 001 NS NS
022(c)1 C0100 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
022c)1 CO3 10 NS NS NS NS NS 001 NS
032 41 CO311 NS 000 NS NS NS
NS NS
022 011 00012 000 NI NS NS NS
NS NS
022.11 CO3 13 NB NS NS NS NB
003 NS
022 AP 00314 NB NS NS NS 001 NS
NS
022(15 CO315 NS NS 001 NS NS 003 NS
02254 CO3 10 NS NS 004 NISA NS NS
NS
022)41 CO317 NS NS NS NS NS NS
02246 003 11 NS NS NS NS NS
- _
anChN 003 10 000 000 NS 000 004 NS NS
022(14 CO320 000 000 NS 000 000 NS NS
022(55 CO324 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
0220)1 00320 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
022011 CO3211 NS NS NS 000 000 - -
022(0)1 CO334 002 NS NS NS NS NS NS
022 41 cosss NS 000 NS NS NS -
_
02341 CO330 000 000 000 002 000 -
-
0225)1 CO330 002 001 NS 000 000 -
0220)5 CO340 002 000 NS 002 000 NS NS
022(4)1 00342 NS NS NS 003 NS 003 NS
0220(1 00344 001 NS NB 003 NS NS NS
022b1 CO347 NS 002 NS 006 NS NS NS
Onto 00340 NS 000 NS 000 001 NS NS
02403 Mb C0420 000 000 005 000 000 NS NS
O24(544 C0432 000 000 NS 003 000 NS NS
024 (8 8)0 00434 002 NIII NS 001 001 NS NS
024(80(1 00434 000 000 NS 000 000 NS NS
024(8 150 C0431 000 000 001 000 000 003 NB
024(8)0)11 00440 - - - NS 002 - NS
021(8)) 00444 Ns NS NS NS NS NS NS
024)81511 00446 NB NS NS NS 003 NS NS
024(8 0(1 C0442 NS NS NS 002 001 0 03 NS
024(8 0)ro C0450 NS NS NS NS 000 0 00 NS
024(8)0)n C0452 NS NS NS 000 000 000 NS
024 (8)00 00454 NS NS 004 0 00 000 008 001
024 (13 0)11 C0456 000 000 NS 000 000 NS 001
0244)6). C0450 001 NS NS NE 001 NS NS
021 (815nRs C0400 000 000 NS 000 000 005 NS
024(8)6). 00462 000 000 000 000 000 000 NS
024 (8 )1111 C0464 000 000 NS 000 000 000 004
024 (13)(41.1 C0403 000 000 NS 000 000 NS NS
024 (11)5W 004541 000 000 NS 000 000 NS NS
0244)15w 00470 000 NS 002 000 000 NS NS
024(6)0(5 C0472 000 NS 004 000 000 004 NS
02455)05b 00503 000 NS
024 (11)1100 CO505 003 NS
Q24 (13)(04 CO507 000 NS
024(15)85. CO500 000 NS
oze nnewn CO511 000 NS
021 (8049 COS IS 000 NS
024(5)8511 00515 000 NS
024 (8)00( 00517 004 NS
024 (13)0 CO510 000 NS
024(15)055 CO52 1 000 NS
021(8)15)1 00523 000 002
024 (11)04n. 00525 000 0.04
024(3)(10n CO527 000 NS
024041000 C0620 000 NS
024(8)01)p CO53 f 000 NS
CrEBISSo CO533 000 NS
024 (B )Plk 00535 000 NS
02401100s CO337 000 NS
024(13)31)1 00530 000 NS
1224(B)(11)2 00541 000 NS
024(13)3)v 005.43 000 NS
021(11)(2)w CO545 000 NS
024(3)550 CO547 L:218 NS 003
(cl)
QUESTION DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT ALL* RESPONDENTS UVING IN RESPONDENTS LIVING IN
VARIABLE	 VARIABLE RESPONDENTS AREAS FLOODED ONCE A AREAS FLOODED ONCE
YEAR OR MORE IN 3 YEARS OR LESS
BUILDING WITH OR WITHOUT WITH OR WITHOUT WITH OR WITHOUT
AGE STILTS STILTS STILTS
C0123 C0125 C0125 C0125
023 CO351 NS NS NS NS
024(a) C0402 NS 0.02 0.02 NS
024(a) C0404 0.05 0.00 0.00 NS
024(a) C0405 0.00 0.03 0.01 NS
024(a) C0406 NS 0.00 0.00 NS
024(a) C0407 NS 0.00 0.00 NS
024(a) C0408 NS 0.04 NS 0.04
024(a) C0409 NS 0.00 0.00 NS
024(a) C0410 0.01 NS NS NS
024(a) C0411
024(a) C0412 Ng 0.05 0.5 Ng
024(a) C0413
024(a) C0414 Ng N	 gNg
024 (a) C0415 NS NS NS NS
024(a) C0416 NS 0.00 0.00 NS
024(a) C0417 NS NS NS NS
024(a) C0418 NS 0.01 0.00 NS
024(a) C0410 NS NS NS NS
024(a) C0420 NS NS NS NS
024(a) C0421
024(a) C0422 0 05 0.5 0.05 Ng
024(a) C0423 NS NS NS NS
024(a) C0424 NS NS NS NS
024(b) CO551 NS 001 0.02 NS
025(a) CO553 NS 0.00. 0.02 NS
025(b) CO558 NS NS NS NS
025(b) CO550 NS NS NS NS
025(b) CO580 0.03 0.02 0.05
_
025(b) CO561 NS 0.05 NS
025(b) CO562 NS NS NS 0.0i
025(b) CO563 NS NS NS 0.03
025(b) CO564 NS NS NS NS
025(b) CO566 NS NS
025(b) CO568 NS NS Ng Ng
025(b) CO570 NS NS NS NS
025(b) CO571 NS 002 NS NS
025(b) CO574 NS 001 0.03 NS
025(b) CO576 NS NS NS NS
025(b) CO577 NS NS NS NS
025(c) CO570 NS NS NS NS
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QUESTION DEPENDENT
VARt484.2(d) LENGT/4 OF RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION
RESIDENCE	 AGE
INDEPENDENT
FAMILY	 ETHNIC
SIZE	 GROUP
VARIABLE
REUG1ON OCCUPATION INCOME GENDER TENURE	 GROUP
MEMBERSHIP
0015600130
00 131 01353 C1358 C1361 C1354 C1355 C1356 Ct350 01352 NO NS
02(6 NEW 002 NS NS NS 000 000 NS NS
N8
NS NS NS
04(e) 00145 NS 002 NS 001 000 000 NS 000 NS NS NS
04(e) DISAD2 NS NS NS NS 002 0 0/ NS 0.03 NS 0.04 NS
0405 00147 NS 002 NS 009 000 000 P48
0.00
NS NS NS
0455
OS
00140
00 181
006
NS
002
NS
006
NS
NS
N13
000
NS
000
NS
0.05
000
0.00
NS NS NS
NS
NB
NB
05 00 152 148 006 001 MI 000 000
NO 0.00 NS
NS 0.00 NS
07 00154 NS NS NS NS 000 000 NS
NS
0.01 0.02
010 00181 NS NS NS 000 000 000 NS
000 NS
NS 0.02 NS
010 00163 NS NS NS 000 000 000
NB 0.02
0.01 0.03
010 C0105 NS 000 NS 003 000 000 NS
NS 0.04
NS NS 0.00
010 00187 NS NO NS 005 000 000
NB NS
NS 0.01 -
010 00 169 NS NS NS NS 000 000
NS NS
NS NS NS
011 00 171 P413 NS NS 000 000 000
000 000
0.01 NS
013 00178 000 000 000 NS 000 000
000 0.00 0.00
NS NB NS
018 00203 P43 NS 001 002 000 000 NS
0.00
NS NS
010 00205 002 0 02 000 000 000 000 NS NS 0.00 NS NS
010 00207 NS NS 002 006 000 000 NS
N8 0.01
NS NO
Oil 00200 NO 0 04 NS NS 000 000 NS
NS NS
NS -
010 00211 NS NS NS NS 000 000 NS
NS NS
NS NS
0 IS 00213 NS 005 002 000 000 000
000 0.01 NS
NS NS
017(a) 00210 HS 005 002 NS NS NO 001 002 0.00 NS
017p) 00218 NO NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
NS NS
NS
018(4) 00320 NS NS NS NS NS NO NS NS NS
NS
0.04
0 18(1) C0222 002 000 002 001 0 00 000 000 000 NS 0.00 NS
010(s) 00228 NS 006 000 NS NS NS 000 • 006 NS NS
010)5) CO210 NS NS 004 NS NS 005 000 0.00 NS NS 0.03NS
020(N 00232 004 000 001 000 000 000 000 000 NS 0.01
020(b) 00233 NS NS NO NI NS NS NS NS NS
Ns NS
020(4 0.0234 NS NI NS NS 002 001 NO NS 0.02 NS
Ns
NS
02005 00215 NS NS 000 NS NO NS
000 000 NS NS
020(6 00296 MI NS 000 NS 000 000 001 0 00 NS
NS NS
0.03
020(0 00237 NO NS MS NS 000 000 NS NS NS NS NS
020(0) 00226 NS NS NS NS 000 000 NS 000 NS 0.04
02006 00220 004 NS NS 002 002 000
NS 000 Ns NS NS
0200) 00240 NS NS NS NS NS NS 000 002 NS NS NS0.02
0200 00241 000 NS NO NS NS NO 000
000 NS NS
02004 00242 NS NO NS NS 000 000 NS 006
NS NS Ks
Ozorn 00243 NS 010 NS NS NS 000 NS NS NS
NS NS
02006 00244 002 NS NS NS 000 000 NS 000 NS
NS NS
02006 00245 000 NS NS NS 000 000 NS 000 0.05
NS N13
020(0) 07261 001 NS NS NS 000 000 001 000 NS NS NSNS
021(s) 0.0301 001 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 NS Ns
02104 CO303 000 003 000 NS 002 MS 000 000
NS NS N8
02661 00346 NS NS MS NS 001 0 00 - 000 NS
NS NS
022(61 0.0305 NO NO NS NS 00$ 000 - 000 NS NS NS
02206 00300 NS NO 00$ NS NS NS NS 004 NS NS Ns
022 41 00310 Pal NS NS Ns NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
0224(1 00311 NS NO 000 NS NS 006 NS NS HS NS NO
022004 00312 NS NS NO NS NS NS NO NS NS NS NS
On .(1 00313 NO NB NS 001 NO Ns NS NS NS 000 NS
022.10 002 14 005 NO NS 001 003 NS NS NS NS NS NS
022(1(1 00316 NO NO NS NS NI NS NS NS NS NS NS
022(011 OM II NO NS NS NS NS N5 NS NS NS NS NS
022g(1 00317 NO NO NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
022(l 073111 NS NS 000 NS NB NS _ NS NS NS NS
02206 00310 NS NS 000 NS NS 001 NS 000 004 NS NS
02206 CO320 NS NS 00$ NS 003 003 NB 00$ NS 0.03 NO
022(34 00124 NS N8 00$ Ns NO NS NS 006 NS NS NS
0226)4 00328 NO P4S NO NS 003 NS Ns NS NS NS NS
0222)1 00320 NS NS NO NS 003 000 NS 000 NS Ns NS
022.18 CO334 NS NO NI 004 001 004 NS NS 0.03 NS NS
022q(1 001437 NS NS NS NS 001 001 NS 002 NS NS Ns
022 eal 00338 NS P111 NS NS 000 000 NS NS NS NS NS
02261 00330 NO 003 000 Ns NS 00$ NS NS NS NS NS
02206 caw NS NS 001 0 05 000 000 001 000 NS NS 006
022(0 07342 001 NS NS mg 0 00 NO NS 009 NS NS NS
022(51 00344 NS NO 145 NS 002 NS NS NS 003 NS NS
022)4 07347 NI NS 000 Ns NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
022*) 00340 NS 1411 003 NS 002 NS 001 0 05 NS NS NS
024(8111)0 00470 4413 0 00 NO NS 000 000 000 000 NS 000 NS
024 (8) ONI 00432 NB NO NS NS 000 000 NS 00$ NS NS NS
024(15)(414 00434 NS NS NS NS 000 000 NS 002 NS NS NS
024(8) (1)1 C0430 NS NS 006 NS 000 000 NO 002 NS NS NS
024 (8) 04 004341 002 NS NS NS 000 000 006 000 Ns NS NS
024(8)0m 03440 - NS NS NS - - NO NS _ Ns NS
024(80)1 0.0444 NS NS PIS NO 00$ 004 NS NS NS NS NS
024(3)(00 00448 NS NS NS NS 000 003 P45 NS NS NS NS
024(6)0)1 00448 NS NS NS NS NS NO NS NS NS NS NS
024(B)(06 00450 NS NS 4418 NS NS NS NS 000 NS NS 000
0240100(0 00452 NS 004 NS NO 000 000 NO NS NS NS NS
0240310)e C0454 NO NS NS NS 000 000 NS NS NS NS NS
024(8)010 00456 NS NS NS NS NO NS NS 002 NS NS NS
024(8)(04 00468 003 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 002
024(8(1)1(1V C0480 MI 000 NO NS 000 000 002 000 NS NS NS
024(8)0)e 004412 NS 002 NO NS 000 000 NS 005 00$ NS 002
026E10)1 00464 NS NO NS NS 000 000 NS 00$ NS Ks NS
024 (B) (1). 004611 P4S NS NS NS 0 0 1 000 NS 000 000 NS NS
024(11)0* 00408 NS NS NO NS 000 000 000 000 002 000 NS
02 4 (2)0* 00470 NS NS NS NS 000 000 NS 0 00 NS 000 NS
024 (B) Ma 00472 NS NS NS NS 000 000 006 000 NS NS NS
024 (SI 006 CO503 NS 0 0 I NS 045 000 000 000 000 NS 0.01 NS
024(8) 01). cosos NS NS N21 - NS - - NS
0 2613101141 00507 NS NS NS MS 004 003 0 0 I 000 NS NS
-
024(81(4. 00500 NS NS NS NS NS NO 000 000 NS NS 005
024(81(11)I 0051 1 Ns 0 0$ NS NS 000 000 001 000 NS NS NS
02401)(60 00513 00$ NS NS MI 000 000 000 000 NS NS 0.04
024031006 00515 NS MS NS NS 004 000 NS 00$ NS - NS
024(5)315 00317 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 0.01
024(13)001 CO510 P41 NS PPS P411 000 NS - 0.01 NS NS NS
024(6)016 00521 NS NS NS NS 000 001 NS NS NS NS NO
0240000 0.0523 NS NS NS NS 004 003 - NS NS NS -
024(8)11116 00525 002 NS P61 NS 00$ 0 09 NS 002 NS NS -
024(1000, 00527 NS NO NS NS 000 000 001 000 NS NS -
024(8)004 00520 NO NS NS NS 000 000 001 000 NS 0.01 -
024 (6) 009 00531 NS NS NS NS NS NS 000 001 NS NS -
0$(8)(4q 00533 NS NS NS NS NS NS 009 000 NS NS -
024(3)001 00535 NO NS RS NS 000 000 000 000 NS NS 0.03
021(8)8), 0.0537 NS NS 002 001 000 000 NS 000 NS NS NO
024 (S) NB 00530 NS NO NS NS NO NS 000 003 NS NS NO
02610004 006.41 NS NS 005 NS 000 000 NS 000 000 NS NS
024(81(105 00643 NB 002 NS NS 000 000 001 000 0.03 NS -
02403100w OosO 003 NS NS NS 001 NS NS NS NS NS NS
024(13)000 00547 NS 005 NS - 000 NS - - NS NS NS
L:220
(dl)
QUESTION DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE VARIABLE
LENGTH OF RESPONDENTS EDUCATION ETHNIC REUGION OCCUPATION INCOME GENDER TENURE
RESIDENCE AGE GROUP
C0131 C1353 c135e C1354 C1356 c1356 C1350 C1352 C0130
023 CO351 NS NS 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 NS NS
024(a) C0402 NS 0.05 NS 0.01 0.02 0.00 0,04 NS 0.01
024(a) C0404 NS 0.01 NS 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 NS 0.04
024(a) C0405 0.00 NS 0.00 0.01 0.01 NS 0.02 NS NS
024(a) C0406 NS NS NS NS NS NS 0.01 NS NS
024(a) 00407 0.00 NS NS 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 NS NS
024(a) 004001 0.04 NS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 NS
024(a) C0400 NS NS NS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 NS NS
024(a) C0410 0.00 NS NS NS NS NS 0.00 NS NS
024(a) 00411
024(a) C0412 0.0. Ngo.ociNg o.o6 Ng 0.0g gNg
024(a) 00413
024(a) C0414 Ng N	 N gNg NN gNg Ng Ng
024(0 C0415 0.03 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
024(a) C0418 NS NS NS 0.01 0.05 NS 0.05 NS NS
024(a) 00417 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
024(a) 00416 NS NS NS NS NS 0.02 NS NS NS
024(a) C0410 NS NS NS 0.04 NS NS NS NS 0.01
024(a) C0420 NS NS NS NS NS 0.01 NS 0.01 NS
024(a) C0421
024(a) C0422 Ng N 0 oi Ng o.i 0.05 0.06 Ni o.oi
024(a) 00423 NS NS 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 NS NS
024(a) 00424 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
024(b) 00551 NS NS NS NS 0.00 0.02 NS 0.04 NS
025(a) CO553 NS 002 0.00 0.00 002 0.00 0.00 NS NS
025(b) 00558 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 0.01 NS
025(b) CO550 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
025(b) CO563 NS NS NS NS NS 0.04 NS NS NS
025(b) CO581 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
025(b) 00562 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 0.00
025(b) CO503 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
025(b) 00584 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
025(b) cosee NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
025(b) CO568 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
025(b) 00570 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
025(b) 00571 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
025(b) CO574 NS NS NS NS NS 0.04 0.01 NS NS
025(b) 00576 NS NS NS NS NS NS 0.01 NS NS02564 CO577 NS NS 000 003 NS 0.02 NS NS NS
025(o) CO570 NS 003 0.04 NS NS NS NS 0.04 NS
L:221
(e)
QUESTION DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
INDEPENDB41 VARIABLE OUESTION DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
INDEPENDENI VARIABLE
I EUEF BLAME ON FLOOOS FLOODS ATTFTUDE BEUEIT BLAME ON ot000s	 FLOODS ATTITUDE
IN GOO HUMANS COMMON UNCOMMON TO GOVT 84 000 HUMANS COMMON UNCOMMON TO CIOVT
CO232 00235 CO2311 CO243 CO245 00232 00236 002311 00245 002411
0200
04(4
04(a)
04(b)
04(0
05
06
07
010
NEW
C0145
0I0A1)2
C0147
CO 140
Co le 1
C0162
C0154
C0161
0.00
NS
000
000
000
002
NS
NS
001
NS
NS
NS
001
NS
NS
-
NS
NIT
000
0.00
NS
000
000
002
-
-
000
002
000
NS
000
000
006
-
-
000
NS
000
NS
NS
000
NS
NS
NS
000
024(8)(7)b
024000)0
024(8)(1).
024(13)(1)1
02403)0)5
024(8)(1)11
024 (B) (0)
024(8)305
C0420
C0432
C0434
C0436
C04311
C0440
C0444
C0446
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
NS
NS
NS
NS
0.02
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
010 C0163 000 000 000 000 000 024(3)0)1 00446 NS NS
010 C0165 001 000 000 000 000 02403)0)m 00450 NS NS
010 C0167 005 NS - - 000 024(3)0)n C0452 0.04 NS
Clio Co HIO 000 - - - 000 024(8)0)0 C0454 NS NS
011 C0171 000 000 000 000 000 02403)(7)p C0450 0.00 NS
013 C0176 000 000 000 000 000 024(8)0)q C04511 NS NS
019 00203 NS 001 000 000 000 024 (B) ox C0460 000 NS
015 00205 006 000 000 000 000 024 (13)(1)0 C0452 000 0.05
016 CO207 000 002 000 000 000 024(0)010 C0454 000 0.02
015 CO200 000 - - - 024(B)31)u cam 0 00 NS
015 Co211 000 - - - - 024(8)0)v 00460 0.00 NS
016 CO219 000 000 000 000 000 024(13)(1)w C0470 000 NS
017(1) 00216 NS 000 000 000 000 024(8)0)0 C0472 000 NS
017(b) CO2 HI NS NS 001 000 000 024(11)00b CO503 000 0.02 0.04 NS NS
010).) CO220 NS NS NB NB NS 024(11)(10c CO505 NS 0.00 NS NS 001
010(b) CO222 000 NS - 000 000 024(11)00d CO507 001 NS 003 0.05 NS
010(a) CO226 001 001 000 005 NS 024(B)00. CO500 000 NS 0.00 NS NS
016(b) 00230 000 - - - NS 024(193(101 00511 000 0.05 0.01 NS NS
020(a) CO232 - 000 000 002 NS 024(13)310g CO513 000 0.00 0.05 NB NS
02000 CO233 NS NS - - NS 024(1300h CO515 0.00 0.02 NS NS 0.00
020(0 CO224 NB 000 000 001 001 02403)01)1 CO517 NS NS NS NS NS
020(1 CO235 000 - 000 000 NS 024(3)001 CO510 0.01 0.01 NS 0.03 0.05
020(a) 00230 000 000 000 000 NS 024(1)0011 CO521 000 NS 0.01 NS 0.03
wo(I) CO237 NE 000 000 000 NS 024M01)1 CO523 001 NS 0.02 NS NS
020(g% CO2341 000 000 - 000 NS Cr21 (NOR n. 00525 000 0.00 003 NS NS
02000 CO269 000 000 000 000 000 02403)00n CO527 0.00 003 000 NS NS
0200) 00240 002 000 000 000 NS 1221 181000 00529 0.00 NB 0.00 0.00 NS
woo CO241 000 000 000 000 000 024(10000 CO531 000 0.01 0.00 NS NS
020(b) CO242 NS 000 000 000 NS 0.1 (8)00o CO533 NS NS NS NB NS
0200) CO243 NS 000 000 - NB 024(8(311(1 CO535 000 NS 0.01 NS 000
020(m) CO244 000 000 000 000 NS
°2111)001 CO537 000 NS 000 NS 0.03
02000 c0245 NS 005 000 000 - 02403)001 00530 000 NS 000 NS 0.00
02000 CO244 NS 000 000 000 000 024(8)5)u 00541 0.00 NS 0.00 NS 0.00
021(5) CO301 000 000 004 NS 000 02100/00v 00543 - - - - -
0210)) CO303 000 000 001 NS 002 024(1)00w CO545 000 NS NS NB 0.01
022001 CO505 000 000 NS NIT NS 024(5)004 00547 0.00 0.02 0.01 NS NS
022(4)1 CO306 001 000 - NB NS
022001 CO300 NS 001 0 o2 NS NS
022(0)1 00310 NS NS NS NS NS
Q22001 CO311 NS 000 000 NS NS
0220611 CO312 NS NS NS NS NS
022001 CO313 NS NS NS NS NS
(222(04 CO314 NS 001 0 00 NS 001 
022(01 CO315 NS NS NS NS NB
022(01 Co3 N1 NS NB 002 NB NS
0212(6)1 06317 NS NS - NS 003
02%/(011 CO3 IS NS NS - NS NS
02201 CO310 NS 003 NS 000 002
022001 CO320 003 000 002 001 NS
022(11 00324 NS NS 004 NS 003
1122001 00321 NS 000
022011 CO321 NS NS
022001 CO334 NS 001
022021 CO337 NS 004
0220211 CO336 000 004
anon come NS 002
(222(01 CO340 001 NS
022(4)1 CO342 NS 000
022(011 CO344 001 003
0220) 00347 NS 00I
022(w) CO340 004 000
L:222
(el)
QUESTION DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE VARIABLE
BEUEF IN BLAME ON FLOODS FLOODS ATTITUDE TO
GOD HUMANS COMMON UNCOMMON GOVERNMENT
CO232 CO235 CO238 CO243 CO245
Q23 CO351 NS 0.00 0.00 0.00 NS
024(a) C0402 0.00 NS NS NS NS
Q24(a) C0404 0.00 0.02 0.02 NS NS
Q24(a) C0405 NS 0.00 0.01 0.00 NS
024(a) C0406 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
024(a) C0407 NS 0.00 NS NS NS
024(a) C0408 NS 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01
Q24(a) C0409 0.00 NS NS NS 0.00
Q24(a) C0410 0.00 0.04 NS NS NS
024(a) C0411
024(a) C0412 0.05 0.04i 0.0 N§ N§
024(a) C0413
024(a) C0414 N§ N	 §N§ N
024(a) C0415 0.01 0.02 NS NS NS
024(a) C0416 0.00 NS 0.00 NS 0.01
024(a) C0417 NS NS NS NS NS
024(a) C0418 0.01 NS NS NS NS
024(a) C0419 NS NS NS NS NS
024(a) C0420 NS NS NS NS NS
Q24(a) C0421
024(a) C0422 N§ 0.00 N§ N§ clod
024(a) C0423 NS 0.00 NS NS NS
024(a) C0424 NS NS NS NS NS
024(b) CO551 NS NS NS NS NS
025(a) CO553 0.00 0.02 NS NS NS
025(b) CO558 NS 0.04 NS NS 0.03
025(b) CO559 NS 0.03 NS NS NS
025(b) CO560 NS 0.02 NS NS 0.03
025(b) CO561 NS NS NS NS NS
025(b) CO562 NS NS 0.02 NS NS
025(b) CO563 NS 0.00 NS 0.02 NS
025(b) CO564 0.04 NS NS NS NS
Q25(b) CO566 NS NS NS NS NS
025(b) CO568 NS NS NS NS NS
025(b) CO570 NS NS NS NS 0.05
Q25(b) CO571 NS NS NS NS NS
Q25(b) CO574 NS 0.02 0.00 NS NS
025(b) CO576 0.00 NS NS NS NS
025(b) c0577 NS NS 0.03 0.03 NS
025(c) CO579 NS NS 0.00 0.02 NS
L:223
(f)
011EST1ON DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE QUESTION DEPENDENTVARIABLE
FLOOD
INDEPENDENT
opTilAillii On
VARIABLE
FLOOD
FLOOD OPTIMISM OR FLOOD AWARENESS PERSOAlsAI PERCEPTION
AWARENESS PESSIMISM PERCEPTION NEW 00171NEW C0171
02(0) NEW 000 024(B)5(b Can 0.00 0.00 0.02
04(4) 00145 0.00 000 000 024(8)6)4 C0432 NS NS NS
04(4) 0I8)02 NEI N8 024(8)(1). 00454 NS NS NS
04(5) C0147 000 000 000 024(6)(6t Came 0.00 NB NS
04(0) C0140 000 000 000 122403)(03 00430 0.00 NS NS
05 C0151 NS NS 001 1224(3)(011 C0440 NS NS NS
00 00152 000 N8 001 024 MM( C0444 NS NS NS
07 C0154 000 NS 000 024(6)5(11 00440 N8 0.00 NS
010 C0181 000 000 000 024(3)3)1 00440 NS NS NB
010 C0163 000 000 000 024(8)(1)rn C0450 0.00 0.01 0.01
010 C0105 000 000 000 024(3)015 00452 0.00 0.01 0.00
010 C0167 000 004 000 024(303)0 00454 0.00 0.01 0.00
010 COIN 000 003 000 024(8)(1)p 00456 0.00 NS N8
131i
013
015
CI 18
018
013
018
018
017(i)
017(b)
015(a)
015(b)
019(s)
010(3)
020(4)
1220(b)
WOO)
02000
1220(5)
0206)
02000
COON
02030
020()
020(11)
0206)
020(ra)
020(n)
02004
021(a)
021(b)
02200
C0171
C0176
CO203
CO206
CO207
00200
00211
CO213
00218
00215
00220
CO222
CO220
CO230
00232
00233
CO234
CO236
00236
CO237
CO2311
CO230
CO240
00241
CO242
CO243
00244
CO245
CO246
00301
00303
00305
000
NS
000
000
000
000
NS
000
000
004
NS
006
000
002
000
NS
NS
NS
NS
000
000
NS
NS
000
000
000
000
004
NS
NS
NS
NS
000
004
000
000
000
001
003
000
000
NS
NS
001
000
001
001
N8
NS
NS
NS
000
000
NS
NS
000
000
001
000
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
NS
NS
000
000
000
000
NS
NS
NS
NS
000
000
000
000
000
000
 0 00
000
NS
NS
NS
002
001
024(13)(1)q
024(8)0)r
024(8)0).
024(5) et
024(8)5(11
1224(8)5(v
024 (8)(1).
024(8)5(0
024(8)(6)b
024(8)61)0
024(8)01)4
0.24(8)61).
024(8)(5(f
024(8)309
024(3)601.
024(3)01)1
024(8)(10)
024(8)6611
4224(8)661
024 18)00 m
024(15)(10n
024 R1)(40
024(3)30.
024(3)300
024(s)00,
024(8)(11).
024 (8)001
024(5(01)11
024(11)0N
024(0)00v
02405400
C0458
c0400
004e7
00454
Coma
004613
C0470
C0472
0.0503
00506
00507
00300
00511
00513
00515
CO517
00510
00521
00523
00525
00527
0.0020
CO501
00530
CO536
00537
CO530
00541
00543
CO545
CO547
0.00
000
0.00
0.00
002
NS
0.02
0.05
0.01
NS
NS
0.01
0.00
0.00
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
000
NS
0.00
NS
NS
0.00
004
000
003
NS
NS
NS
0.05
0.00
NS
0.00
0.01
NS
0.00
NS
000
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
-
NS
-
-
-
NS
NS
-
NS
-
NS
NS
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
0.54
NS
NS
NS
0.00
N8
N8
0.00
0.00
000
0.00
0.00
000
0.00
0.00
0.00
NS
NS
NS
022(03 00308 NS NS N8
Ct22(0)1 00300 0 01 002 004
=MI 00310 000 NS 001
022100 CO311 002 NS 001
o=411 cos 12 NS 004 NS
022(0 CO313 NB NS NS
022(01 000 14 NB N8 NS
022(1)1 COO 16 NI 000 NB
1222611 00316 t48 000 NS
022(d4 00317 NS 001 NS
022004 CO3 IS NS 000 000
0226,)1 00310 003 NS NS
022608 00320 000 003 000
022(0 CO324 000 NS NS
C122004 CO326 NS 004 001
022(1)11 CO328 NS NS NS
022(00 00334 NS NS NS
022(401 00337 000 000 000
022(6)11 00330 001 000 000
0220)1 C0030 NS N8 NS
(2220)11 C0040 NB 001 NS
022(.)11 00312 NS NS 004
022(011 CO344 002 NS Ns
02700 00347 001 000 004
02204 00349 000 000 002
L:224
(f1)
QUESTION DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE	 VARIABLE
FLOOD
AWARENESS
OPTIMISM/	 FLOOD
PESSIMISM PERCEPTION
C0145 NEW C0171
Q23 CO351	 0.00 NS 0.00
024(a) C0402	 NS NS NS
024(a) C0404	 NS NS 0.02
024(a) C0405	 NS NS NS
024(a) C0406	 NS 0.03 NS
Q24(a) C0407	 0.01 NS NS
Q24(a) C0408	 0.02 0.00 0.04
024(a) C0409	 0.00 NS 0.01
024(a) C0410	 NS NS NS
024(a) C0411 . _
024(a) C0412	 0.00 g0.02
024(a) C0413
024(a) C0414	 Ng N Ng
024(a) C0415	 NS NS NS
024(a) C0416	 0.00 NS 0.03
024(a) C0417	 NS NS NS
024(a) C0418	 NS NS NS
024(a) C0419	 NS NS NS
024(a) C0420	 NS NS NS
024(a) C0421
024(a) C0422	 0.0i 0.03 Ng
024(a) C0423	 NS NS NS
024(a) C0424	 NS NS NS
024(b) CO551	 NS NS NS
025(a) CO553	 0.02 NS NS
025(b) CO558	 NS NS NS
025(b) CO559	 NS NS NS
025(b) CO560	 NS NS 0.02
025(b) CO561	 NS NS NS
025(b) CO562	 NS NS NS
025(b) CO563	 NS NS 0.00
025(b) CO564	 NS NS NS
025(b) CO566	 NS NS NS
025(b) CO568	 NS NS NS
025(b) CO570	 NS NS NS
025(b) CO571	 NS NS NS
025(b) CO574	 NS 0.01 0.00
025(b) CO576	 NS lAS NS
025(b) CO577	 NS NS NS
025(c) CO579	 NS NS NS
APPENDIX M: EXPERTS' OPINION ON FLOOD HAZARD MANAGEMENT IN
PENINSULAR MALAYSIA, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
FLOOD FORECASTING AND WARNING SYSTEMS
M.1 Introduction
This section discusses the results of a questionnaire survey on how flood management
experts, viz, government officers, academics, consultants and workers of voluntary
organisations whose work is related to the flood hazard, view existing flood hazard
management strategies and policies in Peninsular Malaysia (see Appendix F, Section F.3.4).
Together with the section on flood warnings in the main household survey (see Appendix A),
this opinion survey is carried out as a means of evaluating the effectiveness of flood hazard
institutions, with special reference to flood forecasting and warning systems in Peninsular
Malaysia.
There were 49 respondents in this survey. While the main part of the survey is based on a
structured quantitative questionnaire, detailed notes were taken (in a qualitative manner) when
respondents revealed some relevant aspects of flood hazard management not covered in the
questionnaire. Of the respondents, 25 were government officers (51.0 per cent), 7 academics
(14.3 per cent), 7 consultants (14.3 per cent), 5 workers from environmental groups (10.2
per cent) and 5 others (10.2 per cent).
M.2 Rating the seriousness of flooding in states
Based on a scale of 1 (least serious) to 10 (most serious), respondents were required to rate
the seriousness of the flood hazard in each state in the peninsula. With an average rating of
8.3, the state of Kelantan appears to have the highest average rating (Table M.1). This was
followed by Terengganu and Pahang. All three are East Coast states. In all three states, not
one respondent rated the seriousness of flooding to be less than 5. On the other hand, the
seriousness of flooding in West Coast states appear to be rated lower. Only Kuala Lumpur,
Perak and Selangor were rated above 6.0. In the case of Johor, the eastern half is considered
located in the East Coast while the western half is on the West Coast.
M.3 Rating government spending in flood management
The results revealed that the experts did not rate the Malaysian government's spending on
flood management highly. On a scale of 1 to 10, the overall average rating of was 4.9 (Table
M.2). And although government officers gave the highest ratings, their average rating was
5.6. Consultants and other professionals appear to give government spending the lowest
ratings. This is an indication of the inadequacy of spending in this area.
The experts' opinion of inadequacy of government spending does not end there. The majority
of the experts (63.4 per cent) also believed that government spending was uneven, some
states receiving more allocations than others (Table M.3). According to the experts, there are
many reasons for this. The most common reason is politics as 61.3 per cent of those rating
spending as unevenly distributed mentioned so. In Malaysia, it is not uncommon for political
parties to try to win over the public through the implementation of flood mitigation schemes.
In fact, many such schemes are carried out as a kind of 'pre-election promise'. This suggests
that political considerations often outweigh others in determining the deployment of
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Table M.1: Average ratings of the seriousness of flooding by experts of flood hazard
management in Peninsular Malaysia
State	 Average rating	 % rating 1-5	 % rating 6-10
Kelantan	 8.3	 0.0	 100.0
Terengganu	 8.2
	 0.0
	
100.0
Pahang	 7.7	 0.0	 100.0
Kuala Lumpur	 7.1	 16.3	 83.7
Johor	 6.5	 14.3	 85.7
Perak	 6.3	 16.3	 83.7
Selangor	 6.2	 22.4	 77.6
Pulau Pinang	 5.8	 36.7	 63.3
Kedah	 4.9
	 71.4	 28.6
Perlis	 4.5
	 69.4	 30.6
Negri Sembilan	 4.2
	 77.6	 22.4
Melaka	 3.8	 79.6	 20.4
Table M.2: Experts' rating of Malaysian government's spending on flood management
Profession	 Frequency	 Percentage	 Average rating
Government officers	 24	 49.0	 5.6
Academics
	
7	 14.3	 5.1
Environmental groups	 5	 10.2	 4.0
Consultants
	
7	 14.3	 3.9
Others	 5	 10.2	 3.6
Overall average rating	 4.9
Table M.3: Experts' rating of distribution of government spending on flood
management
Rating	 Frequency	 Percentage
Very evenly distributed	 2	 4.1
Fairly evenly distributed
	
12	 24.5
Fairly unevenly distributed
	 15	 30.6
Very unevenly distributed 	 16	 32.8
No idea	 4	 8.2
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resources to manage floods. Variation in flood risk and exposure was only second in
importance. This was indicated by 35.5 per cent of the experts. Other reasons given include
population and development densities, climatic difference, whether a state was comparatively
rich or poor, and others.
On the other hand, while many reasons are given by the experts who think government
spending is evenly distributed, none is dominant. Amongst the popular ones are difference
in population size, politics, flood risk difference and physical and physiographic difference
(Table M.4).
When the experts were asked to rate the overall flood management strategy of the Malaysian
government, they gave an overall average rating of 5.1. This implies that the Malaysian flood
management strategy is only averagely effective, and certainly there is room for
improvement. In fact, 73.5 per cent of the experts rated it between a value of 3 and 5,
implying a below average strategy. Only 10.2 per cent rated it with a value of 7 and above,
indicating a strategy with a high level of effectiveness.
M.4 Opinion and views on various aspects of floods and government flood
management
The majority of the experts (59.2 per cent) agree that the flood management policies and
strategies of the Malaysian government are over-dependent on the engineering approach, as
compared to only 14.3 per cent who did not think so. However, almost all the experts (98.0
per cent) are of the opinion that there is a need to incorporate a multi-disciplinary approach
to flood hazard management in the peninsula.
The majority of the experts (81.6 per cent) disagree with the statement that the likelihood of
flooding is decreasing in many parts of the peninsula as a result of flood control by the DID
and other government agencies. Clearly, this is a strong indication of the Jack of confidence
of the experts in government flood management strategies and policies but also, more
significantly, that they think that the occurrence of floods is not decreasing. The experts also
do not think that floods are decreasing as a result of climatic changes as 85.7 per cent of
them disagree with the statement. In fact, 85.7 per cent of them think that floods are
increasing and becoming worse because of uncontrolled and haphazard development.
Furthermore, 81.6 per cent of the experts believe that the DID is inadequate to tackle the
flood problem in the peninsula. This implies that there is a need to incorporate other
government agencies and departments into a more concerted effort in managing the flood
problem. And 63.3 per cent of the experts believe that pressure groups, such as voluntary
environmental groups, should not refrain from leaving government agencies alone to do their
work. Rather, this implies that such groups should keep the agencies on the right track by
creating more public awareness and public accountability on the part of the government
agencies with a view to improve flood protection.
M.5 Opinions on flood forecasting and warning systems
A series of questions were put to government officers about their agency's/department's
annual budgetary allocation for flood forecasting and warning systems for the years 1991,
1992 and 1993. In Table M.5, it is obvious that their ratings of agency/departmental
budgetary allocations is only average for 1991 and 1992. If 7 is taken as the arbitrary cut-off
APPENDIX M:228
Table M.4: Main reasons why experts think government spending is not evenly
distributed
Reasons	 Frequency	 Percentage
Politics	 19	 61.3
Difference in flood risk 	 11	 35.5
Population difference 	 7	 22.6
Disparity in development	 5	 16.1
Some states richer than others 	 5	 16.1
Table M.5: Government officers' rating of budgetary allocations of their respective
agency/department on flood forecasting and warning systems
Rating	 1991	 1992	 1993
Frequency	 %	 Frequency	 %	 Frequency
1	 0	 0.0	 0	 0.0	 0	 0.0
2	 1	 4.0	 1	 4.0	 1	 4.0
3	 0	 0.0	 1	 4.0	 1	 4.0
4	 1	 4.0	 0	 0.0	 0	 0.0
5	 3	 12.0	 2	 8.0	 2	 8.0
6	 7	 28.0	 8	 32.0	 5	 20.0
7	 3	 12.0	 4	 16.0	 4	 16.0
8	 2	 8.0	 2	 8.0	 4	 16.0
9	 0	 0.0	 0	 0.0	 1	 4.0
10	 0	 0.0	 0	 0.0	 0	 0.0
Don't know	 8	 32.0	 7	 28.0	 7	 28.0
1 = least adequate
10 = most adequate
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point for adequacy, then only 20.0 per cent and 24.0 per cent rated the allocations in those
two years as adequate. However, the 1993 ratings were better as 36.0 per cent rated the
allocations 7 and above. This is due to the increase in such allocations in 1993 and is a good
sign that the government is paying more attention to the flood problem.
When government officers were asked to assess the areal coverage of flood forecasting and
warning systems in the region under their agency's/department's control, 60.0 per cent of
them indicated that it was below 30.0 per cent coverage. Only 12.0 per cent said their
region's coverage was more than 30.0 per cent. Furthermore, 68.0 per cent of the experts
thought that the current extent of coverage in their respective regions was insufficient. Only
one officer thought that it was sufficient. He is the flood forecasting officer in Kuala Lumpur,
the area of which is small. The flood warning service covers almost the entire region under
the federal capital. This small percentage of flood forecasting and warning areal coverage
reflects the inadequacy of the service and implies much scope for improvement. It also means
that non-structural flood management programmes need to be up-graded and further
developed to increase overall flood management effectiveness. Of the officers who gave a
positive reply, 76.5 per cent believed that a minimum coverage of 70.0 per cent would suffice
for their region. Surprisingly, a significant percentage of 28.0 per cent were not sure and
could not give an answer.
When all the experts were asked as to whether the current flood forecasting and warning
system was the best available, only 6.1 per cent thought so. The majority of 87.8 per cent
did not think so and suggested various other systems which they thought were better. 49.0
per cent suggested that radar and telemetry system was the best currently available. The rest
suggested computer analysis, flood routing, better weather forecasting as alternative systems.
This suggests that the current systems employed by each state are not the most current and
effective systems. Thus, there is much room for improvement in this respect. Almost all the
experts, except two, thought that the flood forecasting and warning systems in their region
should be improved, and the main reasons given were the inadequacy of current systems,
increasing flood risk, systems not computerised and the need to constantly keep abreast with
current technology. Many suggestions were put forward as to how the existing systems could
be improved (Table M.6).
Of those who are involved with forecasting and warning, 68.8 per cent believed that less than
30.0 per cent of current forecasting and warning systems are automated. This means actual
forecasting and warning dissemination is operated automatically via telemetry, computer
modelling, faxing, sirens etc. In contrast, this implies that a greater proportion of such work
is still being carried out manually. If a 70.0 per cent automation rate is considered as the
target, then there is a 40.0 per cent difference which needs to be made up. However, 75.5
per cent of the experts thought that automation is not likely to take up more than 50.0 per
cent of a forecasting and warning functions. This implies that the responsibility of flood duty
officers is very important in this line of work. In fact, the experts rated the importance of the
flood duty officer's experience in forecasting with an average of 7.5 out of a maximum of
10. This line of work is so highly specialised that 75.5 per cent of experts were of the
opinion that even with maximum automation available, no untrained personnel would be able
to take over the functions of a flood duty officer.
When assessing the competence of flood duty officers, only 62.5 per cent of the experts were
satisfied with those working in their region. Of all the qualities of a flood duty officer, the
most important considered by the experts were qualifications and experience. In both cases
30.6 per cent each of the experts said so. Other important qualities include commitment and
dedication, knowledge of rivers and being responsible and hard-working.
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Table M.6: Experts' suggestions as to how current flood forecasting and warning
systems could be improved
Suggestion	 Number	 %
Install more radar stations 15 30.6
Install more telemetric stations 30 61.2
Employ automatic computer analysis 18 36.7
Install more automatic sirens 14 28.6
Install more auto-loggers (rainfall and river level) 11 22.4
Employ radar estimate of rainfall 9 18.4
Purchase new flood forecasting models 8 16.3
Set up a flood control centre 6 12.2
Allocate more spending on flood forecasting 5 10.2
Employ more qualified staff 5 10.2
Provide better information to the public 4 8.2
Employ a multi-disciplinary approach 4 8.2
Educate the public on how to response 4 8.2
Employ a combination of methods 3 6.1
Update current systems 3 6.1
Employ flood routing programmes 2 4.1
Employ flood watching 2 4.1
Employ flood wardens 2 4.1
Use satellite data in forecasting 2 4.1
Install more flood warning boards 1 2.0
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The importance of an adequate warning lead time can not be over-emphasised. In Peninsular
Malaysia, the experts gave their opinions on the average target warning lead time for various
types of catchments. The results are shown in Table M.7. In all catchments, the current
average lead times are still short of the target lead times. For instance, in urban and rural
catchments, the current average lead time is 1.1 and 2.3 hours short of the target lead time
respectively. This shows that there is much scope for improvement. Furthermore, target lead
times are those expected at the current moment based on current technology. Future
advancement in forecasting and warning technologies may extend lead times significantly. In
order to improve target lead times, the main suggestions given by the experts were that of
setting up more radar stations (30.6 per cent) and using radar estimates of rainfall (26.5 per
cent). Other suggestions include setting up a coordinated central body responsible for
forecasting and warning (16.3 per cent), using computer analysis (22.4 per cent), better
communication system (16.3 per cent), using new computer models (12.2 per cent) and using
satellite data in rainfall estimation (10.2 per cent).
In Peninsular Malaysia, it is noted that the majority of the forecasting work is still very much
based on conventional forecasts using point rainfall (from rain gauges) and river levels (from
river level gauges). Although such conventional methods are reasonably accurate (if used
together with other methods such as flood routing), they do not produce sufficiently long lead
times for warnings to be effective, especially in the case of urban catchments. In the current
research, 60.0 per cent of government officers mentioned that more than 70.0 per cent of
their work on forecasting was based on point rainfall. The reliability of point rainfall is
reasonably high as 59.2 per cent of all experts with a reliability of 60.0 per cent or more
when used as an input in forecasting floods. The average rating given for point rainfall was
5.7 out of a maximum of 10. Many regions in the peninsula also use gauged river levels as
inputs in forecasting. In this research, 56.0 per cent of government officers said their region
used such data and river levels are given an average rating of 6.8. A majority of 67.3 per
cent of the experts interviewed were of the opinion that river level data is 70.0 per cent or
more reliable when used as inputs in forecasting floods. Because conventional flood
forecasting using rainfall and river level data is relatively cheap and fairly reliable, it is used
widely in most states and regions Peninsular Malaysia. This method has proven quite
effective in the larger river systems such as the Pahang, Perak and Kelantan Rivers where
warnings given to downstream areas are usually in advance of at least a few hours or more.
Also, conventional methods are suitable for forested or rural catchment where flood routing
models are more predictable and the lag time between rainfall and flood flow is longer.
On the other hand, despite the fact that radar estimates of rainfall provides the best possible
lead time and is the current state of the art method of forecasting heavy rains and floods%
it has not hitherto been sufficiently developed in Peninsular Malaysia. Although government
flood duty officers and those associated with rainfall and flood forecasting are aware of such
remote sensing methods, 64.0 per cent of them say that radar is not used at all in their
forecasting work. This may be partly due to the fact that radar estimates are not as reliable
as rainfall and river level data which are `actuals' rather than estimates. The experts have
only given radar estimates an average reliability of 3.6 out of a maximum of 10. In fact, 81.6
per cent of the experts were of the opinion that radar estimates do not perform well and were
1 Radar estimates of rainfall coupled with satellite estimates, with further confirmation
from rain gauges and river level gauges is effectively employed by the NRA in Britain in
their forecasting models. The use of radar estimates has effectively increased warning lead
times, especially in urban catchments (see Haggett 1986; Haggett et al 1991; Chan 1994).
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Table M.7: Experts' opinion on the average target warning lead times for issuing
warnings in Peninsular Malaysia (in hours)
Type of	 Average target
	
Current average	 Maximum lead time
catchment	 lead time
	 lead time	 achievable
Urban	 3.0
	 1.9	 3.2
Rural	 8.6
	
6.3
	 8.6
Mixed	 5.3	 4.1	 6.1
Region/country	 5.6
	
4.4	 6.1
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less than 50.0 per cent reliable when used as inputs in forecasting floods. The same is also
true in the case of satellite estimates of rainfall. Although government officers are aware of
such data, 68.0 per cent said their regions did not have access to such data. Their forecasting
systems did not use such data. In fact, only the Malaysian Meteorological Service use satellite
images to predict rainfall and the rainfall predicted is more qualitative rather than
quantitative. The experts only rated satellite data at 2.7 out of 10, indicating that they are
highly unreliable when used as inputs in forecasting floods. In fact, 75.5 per cent of the
experts said that such data would only produce a performance with a reliability of less than
30.0 per cent.
Table M.8 gives an indication of the evaluation of the experts' assessment of accuracy,
reliability, timeliness and coverage of each type of data input for forecasting flood. In terms
of accuracy, remotely sensed rainfall such as satellite and radar estimates are the least
accurate and least reliable when used as inputs for forecasting floods, but they provide the
fastest time (therefore increasing warning lead time) and their coverage is the most extensive.
In the case of conventional point rainfall and gauged river levels, their accuracy and
reliability are high but is the slowest (therefore limiting the warning lead time) and covers
the least area. Clearly, there is a need to combine both remotely sensed data and conventional
data to fully exploit both accuracy and reliability as well as timeliness and coverage.
Finally, experts were asked to rate the current state of flood forecasting and warning in
Peninsular Malaysia. The results in Table M.9 and Table M.10 show that both forecasting
and warning technologies are not rated highly. In fact, 71.4 per cent rated forecasting
technology 5 and below. The corresponding percentage for warning was 65.3 per cent. Only
14.3 per cent and 16.3 per cent of the experts rated forecasting and warning at 7 or higher.
According to the experts, Malaysian forecasting and warning technologies also do not
compare favourably with their immediate neighbours or the other countries in the world. For
instance, 81.6 per cent were of the opinion that both the Malaysian flood forecasting and
warning technologies were average (4) to below average (6) when compared to its
neighbours. When compared with the rest of the world, 89.9 per cent indicated that the
Malaysian forecasting was below average as compared to 93.9 per cent for warning
technology. The results once again confirmed that forecasting and warning technologies in
the peninsula are behind time and that there is plenty of room for improvement. As non-
structural flood management methods are poorly developed in the peninsula, this is one area
where much work needs to be done. Advancement in these two areas would certainly reduce
potential flood losses.
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Table M.8:	 Experts' opinion on the accuracy, reliability, timeliness and coverage of
satellite forecasted rainfall, radar estimated rainfall, point rainfall and
gauged river levels as inputs for forecasting flood.
Type of data Accuracy Reliability Timeliness Coverage
Satellite rainfall 4.1 4.4 1.6 1.2
Radar rainfall 3.3 3.5 2.3 2.2
Point rainfall 2.3 2.4 3.4 4.1
Gauge river levels 1.9 1.7 4.0 4.2
Key:
1 = most
	 1 = most
	
1 = fastest	 1 = largest
accurate	 reliable
5 = least	 5 = least	 5 = slowest 5 = smallest
accurate	 reliable
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Table M.9: Experts' opinion on the current state of flood forecasting and warning
technology in Peninsular Malaysia.
Rating	 Forecasting technology
	
Warning technology
Frequency % Frequency %
1 (very backward) 0 0.0 0 0.0
2 0 0.0 1 2.0
3 14 28.6 13 26.5
4 11 22.4 9 18.4
5 10 20.4 9 18.4
6 7 14.3 9 18.4
7 5 10.2 5 10.2
8 2 4.1 3 6.1
9 0 0.0 0 0.0
10 (most advanced) 0 0.0 0 0.0
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Table M.10: Experts' opinion on the current international standing of Malaysian flood
forecasting and warning technology.
Rating
In the ASEAN region
Forecasting	 Warning
Freq	 %	 Freq	 %
In the world
Forecasting	 Warning
Freq	 %	 Freq	 %
1 - the best 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
2 1 2.0 1 0.0 1 2.0 0 0.0
3 7 14.3 7 14.3 3 6.1 2 4.1
4 18 36.7 18 36.7 12 24.5 12 24.5
5 18 36.7 17 34.7 12 24.5 15 30.6
6 4 8.2 5 10.2 17 34.7 15 30.6
7 - the worst 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 6.1 4 8.2
8 - don't know 1 2.0 1 2.0 1 2.0 1 2.0
Total 49 100.0 49 100.0 49 100.0 49 100.0
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APPENDIX N	 HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED SAMPLE
AREAS IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
N.1	 Introduction
This appendix summarises the main socio-economic characteristics of households surveyed
in this research. It forms the background material from which socio-economic characteristics
of individuals are tested against their perception and response to the flood hazard.
N.2	 Characteristics of sample areas
In this research, a total of 618 heads of households, 332 (53.7 per cent) from the East Coast
and 286 (46.3 per cent) from the West Coast are interviewed. The breakdown into the four
sample areas is shown in Table N.1.
A total of 336 households (54.4 per cent) are urban while 282 households (45.6 per cent) are
rural (Table N.2). All households in Kuala Lumpur are urban. The majority of households
in Pulau Pinang are also urban. On the other hand, the majority of households in both the
Kelantan and Pekan areas are rural.
Within the four sample areas, different locations are subjected to different types of flooding
which are classified as river floods, a combination of tidal and river floods, and tidal floods.
The total number of households subjected to each type of floods is shown in Table N.3.
Households are also classified into residential, farming, commercial and fishing because
perception and response to the flood hazard are envisaged to be different between them (Table
N.4).
Building types are classified into detached, semi-detached, terraced and flat (Table N.5).
Detached houses are mainly traditional houses (usually built on stilts) found in the rural areas
as can be seen in the high proportion of such houses in the Kelantan and Pekan areas. In the
Pulau Pinang and Kuala Lumpur areas, detached houses are usually modern houses but those
located near river banks are squatter-type houses. A minority of the semi-detached houses are
traditional type houses which have stilts but all terraced houses and flats are modern
buildings.
N.3	 Building characteristics
Building material is envisaged to have some influence on damage reduction and indirectly on
perception and the employment of adjustment strategies. Different types of building materials
are shown in Table N.6. Likewise, age of buildings may have similar influences and is shown
in Table N.7. Floor types of houses are also envisaged to have an effect on perception and
adjustment of respondents. For instance, those with carpeted floors would suffer a higher
damage potential than those with cement floors. Thus, the perception and willingness to take
action and adopt certain strategies may be different between the above two groups. On the
whole, the majority of houses have wooden and cement floors, 51.5 per cent and 39.2 per
cent respectively (Table N.8).
One of the unique features of traditional Malay houses is that they are built on stilts. The
origin of the stilt house appears to be human's attempts to inhabit the low-lying fringes of
coastal, riverine and swampy areas as this evidence is in abundance in rural Malay houses
throughout the peninsula. As a means to keep above the water level, the stilt house would be
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a natural answer to the swampy or damp environment (Voon et al 1978 p63). With inland
migration of settlements, however, the stilt house is gradually being diffused as they cost
more to build than conventional houses built on the ground (based on qualitative interviews
with respondents living in stilt houses). Furthermore, the empty space below a stilt house is
not utilised and is considered by modern builders as a waste of space. Naturally, the lesser
threat of floods on higher grounds meant that stilts were expendable and with the
encroachment of modernizing influences on human values, there is now a strong likelihood
that the traditional stilt house will feature decreasingly in the landscape of rural Malaysia,
except perhaps in the flood-prone areas. Despite that, traditional stilt houses have evolved
over time and have become as much a necessary part of Malay culture in architecture as it
is an essential need for protection against nature. The stilts of such houses vary in height and
materials. In the former, the house may be raised from one to three metres or more above
the ground, and different parts of the house may again show differences in height above
ground level (Voon et al 1978 p63). In terms of the latter, the majority are built of wood
although wooden stilts can be reinforced with a surrounding layer of cement or concrete.
Wooden stilts are susceptible to wear and tear caused by frequent inundations of river and/or
sea water, in many instances causing houses to collapse. In many modern Malay houses,
wooden stilts have given way to completely concrete or cemented ones. Because floods are
generally more frequent and of a greater magnitude in the East Coast than those in the West
Coast of the peninsula, more houses in the former are built on stilts and they tend to be
higher.
In the current research, 58.9 per cent of houses surveyed are built on stilts (Table N.9). In
the East Coast, the two sample areas of Pekan and Kelantan have the highest percentages of
houses built on stilts, i.e. 86.4 per cent and 79.7 per cent respectively. On the other hand,
the corresponding figures for the two West Coast areas of Pulau Pinang and Kuala Lumpur
were much lower, i.e. 33.7 per cent and 28.1 per cent respectively. The East Coast locations
also have a higher average stilt height of 1.5 m compared to the West Coast locations of 1
m.
The distribution of stilt heights by sample area is given in Table N.10. In terms of the
building material of the stilts, it was found that the majority of houses (41.1 per cent) had
stilts built of wood (Table N.11). This is especially so in Pekan where 56.2 per cent of
houses had wooden stilts. In Pulau Pinang, however, 55.2 per cent of houses were built on
wooden stilts reinforced with an external layer of concrete. On the whole, the number of
houses with different stilt type is fairly evenly distributed between wood, wood with
reinforced concrete and pure concrete.
N.4	 Socio-economic characteristics of households
In Peninsular Malaysia, other than their attractiveness as fertile agricultural land, floodplain
regions are generally considered low priority in terms of property land value, although in
highly developed urban areas, population pressures and shortages of land might result in such
areas being deliberately developed. Many of the flood-prone riverine areas in cities are
occupied by squatters. In general, the majority of occupants in floodplains are farmers and
those who cannot afford to live elsewhere. This has given rise to a characteristically low
socio-economic profile amongst households in floodplain regions.
N.4.1 Tenure
In the current research, ownership of floodplain properties is quite high at 79.6 per cent, with
Pekan and Kelantan registering the highest rates at 85.7 per cent and 81.8 per cent
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respectively (Table N.12). Although slightly lower rates are registered for Pulau Pinang and
Kuala Lumpur, the overall percentage of ownership of properties is considered high.
N.4.2 Length of residence
The average number of years respondents have lived in their current property is about 22
years and 11 months (Table N.13). Respondents in Kelantan appear to have lived in their
current properties the longest while those in Kuala Lumpur have the shortest occupancy.
N.4.3 Gender
On the whole, as Malaysian society, especially in the rural agricultural areas are dominated
by a patrilinear society, more males were interviewed than there were females. This was
deliberate because females tend not to be as open as males when responding to questions.
Furthermore, as males are usually the breadwinner of the household, it is usually their
perceptions and decisions that determine the course of action taken by each household when
responding to the flood hazard. In the current survey, although 73.9 per cent of respondents
were males (Table N.14), this does not reflect the actual sex ratio in Malaysian society which
is about 100:102 males to females in 1991 (Department of Statistics Malaysia 1992 p28).
However, the sample for females is large enough for most statistical analysis to be
performed.
N.4.4 Age
The average age of respondents in the current survey is about 41 years and 4 months. On the
average, respondents in the two East Coast areas are slightly older than their counterparts in
the West Coast. This could be due to the fact that many of the respondents from the East
Coast are padi farmers who are over 50 years of age. However, the difference is small, about
two years. The age distribution of respondents in all the sample areas is given in Table N.15.
N.4.5 Ethnicity
In 1990, the Malays made up 58.1 per cent of the total population of the peninsula compared
to 31.4 per cent and 9.9 per cent by the Chinese and Indians respectively (International Law
Book services 1991 p23). In the current survey, the ratio of the various groups closely
resembles the 1990 figures (Table N.16). It should be noted that the Malays dominate the
East Coast areas but their numbers in the West Coast are only slightly higher than that of the
Chinese. This is not surprising as Malays form 77.9 per cent of farming households which
are mostly located in the East Coast. On the other hand, the Chinese form 58.3 per cent of
commercial households which are mostly located in the West Coast. Furthermore, 67.4 per
cent of rural households are Malays as compared to only 22.7 per cent Chinese.
N.4.6 Religion
Theoretically, all Malays are muslims in Malaysia. Unlike the Chinese and Indians who do
not have a common religion, Islam provides the main foundation on which Malay unity is
bound. Thus, religion (Islam) and the institutions linked to it - the mosque, the `surau'
(prayer house in which the men congregate at least once a day), the `pondok' school (where
all Malay children receive religious instruction after their normal school hours) all form an
important part of Malay culture, expressed in the kampung way of life. Thus, most important
functions, official, ceremonial or communal such as the `kenduri' (feast), election of the ketua
kampung or penghulu (headman), opening of a new mosque and other important functions
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are held in the mosque or surau. In fact, in some cases even political gatherings are held in
the mosque. The mosque, surau and pondok (considered sacred places other than their
functional importance) are usually built on high ground to prevent them from being flooded.
Some of these places also act as relief centres for flood evacuees during times of floods.
In the current research, 61.5 per cent of respondents are muslims followed by 16.7 per cent
buddhists (Table N.17). Muslims (mainly Malays) are mostly concentrated in the two East
Coast areas but buddhists and taoists (mainly Chinese) and hindus (mainly Indians) are
concentrated more on the West Coast. All Malays in the current research are muslim.
Chinese and Indians are a mixture of buddhists, christians, hindus, taoists and others.
Amongst the Chinese, 58.0 per cent are buddhist and 23.9 per cent are taoists. The majority
of Indians (65.7 per cent) are hindus. However, a significant percentage of Indians are
christians (17.1 per cent) and muslims (11.4 per cent). While the distribution of urban and
rural muslims is quite even (44.7 per cent and 55.3 per cent respectively), the majority of
hindus (85.1 per cent), buddhists (68.9 per cent), and taoists (61.9 per cent) are urban
dwellers.
N.4.7 Occupation
The majority of respondents were either entrepreneurs (traders and business operators) (24.1
per cent) or farmers (15.4 per cent). The distribution of occupations amongst the respondents
is varied (Table N.18). Unemployment amongst the respondents is very low, only 1.1 per
cent, the highest of which is in Pekan (3.6 per cent). One distinct characteristic is that only
few professionals (3.1 per cent) choose to live in floodplains.
N.4.8 Education
Educational achievements of floodplain occupants are low, despite the fact that primary and
secondary education is provided free by government schools. In the current survey, only a
small minority of 5.0 per cent of respondents have reached tertiary education (degree and
diploma levels) (Table N.19). The percentage with at least secondary education is about 43.5
per cent. On the other hand, the figure for illiteracy is significantly high at 12.9 per cent. The
rate of illiteracy is highest in the East Coast areas, with Kelantan and Pekan registering 20.8
per cent and 17.9 per cent respectively. This is not surprising as most of the respondents in
the East Coast are poor aged peasant farmers living in the rural areas. Those with higher
educational achievements such as the children of farmers have migrated to the urban areas
where better job opportunities and the attraction of city life are on offer. Kuala Lumpur
appears to be the area where floodplain occupants have the highest educational achievements.
51.8 per cent of its respondents have at least secondary education.
N.4.9 Household Income
The average household monthly income of all respondents approximates $917' (Table N.20)
but this figure is misleading as significant income disparities exist between regions, states,
ethnic groups, urban and rural areas, and other parameters are not uncommon. The difference
between the average monthly incomes of an East Coast floodplain occupant ($550) and the
West Coast counterpart ($1,353) is about $803. The latter earns more than twice the monthly
income of the former. In terms of the four sample areas, respondents from Kuala Lumpur
All figures are at 1993 prices (during time of survey) unless otherwise specified.
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have the highest monthly income while respondents from Pekan have the lowest. It should
be noted that Pekan has the highest percentage (19.3 per cent) of respondents with monthly
household incomes of less than $175. Households earning less than this income are classified
by Sulaiman Alias (1989) as living below the 'Hard-core' poverty line. According to the
Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Ghaffar Baba, households with incomes less than $350 are
considered poor (Utusan Malaysia 20.6.89). It has also been identified elsewhere that the East
Coast states have high rates of poverty between 15.0 to 40.0 per cent, Kelantan being the
poorest (International Law Book Services 1991 p235). In the current survey, 25.2 per cent
of households were identified as poor. Those living on marginal incomes (between $350 and
$499) are also substantial, totalling 15.2 per cent. As a comparison, the average household
income for Peninsular Malaysia is about $1,254 per month in 1990 (Government of Malaysia
1991a p38), or approximately $1,378 at 1993 prices.
During and immediately after the colonial period, wide income disparities existed among the
various ethnic groups. The British encouraged the more industrious Chinese to work the
mines and get involved with commercial activities but preferred the Malays to go into
government service. Indians were mostly encouraged to work in rubber estates and the public
services such as the building of roads and railways. As a result, the Chinese were
economically most advanced, followed by the Indians. The Malays were the least advanced
as the majority still remained in the rural areas as farmers and fishermen. Income disparities
became wider as the Chinese moved further and further ahead of the other two ethnic groups.
When this trend continued and even worsened after the colonial period, it culminated in
jealousies and discontent resulting in the racial riots of 13 May 1969. Since then, the New
Economic Policy (NEP) incorporated a policy of 'positive discrimination' whereby Malays
were given special preferences (in the economic and education spheres) to enable them to
catch up with the Chinese and the Indians. Successive governments have since then adhered
to the NEP and even today, although the NEP has lapsed in 1990, post-1990 policies
regarding income distribution remained similar to that of the NEP. Although the Malays have
improved their economic status, they are still behind the Chinese.
In the current survey, the average incomes of the Chinese, Indians and Malays were $1,418,
$1,320 and $625 respectively. The average monthly income of the Chinese is more than
double that of the Malays. About 35.2 per cent of Malays had monthly incomes below $350
and were therefore poor. Corresponding figures for the Chinese and Indians were 16.8 per
cent and 6.7 per cent respectively. On the other hand, only 16.1 per cent of Malays had
monthly incomes above $1,000 as compared to 45.5 per cent of Chinese and 45.0 per cent
of Indians. The chi-square test gives an observed significance level of 0.0000 which suggests
that ethnic group and income are not independent. It indicates that there are significant
differences between the incomes of the various ethnic groups. Urban respondents also tend
to have higher average monthly income ($1,247) than their rural counterparts ($529). For
instance, 41.7 per cent of urban respondents had incomes above $1,000 as compared to 9.8
per cent of rural respondents. On the other hand, poverty was high among the latter (49.2
per cent) but much lower in the former (15.7 per cent). The chi-square value of 0.0000
indicates that there are significant differences between the incomes of urban and rural folks.
Different household types also show considerable differences in incomes. Naturally,
commercial households have the highest average monthly income of $2,193. This was
followed by residential households with a figure of $850. Farming and fishing households had
much lower average monthly incomes with figures of $346 and $325 respectively. This is not
surprising as farmers and fishermen generally belong to the lowest income strata of Malaysian
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society. The chi-square value of .0000 2 also indicates significant differences between the
incomes of the various household types.
N.4.10	 Family size
Family or household size has a significant effect on many aspects of flooding on the
household. For instance, a large family involves a greater risk, especially if the bulk of the
family members are children. Furthermore, large families need more transport during
evacuation. However, if the majority are adults, then it would facilitate the moving of
damageable items from the house.ln the current research, the average family size ranged from
6 to 8 persons. Floodplain occupants in Pulau Pinang appear to have the largest family size
of 8. This is possibly due to the shortage of land and expensive housing on the island, forcing
the poor to live together as extended families. West Coast respondents have an average family
size of 7 as compared to a figure of 6 for East Coast respondents. In general, 57.4 per cent
of respondents have family sizes of 6 or less. With the exception of commercial households
which sometimes include workers who are relatives, thereby increasing the size of the
household, there is no apparent difference between the average family size of the different
household types.
N.5	 Frequency and magnitude of flooding
Naturally, the frequency and magnitude of flooding varies over space and time. While
flooding in the East Coast is generally of greater magnitude (more severe) and of longer
duration (caused by monsoon storms during the Northeast Monsoon Season), flooding in the
West Coast is currently of shorter duration but more frequent (caused by year round
convectional storms). The chi-square test result of .0000 indicates that there are significant
differences in flood frequency between properties on the East and West Coasts. Similarly,
the a test result of .0000 also indicated that there are significant differences in flood
frequency between the four sample areas. There are more properties in Pulau Pinang which
flood more than once a year than elsewhere. When respondents were asked about the number
of times their property had been flooded in the last ten years, a significant number (49.0 per
cent) reported a frequency of ten in ten years (Table N.21). In fact, many of the more
severely flooded areas such as Rawang Road in Pulau Pinang, Old Klang Road and Kampung
Pantai Dalam in Kuala Lumpur, Kota Bharu town in Kelantan and parts of Pekan town are
flooded many times a year. For instance, Makcik Mabee's house in Rawang Road is flooded
at least 7 times a year (see Appendix H Case 1). Of the four sample areas, there appears to
be a large number of properties in Pulau Pinang which are flooded at least once a year. In
the Kelantan and Pekan areas, flood frequencies are also high.
The frequency of flooding is higher in the urban areas. The chi-square test gives a value of
0.0259 which indicates that there are significant differences in flood frequency between urban
and rural households. For instance, 33.9 per cent of urban properties are flooded more than
once a year as compared to 24.5 per cent for rural properties. On the other end of the scale,
the percentage of properties experiencing a flood frequency of once in three years or less is
almost the same for rural and urban areas, being 36.5 per cent and 36.0 per cent respectively.
The higher frequency of flooding for urban areas may be attributed to intense development
which altered the hydrological regime of such areas, giving rise to higher rates of run-off,
2 This result is obtained by excluding those who refused to report their incomes and
collapsing some income categories in order to satisfy the chi-square requirement of not having
more than 20.0 percent of cells with frequencies less than 5.
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lower moisture retention of soils and shorter lag time. All these, among other factors, will
bring about higher flood peaks and more frequent flooding.
In the case of flood types, the chi-square test yielded a result of .0000, indicating that there
are significant differences in flood frequency between properties affected by river, tidal and
combined river-tidal flooding. Properties affected by tidal flooding appear to experience the
most frequent flooding. In the current survey, although 67.6 per cent of such properties were
reported to be flooded more than once a year, the truth is that these properties experience
flooding at the regular interval of twice a month when every 14 days at new and full moon,
lunar and solar tidal maxima coincide to produce spring tides. In the case of properties only
affected by river flooding, especially those located on upstream stretches of rivers, 29.9 per
cent reported experiencing a flooding frequency of more than once a year. On the other hand,
42.3 per cent of properties affected solely by river floods experience a flood frequency of less
than once in three years. However, properties which are affected by both river and tidal
flooding do not appear to have a high flood frequency. Only 22.2 per cent are flooded more
than once a year. This could be due to the respondents' denial of 'normal' flooding during
spring tides which they probably consider as 'high waters' rather than as 'floods'.
In terms of type of establishment, a greater number of commercial (39.6 per cent) and
residential households (33.0 per cent) were flooded more than once a year than other
establishments. Only 19.5 per cent of fishing and 17.9 per cent of farming households
experienced this level of flood frequency. This could be due to the fact that farming and
fishing households, mostly located in the rural areas experience fewer flash floods caused by
localised thunderstorms as compared to commercial and residential households which are
mostly located in the urban areas. The chi-square test gave a value of 0.0016, indicating that
significant differences in flood frequency exist between different types of households.
As to be expected, there are more houses with stilts (52.7 per cent) which are flooded at least
once a year than those without (43.7 per cent). Houses with higher stilts (2 metres or more)
also tend to be flooded more frequently. This is not surprising as the owners have probably
specifically built them to as a form of adaptation to the severe flooding in the area. A chi-
square value of 0.0000 indicates that significant differences in flood frequency exist between
houses with stilts and those without stilts. The test also showed that there are significant
differences in flood frequency between houses with high stilts (2 m or more) and those with
low stilts (0.5 m or less).
Flood magnitude may be indicated by a number of parameters, of which a principal one is
flood depth. Respondents were asked about the flood depth during the worst flood
experienced while living in their current properties. Flood depth reported varies between 0.3
m to more than 3 m. The majority of properties (70.1 per cent) generally experience flood
depths of less than 1.8 m but there are a significant number of properties (13.2 per cent) with
flood depths of more than 3 m (Table N.22). This indicates a substantial risk to life for those
living in them. In terms of sample areas, the two East Coast areas appear to suffer the
greatest flood depths. For instance, the greatest average flood depth of 2 m was reported by
respondents from Pekan. This was followed by a figure of 1.9 m at the Kelantan area. By
contrast, the two West Coast areas of Kuala Lumpur and Pulau Pinang had average flood
depths of 1.7 m and 1.1 m respectively. It should also be noted that the East Coast areas have
a larger number of properties experiencing greater flood depths. For instance, the proportion
of properties experiencing flood depths of 2.4 m or more in Pekan and Kelantan are 39.4 per
cent and 27.3 per cent respectively. The corresponding figures for Kuala Lumpur and Pulau
Pinang are 16.0 per cent and 2.3 per cent respectively. chi-square test values of .0000 and
.0000 indicate the existence of significant differences in flood depths between coasts as well
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as between sample areas respectively.
Flood duration may also be an indicator of flood magnitude. In Peninsular Malaysia, the
existence of different types of floods and their combinations have given rise to a great
variation in flood duration. Generally, floods can last between less than an hour (in the case
of flash floods) to more than a month (in the case of monsoon floods). In the two West Coast
areas where most of the floods are flashy in nature, flood duration tends to be short. For
instance, 92.9 per cent of respondents in Pulau Pinang reported that the worst flood lasted
less than 24 hours (Table N.23). In Kuala Lumpur, the corresponding figure was 40.5 per
cent. On the other hand, only 10.3 per cent and 4.6 per cent of households in the Kelantan
and Pekan areas were flooded for that duration. A great majority of respondents from the
East Coast areas reported durations between a week to 30 days. This is not surprising as East
Coast areas are usually inundated by monsoon floods during the Northeast Monsoon Season
from November to March. Thus, in some of the low-lying areas, the flood water subsides at
a very slow rate. In many instances, the water may actually rise again due to another spell
of flooding caused by heavy monsoon rains. The chi-square test yielded a value of .0000,
indicating that significant differences in flood duration exist between coasts as well as
between sample areas.
Flood duration is also significantly different between urban and rural areas. In the former,
the high frequency of flash floods invariably gives rise to short flood durations. On the other
hand, areas are seldom subject to flash floods because of the nature of the land surface. The
chi-square test result of .0000 indicated that there are significant differences in flood duration
between urban and rural areas. In areas subject to tidal flooding, the duration is usually short.
In fact, 80.6 per cent of households subject to tidal floods indicated that the duration of
flooding was less than 24 hours. This is obvious as the effect of high tides come and go
within a day. The duration of river floods, on the other hand, varies from a few hours to a
few weeks. A combination of tidal and river floods appears to increase flood duration. This
is because flood waters are prevented from flowing sea-wards by incoming tides which also
increase the depth of flooding. The chi-square test generated a value of 0.0000 indicating the
existence of significant differences in flood duration between different flood types.
The magnitude of a flood event can also be evaluated in terms of total actual damage caused
by the flood (Table N.24). In the current survey the total reported flood damage of the worst
flood and the most recent flood was surveyed. During the worst flood, the average total
damage suffered for all areas was $1,837. The greatest loss was in the highly built up area
of Kuala Lumpur where the average total damage was $2,753. The lowest damage was found
in the Kelantan area (For a more detailed discussion on flood damage see Appendix K). The
chi-square test value of .0000 indicated that significant differences in actual flood damage
exist between coasts and sample areas, damages being higher in the West Coast than in the
East Coast. For the most recent flood, however, similar average damages were reported by
all sample areas except Pulau Pinang which had the highest figure (Table N.25). This is due
largely to the June 1991 flood which inundated most of Georgetown and other parts of Pulau
Pinang. On the other hand, the most recent floods experienced by respondents in the other
sample areas were of lesser magnitude. On the whole, actual damages were much lower
compared to that suffered in the worst flood. An average damage of $1,393 was reported by
234 respondents who suffered damages during the most recent flood.
Although the average flood damage is not excessively high for both the most recent and worst
flood, the amount of damage must be seen in the perspective of the household's income. It
is when the amount of household flood damage is compared to the household's monthly
income that the damage severity becomes clear. In the most recent flood, 49.2 per cent of
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poor households with reported monthly incomes less than $350 suffered flood damages more
than their monthly incomes. For the low income households earning monthly incomes less
than $500, 39.0 per cent suffered flood damages greater than their monthly incomes (Table
N.26). However, a comparatively lower percentage of the higher income households appear
to suffer flood losses in excess of their monthly incomes. For example, 35.7 per cent of
households with monthly incomes between $500 and $999 suffered damages greater than their
monthly incomes. The corresponding percentages for households within the income groups
$1,000-1,999 and $2,000-2,999 are 27.3 per cent and 30.0 per cent respectively. Only 10.5
per cent of households with monthly incomes of $3,000 or more suffered damages more than
their monthly incomes.
The amount of flood damage is more severe when the figures for the worst flood experienced
is cross-tabulated against the monthly incomes of households (Table N.27). For example, a
total of 100 (77.5 per cent) out of 129 poor households with reported monthly incomes less
than $350 suffered flood damages greater than their monthly incomes. A total of 136
households (68.7 per cent) out of 198 with monthly incomes less than $500 reported flood
damages more than their monthly incomes. In comparison, only 16.1 per cent of wealthier
households with monthly incomes in excess of $3,000 suffered flood losses greater than their
monthly incomes. Thus, while flood losses are insignificant for the higher income households,
they are very significant for lower income households. This is especially so for those living
close to or below the poverty level. Flood losses can, therefore, increase flood hazard
vulnerability amongst the poor and reinforce poverty.
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Table N.1: Distribution of households in sample areas within the East and West Coasts
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
East Coast - 192 - 140 332
(West Coast 172 - 114 - .862537)
( 46.3)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
( 27.8) ( 31.1) ( 18.4) ( 22.7) (100.0)
(Figures in parentheses are percentages
Table N.2: Distribution of rural and urban households by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Urban 113 55 114 54 336
( 65.7) ( 28.6) (100.0) ( 38.6) ( 54.4)
Rural 59 137 0 86 282
( 34.3) ( 71.4) (	 0.0) ( 61.4) ( 45.6)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
igures in parentheses are percentages
Table N.3: Households affected by various flood types by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
River flood 110 131 114 23 378
( 64.0) ( 68.2) (100.0) ( 16.4) ( 61.2)
Tidal & 36 50 0 117 203
River flood ( 20.9) ( 26.0) (	 0.0) ( 83.6) ( 32.8)
Tidal flood 26 11 0 0 37
( 15.1) (	 5.7) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 6.0)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
igures in parentheses are percentages
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Table N.4: Type of establishment of households by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Residential 121 72 90 53 336
( 70.4) ( 37.5) ( 79.0) ( 37.8) ( 54.4)
Farming 18 79 0 48 145
( 10.5) ( 41.1) (	 0.0) ( 34.3) ( 23.5)
Commercial 32 30 24 10 96
( 18.6) ( 15.6) ( 21.1) (	 7.1) ( 15.5)
Fishing 1 11 0 29 41
(	 0.6) (	 5.7) (	 0.0) ( 20.7) (	 6.6)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
igures in parentheses are percentages
Table N.5: Distribution of building type by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Detached 92 134 59 114 399
( 53.5) ( 69.8) ( 51.8) ( 81.4) ( 64.5)
Semi- 33 45 13 21 112
detached ( 19.2) ( 23.4) ( 11.4) ( 15.0) ( 18.1)
Terraced 41 12 36 5 94
( 23.8) (	 6.3) ( 31.6) (	 3.6) ( 15.2)
Flat 5 1 6 0 13
(	 3.5) (	 0.5) (	 5.3) (	 0.0) (	 2.1)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
gures in parentheses are percentages
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Table N.6: Building material of outer wall of buildings by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Brick & 69 12 23 21 125
concrete ( 40.1) (	 6.3) ( 20.2) ( 15.0) ( 20.2)
Brick & 59 61 34 22 176
wood ( 34.3) ( 31.8) ( 29.8) ( 15.7) ( 28.5)
Wood 43 119 57 97 316
( 25.0) ( 62.0) ( 50.0) ( 69.3) ( 51.1)
Others 1 0 0 0 1
(	 0.6) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 0.2)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
igures in parentheses are percentages
Table N.7: Age of buildings (Years) by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
>100 0 2 0 0 2
(	 0.0) (	 1.0) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 0.3)
81 - 100 0 5 0 0 5
(	 0.0) (	 2.6) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 0.8)
61 - 80 9 11 3 7 30
(	 5.2) (	 5.7) (	 2.6) (	 5.0) (	 4.9)
41 - 60 44 30 14 20 108
( 25.6) ( 15.6) ( 12.3) ( 14.3) ( 17.5)
21 - 40 60 56 60 48 224
( 34.9) ( 29.2) ( 52.6) ( 34.3) ( 36.2)
11 - 20 37 53 31 39 160
( 21.5) ( 27.6) ( 27.2) ( 27.9) ( 25.9)
<11 7 35 6 26 89
( 12.8) ( 18.2) (	 5.3) ( 18.6) ( 14.4)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Average 30.4 29.0 28.1 26.0 28.7
gures in parentheses are percentages
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Table N.8: Floor type of buildings by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Marble 18 4 1 12 35
( 10.5) (	 2.1) (	 0.9) (	 8.6) (	 5.7)
Carpet 8 1 0 1 10
(	 4.7) (	 0.5) (	 0.0) (	 0.7) (	 1.6)
Cement 106 52 74 10 242
( 61.6) ( 27.1) ( 64.9) (	 7.1) ( 39.4)
Wood 31 134 36 117 318
( 18.0) ( 69.8) ( 31.6) ( 83.6) ( 51.5)
Vinyl 8 1 0 0 9
(	 4.7) (	 0.5) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 1.5)
Others 1 0 3 0 4
(	 0.6) (	 0.0) (	 2.6) (	 0.0) (	 0.7
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
(Figures in parentheses are percentages)
Table N.9: Number of buildings with and without stilts by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
With stilts 58 153 32 121 364
( 33.7) ( 79.7) ( 28.1) ( 86.4) ( 58.9)
Without 114 39 82 19 254
stilts ( 66.3) ( 20.3) ( 71.9) ( 13.6) ( 41.1)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
gures in parentheses are percentage
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Table N.10: Distribution of stilt heights of surveyed buildings by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
< 1 metre 28 50 21 36 135
( 48.2) ( 32.7) ( 65.7) ( 29.7) ( 37.1)
1 - 2 metres 19 51 10 59 139
( 32.8) ( 33.3) ( 31.2) ( 48.8) ( 38.2)
> 2 metres 11 52 1 26 90
( 19.0) ( 34.0) (	 3.1) ( 21.5) ( 24.7)
Total 58 153 32 121 364
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Average 1.2 metres 1.5 metres 0.9 metres 1.4 metres 1.3 metres
es in parentheses are percentages
Table N.11: Stilt type of houses surveyed by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Concrete 6 75 4 26 111
( 10.3) ( 49.0) ( 12.5) ( 21.5) ( 30.5)
Wood & 32 30 10 26 98
concrete ( 55.2) ( 19.6) ( 31.2) ( 21.5) ( 26.9)
Wood 20 47 15 68 150
( 34.5) ( 30.7) ( 46.9) ( 56.3) ( 41.2)
Bamboo 0 1 3 1 5
(	 0.0) (	 0.7) (	 9.4) (	 0.7) (	 1.4)
Total 58 153 32 121 364
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
(Figures in parentheses are percentages)
Table N.12: Property ownership amongst respondents by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Owner 130 157 85 120 492
( 75.6) ( 81.8) ( 74.6) ( 85.7) ( 79.6)
Tenant 42 35 29 20 126
( 24.4) ( 18.2) ( 25.4) ( 14.3) ( 20.4)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
gures in parentheses are percentages)
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Table N.13: Number of years respondents have occupied the current property by sample
area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
> 61 years 1 7 0 5 13
(	 0.6) (	 3.7) (	 0.0) (	 3.5) (	 2.0)
51-60 years 6 12 0 5 23
(	 3.5) (	 6.3) (	 0.0) (	 3.5) (	 3.7)
41-50 years 17 12 2 7 38
(	 9.9) (	 6.3) (	 1.8) (	 5.0) (	 6.1)
31-40 years 22 23 14 17 76
( 12.8) ( 12.0) ( 12.3) ( 12.1) ( 12.3)
21-30 years 31 40 35 23 129
( 18.0) ( 20.8) ( 30.7) ( 16.4) ( 20.9)
11-20 years 50 55 37 40 182
( 29.1) ( 28.6) ( 32.5) ( 28.6) ( 29.4)
1-10 years 45 43 26 43 157
( 26.2) ( 22.4) ( 22.8) ( 30.7) ( 25.4)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Average 23 years & 24 years & 19 years & 22 years & 22 years &
....	 .
4 months
.
10 months 11 months 6 months 11 months
	
r
igures in parentfleses are percentages
Table N.14: Gender of respondents by samp e area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Male 125 142 85 105 457
( 72.7) ( 74.0) ( 74.6) ( 75.0) (	 73.9)
Female 47 50 29 35 161
( 27.3) ( 26.0) ( 25.4) ( 25.0) (	 26.1)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
(Figures in parentheses are percentages)
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Table N.15: Age of respondents by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
> 60 years 17 27 10 14 68
(	 9.9) ( 14.1) (	 8.8) ( 10.0) ( 11.0)
51-60 years 24 31 16 30 101
( 14.0) ( 16.1) ( 14.0) ( 21.4) ( 16.3)
41-50 years 46 46 32 30 154
( 26.7) ( 24.0) ( 28.1) ( 21.4) ( 24.9)
31-40 years 46 44 30 40 160
( 26.7) ( 22.9) ( 26.3) ( 28.6) ( 25.9)
21-30 years 24 33 22 18 97
( 14.0) ( 17.2) ( 19.3) ( 12.9) ( 15.7)
< 21 years 15 11 4 8 38
(	 8.7) (	 5.7) (	 3.5) (	 5.7) (	 6.1)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.00 (100.00
Average age 40 years & 42 years 40 years & 42 years 41 years &
4 months 7 months 4 months
(Figures in parentheses are percentages)
Table N.16: Ethnicity of respondents by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Malay 76 123 52 98 349
( 44.2) ( 64.1) ( 45.6) ( 70.0) ( 56.5)
Chinese 55 65 34 22 176
( 32.0) ( 33.9) ( 29.8) ( 15.7) ( 28.5)
Indian 41 2 27 0 70
( 23.8) (	 1.0) ( 23.7) (	 0.0) ( 11.3)
Others 0 2 1 20 23
(	 0.0) (	 1.0) (	 0.9) ( 14.3) (	 3.7)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
(Figures in parentheses are percentages)
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Table N.17: Respondents' religion by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Muslim 82 128 54 116 380
( 47.7) ( 66.7) ( 47.4) ( 86.1) ( 61.5)
Christian 10 10 10 10 40
(	 5.8) (	 5.2) (	 8.8) (	 9.1) (	 6.5)
Buddhist 35 36 21 11 103
( 20.3) ( 18.8) ( 18.4) ( 23.3) ( 16.7)
Hindu 26 2 19 0 47
( 15.1) (	 1.0) ( 16.7) (	 0.0) (	 7.6)
Taoist 14 16 9 3 42
(	 8.1) (	 8.3) (	 7.9) (	 2.1) (	 6.8)
Others 5 0 1 0 6
(	 2.9) (	 0.0) (	 0.9) (	 0.0) (	 1.0)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
(Figures in parentheses are percentages)
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Table N.18: Respondents' occupation by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Professional 9 1 5 4 19
(	 5.2) (	 0.5) (	 4.4) (	 2.9) (	 3.1)
Farmer 15 50 0 30 95
(	 8.7) ( 26.0) (	 0.0) ( 21.4) ( 15.4)
Artisan 24 15 19 14 72
( 14.0) (	 7.8) ( 16.7) ( 10.0) ( 11.2)
Trade & 39 50 40 20 149
Business ( 22.7) ( 26.0) ( 35.1) ( 14.3) ( 24.1)
Labourer 11 20 9 6 46
(	 6.4) ( 10.4) (	 7.9) (	 4.3) (	 7.4)
Education 10 8 7 4 29
(	 5.8) (	 4.2) (	 6.1) (	 2.9) (	 4.7)
Manufacture 25 2 12 2 41
( 14.5) (	 1.0) ( 10.5) (	 1.4) (	 6.6)
Fisherman 2 11 0 29 42
1.2) (	 5.7) (	 0.0) ( 20.7) (	 6.8)
Unemployed 2 1 0 5 8
1.2) (	 0.5) (	 0.0) (	 3.6) (	 1.3)
Retired 11 12 5 6 34
6.4) (	 6.3) (	 4.4) (	 4.3) (	 5.5)
Housewife 16 13 13 18 60
9.3) (	 6.8) ( 11.4) ( 12.9) (	 9.7)
Student 8 9 4 2 23
4.7) (	 4.7) (	 3.5) (	 1.4) (	 3.7)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
gures in parentheses are percentages
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Table N.19: Respondents' educational achievement by sample area
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Degree 6 2 2 1 11
(	 3.5) (	 1.0) (	 1.8) (	 0.7) (	 1.8)
Diploma 5 8 7 0 20
(	 2.9) (	 4.2) (	 6.1) (	 0.0) (	 3.2)
Upper 36 22 22 16 96
Secondary ( 20.9) ( 11.5) ( 19.3) ( 11.4) ( 15.5)
Lower 35 51 28 28 142
Secondary ( 20.3) ( 26.6) ( 24.6) ( 20.0) ( 23.0)
Completed 40 35 37 28 140
Primary ( 23.3) ( 18.2) ( 32.5) ( 20.0) ( 22.7)
Few years 36 34 17 42 129
Primary ( 20.9) ( 17.7) ( 14.9) ( 30.0) ( 20.9)
Illiterate 14 40 1 25 80
(	 8.1) ( 20.8) (	 0.9) ( 17.9) ( 12.9)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
(Figures in parentheses are percentages)
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Table N.20: Reported monthly household incomes by sample area (in Malaysian
Ringgits)
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
10,000& 2 0 1 0 3
above (	 1.2) (	 0.0) (	 0.9) (	 0.0) (	 0.5)
5,000-9,999 1 1 4 0 6
(	 0.6) (	 0.5) (	 3.5) (	 0.0) (	 1.0)
4,000-4,999 1 0 2 0 3
(	 0.6) (	 0.0) (	 1.8) (	 0.0) (	 0.5)
3,000-3,999 3 1 4 0 8
(	 1.7) (	 0.5) (	 3.5) (	 0.0) (	 1.3)
2,500-2,999 3 1 3 0 7
(	 1.7) (	 0.5) (	 2.6) (	 0.0) (	 1.1)
2,000-2,499 7 3 6 1 17
(	 4.1) (	 1.6) (	 5.3) (	 0.7) (	 2.8)
1,500-1,999 12 9 13 1 35
(	 7.0) (	 4.7) ( 11.4) (	 0.7) (	 5.7)
1,000-1,499 28 14 28 7 77
( 16.3) (	 7.3) ( 24.6) (	 5.0) ( 12.5)
750-999 27 10 26 12 75
( 15.7) (	 5.2) ( 22.8) (	 8.6) ( 12.1)
500-749 35 31 12 19 97
( 20.3) ( 16.1) ( 10.5) ( 13.6) ( 15.7)
350-499 27 35 5 27 94
( 15.7) ( 18.2) (	 4.4) ( 19.3) ( 15.2)
175-349 7 52 2 41 102
(	 4.1) ( 27.1) (	 1.8) ( 29.3) ( 16.5)
<175 5 22 0 27 54
(	 2.9) ( 11.5) (	 0.0) ( 19.3) (	 8.7)
Refused 14 13 8 5 40
(	 8.1) (	 6.8) (	 7.0) (	 3.6) (	 6.5)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Average
monthly 1,151 629 1,655 445 917
income
Tures in parenifieses are percentages
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Table N.21: Reported flood frequency of properties in four sample areas in Peninsular
Malaysia
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Don't know 4 1 1 1 7
(	 2.3) (	 0.5) (	 0.9) (	 0.7) (	 1.1)
0 in 10 0 6 21 3 30
(	 0.0) (	 3.1) ( 18.4) (	 2.1) (	 4.9)
1 in 10 38 33 8 18 97
( 22.1) ( 17.2) (	 7.0) ( 12.9) ( 15.7)
2 in 10 14 16 13 16 59
(	 8.1) (	 8.3) ( 11.4) ( 11.4) (	 9.5)
3 in 10 6 16 10 6 38
(	 3.5) (	 8.3) (	 8.8) (	 4.3) (	 6.1)
4 in 10 4 6 3 1 14
(	 2.3) (	 3.1) (	 2.6) (	 0.7) (	 2.3)
5 in 10 2 6 3 4 15
(	 1.2) (	 3.1) (	 2.6) (	 2.9) (	 2.4)
6 in 10 0 6 0 6 12
(	 0.0) (	 3.1) (	 0.0) (	 4.3) (	 1.9)
7 in 10 3 9 5 7 24
(	 1.7) (	 4.7) (	 4.4) (	 5.0) (	 3.9) (
8 in 10 2 7 2 5 16
(	 1.2) (	 3.6) (	 1.8) (	 3.6) (	 2.6)
9 in 10 0 1 0 2 3
(	 0.0) (	 0.5) (	 0.0) (	 1.4) (	 0.5)
10 in 10 9 47 14 50 120
(	 5.2) ( 24.5) ( 12.3) ( 35.7) ( 19.4)
11 + in 10 90 38 34 21 183
( 52.3) ( 19.8) ( 29.8) ( 15.0) ( 29.6)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
(Figures in parentheses are percentages)
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Table N.22: Reported flood depth of properties in four sample areas during the worst
flood
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Don't know 2 3 0 1 6
(	 1.3) (	 1.6) ( 0.0) (	 0.8) (	 1.0)
0.3m 27 4 2 4 37
( 15.7) (	 2.2) (	 1.9) (	 3.0) (	 6.2)
0.6m 20 13 5 8 46
( 11.6) (	 7.1) (	 4.7) (	 6.1) (	 7.8)
0.9m 34 15 11 25 85
( 19.8) (	 8.2) ( 10.4) ( 18.9) ( 14.3)
1.2m 23 27 15 13 78
( 13.4) ( 14.8) ( 14.2) (	 9.8) ( 13.2)
1.5m 41 24 21 10 96
( 23.8) ( 13.1) ( 19.8) (	 7.6) ( 16.2)
1.8m 15 28 11 14 68
(	 8.7) ( 15.3) ( 10.4) ( 10.6) ( 11.5)
2.1 m 6 19 24 5 54
(	 3.5) ( 10.4) ( 22.6) (	 3.8) (	 9.1)
2.4m 3 6 9 9 27
(	 1.7) (	 3.3) (	 8.5) (	 6.8) (	 4.6)
2.7m 0 7 3 8 18
(	 0.0) (	 3.8) (	 2.8) (	 6.1) (	 3.0)
3.0 m 0 9 1 13 23
(	 0.0) (	 4.9) (	 0.9) (	 9.8) (	 3.9)
> 3.0 m 1 28 4 22 55
(	 0.6) ( 15.3) (	 3.8) ( 16.7) (	 9.3)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Igures in parentneses are percentages
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Table N.23: Reported flood duration in four sample areas during the worst flood
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
Don't know 4 8 1 5 18
(	 2.3) (	 4.4) (	 0.9) (	 3.8) (	 3.0)
1-2 hours 7 0 3 1 11
(	 4.1) (	 0.0) (	 2.8) (	 0.8) (	 1.9)
3-5 hours 17 3 20 0 40
(	 9.9) (	 1.6) ( 18.9) (	 0.0) (	 6.7)
6-12 hours 99 3 11 0 60
( 57.6) (	 1.6) ( 10.4) (	 0.0) ( 10.1)
13-24 hours 15 5 8 0 113
(	 8.7) (	 2.7) (	 7.5) (	 0.0) ( 19.1)
1-2 days 24 23 11 2 60
( 14.0) ( 12.6) ( 10.4) (	 1.5) ( 10.1)
3-4 days 5 64 7 10 86
(	 2.9) ( 35.0) (	 6.6) (	 7.6) ( 14.5)
5-7 days 1 54 16 30 101
(	 0.6) ( 29.5) ( 15.1) ( 22.7) ( 17.0)
8-10 days 0 14 27 16 57
(	 0.0) (	 7.7) ( 25.5) ( 12.1) (	 9.6)
11-30 days 0 9 2 63 74
(	 0.0) (	 4.9) (	 1.9) ( 47.7) ( 12.5)
> 30 days 0 0 0 5 5
(	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 3.8) (	 0.8)
Total 172 192 114 140 618
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
(Figures in parentheses are percentages)
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Table N.24: Total reported actual flood damage suffered by households in four sample
areas during the worst flood (In Malaysian Rmggits)
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
1-100 12 12 1 2 27
(	 8.0) (	 7.9) (	 1.2) (	 2.0) (	 5.6)
101-200 9 21 2 2 34
(	 6.0) ( 13.9) (	 2.4) (	 2.0) (	 7.0)
201-300 13 11 1 4 29
(	 8.7) (	 7.3) (	 1.2) (	 4.0) (	 6.0)
301-400 9 9 3 3 24
(	 6.0) (	 6.0) (	 3.6) (	 3.0) (	 4.9)
401-500 6 16 8 6 36
(	 4.0) ( 10.6) (	 9.5) (	 6.0) (	 7.4)
501-1,000 30 32 15 21 98
( 20.0) ( 21.2) ( 17.9) ( 21.0) ( 20.2)
1,001-2,000 24 26 17 25 92
( 16.0) ( 17.2) ( 20.2) ( 25.0) ( 19.0)
2,001-3,000 16 9 10 22 57
( 10.7) (	 6.0) ( 11.9) ( 22.0) ( 11.8)
3,001-4,000 13 6 9 8 36
(	 8.7) (	 4.0) ( 10.7) (	 8.0) (	 7.4)
4,001-5,000 10 2 7 1 20
(	 6.7) (	 1.3) (	 8.3) (	 1.0) (	 4.1)
5,001-7,500 2 5 7 5 19
(	 1.3) (	 3.3) (	 8.3) (	 5.0) (	 3.9)
7,501- 2 1 2 0 5
10,000 (	 1.3) (	 0.7) (	 2.4) (	 0.0) (	 1.0)
10,001- 4 0 0 1 5
15,000 (	 2.7) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 1.0) (	 1.0)
15,001- 0 1 0 0 1
20,000 (	 0.0) (	 0.7) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 0.2)
>20,000 0 0 2 0 2
(	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 2.4) (	 0.0) (	 0.4)
Total 150 151 84 100 485
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Average $1,867 $1,257 $2,753 $1,897 $1,837
(Figures in parentheses are percentages)
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Table N.25: Total actual flood damage reported by households in four sample areas
during the most recent flood (In Malaysian Ringgits)
Pulau
Pinang
Kelantan Kuala
Lumpur
Pekan Total
1-100 8 18 1 2 29
(	 7.2) ( 24.7) (	 5.0) (	 6.7) ( 12.4)
101-200 9 16 2 7 34
(	 8.1) ( 21.9) ( 10.0) ( 23.3) ( 14.5)
201-300 16 6 4 0 26
( 14.4) (	 8.2) ( 20.0) (	 0.0) ( 11.1)
301-400 9 5 1 3 18
(	 8.1) (	 6.8) (	 5.0) ( 10.0) (	 7.7)
401-500 4 3 3 3 13
(	 3.6) (	 4.1) ( 15.0) ( 10.0) (	 5.6)
501-1,000 14 12 2 4 18
( 12.6) ( 16.4) ( 10.0) ( 13.3) (	 7.7)
1,001-2,000 15 6 5 6 32
( 13.5) (	 8.2) ( 25.0) ( 20.0) ( 13.7)
2,001-3,000 13 1 0 4 18
(	 11.7) (	 1.4) (	 0.0) ( 13.3) (	 7.7)
3,001-4,000 11 2 1 0 14
(	 9.9) (	 2.7) (	 5.0) (	 0.0) (	 6.0)
4,001-5,000 6 2 0 0 8
(	 5.4) (	 2.7) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 3.4)
5,001-7,500 2 0 1 1 4
(	 1.8) (	 0.0) (	 5.0) (	 3.3) (	 1.7)
7,501- 3 0 0 0 3
10,000 (	 2.7) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 1.3)
10,001- 1 0 0 0 1
15,000 (	 0.9) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 0.4)
15,001- 0 2 0 0 2
20,000 (	 0.0) (	 2.7) (	 0.0) (	 0.00) (	 0.9)
Total 111 73 20 30 234
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Average $1,738 $1,088 $1,090 $1,060 $1,393
igures in parent ieses are percentages
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Table N.26: Cross tabulation of estimated total flood damage suffered during the most
recent flood (C1275) by reported average monthly income of respondent
(C1359)
,
C1275
<$500 $500-999 $1,000-
1,999
$2,000-
2,999
$3,000+ TOTAL
C1359
<$500 61 18 14 4 3 100
( 54.5) ( 56.2) ( 46.7) ( 23.5) ( 10.4) ( 45.5)
$500-999 29 7 6 5 9 56
( 25.9) ( 21.9) ( 20.0) ( 29.4) ( 31.0) ( 25.5)
$1,000- 18 6 8 5 7 44
1,999 ( 16.0) ( 18.8) ( 26.7) ( 29.4) ( 24.1) ( 20.0)
$2,000- 3 1 2 1 3 10
2,999 (	 2.7) (	 3.1) (	 6.6) (	 5.9) ( 10.4) (	 4.5)
$3,000+ 1 0 0 2 7 10
(	 0.9) (	 0.0) (	 0.0) ( 11.8) ( 24.1) (	 4.5)
TOTAL 112 32 30 17 29 220
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
igures in parentheses are percentages)
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Table N.27: Cross tabulation of estimated total flood damage suffered during the
worst flood (C1032) by reported average monthly income of respondent
(C1359)
C1032
<$500 $500-999 $1,000-
1,999
$2,000-
2,999
$3,000+ TOTAL
C1359
<$500 62 52 43 20 21 198
( 45.3) ( 55.3) ( 48.3) ( 35.7) ( 25.0) ( 43.0)
$500-999 44 21 21 16 23 125
( 32.1) ( 22.3) ( 23.6) ( 28.6) ( 27.4) ( 27.2)
$1,000- 27 17 21 13 18 96
1,999 ( 19.7) ( 18.1) ( 23.6) ( 23.2) ( 21.4) ( 20.9)
$2,000- 4 4 1 3 9 21
2,999 (	 2.9) (	 4.3) (	 1.1) (	 5.4) ( 10.7) (	 4.6)
$3,000+ 0 0 3 4 13 20
(	 0.0) (	 0.0) (	 3.4) (	 7.1) ( 15.5) (	 4.3)
TOTAL 137 94 89 56 84 460
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
(Figures in parentheses are percentages)
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In P A Merriman and C W A Browitt (eds) 1993 Natural Disasters: Protecting Vulnerable
Communities, Proceedings of the IDNDR Conference in London, 13-15 October, Thomas
Telford, London, 194-209
16. Flood hazard mitigation in peninsular
Malaysia
N. W. CHAN, Flood Hazard Research Centre, Middlesex
University
INTRODUCTION
Peninsular Malaysia lies approximately between latitudes 1"N
to 7"N and longitudes 100"E to 105"E. It covers an area of
131,795 km 2 . The climate is equatorial with uniformly high
temperatures all year round (mean monthly temperature is about
26.7"C). The mean annual rainfall is high and varies from
about 150 cm to more than 350 cm. In general. rainfall
decreases as one moves from the east coast to the west coast.
In the east coast, the mean annual rainfall can be as high as
400 cm. The bulk of this rainfall is deposited during the
Northeast Monsoon Season from November to March (Ref.1). In
the west coast, most of the rains fall during the two short
inter-monsoon seasons in April and October where convectional
rain storms occur frequently.
The topography of the peninsula is characterised by various
fold mountain ranges in a predominantly northwest to southeast
direction. A central mountain range, the Titiwangsa Range,
forms the backbone of the peninsula. It is flanked by seven
other mountain ranges. Average height ranges from about 1500
meters to 2000 meters. Near the coasts and rivers are flat
alluvial plains with heights no more than one or two meters
above sea level. It is in these lowland plains that most of
the population is concentrated.
The heavy all year round rainfall in the Malaysian peninsula
has given rise to a more than 100 river systems, though there
is no single large river dominating the drainage pattern. The
Titiwangsa Range is the main divide which determines whether a
river flows eastward into the South China Sea or westwards
into the Straits of Malacca. Due to the nature of its
topography, the river courses are relatively short. The
gradients of the rivers in the upper courses are steep, some
drop about 1200 meters in less than 24 km before they emerge
on to the coastal flood plains. In the lower stretches and the
flood plains, the river gradients are gentle and flat, giving
rise to widespread meandering patterns. Although the year-
round precipitation ensures perennial stream flow and no river
course is ever completely dry at any one time of the year, the
torrential and localised nature of the rainfall causes rapid
194	 Natural disasters. Thomas Telford, London, 1993
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fluctuations in	 the river	 discharge. Consequently, 	 the
occurrence of floods is not uncommon (Ret.2).
THE FLOOD HAZARD
Historical floods
Although	 its	 neighbours	 Indonesia and	 the Philippines
experience earthquakes. volcano eruptions and typhoons,
Malaysians are fortunate in that there are no such natural
hazards in the peninsula. The flood hazard is the only
significant natural hazard that affects Peninsular Malaysia.
While localised flooding occurs almost every year in one place
or another, widespread and extensive floods in the peninsula
have occurred regularly with a trequency of once in a few
years. In the distance past, major floods in 1886, 1926. 1931,
1947, 1954, 1957. 1965. 1967 and 1971 have caused extensive
damage to public utilities, crops and properties, disruption
ot social and economic activities, breakdown of essential
services, outbreak ot diseases and even the loss of lives.
More recently, extensive hoods have also occurred in 1973,
1979, 1983, 1986. 1988 and 1991. In the highly developed urban
areas, flash floods are also a common hazard during torrential
convection storms which occur all year round (Ref.3). The
major flood-prone areas in the peninsula are mostly located in
the coastal plains and riverine areas IFig.1).
Flood damage
The costs incurred by the Malaysian Government in rescw% and
flood relief operations, as well as rehabilitation of public
works and utilities is substantial. It is estimated that the
damages for an annual flood, a 10-year flood and a 40-year
flood are M$3.0 million, MS18.0 million and MS44.0 million
respectively. Very little is remembered of the 1886 flood
except that it was called the "Storm Forest Flood". This was
because the flood, accompanied by gale force winds, destroyed
several hundred sq.km ot lowlying forests in the Kelantan
River and Besut River flood plains. The 1926 flood was perhaps
the biggest flood in living memory. During this flood most
parts of the peninsula were affected. The 1971 flood was so
serious that it was declared a national disaster by the Prime
Minister. During this flood, most parts of the peninsula
suffered damages on an unprecedented scale. The federal
capital of Kuala Lumpur (MS34 million flood damage) and the
Pahang River Basin (MS30 million flood damage) were the two
worst hit areas. The 1967 flood was also a big one causing the
most damage in the Kelantan, Terengganu and Perak river
basins. The damage estimated for the Kelantan River Basin
alone was MS78 million. More recently, the 1986 flood in
Kelantan and Terengganu caused an unprecedented postponement
of the public school examinations (Ref.4). A summary of flood
damage for selected floods is shown in Table 1.
Types of flooding
In general, flood types in Peninsular Malaysia may be
classified into the following categories:
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Fig. 1. Flood-prone areas in peninsular Malaysia (after Japan
International Cooperation Agency, 1982)
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(Year)
1967
1967
1967
1971
1971
1984
1988
1991
1992
Persons
Evacuated
320,000
280,000
78,000
153,000
NA
8,400
36,800
NA
NA
FORECASTING AND WARNING
Table 1 : Flood	 Damage for Selected Floods in Peninsular
Malaysia
Flood Event	 Damage
(Place)	 (MSmillion)
Death
Kelantan R. Basin 78.4 38
Perak R. Basin 60.8 0
Terengganu R. Basin 15.8 17
Pahang R. Basin 37.7 24
Kuala Lumpur 34.3 24
Batu Pahat R. Basin 18.0 0
Kelantan R. Basin 29.8 19
Peninsular Malaysia NA 11
Peninsular Malaysia NA 12
(Source: Drainage and Irrigation Department Malaysia
and Malaysian National Security Council)
(1) Overbank flooding due to overbank flow as a result of
insufficient channel capacity:
(2) Tidal flooding which is the combined result of high tideS
and back water effect: and
(3) Inland flooding due to poor drainage.
FLOOD MITIGATION
Pre-1971
In Peninsular Malaysia, the Government is the main body
responsible for flood mitigation. However, prior to the 1971
flood, flood mitigation was not even mentioned as a function
of any agency/department. Although the Drainage and Irrigation
Department (DID) was entrusted with the responsibility of
providing drainage and irrigation, the responsibility of flood
mitigation was not part of its function (even though flood
mitigation is closely related to drainage). Because of its
role in drainage and river conservancy. the DID employed
mostly structural measures of flood control. This was
inevitable because the DID was an agency entirely dominated by
engineers.
The Malaysian Meteorological Service (MMS) was responsible for
forecasting the weather, but it was never entrusted with the
responsibility of forecasting floods. Because of this, all it
did was to forecast heavy rain spells. In the case of the
Public Works Department JPWD), flood mitigation measures would
mean building stronger and higher bridges, building roads
higher than the normal flood mark, or even building
alternative roads which avoided the flood plains. Only the
Police Department, the Welfare Department and the Ministry of
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Health could be said to employ some form of non-structural
flood mitigation measures. The Police Department was involved
with the dissemination of flood warnings and rescue
operations. The Welfare Department only moved in during and
after a flood, mostly to provide relief. And the Health
Department's concern was really the control of diseases rather
than flood mitigation of	 any sort. As a result, flood
mitigation measures prior to 	 1971 were almost	 entirely
structural.
Whenever flooding occurred, each and every Government agency
was responsible for the protection, rehabilitation, relief and
carrying out of all other works related to the flood hazard
within its jurisdiction. There was no central controlling body
to monitor and coordinate the work. As a result, there was
little team work between the Government agencies and often
there was overlapping of responsibilities between two or more
agencies, frequently resulting in confusion.
Post-1971
Despite its disastrous nature, the 1971 flood was really a
blessing in disguise. It exposed the inadequacies of flood
protection measures and the non-existence of a central body to
plan, manage and monitor all aspects of flood mitigation in
the peninsula. Furthermore, it showed that rapid development
of flood plain regions since independence had substantially
increased flood damage potential, particularly in urban areas.
As a result, the Government embarked on a new approach towards
comprehensive flood mitigation in the peninsula. A Water
Resources Committee, headed by the Prime Minister's Department
was set up to tackle the flood problems and other water
related issues. Based on the recommendations of this
committee, the flood mitigation strategies introduced were:
(1) The establishment of flood hazard institutions:
(a) The Permanent Commission on Flood Control:
This commission was established by a decision of the Malaysian
Cabinet on 21st December 1971. Its immediate task was to study
short-term measures to prevent the occurrence of floods and
long-term measures for flood mitigation. As such, its main
objective is to prevent floods from occurring. However, in the
event of unavoidable flooding, its objective is to minimize
flood damage in terms of loss of life and property. It is
headed by the Minister of Agriculture with the DID serving as
the secretariat.
(b) The National Disaster Relief and Preparedness Committee
(NDRPC):
The NDRPC is headed by the Minister of Information and has its
secretariat at the National Security Council in the Prime
Minister's Department. The committee is responsible for
coordinating all relief operations before, during and after a
flood. The NDRPC is theoretically responsible for all the
operations at the national, state, district, mukim and village
levels (Fig.2). In reality, however, it coordinates operations
at the national level and overlooks operations at the state
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FEDERAL DISASTER RELIEF AND PREPAREDNESS COMMITTIE
National Security Council (Secretariatl
Ministry of Information (Chair)
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of National Unity and Social Development
Federal Chief Secretariat
Ministry of Transport
Federal Police Department
Federal Armed Forces
FEDERAL SUB-GROUP
TRANSPORT/COMMUNICATIONS
Ministry of Finance. Ministry of Internal
Commerce & Consumer Affairs, Ministry of
Health. Ministry of National Unity & Social
Development, National Padl Board, Federal
DID, Federal MMS, Kuala Lumpur City Hall,
National Security Council.
FEDERAL SUB-GROUP
WORKS/SUPPLIES
Ministry of Transport, Ministry
of Internal Commerce & Consumer
Affairs. Federal PWD, Ministry of
National Unity & Social Development,
Federal DID. Federal MMS. Federal
Police Department, Federal Armed
Forces. Federal Navy, Federal Air
Force, Kuala Lum pur City Hall,
National Security Council
STATE DISASTER RELIEF AND PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEES
State Security Council
State Police Department
State Armed Forces
State Department of Health
State Drainage and Irrigation Department
State Welfare Department
State National Padl Board
State Department of Commerce and Industry
State Department of (n(ormatfon
State De partment of Education
State Public Works Department
Other State Government Agencies
All Voluntary Organisations 
DISTRICT DISASTER RELIEF AND PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEES
District Office
District Police Department
Distnct Public Works Department
District Hesith Department
District Welfare Department
Armed Forces Representative
District Drainage and Irrigation Department
Other District Government Agencies
All Voluntary Organisations
MUKIM DISASTER RELIEF AND PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEES
Penghulu (Chief Headman) and village heads
Some advisers (Government officers) in certain cases 
VILLAGE DISASTER RELIEF AND PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEES
Village Head, Elders of the village
Flood Wardens ithose villagers living closest to river)
Fig. 2. Structure of the Federal Disaster Relief and
Preparedness Committee in peninsular Malaysia (source:
National Security Council of Malaysia)
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level. Much of the operations in each state is left to be run
by the respective state authorities. The main task of the
NDRPC is to ensure that assistance and aid are provided to
flood victims in an orderly and effective manner from the
national level downwards.
(c) The Drainage and Irrigation Department:
Although river conservancy has always been a traditional
function of the DID, flood mitigation was only offiCially
designated as an additional function in 1972 (Ref.5). With
these two functions going hand in hand, the DID is now
responsible for the maintenance of river channels free from
foreign obstructions, preventing silt from reaching the river,
de-silting of river beds, diversion of river channels for
mining and other purposes, river improvement works, river
training and the construction and maintenance of other
engineering structures for flood protection.
(2) The establishment of a flood disaster relief machinery:
This machinery was set up to ensure that all assistance and
aid can be brought to the flood victims as quickly and as
efficiently as possible. It is coordinated by the National
Security Council (NSC) and the NDRPC is a part of this
machinery (Fig.3). When the MMS and DID has forecasted an
impending flood, the machinery will be activated. However, the
full machinery will only be activated when floods occur in
several states or when a state experiences a massive flood
which cannot be adequately handled by the state authorities.
In the event of massive and widespread flooding seriously
crippling several states, then the NSC will advise the
Honourable Prime Minister who may then decide whether or not
to declare the flooding as a national disaster.
At the federal level, the NSC is the secretariat for the Flood
Disaster Relief and Preparedness Committee (FDRPC) which
comprises members from the Ministries of Information, Finance.
National Unity and Social development. Transport, the Federal
Chief Secretary, the Federal Police Department and the Federal
Armed Forces. The FDRPC coordinates all relief operations from
the Malaysian Control Centre in Kuala Lumpur. At the state
level, there are 11 State Flood Relief and Preparedness
Committees (SFRPC) for Peninsular Malaysia. Each state is
given funds by the Federal. Government every year to enable it
to run its own flood relief operations. At the district level,
there are several district committees under each state,
depending on the number of districts in a particular state.
Each district will have its own District Flood Relief and
Preparedness Committees (DFRPC) which receives 	 funds and
directives from the SFRPC. Below the district level, there are
several Mukim i Flood Relief	 and Preparedness	 Committees
(MFRPC), again depending on the number of mukims in each
A "mukim" is an administrative unit just below that of
a district. A district is made up of several mukims. Likewise,
a mukim is made of several villages, the latter being the
smallest administrative unit.
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district. Each MFRPC is headed by a penghulu. 2 Finally, there
are many Village Flood Relief and Preparedness Committees
(VFRPC) under each mukim. Each VFRPC is headed by a ketua
kampung2.
(3) The collection of hydrological and flood data:
The importance of accurate hydrological data in the planning,
design and implementation of flood mitigation methods cannot
be underestimated, especially with reference to flood
forecasting. Accurate hydrological data forms the basis of all
aspects of water resource planning and management. Recognising
this importance, the Malaysian Government has invested
substantially in a programme to expand, update and improve the
hydrological network in the peninsula. New procedures on data
collection and processing are	 also	 constantly being
introduced. The hydrological data bank is now fully
computerised. This affords easy access and manipulation of the
data which is now used for a variety of purposes. In terms of
flood mitigation, it includes flood forecasting, flood
analysis, design flood estimation and flood mapping. Other
areas using hydrological data are water resource planning and
management, drainage and irrigation, domestic water supply,
generation	 of	 hydro-electricity, agriculture,	 land	 use
planning, recreation and related researches.
(4) The carrying out of river basin studies, water resource
studies and specific flood mitigation studies:
Since the 1971 flood, the Government has commissioned a number
of river basin studies where major floods have occurred. These
studies were aimed at understanding tne hydrological
characteristics of these basins, particularly with reference
to its flood characteristics. By doing so, master plans for
general water resource management (including flood mitigation)
could then be prepared for each basin. To date, river basin
studies which have been completed in the peninsula include the
Kelang River Basin Study for Kuala Lumpur (1974), the Pahang
River Basin Study (1974), the Kelantan River Basin Study
(1978), the Terengganu River Basin Study (1978). the Batu
Pahat River Basin Study (1984), the Johor River Basin Study
(1985), the Golok River Basin Study (1985), the Besut River
Basin Study (1990), the Krian River Basin Study (1990), and
the Pinang River Basin Study (1991).
With the help of the Japan International Cooperation Agency,
the Government also carried out a National Water Resources
Study which was completed in 1982. Under this study, flood
studies in other river basins not previously studied were
carried out. The results of this study is now being used to
develop a comprehensive and coordinated water resources
deVelopment programme for the peninsula. One of the salient
2 A "penghulu" is the Malay term for headman to a group
of villages. However, in some areas the term is used
synonymously with "ketua kampung" or village head.
2 "Ketua kampung" is literally translated as village
head, "ketua" being head and "kampung" being village.
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features of this study is the formulation of a 20-year plan
for flood mitigation works in 31 river basins and many other
flood prone areas in the peninsula. Under this plan, a total
of 573 km of river channel will be improved, 10 multi-purpose
dams will be constructed, 74 km of flood bypass will be
constructed, 11 ring bunds around urban centres will be built,
and 10,000 people in flood-prone areas will be resettled. The
cost of the entire plan is about MS2 billion. When fully
completed it will provide protection to some 1.6 million
people in the peninsula.
Specific flood mitigation studies have also been conducted to
alleviate flooding in strategically important flood-prone
areas in the peninsula. To date, the studies completed include
the Cukai Flood Mitigation Study (1978), the Lower Perak Flood
Mitigation Study (1980), and the Kangar Flood Mitigation Study
(1983). Other studies aimed at flood alleviation include the
Sewerage and Drainage Master Plan Studies for urban centres in
the peninsula. These include studies for Kuala Lumpur, Kalang
and Port Kelang, Butterworth and Bukit Mertajam, Alor Setar,
Johor Bahru, Seremban, Melaka, Kuantan, Kota Bharu, Kuala
Terengganu. Port Dickson and Muar. The completed master plans
are of immense value to Government authorities and the private
sector in terms of future land use planning in the areas
concerned.
(5) The implementation of flood mitigation projects:
From past flood experiences, the Government is aware that
providing costly structural (engineering) protection to the
masses is not the only means of reducing the flood hazard. To
date, flood mitigation strategies adopted represent a multi-
disciplinary approach. All strategies can be grouped under two
types of flood mitigation measures: structural measures and
'non-structural measures. The former represents all those
measures involving the construction ot engineering structures
while the latter includes those measures which are non-
engineering in nature. Non-structural measures are usually
used in areas where structural measures are either too costly
or are not economically justified. In 	 most 'cases, non-
structural	 measures are	 used to	 supplement	 structural
measures.
(a) Structural measures:
(i) Improvement of river channels:
This is one of the oldest methods and is still the most widely
used in the peninsula. Perennial silting of river channels
have raised the river bed in relation to the flood plain. In
many instances, the flood plain level may be below that of the
river level, flooding being avoided by a raised natural levee
(in some cases by an artiiicial embankment) on both sides of
the river. As a result, the river bed has to be constantly
dredged to deepen it. The rate of dredging should at least
keep up with the rate of silting. River channels can also be
improved by canalization. This latter method reduces the
volume of discharge in the main river channel. As a result,
flood flows can be contained.
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(ii) Construction of levees or embankments:
Usually, this method is applied hand in hand with dredging and
canalization. The sand and silt from the river bed is dumped
on both sides of the river bank resulting in the formation of
two raised river banks or levees. In urban areas, however,
dumping of sand and silt is not feasible because of the
constricted nature of river banks in such areas. Consequently,
concrete embankments may have to be built.
(iii) Construction of flood diversion channels:
This method involves the construction of artificial channels
along the main river channel to divert part of the discharge
during flood flows. Diversion channels are built just before
the main river enters a flood-prone area. This method is only
feasible if the intended diversion channel is not too long.
Otherwise, the cost of construction may be too high.
(iv) Construction of flood retention ponds:
A flood retention pond can be easily built in an area where
there is a depression. Otherwise, it may prove too costly. In
many cases, old mining depressions are ideal locations tor the
building of such ponds. Artificial retention ponds are like
huge reservoirs. A small channel with a gate joins the
retention pond to the main river. The gate can be opened
during flood flows.
(v) Use of natural and man-made ponds for flood attenuation:
Man-made ponds such as disused mining pools and park lakes are
ideal for flood storage. If flood flows can be diverted into
such ponds and lakes, then flood peaks can be attenuated. The
outflow from such ponds can also be regulated. This method has
great potential for large urban areas such as Kuala Lumpur and
Georgetown.
(vi) Construction of polders/ring bunds/tidal bunds:
This method requires the construction of a raised ring bund
surrounding the area that is being protected. It is only
applied in localised areas with a high damage potential and
where it is not economically feasible to carry out an overall
basin protection. A good example of poldering is the flood
mitigation scheme of Pekan on the estuary of the Pahang River.
Tidal bunds are built in coastal and estuarine areas to
control tidal flooding. They are effective on the west coast
of the peninsula which is sheltered from both the monsoons.
(vii) Construction of multi-purpose dams:
The building of dams solely for the purpose of flood
mitigation in Peninsular Malaysia is seldom if not never
economically justified. As a result, multi-purpose dams have
been built. These dams serve a variety of functions. They
generate hydro-electricity. provide water supply, regulate
flood peak flows and can be used for recreational purposes.
Some examples are Kenyir Dam in Terengganu. Chenderoh and
Temengor Dams in Perak, Pedu and Muda Dams in Kedah, Kiang
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Gates and Langat Dams in Selangor, and Machap and Sembrong
Dams in Johor.
(b) Non-structural measures:
(i) Legislation:
In Peninsular Malaysia legislation with respect to flood
mitigation is rather vague. There are a few laws touching on
flood mitigation but only in an indirect manner. For instance,
the Waters Enactment 1920 provides that "the entire property
in and control of all rivers in any State is and shall be
vested solely in the Ruler ot such State". With respect to
flood mitigation, the Waters Enactment contains provisions
for:
(1) prohibiting the construction of buildings and structures
in the vicinity of a river or a declared flood channel
"except in a case which may be expressly authorised by
any other law" or "except in accordance with the terms ot
a written permission by the State Authority":
(2) allowing the Ruler of a State, if he is satisfied that
the bed of any river is insufficient to contain flood
waters, to declare by notification in the Gazette that
the abutting land at such river shall be a flood channel
and be subjected to the State's control;
(3) empowering the State ruler to put a stop to all illegal
acts and interference with the bank of a river; and
(4) the issuance ot a written authorization from the Ruler-
in-Council for the construction of any revetment or
erection of any building or structure within 15.2 meters
of a river bank or within any flood channel.
The National Land Code also contains some provisions for
dealing with flood control. In Malaysia, land is the property
of the State. As such, the State authority has the right to
reserve land for any public purpose by notification in the
Gazette.	 Since flood mitigation is	 considered a public
purpose, certain flood-prone areas may be 	 set aside as
"reserved land" and thereby not to be developed.
The Mining Enactment 1929, the Drainage Works Ordinance 1954
and the Land Conservation Act 1960 also touches on flood
mitigation indirectly. All have provisions for the regulation
of land and river use. However, the term flood mitigation is
not spelled out clearly and the approval of land and river use
is clearly left to the discretion of the authorities
concerned.
(ii) Restriction of development:
This measure is a case of "prevention is better than cure". In
areas where the building of flood mitigation structures cannot
be economically justified, the planning authority may use this
as a measure to avoid rather than control floods. Recently,
the information gathered through flood risk analysis and flood
mapping in the peninsula (Ref.6) has made it easier for
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planners to restrict development in crucial flood-prone areas.
(iii) Flood risk analysis:
Expanding urban areas due to increased economic development
have resulted in increased runoff, subsequently giving rise to
increased flooding. Flood risk analysis is a technique of
flood mitigation aimed at monitoring such changes in economic
development in relation to flood peaks. Flood risk maps are
prepared to help the authorities, particularly planners in the
approval of development projects. They also help the public,
particularly developers and property buyers, appraise certain
properties in flood hazard areas.
(iv) Land use change:
Changing the type of crop can have a drastic effect on the
runoff pattern. For instance, by converting padi land into oil
palm can substantially increase surface cover and thereby
reduce runoff. Another method is to cultivate cover crops such
as peanuts or sweet potatoes between rows of rubber or oil
palm trees. Other common cover crops planted in between rows
of coconut trees are coffee and cocoa. The planting of such
cover crops is not only beneficial as a measure of flood
control but it also nourishes the soil and provides the farmer
with a source of additional income.
(v) Resettlement of population:
As far as the Government is concerned, this measure is only
used as a last resort when all flood mitigation measures do
not seem to work. This measure is very costly for the
Government because alternative land (and houses in many cases)
will have to be allocated to each household that is being
resettled.
(vi) Flood proofing:
Malaysians are very proud of their cultural heritage. There is
a campaign to preserve old Malay palaces and mosques, Chinese
shop-houses, Indian temples and old Portuguese, Dutch and
British colonial buildings. Where such buildings happen to be
located in flood-prone areas, all efforts are channelled to
flood proof them. Flood proofing includes the construction of
protection works to prevent flood waters from entering the
individual buildings. This usually entails the building of a
flood wall or a raised bund around the building. However,
there are other methods such as raising the floor of the
building, building a higher threshold across the doors, and
replacing wooden stilts with concrete ones. Many individual
property owners in flood-prone areas have also flood proofed
their properties.
(vii) Flood insurance:
While insurance has been widely used as a means of flood
protection in many countries in the west, particularly the
United States and the United Kingdom, it is not well developed
in Malaysia. In Malaysia, factory owners can insure the
building structure as well as its contents (usually production
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goods) against flood damage but there is no specific insurance
for individual house owners against such damage. Usually, the
flood damage clause is incorporated as a sub-clause in the
fire policy of the house. In this sub-clause, only the
structure of the building is covered. House owners in flood-
prone areas can take up special insurance against flood damage
to house contents but the premium charged by insurers may be
too high for its justification. Because of this limitation,
there is great scope for the further development of flood
insurance.
(viii) A sound watershed development and management policy:
While it is arguably difficult to control seasonal floods
caused by the Monsoons, their severity can nevertheless be
reduced. So too are flash floods caused by over-development
and deforestation. In order to reduce if not control flooding,
the solution lies in a sound watershed development and
management policy. To date, less than 60 % of the total area
in Peninsula Malaysia is still covered by natural forest. The
Government (through the Forestry Department) has a long term
plan for reafforestation in the National Forest Policy adopted
in 1977. In this policy, development programmes in forested
watershed are closely monitored. The country's forestry
programme is also based on one of sustainable utilization
rather than all-out exploitation.
(ix) The implementation of flood forecasting 	 and warning
systems:
Before the 1971 flood, flood forecasting methods were only
used in a few of the major river systems. These were rather
crude forms of forecasting based on simple stage-correlation
whereby the river level at an upstream station is used to
predict the level at a downstream station, usually located in
a populated flood-prone area. Warning is then issued when a
certain preset critical level at the upstream is exceeded. For
instance, the river level at Kuala Kral is used to predict the
river level at Kota Bharu. All these are done manually.
Since the 1971 flood, flood forecasting and warning systems
have gradually been improved. The Government has pumped in a
lot of funds to upgrade the hydrological infra-structure which
supports flood forecasting and warning systems. There are now
42 telemetric rainfall stations, 47 telemetric river level
stations, 119 manual rain gauges, 56 flood notice boards, 23
automatic sirens, 83 fixed VHF radio stations, and 63 mobile
VHF radio stations throughout the peninsula. As a result of
these new infra-structure, real-time flood forecasting has
been made available for the Kelantan, Pahang, Perak, Kiang,
Batu Pahat, Muar and Johor rivers.
(x) Educating the masses:
Through its many agencies, the Government has set up various
information programmes to educate the masses on how to
response when a flood occurs. For instance, the Police tell
the people when to move. The Welfare Department instructs the
people where to go for shelter, food, clothing and other
needs. There are also leaflets and posters distributed to
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people in flood-prone areas telling them what to do during a
flood. The ketua kampung and his village committee are briefed
by Government officers well in advance ot any flood. The
committee in turn briefs the village folks.
CONCLUSION
As a developing country. Malaysia's flood mitigation policy
can be described as commendable, particularly since 1971.
Since the First Malaysia Plan (1971-1975), the country's
expenditure on flood mitigation has increased substantially.
From a mere MS14 million in this plan, it has shot up to a
massive M$700 million for the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995),
a 50 fold increase over a 20 year period. Even after
discounting inflation, the real increase is still substantial.
With the many structural and non-structural measures being
implemented for flood control and for flood relief, the
country is moving in the right direction towards a
comprehensive programme ot flood mitigation. Yet, there are
many areas which can still be improved.
While the total number of telemetric stations for rainfall and
river flow in the peninsula seems large enough, a closer
scrutiny would expose the inadequacies of uneven distribution.
Most telemetric stations are located in populated areas while
the sparsely populated areas, especially highland watershed
areas, do not have enough telemetric stations. The MMS and DID
have also not utilised remotely sensed rainfall (radar' and
satellite sensed rainfall) as an input in its forecasting
models. This could have been deliberately overlooked because
of the high cost involved but real-time flood forecasting
cannot be detached from the usage of such techniques.
Although the DID is officially recognised as the authority on
all aspects of river use and management, it has no legislative
authority or enforcement powers when it comes to rivers. All
such powas are still vested with the respective State
Authorities or the District Offices. Given the present status
quo, the States will never relinquish their stranglehold on
their rivers. At the moment, all the DID can do is to give
advice to the State authorities when a certain project
concerning a river is proposed. There is even no provision
that a State authority needs to seek advice from DID's
expertise. Even if it does, it may not adhere to DID's
recommendations. So the only way to be certain that flood
mitigation is given due consideration in any project is to
make the DID one of the authorities that approve or reject the
proposals. This would be difficult as legislation would have
to be passed by the Federal Parliament.
• The MMS has used radar to predict rainfall in a
qualitative way. The current radar can tell the meteorologist
whether a certain region has rain or not. What it cannot do,
however, is to tell the meteorologist how much rain the region
is getting. Given the importance of time in the issuance of
flood warning, this quantitative sensing of rain is vital to
flood forecasting as it increases the lead time (time between
the issuance of a warning and time when a flood occurs).
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While there are some laws governing the regulation of river
use and have some bearing on flood mitigation, they are not
sufficiently clear or torceful enough as measures of flood
mitigation. These laws were formulated mainly tor the purpose
of regulating and managing single sectoral water use. New laws
must be passed to enable the authorities to have direct
control in all aspects of water use which may affect flooding.
This
	
include laws	 that	 specify	 clearly water	 rights
administration, water resource development, flood plain
management and all aspects of flood mitioation. Alternatively,
the existing laws should be updated with a stronger emphasis
on flood mitigation.
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